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ABSTRACT

The biography of John C. Calhoun published in 1843 with his
sanction was intended to assist in Calhoun's election to the presidency
in 1844.

Only a few pages of this work were devoted to an accounting of

Calhoun’s career as President James Monroe's Secretary of War from 1817
to 1825.

Scholarship has generally reflected this biography's lack of

detail concerning this part of Calhoun's official life, and yet it was
while he was Secretary of War that Calhoun first became a presidential
contender in the hard-fought campaign of 1824.

Not only his participa

tion in that campaign, but indeed his every activity during this period
provided Calhoun with a practical education in the relationships between
politics and military policy in America.
The fact that Calhoun made his first attempt to become President
while he was a Secretary of War had salient consequences for the American
military establishment also.

Among military historians Calhoun has been

well regarded for his attempts to modernize the War Department and the
American Army, but the political context in which Calhoun's reforms were
attempted rarely has entered into historical evaluations; the result has
been the considerable distortion of the origins and meaning of these
reforms.

Thus the major aims of this study are an examination of the

confluence of Calhoun's political and official roles, the impact his
association with the War Department had upon his career, and the Regular
Army's reaction to the political attention which Calhoun attracted to it.

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Because the clash between Calhoun's ambitions for political advance
ment and military reform exposed the military establishment to considerable
stress, an attempt has been made to examine the inner workings of the War
Department in order to evaluate the impact of politics upon this institu
tion.

Subjects of particular concern are the provenance and effect of

Calhoun's reforms, his influence upon the making and administering of
national defense policy, and his execution of American Indian policy.

And

because the War Department was one of the most fiscally important agencies
of government, Calhoun's role in the monitoring of public expenditures at
a time of national economic distress is discussed.
The recent p’ olication of the Papers of John C. Calhoun by the
University of South Carolina Press made it possible to consider a wider
range of topics than earlier studies, and to expand the scope of this
work to include relevant collections of official and private papers
bearing upon Calhoun's activities.

In addition to these sources, little-

used collections at the William L. Clements Library of the University of
Michigan, and the Library of the United States Military Academy at West
Point, New York, were instrumental in explaining Calhoun's part in the
election of 1824 and his associations with the "defense entrepreneurs"
of the era of good feelings.
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INTRODUCTION

John C. Calhoun was President James Monroe's Secretary of War
from December, 1817, to March, 1825.

Although he was the youngest and

perhaps the least experienced of Monroe's cabinet members, Calhoun
fashioned for himself a unique place in the military and political annals
of the United States while he held this post.

Calhoun's stewardship over

the American military establishment required that he execute many of the
policies which stamped Monroe's government as one of the most progressive
in the early history of the republic, and Calhoun's ascent from congress
man to presidential candidate in the course of a dozen years was
immeasurably aided by his accomplishments as the civilian chief of the
War Department.
A question yet to be settled by the time Calhoun came to the War
Department was the precise role of the military establishment in the
democratic republic.

Aged republican canons taught that standing armies

were dangerous in times of peace, so dangerous that they should be sup
pressed even at the cost of early defeats when war did come.

Accordingly,

for the first forty years of the nation's history, the American military
establishment had been estranged from the nation at large, neither threat
ening nor encouraging the progress of civil life.

The institutional life

of the military establishment was governed chiefly by these republican
fears rather than by visions of republican progress.

vii
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Many of the postwar defense programs initiated by Calhoun were
frankly aimed at rectifying the traditional estrangement of the army and
the nation.

Deliberately attempting to expand the army's range of func

tions, Calhoun and his most talented officers put the army to tasks
heretofore seldom contemplated by the nation's political leaders.

By

using the army to ejqplore the West, to make surveys, and to construct
internal improvements, Calhoun and his staff at the War Department sought
to strike a bargain with the nation.

If by these new activities the

army could assist the nation in peace as well as in war, the military
establishment could earn for itself a secure place in the future from a
grateful nation.

Military institutions could thereby become an integral

part of national life.
While Calhoun explored new ways to use a peacetime military
force, he also set about reforming the organization of the War Depart
ment and the army.

Techniques of management long applied to other

executive departments seemingly had been ignored by previous secretaries
of war.

At Calhoun's insistence clearer lines of authority and responsi

bility were devised:

a new general staff system which Calhoun aided in

creating replaced a military command structure that was sustained more
by personal than institutional authority.

Calhoun saw to it that new

regulations were laid down which demanded a stricter exercise of
responsibility from officers now held accountable for their conduct of
official business.

New fiscal controls were devised for War Department

disbursements which minimized the opportunities for official waste and
peculatiQnwhich had existed almost by tradition.

viii
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Yet these organizational reforms reflected only a part of
Calhoun's larger ambitions.

Even as he endeared the army to the nation

through the medium of good works, and as he invested the military estab
lishment with a new efficiency, it was Calhoun's intention to build a
professional army in the United States for the first time.
which promised this end received Calhoun's support.

Any object

In this ambition he

could be certain of the enthusiastic assistance of a group of young offi
cers who were already devoted to making their visions of military
professionalism come true.

With Calhoun's support, Major Sylvanus

Thayer's West Point took its first steps toward providing the American
army with professionally educated officers.

Various other military

intellectuals found the Secretary of War to be a valuable patron who
followed their activities with unwavering interest.

Under the auspices

of Calhoun's War Department several military works were translated from
the French and thousands of dollars' worth of other treatises on military
subjects were imported from Europe to the United States so that army
officers could take advantage of the most recent advances in the "science
of war."
Although it would have been expedient for him to do so, Calhoun
made no apologies, then or later, for his avid support of a modernized
and professional military establishment.

It is not surprising that his

avidity left him open to charges of militarism.

His opponents used such

charges against him with good effect during his contest for the presi
dency.

Their anti-military rhetoric showed clearly enough that these

ancient suspicions were still alive in some quarters, but they were
hardly accurate when they were turned on John C. Calhoun.

Calhoun was

ix
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the sort of man who, although he created his own enthusiasms, was never
overtaken completely by them.
virtues.

He did not need to mimic imagined military

The standards of improvement he insisted that the military

establishment meet were imminently civilian standards? for Calhoun one
index of improvement for the army was how well it performed heretofore
civilian tasks.

Calhoun's opponents claimed that, if he could, he would

make American into a. garrison state, whose swollen defense budgets main
tained a parasitic and dangerous army, but it is doubtful that Calhoun
would ever have gone this far.

Calhoun did not ingratiate himself to

the military establishment by imitating the mentality that was associated
with it, but by providing a bridge between the military and civilian
worlds of the 1820s.
It is fruitless to speculate how the American military estab
lishment would have fared had not Calhoun become embroiled in presidential
politics.

That he was politically involved almost from the beginning of

his tenure in the War Office meant that military policy would become
even more a matter of partisan contention than it normally was.

Calhoun's

status as one of America's leading political men was a two-edged sword as
far as the army's fortunes were concerned.

If Calhoun's brilliance and

influence could instill the army with a new efficiency and pride in
achievement, his role as a Secretary-politician could jeopardize any
advancements which he happened to effect.

Not originally aware of the

conflict his duty and ambition might cause, Calhoun quickly became so.
From 1817 to 1819 were the creative years for the Secretary of War.
1820 the War Department was being assailed by Calhoun's political
opponents in an attempt to discredit the Monroe administration's

x
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By

nationalistic policy.

After 1821, when all of the prospective presidents

began their campaigns, the War Department and the army more clearly
became Calhoun's surrogates in the congressional battles which erupted.
Caught up in the Secretary of War's ambitions, the army's men
resorted to their traditional defenses: past glories and sacrifices were
recounted, modern dangers were detailed to a defenseless nation.

They

pointed to the new military professionalism which was sensitive to the
requirements of liberty as well as to the needs of expansion and progress.
And though there was no danger that the army would be abolished once more,
just for good measure the army's friends argued for its continued exist
ence.

It is a fair demonstration, also, of Calhoun's popularity among

these officers that none of them blamed the Secretary of War for focusing
attention upon their army; as soldiers in a democratic republic, they
largely accepted the prejudices against them as their lot.
The fact that the Secretary of War was running for the presidency
was nonetheless unsettling to some, and the participation of several highranking officers in Calhoun's campaign allowed his opponents to conjure
up even darker visions of military despotism.

Yet these politicians in

mufti acted more out of self-interest than institutional loyalty; it was
assumed that Calhoun's election would be good for the military establish
ment, and if any of them had notions about making a praetorian choice,
there is no evidence of it.

On the contrary, these soldier-politicians

embraced the civilian political system as ardently as any partisan— as
ardently, in fact, as their Secretary of War.
Contemporaries often said that Calhoun was a visionary; coming
from pragmatic politicians, this was no recommendation.

But it is

xi
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evident that John C. Calhoun was far more representative of his age and
its thought than these observers believed.

He was only slightly younger

than the republic •vtoelf, and in his character and thought one can see
the same ambitions and anxieties which beset the nation at large.
Calhoun and his nation experienced together several of the most salient
transformations in the history of the nation:

his conversion from

nationalism to sectionalism, because he was no much at the center of
affairs, was hardly less important than that of the nation itself.
During the election of 1824, he saw at first hand the emergence of a new
electorate, more massive and importunate than any that had come before,
and one which would change the face of American politics thereafter.
His time in the War Department coincided with that in which the nation
was reconsidering its steadfastly anti-military traditions, and in which
the military men of America were striving to replace old amateur forms of
defense with a new and "scientific" system, based upon professionalism.
Calhoun is therefore the central figure in the pages which follow,
but this study is by no means an attempt at biography— that has already
been done, and well.

Calhoun's part here is solely confined to his

activities as a Secretary of War and a politician.
nevertheless crucial:

It is a part that is

Calhoun was the first American politician to

attempt to build a bridge between the nation and its army, a fact that is
equally important to him, the military establishment, and the nation which
they served.
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CHAPTER I

1817:

THE NATION, THE SECRETARIAT,
AND MR. CALHOUN

In November, 1817, John Caldwell Calhoun, of late a congressman
from the Abbeville district of South Carolina, left his home for
Washington and his new post as President James Monroe's Secretary of War.
Matters of war and peace were now very much Calhoun's concern, and as he
traveled northward, Calhoun could reflect that for the first time in his
memory, the world was enjoying a new tranquility.

The man who was held

most responsible for disturbing the peace of the Atlantic nations,
Napoleon Bonaparte, had been locked away on St. Helena for nearly two
years.

Almost daily, Calhoun could see in the newspapers the latest

reports of the infamous exile's doings.^

But the new Secretary of War

knew, as did any thinking man, that peace was not won so simply— the great
Corsican could go to his tomb, and national dangers could still persist.
America's latest war was over; the peace was just two years old.
A long period was beginning in which the United States would be free
from external danger, but only a few of America's leaders realized this.
John Randolph of Roanoke, always the errant mind, believed that
America's wars were over, but he was not given to thinking with major
ities.

Calhoun was more in concert with the national mood in warning

^Niles' Weekly Register, November 22, 1817; National Intelli
gencer, April 10, April 11, April 14, and April 15, 1817.

1
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2
that Britain would continually pose a future danger to the United
States.

2

Eight years later, an unembarrassed Calhoun would point to the

Northwest Territory, which he thought was still an object of British
3

desires.

But by then voices which sounded such alarms were rarer; by

then the United States had newer problems, less international, more
self-considered.

For now though the Atlantic world was as peaceful as

it could have been.
The nature of the post-Napoleonic peace was such that Americans,
public and private, had to content themselves with a less than secure
world, and with a mixture of apprehension, vanity, and relief.
peace was unsettled and unsettling.

The

One reason for this condition was

that the enemy which the United States had stalemated recently was else
where triumphant as the first power among the Allies, and in 1817 the
Allies were busily putting Europe into their own kind of order.

At the

end of 1818, one young American officer reported from France that there
were 700,000 Allied soldiers in Paris and that the Louvre had been so
looted that only four hundred works of art remained in the great palace.
The military schools of France, including the famed Ecole Polytechnique,
had been turned into barracks and stables.

4

Since France once had been

2Charles R. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Nationalist: 1782-1828
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949), p. 107 (hereafter cited
as Wiltse, Calhoun).
^Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, October 24, 1821, and John C.
Calhoun to Lewis Cass, February 11, 1822, W. Edwin Hemphill and Robert
Merriwether, eds., The Papers of John C. Calhoun, 9 vols.
(Columbia,
South Carolina: The University of South Carolina Press, 1959-76),
6:460-71, 685-88 (hereafter cited as Calhoun Papers).
4

Sylvanus Thayer to Joseph Swift, October 10, 1815, The Papers
of Sylvanus Thayer, United States Military Academy Library, West Point,
New York (hereafter cited as Thayer Papers).
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the only other modern republic and was now occupied by the monarchist
Allies, some believed that the United States was being given a preview
of its own fate.

Samuel du Pont de Nemours, no friend of Napoleon’s nor

the Allies', warned James Monroe, "XI S'agit d'egorger la Republique
5
americaine, apres avoir assassine la nation Frangaise."
For a world now thoroughly inured to war, there were many poten
tial causes of conflict easily found in the western hemisphere.

Too

much accustomed to strife, perhaps, some men in ships sortied into the
southern Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico to continue their private wars,
and brigands of every description played along the southern coasts.
Creek Indians and fugitive slaves attached themselves to this outlawry
in the borderlands of Spanish Florida.

Nine months in office, President

Monroe had determined to exterminate the notorious "establishments" at

0
Amelia Island and Galvez Town.

Before the year was very old, Americans

were fighting once again on the southern borders.

7

Naturally, the

Spanish authorities were alarmed.
Spain's South American colonies were in the first stages of
revolt; simply the proximity of the United States to these colonies
meant that there was a possibility that the conflict there would somehow
5 "it is a question of cutting the throat of the American Repub
lic, after having assassinated the French nation." Pierre Samuel du
Pont de Nemours to James Monroe, February 26, 1817, The Papers of James
Monroe, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
(hereafter cited as
Monroe Papers, LC) .
^James Monroe to James Madison, November 24, 1817, Stanislaus M.
Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Monroe, 7 vols.
(New York: AMS
Reprints, 1969), 6:33 (hereafter cited as Hamilton, Monroe Papers) .
7
John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, December 26, 1817, John S.
Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 7 vols.
(Washington:
The Carnegie Institute, 1926-35), 2:341-42 (hereafter cited as Bassett,
Jackson Correspondence).
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4
involve the United States.

This compounded the difficulties between the

United States and Spain, especially after General Andrew Jackson invaded
Florida in 1818.

But Britain was involved too.

In June, 1817, Monroe

warned Jackson, then commanding the Regular Army's Southern Division, to
beware of future developments; he wrote:
Affairs are unsettled with Spain and by recent intelligence from
England, it appears that the British govt., is equipping two large
Squadrons for the Spanish provinces. . . . It seems probable, that
this movment [sic], of the British govt., may produce serious conse
quences, among which, war, with other powers, may be reasonably
presumed.^
The British presence still hung like a pall over North America
two years after the war's end, and the Rush-Bagot agreement made in
April did little to dispel it.

On the northwestern frontiers, British

officers, Indian agents, and fur company men in Canada still exercised
an influence on their old Indian allies that made its effect felt even
over the international border.

One American Indian agent in Green Bay

insisted that the Indians living in U. S. territory somehow be quarantined from the pernicious British.

9

Later that year, the Superintendent

of Indian Affairs pessimistically inquired of his western agents whether
there ware any "lurking evils, or latent fires" in that region which
might break out in the "event of British or Indian wars."10
Interestingly, the British felt similar anxieties about
America1s intentions.

The Times voiced apprehension about the growing

®James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, June 2, 1817, ibid., 2:296.

9

John Bowyer to Lewis Cass, July 22, 1816, R. G. Thwaites, ed.,
"The Fur Trade in Wisconsin, 1815-17," Collections of the State Histori
cal Society of Wisconsin, 20 vols.
(Madison, Wisconsin: The State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1911), 19:467 (hereafter cited as
Thwaites, Wisconsin Collections).
10Thomas L. McKenney to George Graham, September 30, 1817, ibid.,
19:480.
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5
power of Britain's late enemy:
We cannot calculate on perpetual concord with the United States.
Their first war with England made them independent— their second
made them formidable. They have . . . cultivated with more assured
and unbending pertinacity the means and resources both of war and
peace. They now have for the first time a standing army, a moveable
militia, & a victorious marine. Their next war will be offen
sive. . . . " H
Mutually suspicious, neither Britain nor the United States
seemed inclined to demobilize quickly; it was necessary to remain on
one's guard in a dangerous if momentarily quiescent world.

But the

price of vigilance and defense was great; during the war America's
national debt had soared beyond one hundred million dollars, an aston
ishing figure for a Republican government.

Although this debt was

considerably offset by very high customs receipts, soon after the war's
end some lawmakers called for a retreat in expenditures and an abolition
of internal taxes.

Military costs, comprising the largest single outlay

of public money, was the logical place to begin the retrenchment.

In

early 1817, the House Committee on Military Affairs offered a resolution
to consider reductions in military strength.

Jeremiah Mason of New

Hampshire, speaking in support said, "In modern warfare, national wealth
is essentially national strength.

With a view, therefore, to public

safety alone, whatever tends unnecessarily to the impoverishment of the
national treasury, should be cautiously avoided."

12

There had been a

consistent difference of opinion on the necessity of maintaining a large
"peace establishment" since just after the war.

As time went by, advo

cates of military retrenchment would gain ground, but memories of the

^ National Intelligencer, June 2, 1817.
^Ibid., March 11, 1817.
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6
war were still too fresh not to be effectively used in rebuttal.

On

this particular occasion James Barbour averred to the lack of prepared
ness before the British raid on Washington in 1814; this was a similar
time, he said, when fatal errors could be made all too easily.

13

Earlier, Calhoun and his fellow South Carolinian, Williams Lowndes, had
pointedly reminded their colleagues of Europe's "habit of war" during
the last two decades, and questioned the wisdom of going "on in the old
imbecile mode, contributing nothing to the honor, nothing to the reputation of the country."

14

The new President stood against retrenchment sentiments and
repeatedly sounded the theme of vigilant defense.

A goodly part of

Monroe's inaugural address concerned the need for continued military
protection.

"Experiencing the fortune of other nations," he argued,

"the United States may again be involved in war . . .

we should dis

regard the faithful admonition of experience if we did not expect it."'*'5
At mid-year, Monroe made a widely-publicized tour of the North, which
thr -e years before had been the center of war resistance.

In New York,

Boston, and elsewhere, Monroe’s ideas on the national defense were re
ceived warmly.

Addressing a crowd of notables in New York, Monroe told

the gathering that "the honorable termination of the late war . . .
should not lull us into repose."

16

Monroe1s views would prevail, but

13Ibid., March 12, 1817.
14

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Additional Revenue Report,"
January 20, 1816, Calhoun Papers, 1:314-15.
15

James Monroe, "Inaugural Address," March 2, 1817, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:10.
~*5A Narrative of a tour of observation, made during the summer
of 1817, by James Monroe, president of the United States, through the
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only so long as prosperity continued and the war was so fresh in the
popular and political minds; a few years later, when the Treasury showed
a deficit of two million dollars, retrenchment would succeed.
Most Americans in 1817, however, had little faith in humanity's
peacefulness.

Since the Declaration of Independence scarcely a year had

passed when Americans were not fighting somewhere.

Most of them would

have agreed with John Quincy Adams, who, when asked to support the new
pacifist journal Friend of Peace, replied that pacifism was impractical;
if tried, "the human flock would soon be butchered by one or a few."

17

The United States had embarked upon the War of 1812 at least in
part because it 'was possessed by the same sensitivity to real or fancied
insult which plagues all immature nations.

The same immoderation which

involved the United States in a world war sustained it in its imagined
triumph.

Europe and Britain were watched closely for signs that they

coveted America's success and prosperity.

Conceivably, hostile envy

could be a motive for renewed conflict; certainly, the jealousy of

north-eastern and north-western departments of the Union; with a view to
the examination of their several military defences (Philadelphia: S. A.
Mitchell, H. Ames, Clark and Raser, Printers, 1818), pp. 38-9 (hereafter
cited as Narrative of a Tour).
17

John Quincy Adams to Noah Worcester, quoted in Merle Curti,
The American Peace Crusade, 1815-1860 (New York: Octagon Books, 1965),
pp. 21-2. The Massachusetts Peace Society, which sponsored Friend of
Peace, announced during the Summer of 1817 the recruitment of a cele
brated figure: Czar Alexander I of Russia. A public exchange of
letters between the Czar and the editor, the Reverend Noah Worcester,
brought on a tclerant, if bemused reaction from a Southern reader:
"The
sober-minded statesman," he wrote, "will look upon Peace Societies with
no hostile or jealous eye— but as among the contrivances of well meaning
persons . . . [who] are at least innocent and innoxious." National
Intelligencer, September 10, 1817.
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foreign powers was easily harnessed to the need for defense and vigilance of the variety which Monroe proposed.

18

Thus, a common idea which arose in the postwar years was that
America was constantly in Europe's spyglass.

"The British press teem

with notices of the United States— every movement we make seems care
fully watched, and minutely scanned," wrote Hezekiah Niles of Niles1
19
Weekly Register.

Speaker of the House Henry Clay, while bragging

shamelessly about America's unique good fortune, told his fellow legis
lators that this prosperity was sure to affect other countries "jealous
of our rising importance."

20

Not all of this was ignorant bravado;

America was prospering noticeably.

What made these contentions at all

palatable was that they had a bit of truth about them, and that they
were held on both sides of the Atlantic.

With poorly disguised pride,

Niles reported, "The Times calls us Britain's powerful descendant and
•
,
,,21
rival.

Such jealousy could foretell new international problems for the
United States, as many said, or it could give way to friendly admira
tion.

Perhaps conditioned by their desire to see admiration where

little existed, Americans returning from abroad told of new European
attitudes toward the United States.

As Niles put it, "Every one that

has traveled in Europe since the treaty of Ghent, is sensible of the
vast change that has been made in our favor.

The opinions about us are

18

See, for instance, Calhoun's "Speech on the Additional Revenue
Report," January 20, 1816, Calhoun Papers, 1:315; and Monroe's Inaugural
Address, March 2, 1817, Hamilton, Monroe Papers, 6:10.
19
20

Niles' Weekly Register, April 25, 1818.
Ibid., April 18, 1818.

21

Ibid., April 25, 1818.
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as extravagant in our favor now, as they were against us some years
„22

ago."

For one source of their newfound pride, Americans looked back to
the war, and gleaned only the most pleasing parts.
naval successes were commonly discussed.

Several unexpected

The hapless Briton who came to

postwar America without knowing his recent naval history was at a disad
vantage in social intercourse.

Henry Bradshaw Fearon, upon arriving in

1B17, remarked:
A short residence here . . . will force upon the attention of all
persons an acquaintance with naval history. Every man, woman, and
child in America talk about the Guerriere, the Java, the Macedonia,
the Frolic, Lake Erie, Lake Champlain, and the 'vast inferiority of
British sailors and soldiers to the true-blooded Yankies1. . . . A
knowledge of such events is certainly desireable; but to cause them,
as they are here, to be the never-ending theme of conversation, the
circle round which every thing revolves, is to make the going into
society a punishment instead of a pleasure.23
Naturally, matters of refinement such as "the sciences, morals, and
literature" suffered terribly in social transactions.

Fearon told of an

episode on the occasion of the visit of Francis Jeffrey, editor of the
Edinburgh Review.

When James Madison asked Jeffrey, "What did you think

of the war, Mr. Jeffrey?"

he was apparently so sick of answering the

question that he replied, "Upon my word, Sir, I did not hear of it."

24

Sometimes this yearning for praise and approval from foreign
quarters was not always so pointed, and Americans were not always so
unreasoning in discussing their nation's military feats.

One naval

22Ibid., August 30, 1817.
23

Henry Bradshaw Fearon, Sketches of America: A Narrative of a
Journey of five thousand miles through the eastern and western states
(London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1818), p. 371 (here
after cited as Fearon, Sketches of America).

24„
Ibid.
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officer with whom Fearon spoke while on a leisurely drift down the
Hudson "much pleased" Fearon with his temperate remarks.

"I make no

claims to superiority over the British," the officer said.
be braver than they are."

"Men cannot

The most the young officer would allow was

that Americans in the navy, at least, were more disciplined and not so
sure of success as were their adversaries.

25

To one American, the

boundless pride which so assaulted the senses of Henry Fearon and other
visitors was presumptuous and arrogant.

The newly-installed Secretary

of State, John Quincy Adams, fumed to his diary, "When it is so noto
rious that the issue of our late war with her [Britain] was at best a
drawn game, there is nothing but the most egregious national vanity that
can turn it into a triumph."

26

Whether America was triumphant indeed, or merely vainglorious.:
as Adams suggested, the United States did have an allure to foreigners
in 1817; eighty per cent of all immigration coming through New York was
from the British Empire.

27

Following the war, several Britishers made a

reconnaissance of the nation and agreed that the country was best suited
for the laboring or middling classes.
25

28

There was a considerable thirst

Ibid., p. 56.

26

Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, com
prising portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848, 12 vols.
(Philadelphia
J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1874-77), 4:33 (hereafter cited as Adams,
Diary).
27

Niles' Weekly Register, January 24, 1818.

28
W. Faux, Memorable Days in America, being a Journal of a Tour
to the United States, principally undertaken to ascertain, by positive
evidence, the condition and probable prospects of British Emigrants;
including Accounts of Mr. Birkbeck's settlement in the Illinois (London:
W. Simpkin and R. Marshall, 1823), pp. 109, 134 (hereafter cited as
Faux, Memorable Days in America); Niles' Weekly Register, November 29,
1817.
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11
for labor in the East, where European redemptioners were still the
objects of frenzied bidding on the Philadelphia docks.
price of eighty dollars, women seventy, and boys sixty.

Men brought a
29

"There is no

want of employment here if disposed to work," said one immigrant who had
obtained a place just two hours after disembarking.

30

The postwar British travelers were at pains to remark that in
America, few could expect to attain great wealth, but that also the
worst conditions in the United States stood no comparison to those in
England or on the continent.

However dim America may have looked, said

the American Traveller and Emigrant's Guide, "the first and principle
[sic] inducement . . .

is the total absence of anxiety respecting the

31
future success of a_ family."

One observer reported meeting two of his

countrymen in a mechanic's hall in Pittsburgh, where one of the men, a
stonemason, complained that there was "nothing in America but d— d
Yankies and rogues, and that it was not fit for a dog to live in."
friend replied, "You forget you were starving in England.
will, this, after all, is the best poor man's country."

His

Say what you
The stonemason

finally agreed, if only it "was free from dirty, cheating Yankies."

32

Thus the "low ease" with which Americans seemed to live (as one
Englishman put it) was sufficiently inspiring to cause an immigration of
29

Fearon, Sketches of America, pp. 148-50.

3°The American Traveller and Emigrant's Guide; containing a
Description of British Possessions in North America; particularly
Quebec, Montreal, La Chine, and the Flourishing Town of Kingston, in the
Canadas; of Hartford, in Connecticutt, the Paradise of the United States;
and various extracts from the Letters of Emigrants (Shrewsbury, England:
Printed and Published by C. Hulbert, 1817), p. 19.
31

Ibid., p. 13.

32

Fearon, Sketches of America, p. 207.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
such magnitude that some in Great Britain feared for the prosperity of
the realm.

The Americans were castigated for being immorally willing to

take in any "miscreant" or "malcontent" who aided in the debilitation of
Great Britain while promoting the wealth of the United States.

33

One

Times correspondent complained that Canada was particularly vulnerable
because of its proximity to the United States.

He wrote that no longer

could Britain think of sending colonists to Canada, since they would
only desert to the Americans once there.

34

One group of English farmers was, however, sufficiently pros
perous to send a man to make an extensive inspection of the United
States in order to select a site for settlement.

Henry Fearon argued

that the nature of emigration had "assumed a totally new character:

it

was no longer merely the poor, the idle, the profligate, or the wildly
speculative," who emigrated, "but men also of capital, of industry, of
sober habits and regular pursuits."
and artificers . . .

35

’
The sight of "agriculturalists

in the full tide of emigration" led some British

observers at home to call for restrictions on leaving the country.
The United States was entering its middle age.

36

As if by a

signal, the end of the war loosed an internal migration, chiefly to the
West.

As this pace of restlessness quickened, one visitor noted:

The small and middling tradesmen do not make much exertion, live
easily, save no money, and appear to care nothing about either the
33

The Times, n.d., quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, November 27,

1819.
34

The Times, April 5, 1817, quoted m
June 2, 1817.

National Intelligencer,

■^Fearon, Sketches of America, p. vii.
3°The Times, n.d., quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, November 27,
1819.
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present or the future. If they find business getting bad, they do,
what is called, "sell out," and pack up for the "back country."37
The volume of traffic on the Pennsylvania pike increased accordingly.
On a journey between Chambersburgh and Pittsburgh, one hundred and three
"stage-waggons" were counted going West, and only seventy-nine going the
other way.

Farther West, near Cincinnati, "every immigrant tells you he

is going to Ohio; when you arrive in Ohio, its inhabitants are 'moving'
to Missouri and Alabama."

38

After a rough overland journey, the Ohio and Mississippi rivers
waited to provide the traveler cheap, relatively easy transportation.
The immigrant or merchant could scudd down the Ohio at four miles per
hour, and it could be navigated at night.

Economy-minded travelers on

the Ohio could buy a skiff, tie on to an ark, and follow it down the
river for seven hundred miles at a cost of fourteen dollars.

39

Natu

rally, cordelling up the rivers was more expensive, slower, and more
dangerous.

Newly-arrived merchants on the frontier who did not figure

their costs closely were often frustrated in their attempts to start
trading houses in the Mississippi valley.

Goods from New Orleans up

river were shipped at five cents on the pound; downriver passage from
Ohio was thirty days, but upriver it was closer to a hundred.
theless, trade between East and West did not seem depressed.

37
38

40

Never

In 1817

Fearon, Sketches of America, p. 172.
Ibid., pp. 196, 234.

39

William Cobbett, A Year's Residence in the United States of
America, in three parts (London: Sherwood, Neely, and Jones, 1818-19),
pp. 460-61.
40

Fearon, Sketches of America, pp. 432-33.
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thirteen thousand wagons arrived at Pittsburg from the eastern cities,
and the value of goods brought from the East was estimated to have been
seventeen million dollars.

41

Western cities which before the war were little more than depres
sing bogs now took on a new luster.

Pittsburg and Cincinnati marketed

luxury items and commodities which were newly demanded by TransAppalachian folk.

On his trip into this district, Fearon was taken with

displays of goods he hardly expected to find so far from the "civilized"
parts of the country.

He wrote to his sponsors in England:

Spots in Tennessee, in Ohio and Kentucky, that within the lifetime
of even young men, witnessed only the arrow and the scalping knife,
now present to the traveller articles of elegance and modes of
luxury which might rival the displays of London and Paris, while,
within the last half century, the beasts of the forests, and man
more savage than the beast, were the only inhabitants of the whole ^
of that immense tract peculiarly denominated the "Western Country."
As American society expanded physically and materially, older
problems would acquire a new edge of urgency.

The vast extent of the

country, said John Calhoun in 1817, was the strength of the United
States.

Speaking to the House of Representatives in support of internal

improvements, Calhoun reminded his fellow legislators that there were
two sides to the question of growth, for as the country expanded the
possibility of disunion so increased.

Distance, more than any other

factor, had the potential to "estrange man from man."

To prevent the

estrangements of distance, he said, "let us conquer space."

43

41

Lewis E. Atherton, The Frontier Merchant in Mid-America
(Columbia, Missouri: The University of Missouri Press, 1971), pp. 64-5.
42

Fearon, Sketches of America, pp. 204-05.

43

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on Internal Improvements," February 4,
1817, Calhoun Papers, 1:401.
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The centrifugal dangers which threatened a vast democracy were a
well-worn Republican creed by Calhoun's time, but Calhoun had in mind
more specifically the conduct of the New England states during the
recent war.

When, following Ghent, these states seemed to return to the

national fold, no one was more pleased than Calhoun, to whom wartime
threats of disunion from that part, of the country were the rankest ana
thema.

"Factious opposition," he said, was an enemy not only to union,

but to progress as well; if a vibrant union was always in danger of
spinning to destruction, a stagnant union would sicken and die.

44

A nation unified in prosperity and progress was the fit antidote
to the disease of inaction.

In times of war, no less than in peace,

Calhoun believed, the life of the republic depended upon the very
absence of dangerous and willful factions (but harmless and beneficial
factions were never acknowledged in 1817).

"The hearty concurrence of

the people in such a war," he said, "constitutes the principal force of
the country.

It is as essential as cannon and ball."

45

The new una

nimity of purpose Calhoun believed he saw in 1817 encouraged his view of
the American future.

With faction declining, things could be done;

"when party spirit is high, it is very difficult to undertake reforma
tions . . . happily for us, party spirit has in a great measure
disappeared.

44

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Dangers of 'Factious Opposi
tion, '" January 15, 1814, ibid., 1:394.
45

John C. Calhoun, "Second Speech on the Compensation Law,"
January 20, 1817, ibid., 1:394.
46

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Transfer of Appropriations,"
February 14, 1817, ibid., 1:413.
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When President Monroe made his tour of the northern states in
the summer of 1817, he may have embarked with some trepidation at what
he would find in a section so recently hostile to the war and to the
central government.

Monroe chose to see the northern states as doing

some sort of penance for their recent factionalism.
pleased by the warm reception he received.

He was amazed and

Newspapers watching the tour

reported cautiously, "The real or apparent moderation of party spirit,
has caused the present to be called the 'era of good feelings.'"

47

From

Plattsburg, New York, the mid-point of his visit, Monroe wrote to Thomas
Jefferson:
In the principal towns, the whole population, has been in motion,
and in a manner, to produce the greatest degree of excit'ment
possible. In the Eastern States of our Union, I have seen, dis
tinctly, that the great cause, which brought the people forward,
was a conviction, that they had suffer'd in their character, by
their conduct in the late war, and a desire to show, that unfavor
able opinions, and as they thought, unjust, had been form'd in
regard to their views and principles. They say'd the opportunity,
which the casual incident of my tour presented to them, of making a
strong exertion, to restore themselves to the confidence and ground
which they had formerly held, in the affections of their brethern,
in other quarters.
I have seen enough to satisfy me, that the great
mass of our fellow-citizens, in the Eastern States are as firmly
attached to the union and to republican govt, as I have always
believ'd or could desire them to be. 4®
The genesis of the "era of good feelings" was the war itself.
The "factious opposition" of which Calhoun and likeminded Republicans
spoke had reached a crescendo when the Federalist-dominated Hartford
Convention met in late 1814 and dispatched agents to Washington to press
the claims of a resisting New England.

The agents arrived just after

the news of Ghent had reached the capital, and, in the words of histo
rian George Dangerfield, returned to New England carrying with them
^ Niles' Weekly Register, November 8, 1817.
48James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, July 27, 1817, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:27.
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"the ruin of the Federalist Party."

In the election of 1816, only three

states voted Federalist; if the occasionally loyal opposition was not
dead, it was certainly dying.

49

The frailty of the Federalist party was further confirmed by the
actions of the Republicans in 1816.

As if they sensed no real danger

from their opposition, the Republicans allowed themselves the luxury of
disagreement over a presidential candidate.^

The real contest for the

presidency was fought out in the Republicans' own caucus.

Monroe

expected to receive the prize in payment for his long and meritorious
service, if nothing else, but other Republicans proposed their own man,
William H. Crawford of Georgia.

Even though Crawford refused to publicly

acknowledge his candidacy, the close caucus vote of sixty-five to fiftyfour in favor of Monroe demonstrated for all Republicans to see that
5
majority parties were not immune to their own brand of factional stress.
By their very absence of power, the Federalists could contribute to dis
cord within the ranks of the Republicans.

With the Federalists all but

vanquished, Republicanism could collapse of its own weight, the implo
sions seeding still new factions.

The baneful effect of party upon the

Republic was an American perennial, and it was generally assumed that
the paramount evil of party was that factional monopoly could easily
49

George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1952; Harbinger Books, 1963), p. 98 (hereafter
cited as Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings).
50Jeremiah Mason to Mrs. Mason, March 16, 1816, G. S. Hilliard,
ed., Correspondence of Jeremiah Mason (Cambridge: The Riverside Press,
1873), p. 137 (hereafter cited as Hilliard, Mason Correspondence) .
^ S e e Harry Ammon's James Monroe: The Quest for National Iden
tity (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971), pp. 354-56 (hereafter cited as
Ammon, Monroe), for a summary of the Republican caucus of 1816.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18
grow out of party government.

So much did Monroe look for an end to

partisanism that he sometimes saw no faction when faction was rife.

52

Jefferson had expressed the same view in 1807; he said then, "When the
republicans should have put all things under their feet,
would schismatize among themselves.

[I expect] they

I always expected, too, that what

ever names the parties might bear, the real division would be into
53
moderate and ardent republicanism."
Jefferson came close in this statement to saying that parties
were an inevitable feature of democratic government.

Nevertheless, when

in 1817 Americans applauded the end of factional strife, they referred
to strife between, not within, parties.

Because thinking politicians

thought that parties were unnatural in a truly republican form of government,
they were forced to look elsewhere for the causes of faction.
unrest offered a likely cause to some.

International

One Ohioan remarked:

The political state of Europe, which, during the reign of French
despotism, operated so strongly upon the feelings and passions of
American politicians, has in it nothing now to excite either their
hopes or their fears. The two great parties are pretty well agreed
upon the course the national government ought to p u r s u e . ^4
Such pronouncements were a painless way for Federalists, in
particular, to acknowledge the decline of their party's strength.
Excited by foreign assaults upon its political system, the republic had
thrown up parties as well as armies for its defense.
52

The end of these

James Monroe to James Madison, May 10, 1822, Monroe Papers LC.

53

Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, July 9, 1807, Andrew A.
Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 20 vols.
(Washington:
The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1905), 11:265.
54

Ohio Federalist, May 8, 1817, quoted in National Intelligencer,
May 28, 1817.
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intrigues argued likewise for an end to the need for such protections,
political or military.

In this way, the Federalists' decline could be

seen as a symptom of the nation's political health and military well
being.

So said a Federalist newspaper in 1817:

One great cause of a violent diversity of opinion in this country
has passed away; we mean the difference of opinion which existed in
relation to the friendship and enmity of foreign nations. Napoleon
no longer moves and agitates the political world. . . . We are happy
in observing a more auspicious epoch dawning upon u s .55
Thus, while both parties applauded the beginning of an era, they
did so

for different reasons entirely.

contend with their party's demise.

The Federalists sought ways to

The Republicans, on the other hand,

were sure enough that the new era would be a Republican one.

However,

the agitations in their caucus of 1816 showed, if anything, that the
Republicans were not overburdened with unanimity.

The advent of this

curious era, then, meant only that Federalism was in decline and told
relatively little of the Republican future.
At the confluence of national political— and therefore
Republican— power in 1817 stood the city of Washington.

In a very real

sense, national politics were sustained by doings in the capital.

At a

time when central government was viewed with some suspicion, the mechan
ism which disposed of the presidency— the congressional caucus— was
firmly a city institution.

56

encies when in the capital:

Officials of government served two constitu
Washington's society, and their supporters

^ National Standard (Middlebury, Vermont), quoted in National
Intelligencer, May 17, 1817.
56

See Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union
(New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 11-13, for a brief summary of the
caucus and other nominating mechanisms in this period (hereafter cited
as Bemis, Adams and the Union).
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at home, and at times it is difficult to conclude which constituency
mattered most to them.

It was the Republican congressional caucus which

held political power so close to the seat of government.

When the caucus

came under attack in 1820, political power began its diaspora, and poli
tics became more provincial; never again would the Washington environment
be so intimately important to the building of personal political power.

57

Monroe's name had stood before the caucus in 1816, and in March,
1817, after a bitterly cold winter, a clear day welcomed the new execu
tive as he made his inaugural address in the open air.

As a preview of

stormier days ahead, the House of Representatives and the Senate could
not agree on final arrangements for the ceremony to be held in the House
chamber.

It was said that Henry Clay, angered by not having received

the post of Secretary of State, was behind the recontre.

But all that

seemed not to matter for the present; thousands of avid citizens watched
the ritual.

It was the largest demonstration of popular curiosity yet

to witness the inaugural ceremony.

58

The leaders of Washington's society were curious about the new
President too.

With the glittering Madisons gone, "people seem to think

we shall have great changes in social intercourse and customs," wrote
one city doyenne.

And because "Mr. and Mrs. Monroe's manners will give

a tone to all the rest," the social lions were sure to be disheartened.
Some months after the inauguration, Margaret Bayard Smith reported that
"few persons are admitted to the great house and not a single lady has
as yet seen Mrs. Monroe," with but one exception.

While Washington's

^7Charles Sydnor, "The One-Party Period of American History,"
American Historical Review, 51 (April, 1946), 439-51.
58

National Intelligencer, March 5, 1817; Ammon, Monroe, pp. 367-68.
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social scene changed with the presidents, the Monroes' sociability appar
ently had not.

"Altho' they have lived 7 years in Washington] both

Mr. and Mrs. Monroe are perfect strangers not only to me but to all the
59
citizens."
Such matters were of no mean consequence in Washington.

A great

deal of public business was conducted at teas, balls, and private dinners.

60

The social season corresponded precisely to those times when the

Congress was in session; when it was not, little gaiety could be found in
the city, save in the sloughs which made Washington notorious as an
unhealthy summer place.

61

As the public business commenced in the fall,

invitations flew from residence to residence, and it was upon these invitations that much of the society and business of Washington ran.

62

Because the Madisons had functioned so masterfully in this
atmosphere, the timid Monroes were bound
sons with their predecessors.

to lose the battle of compari

Those who attended President Monroe's

first drawing room were greeted by a "beggarly row of empty chairs,"
only to find that an ^indispensable element of any successful soiree— the
female— was sadly lacking.

There were only five in attendance.^3

On the

eve of the convening of the Fifteenth Congress, the President announced
59
Margaret Bayard Smith, The First Forty Years of Washington
Society, ed. Gaillard Hunt (New York: Frederick Ungar Reprints, 1965),
p. 141 (hereafter cited as Smith, The First Forty Years) .
60
61
62

See Adams, Diary, 4:30-1, for one of many examples.
Faux, Memorable Days in America, p. 87.
Fearon, Sketches of America, p. 291.

63

Joseph Seaton, William Winston Seaton of the National Intelli
gencer (Boston, 1871), p. 144, quoted in William E. Ames, History of the
National Intelligencer (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1972) (hereafter cited as Ames, History of the
National Intelligencer) .
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that henceforth visitors could be seen only by appointment and at offi
cial functions.

Mrs. Monroe also refused to pay calls upon city ladies,

as did her daughter.

There was an anguished outcry in society.

Then the

senators, their dignity wounded, declared that they would not pay first
calls either.

John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State, was asked to

solve this grave impasse.

Only in a society where status was so keenly

felt could such picayune resentments be elevated to a hostility of this
intensity.

64

What made Washington society run was politics, and natu

rally some persons were better than others at mixing the two to their
advantage.

This aspect of the city did not change substantially during

the next decade.

Just before the end of the Monroe presidency, George

Ticknor, down from Harvard, paid a visit to the city.

To a friend back

home, he wrote:
The regular inhabitants of the city, from the President downwards,
lead a hard and troublesome life. It is their business to entertain
strangers, and they do it, each one according to his means, but all
in a very laborious way. . . . The truth is, that at Washington
society is the business of life. . . . People have nothing but one
another to amuse themselves with; and as it is thus obviously for
every man's interest to be agreeable, you may be sure very few
fail.65
Ticknor added that his only objection to Washington's society was that
"there is too much of it."

66

During his years in Washington, John C. Calhoun had easily
learned how to move in capital society.

As a relatively well-to-do young
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Constance McLaughlin Green, Washington; Village and Capital,
1800-1878 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 81.
65

George Ticknor, Life, Letters, and Journals of George Ticknor,
2 vols.
(Boston: James R. Osgood and Co., 1877), 1:349-50 (hereafter
cited as Ticknor, Journals) .
56Ibid., 1:351.
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man of some presence, with a lovely young wife, he was, as Secretary of
War, an "item" in the society of the times.

As one of the highest-ranking

members of the executive branch of government, his presence at official
and social gatherings was all the more desirable.
tition.

He had little compe

His President was "a very plain, practical man of business .1,6‘

The Secretary of the Treasury, William H. Crawford, was engaging enough,
but he was still very much the roughhewn Georgian.

68

The Secretary of

State's friends chided him for not going into society more often to
widen his circle of supporters, but he replied that he was "scarcely ever
satisfied with myself after going into company, and always have the
impression that my time at home is more usefully spent."

69

Although he

doubted the quality of his social grace, Adams nonetheless continued to
give and attend parties where political business was always a topic of
conversation.

70

Abruptly cut off from informal relations with the first

family, Washington society compensated by lavishing attention upon the
next highest ranks:
about

the cabinet officers.

As the social season was

to begin in 1817, one matron fairly gushed upon hearing of the

most recent ministerial appointments:

"Every one is highly pleased with

the appointments of Mr. Wirt and Mr. Calhoun, they will be most agreeable
additions to our society."

71

Calhoun lived up to his promise.

At these

soirees, Calhoun looked for the listeners and was a generous conversa
tionalist.
67

"You know how frank and communicative he is," Mrs. Smith

Fearon, Sketches of America, p. 291.

68

Chase Mooney, William H. Crawford (Lexington, Kentucky: The
University of Kentucky Press, 1374), p. 76 (hereafter cited as Mooney,
Crawford).
^Adams, Diary, 4:202.
71

”^ I b i d . , 4:323-24, 306-07.

Smith, The First Forty Years, pp. 141-42.
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wrote a relative, "perhaps you will not be surprised at our conversing
without any interruption until 9 o'clock."

72

Having won his executive

appointment, Calhoun was able to bring his wife, Floride, to the capital
and establish a permanent home.

With this social base, the Calhouns

entertained frequently and well.

Ticknor partook of all the social

amusements when he visited the city and pronounced "Calhoun's . . . the
pleasantest of the ministerial dinners, because he invited ladies, and
is the most agreeable person in conversation at Washington."

73

In Washington, social intercourse offered unique liabilities.
If a man's reputation could be made at parties, it could be unmade as
well.

Contrary to what Ticknor believed, the conversations around the

dinner tables and on the dance floors were not always bland and unprovoking.

Some guests were not above trying to deflate their adversaries

in public company.

74

Because politics formed the superstructure for all

these relationships, they were frequently reordered and adjusted themselves with reference to new political unions and disunions.

75

Invita

tions and counter-invitations which tested endurance and patience could

^Ibid., p. 147.
73

Calhoun's dinners tended to be of some size and expense and, of
course, of political significance. While in Washington in 1819 to defend
himself against the congressional investigation of the Seminole War,
General Jackson found himself apologizing to Adams for having attended a
Calhoun party when he had already committed himself to come to Adams'
house the same evening. Adams, Diary, 4:247, 512; Ticknor, Journal,
1:349; Smith, The First Forty Years, p. 148.
74

Adams, Diary, 4:513.
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The best single analysis of social and political interrelation
ships in early Washington is James Sterling Young's The Washington
Community, 1800-1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), passim
(hereafter cited as Young, Washington Community) . Much of the foregoing
analysis relies upon Young's work.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25
impose a further burden upon the political man.

Even the matter of going

to a party was sometimes not so simple in Washington.

Returning from a

party in Georgetown, only two miles away, Adams' carriage was almost
overturned twice on the foul roads.

Near the Treasury building, the

Secretary of State and his driver had to get

out

in the mud, beg a lantern

from a guard at the Treasury, and make their

way

home in the muck.

was a mercy we got home with whole bones," Adams said.

76

As a capital, Washington was certainly no St. Petersburg.
ravages of the war were still evident.

The

Congress had to meet in the

"Brick Capitol," which looked to one visitor like "an hotel."

The old

capitol still stood as it had burned, its walls adorned with public
comment on who was responsible for the success of the British invasion.
"The capital of the Union lost by cowardice," or more pointedly, "James
Madison is a rascal, a coward, and a fool." Benjamin

Latrobe was at

work on the new domed structure, which, however externally imposing,
fell short of comfort and elegance inside.

The President's new house

was habitable by mid-September, when he returned from his tour of the
North, but Monroe was "apprehensive of the effects of fresh painting and
plastering" and retreated to Virginia for a few days more.

Looking over

the city from Capitol Hill, one received the impression of "a Roman
village," but of a most peculiar kind.

Streets were "a mile or two in

length, with houses a quarter mile apart, beautified by trees and
swamps, and cows grazing between."

77

The whole establishment showed a

meager promise for a very distant future.
76
Adams, Diary, 4:74.
77

Ibid., 4:7; Faux, Memorable Days in America, p. 112; Fearon,
Sketches of America, pp. 283-85.
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Physically reflecting the constitutional arrangements of the
government, the President's house and the Capitol stood some distance
apart, divorced by a stream, the "Tiber," which regularly flooded, doubtless assisting further the separation of powers.

78

Private houses,

hotels, and boarding houses clustered around the capitol served the
legislators' needs, while executive officers huddled across the Tiber
near the President's house.

Close by the executive mansion on the

eastern side stood the Treasury.

On the other side of the mansion another

building (part of the old "Seven Buildings") housed the War, State, and
Navy departments.

Their building squatted in a depression apparently

not of a natural origin; its grounds had been excavated so that the
structure might not exceed the height of the Treasury.

79

Calhoun's

offices occupied the southeastern part of this bureaucratic warren.
Here Calhoun did his work for the next seven years.

80

Were he the usual

kind of Secretary of War, a short time obscured here would have been a
sufficient test of his stamina, but he was not; he was foremost a polit
ical man doing political work.

II
The War Department which John C. Calhoun inherited in 1817 was
hardly the most distinguished of the American ministries.

No great

political power adhered to its chiefs as in the cases of those premier
departments, State and Treasury.

Although these last owed some of their

repute and power to those individuals who first held them, these depart
ments were important in their own right.
78y0ung, Washington Community, p. 75.

*7 Q

Ibid., pp. 73-5.
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L. D. Ingersoll, A History of the War Department of the United
States with biographical sketches of the Secretaries (Washington:
Francis B. Mohun, 1880), p. 110.
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By 1816 the man who presided over the State Department was con
sidered the American crown prince, the president-designate.
aspirants naturally vied for the post.

Presidential

By contrast, the Treasury

Department from the first had a value of a different kind.

Although it

lacked the prestige of the State Department, the Treasury possessed
patronage in abundance to soothe the faithful supporter.

81

The Treasury Department began its life well populated; in 1789
there were thirty-nine staff members.
doubled.

Within one year that number

Two years after that, there were ninety comptrollers, auditors,

and clerks.

Guided by the sure hand of Alexander Hamilton, the Treasury

was soon transformed to Hunnic proportions.

The office staff declined to

seventy-eight in 1801, but by then there were sixteen hundred civilian
field officers.

Neither the State nor War Departments could compete with

Treasury's imperial growth.

Both these offices made do with less than

ten staff members until the end of the century.

When employment could

expand, it naturally did so, as in the addition of sixty-three consular
and commercial agents to the State Department by 1801; but the War
Department remained a poor relation.

By 1801 the Department of War still

had only sixteen employees, and that number included two messengers.

82

Thus, by sheer organizational weight the Treasury was in a posi
tion to establish suzerainty over the other departments.

Because of their

extensive and well-manned department, Treasury secretaries could encroach
upon other ministerial prerogatives.

This poaching was common enough

during Hamilton's tenure, and later under Secretary Albert Gallatin,
81

Leonard White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative
History, 1789-1801 (New York: Macmillan, 1948; The Free Press, 1965),
pp. 117-18 (hereafter cited as White, The Federalists).
OO

Ibid., pp. 122-23, 146-48, 128, 136.
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cabinet business all too frequently became Treasury's business.
Although Treasury's administrative empire did not expand markedly during
the first quarter of the century, it remained a formidable department
which could easily accommodate to the political needs of ambitious chiefs
Although it is a commonplace to argue that the two great depart
ments were, in the first instance, made so by their first two secretaries
Hamilton and Jefferson, it is also true that the tasks which each
department performed during the Federalist decade demanded their rise to
pre-eminence in the structure of government.

The War Department had

lesser guardians, and it was subject to clearly prescribed duties which
were conditioned by two centuries of suspicion of standing armies and
their governmental accouterments.
Like the other executive departments, the War Department and its
chief officer were carried over to the new government from the old Con
federation.

Adjustments had to be made, of course.

The Secretary at

War of the Confederation, Henry Knox, had been the military agent of the
Congress, and in 1789, as the Secretary of War, he became an officer of
the executive branch.

Laws passed by the new Congress in 1789 further

detailed the cautious approach to military affairs which marked the Constitution.

84

Because a standing army was considered in some quarters a

threat to liberty and democracy and a friend of despotism, any machinery
of government which sustained an army was suspect.

Even though the need

83

Leonard White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative
History, 1801-1829 (New York: Macmillan, 1951; The Free Press, 1965),
pp. 127, 149, 133 (hereafter cited as White, The Jeffersonians).
^Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York:
Macmillan, 1967), pp. 88-9 (hereafter cited as Weigley, History of the
U. S . Army). See also, White, The Federalists, pp. 145-46.
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for an army during the devolution was uncontested, there was some doubt
that one was needed by a nation nominally at peace.

Likewise, the

civilian chief of the army seemed less than useful (or even necessary)
to some.

Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania told the Congress in

1789 that "the first error seems to have been the appointing of a
Secretary of War when we were at peace, and now we must find troops
lest his office should run out of e m p l o y m e n t . T h e special require
ments of the frontier nation soon accommodated Maclay's desires.

No one

had such doubts about the usefulness of other departments or their
ministers.
By the time Calhoun was ready to take over the War Department,
this office was known to have attracted an inordinate number of mediocrities to preside over it.

86

Those who did have some talent, almost as

if by common agreement, seemed not to perform well in the job.

If one

had ambitions beyond the Department of War, perhaps it was best not to do
too well in a post which was the object of republican suspicions.

Henry

Knox was the ablest of the Federalist Secretaries of War; among those
who served in the Republican administrations before Calhoun, John
Armstrong— an executive of countless failings— was the best the Jeffer
sonians could offer.

Nine men had filled this post in the first twenty-

eight years of the republic, their tenure averaging thirty-five months
each.

Of the four presidents before Monroe, only one— John Adams— had

been contented with just one Secretary of War.

85

Madison had the record

Quoted in Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, p. 89.
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Massachusetts men also had a propensity for the post; five of
the first nine secretaries of war were from that state.
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for changing secretaries:

under the press of impending hostilities and

then the War of 1812, the department had four different chiefs.

87

The

office was difficult enough to manage in times of peace, but during
wartime its demands quickly eliminated those lacking talent and dedica
tion, or those whose attentions were directed elsewhere.
Even though most of Calhoun's nine predecessors were not young
men when they came to the War Department (their average age upon assuming
office was forty-nine) , their tenures there could hardly be called the
zeniths of their careers.

88

All except William Crawford had served in the

Revolution and therefore could be said to have possessed at least a
nominal military experience.

Most went on to more attractive positions.

After leaving office, Henry Knox remained active in Federalist politics
and indulged his interest in the Society of the Cincinnati.

Timothy

Pickering became a Secretary of State, a Senator, and a Congressman.
Henry Dearborn took to the Canadian battlefields of the War of 1812,
without notable success.

Even the incompetent William Eustis became a

minister to Holland, and then later the governor of Massachusetts.
Future President James Monroe divided his time between the Department of
State and the War Department after John Armstrong was relieved.

89

William

Crawford took over the Treasury during the Monroe administration and hoped
for the Presidency.

Thus, when Calhoun came to the department, two of

his fellow cabinet members had held his post.

Whether the President or
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Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, p. 557; and also his chap
ters 5, 6, and 7, passim.
^^Henry Knox was the youngest Secretary of War before Calhoun.
He was 39 years old; Calhoun was 35.
89See Webster's Biographical Dictionary (Springfield, Massachu
setts: G. & C. Merriam, Publishers, 1968), passim. For a cautiously
favorable view of Armstrong's period in office, see T. Harry Williams,
Americans at War (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: 'Louisiana State University
Press, 1961), pp. 28-9 (hereafter cited as Williams, Americans at War) .
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the Secretary of Treasury were very solicitous of their old department is
problematical, but it is unlikely that they would take an interest in a
department which they had passed through on their wiy to better things.
The laws under which these secretaries operated were frequently
reshaped in the years following the basic legislation which established
the war Department.

Compared to the duties of the Secretary at War

under the Confederation, the legislation of 1789 was quite general.

It

enjoined the Secretary to watch over any matters having to do with the
land and naval forces, military stores, commissions, warrant lands, and
Indian affairs.

90

The Confederation's "Ordinance for Ascertaining the

Powers and Duties of the Secretary at War" set out in detail the several
obligations of the military's civilian supervisor.

He was at once an

inspector general, quartermaster general, commissary, paymaster, and
chief of recruiting and demobilization.

The Ordinance also demanded

that the Secretary at War "keep a public and convenient office at the
place where Congress shall reside," thereby binding him physically as
well as legally to congressional supervision.

91

Under the law of 1789,

this last requirement was not spelled out, but presumably the war
minister was to be attached to the President.
Subsequent legislation under the new Constitutuion tended to
assign special tasks to military officers or civilian sub-officers, who
were in turn responsible to the Secretary of War.

The Navy was given

90

1 Stat. 49. Here, too, the name of the officer was cnanged.
He became, officially, the Secretary of War. Both forms were used for
some time thereafter. Before he took that office, Calhoun referred to
the Secretary at_ War habitually. See, for instance, John C. Calhoun to
John E. Calhoun, February 20, 1815, Calhoun Papers, 1:276.
91

Ibid., see Ordinance appended to statute.
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the independence of its own department in 1798, and before long other
statutes had created a paymaster, and superintendents of military stores
and Indian affairs.

92

Secretary John Armstrong's most notable act was

the encouragement of the creation of what was called a "General Staff"
in 1813.

Unlike a modern General Staff, this group of officers (and

civilians) had no authority at all over field commanders; staff authority
was limited either to specific functions or to the supervision of the
more technical branches of the service.

Eventually, separate bureaus

were established to deal with the pay, subsistence, and medical care of
the troops; the scientific arms of engineering and ordinance were repre
sented by departments also.
technical than general staff.

Thus, this arrangement provided for more a
Now, however, the Secretary could call

upon the assistance of military specialists who were required to spend
their time at the War Department instead of being attached to wayward
93
field commands.
Such legislative forms merely provided general directions to the
secretaries, however.

The first official generation of the republic

gave substance to the machinery of government by establishing customs
and usages which laws simply could not apprehend.

The laws prescribing

the Secretary's duties told only a part of what he actually did.

None

of this legislation designated the Secretary of War an officer of cabinet
94
rank (and indeed the Constitution says nothing of a cabinet).

Almost
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1 Stat. 279, sec. 3; 1 Stat. 279, sec. 5; 1 Stat. 352, sec. 3;
1 Stat. 352, secs. 1 and 2; 1 Stat. 137; 1 Stat. 452; and 1 Stat. 469.
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2 Stat. 819; see, also, White, The Jeffersonians, pp. 236-37;
and Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, pp. 122-23.
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U. S., Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.
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casually, the new executive departments were fashioned after British
models, but still they were not identical to their British counterparts.
This is especially true insofar as the War Department was concerned.
Great Britain the Secretary at War was decidedly a minor official.

In
He

was not a cabinet officer and had no policy-making authority under the
Constitution.

Any power connected with that post derived entirely from

the political exertions of the man who held it.

Had America's government-

makers given much thought to the matter of what the exact place and
function of their Secretary of War were to be (and there is little evi
dence that they did), they likely would have looked at William Wildman,
Viscount Barrington.

It was Barrington who held this post in Crown

government from the Seven Years' War to 1778.

Barrington was highly

assertive, frequently visited the King's Closet, and by virtue of that
familiarity, he was able to act during the last part of his career some
what more independently of the House of Commons than his predecessors.
Thus did Barrington overshadow his own post and acquire power in his own
right.

95

It is therefore interesting to speculate why a nation which

made so much of its suspicion of standing armies and their appendages,
would elevate to cabinet rank a position which, even in Great Britain,
depended less on the Constitution than on personal interest and energy.
The cabinet status of the Secretary of War automatically gave
more official freedom to this officer than the original law countenanced.
There he was held rather strictly to the military domain.

In practice,
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White, The Federalists, pp. 26-9; John Shy, Toward Lexington:
The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 234-35; Piers
Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1964), pp. 12-15.
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however, he was not just the President's overseer for military affairs.
As a cabinet officer, he was at once a part of a ministerial collegium.
From the first musings about an American cabinet, there was no doubt
that these men were meant to be the President's assistants, not rivals;
but allowing for the different mixtures of personalities within the
various cabinets, degrees of assistance could sometimes vary widely.

96

On the practical level, cabinet members would oftentimes guide and even
shape policy.

Within the closed politics of the collegium, they could

argue, cajole, debate, appeal to reason, emotion, patriotism, or partisanism.

The cabinet of which Calhoun was a member offers ample

illustrations of just such deliberations.
In a situation where the precise functions of office were poorly
described, distinct and legal boundaries of duty often faded to invisi
bility.

To some extent, each member of the cabinet was responsible not

only for his own department's business, but in cabinet might be called
upon to deal with any other matter if the President so wished.

97

At

first Monroe's new Attorney General, William Wirt, complained bitterly
that he did work which was not properly his, but he quickly warmed to
an expanded notion of what it meant to sit m

96

the cabinet.
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White, The Federalists, p. 28.
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On occasion, cabinet members did not wait to be asked for
their opinions, especially about other cabinet members' business. See,
for instance, William H. Crawford to James Monroe [December?], 1818,
Monroe Papers, L C ■
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William Wirt to Judge Carr, January 21, 1818, John P. Kennedy,
ed., Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt, attorney general of the United
States, 2 vols.
(Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard), 2:73 (hereafter
cited as Kennedy, Life of Wirt).
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Moreover, a cabinet officer in Monroe's administration might well
find himself filling the role of chef de Consiel when the President was
away from the seat of government.

When Monroe left Washington, one or

another of the secretaries would take it upon himself to keep the Presi
dent informed of matters requiring his attention; after having conferred
with other members of the cabinet present in the city, the communication
of decisions would be made or deferred as needed.

99

On occasion, a

member of Monroe's cabinet could be left alone in the city, essentially
in charge of the entire executive branch.

Attorney General Wirt lamented

the leaving of the President and all the other cabinet members except
himself because, as he put it, "three departments will be in the hands of
subalterns, who will stand in daily need of the Attorney General to help
them through their difficulties.
Ministering to the President's whims and the claims made by the
daily business of state perforce complicated each cabinet officer's
role.

But the President was not a secretary's only constituent; the

cabinet also owed at least some attention to a group whose opinions were
often importunate.

The chiefs of department had to be aware of and

calculate upon the vagaries of the congressional mind, contemplations
sometimes overwhelming and unendurable.

If a cabinet officer was to

champion an administration policy, or if he somehow became personally
identified with a particular program, ignorance of this special constitu
ency could cause him much grief.

However, the Secretary of War dealt

with another constituency just as troublesome:

the military hierarchy.
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John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, September 6, 1818, Monroe
Papers, L C .
'L00William Wirt to Judge Carr, August 1, 1820, Kennedy, Life of
Wirt, 2:109.
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During Monroe's administration, only the Secretary of War had to contend
with subordinates who were so potentially mischievous.

Adams had no

diplomat, Crawford no revenue officer, who could compare with Calhoun's
Andrew Jackson problem.

Nominally, Jackson was only a militia general

who had risen to command a significant portion of the Regular Army on
the southwestern frontier, but his political importance transcended that
mundane role.

Jackson's real power derived from his popularity as the

Hero of New Orleans, and it was sufficiently strong in 1817 for the
President-elect to do him the courtesy of discussing at length cabinet
appointments with him.

President-elect Monroe was not merely taking

casual notice of one of his generals; he did not see fit to consult with
other high-ranking military figures on the choice of his cabinet appoint
ments.

When Monroe looked at the political horizon, he saw Jackson, and

Calhoun was bound to share his President's sensitivity to the general's

101

views.

Neither could a cabinet officer afford to overlook public
opinion.

The highly politicized newspapers of the day were an excellent

forum in which administration policy could be explained.

102

Holding the

government printing contract in the city, the National Intelligencer
regularly published the proceedings of Congress and all new legislation,
as well as executive proclamations, regulations, announcements, and

^ James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, March 1, 1818, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:4-6; M. Bayley to James Monroe, July 28, 1818, Monroe
Papers, L C ; James Monroe to James Madison, May 7, 1819, Monroe Papers,
LC; John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, December 29, 1817, Calhoun
Papers, 2:43-44.
102

Adams, Diary, 4:371-72.
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important correspondence.

Thus, for at least a part of Monroe's

tenure the newspaper served as a valuable conduit, not only for official
news, but also for pieces authored by cabinet officers.

104

During the

Florida crisis of 1818, extensive correspondence between Adams and
various Spanish officials appeared in the newspapers.

105

Monroe coun

seled Adams in some detail about the public impact which the Secretary's
pronouncements should have.

205

Occasionally, an officer in the executive

branch would anonymously author a piece which defended some aspect of
policy.

As "Vauban," Calhoun had the Intelligencer publish a defense of

coastal fortifications when the program came under attack in the Congress
Calhoun's Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Thomas L. McKenney, contri
buted several such articles which opposed the dismantling of the government's Indian factory system.

208

In an age when the public prints had

frankly partisan sympathies, such official subvention as the National
Intelligencer enjoyed made of its editors, Messrs. Gales and Seatcn,
powers to be reckoned with m
103
104

Washington.
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Ames, History of the National Intelligencer, pp. 111-13.
Adams, Diary, 4:116, 119.
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See, for instance, National Intelligencer, July 27, 1818.

^°^James Monroe to John Quincy Adams, August 17, 1818, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:66.
’'‘^ National Intelligencer, April 10, 1821; and John C. Calhoun
to Virgil Maxey, April 11, 1821, Calhoun Papers, 6:41.
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Washington Republican and Congressional Examiner, September 7,
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Herman Viola, ed., Memoirs Official and Personal (Lincoln, Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press, 1972; Bison Books, 1973), p. viii (here
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Finally, there was the matter of policy-making.

Certainly, the

President originally was meant to set the direction and tone of his
administration, but a wide latitude existed within this intention.

The

President could rule the executive branch by virtual fiat, or he could
encourage his officers' participation in manifold questions of policy.
Monroe leaned toward the latter.

The cabinet he envisioned for his

administration was a sort of genial college, in which "each member will
stand on his own merit, and the people respect us all according to our
conduct."''''*'0

Monroe wanted his cabinet officers to tend to their busi

ness and did not want the cabinet coalescing into factions, either
sectional, or personal.

To guard against the first eventuality, Monroe

contemplated a cabinet which would reflect the new sectional arrangement
of the nation:

a Secretary of State

Secretary of Treasury taken from the
from the newly important West.

111

taken fromthe Northeast, a
South, and a Secretary of War taken

He hoped that the cabinet would be so

composed as to deny any opportunity of "aggrandizement for any o n e ."

112

With such a collection of public men, disinterested in their own
destinies, animated only by a desire

to serve the republic, Monroe hoped

to put questions of moment regularly

before the cabinet and obtain a

'*''*'0James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, March 1, 1817, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:5.
’*■'*''*'Jackson applauded Monroe's plan to balance the cabinet sectionally, but added that if it could not be done, "the executive is
entitled to have the best talents, when combined with other necessary
qualifications that the country can afford reguardless [sic] of the
section of the country that hold [sic] them [.] Andrew Jackson to James
Monroe, June 1, 1817, Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2:272.
112

Monroe explained his plans for building a cabinet to several
people, including Jefferson and Madison.
See Monroe's letters to
Jackson, March 1, 1817, Hamilton, Monroe Papers, 6:5-6, for example.
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consensus on matters of policy.
aspirations.

Those were not politically naive

Monroe well knew that the heads of the three great depart

ments had "friends" in the Congress.

Cabinet consensus therefore could

smooth the way for administration policy which had to be translated into
legislation.
set of men.

But unanimity was too much to ask of such a contentious
Before long, Monroe's aspirations of a noble collegium

would be shattered; after a particularly trying cabinet meeting, Monroe
was "apparently affected" by a protracted argument.

This argument, over

whether to retain the just-captured Amelia Island, was just the beginning
of more heated disputes which had less to do with islands than politics.

11

Considering together all the official and auxiliary functions
demanded of a cabinet official, as well as the particular circumstances
of the Monroe cabinet, an entirely happy choice of ministers was almost
impossible to achieve.

John Quincy Adams was decided upon rather quickly,

much to the chagrin of Henry Clay, who wanted the State Department for
himself.

In compensation, Monroe offered Clay the War Department, which

he sullenly declined.

114

Crawford was continued in the Treasury, it was

said, as much because of political expediency as for any other reason
(as if there could have been a better reason)

Having filled these

two places, Monroe took his time deciding upon his choices for Attorney
General and Secretary of War.

116

■^^Adams, Diary, 4:36-7.

^ ^ I b i d . , 4:71-3.

115

Jeremiah Mason to Christopher Gore, December 30, 1816,
Hilliard, Mason Correspondence, p. 148.

X1G

There was some slight speculation about the man who would
fill this position. Lowndes' refusal was known by the Fall. The
Charleston Courier of October 30, 1817, reprinted a piece from the Rich
mond Enquirer which asked, "Would it not be best to appoint some gentleman
of the army to the arduous station— arduous, because the Secretary has
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Monroe seemed less interested in having a good Secretary than in
making an acceptable political appointment.

Aside from building a sec

tional balance in the cabinet, Monroe did not ponder exactly what made a
good Secretary of War.

He believed his short time with the War Depart

ment had enhanced his political reputation (even though he ran the State
Department simultaneously and was ill from overwork much of the time).
He certainly knew that Eustis' and Armstrong's confused administrations
were insufficient to wreck the department totally, even in hostile times.
Thus, as Monroe considered the various pretenders to the office, there
were no real pressures upon him to fill quickly a place which seemed
. .
.
117
rather immune to maladministration.
Monroe wanted the West to provide one member of the cabinet, and
in fact a majority of those in the running were from that section.

As a

political and military man of the West, Jackson was naturally and
directly interested in whom Monroe would choose.

Even before the elec

tion, Jackson had heard it rumoured that Senator Richard Mentor Johnson
of Kentucky was being considered.

Bluntly, the General informed Monroe

that such an appointment would not do.

Jackson argued that Johnson

lacked "capacity stability or energy," [sic] all the requisites, Jackson
thought, of a good head of department.
Drayton, a South Carolina Federalist.

He recommended instead William
This last suggestion Monroe

sometimes to deal with impetuous spirits, made still more impetuous by
the reputation they have won during the late war?" Allusions to "impetu
ous spirits" could have applied to any number of military men of repute.
The Baltimore Patriot of November 11, 1817, reported Lowndes' refusal
and named David R. Williams as the new appointee. Finally, on November
29, 1817, Calhoun's appointment was announced in the Charleston Courier.
117

James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, February 23, 1817, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:3; see also Ammon, Monroe, pp. 342-48, for a summary of
Monroe's tenure as Secretary of War.
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tactfully ignored, but during the next several months Jackson went to
some pains to inform the President-elect of the kind of person who should
fill the War Department position.

Most of all, the new officer should be

competent and aware of the best interests of the army.

A poor Secretary

could be disruptive of good military order, but a wrong-headed one was
potentially "a tyrant.”

Other correspondents had discussed the new War

Secretary in general terms, but Jackson's letters to Monroe seemed more
importunate.

The General was adamant that the War Office did not need

another incompetent to oversee it.

2.18

Of course, Jackson himself was an

obvious choice, as Monroe cheerily and doubtless with some relief informed
the General when word reached the capital that Jackson was not interested
47 !
1 1 9
at
all.

By then Monroe had decided upon Isaac Shelby, the Governor of
Kentucky.

The President had gone so far as to place his name in nomina-

tion before word came that Shelby did not want the job either.

120

There

was at the same time a minor swell in the West for General William Henry
Harrison, who did want the appointment.

Judge Thomas Todd of Kentucky

deftly pointed out to Monroe that, rumours to the contrary notwith
standing, Harrison's appointment would be looked upon with favor in the
West.

However, Harrison did not receive the call.

121

xoAndrew Jackson to James Monroe, October 23, 1816, and March 4,
1817, Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2:262, 277-82.
119

James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, March 1, 1817, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:5.
120

James Monroe to Isaac Shelby, February 20, 1817, ibid., 6:1.

121

Thomas Todd to James Monroe, February 9, 1817, Monroe Papers,
L C ; see also Rufus King to Jeremiah Mason, April 7, 1817, Hilliard,
Mason Correspondence, pp. 162-63.
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Not until early in the summer of 1817 did Monroe begin to look
to the South.
South Carolina:

There were three potential Secretaries there, all from
former Governor David R. Williams, Senator William

Lowndes (who had turned down the post when President Madison had offered
it to him) , and finally, Calhoun.
It was by no means odd that Monroe should consider Calhoun as a
prospective cabinet member.

The two men had known each other since the

early days of the Twelfth Congress, when Calhoun was closely identified
with the so-called "War Mess," a nest of War Hawks who lived in the same
boarding house in Washington.

As the War of 1812 approached, Calhoun had

steadily supported administration war measures while on the Committee for
Foreign Relations.

As acting chairman of that committee, Calhoun had

delivered the manifesto for war, which had been written by Monroe.

During

the conflict, Calhoun was known to be solidly in the administration camp.
One very good reason Monroe considered Calhoun in the first place, therefore, was because Calhoun's politics corresponded with the President's.

122

When the President offered the War Department to Calhoun in
October, 1817, the young South Carolinian was at least the President's
fifth choice for the spot.
had expected the offer.

There is no reason to believe that Calhoun

It probably came as a happy surprise to him;

just as happily he accepted it.

By late November, both Calhoun and his

letter of acceptance were on their way to Washington.

123

129
“The best discussion of Calhoun's career before he became
Secretary of War can be found in Wiltse,- Calhoun, pp. 53-102.
123

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, November 1, 1817, Calhoun
Papers, 1:418-19. Monroe had tested reactions to Calhoun's possible
appointment earlier that year during his tour of the North. He appar
ently asked several officers (perhaps including Jacob Brown) while there
and drew a favorable response. John C. Calhoun to James Monroe,
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Scholars have argued that ambition drove Calhoun into the
cabinet, but such an argument tells us very little about him.
Calhoun's contemporaries would have shunned Monroe's offer.

Few of
The fact

that several men turned the post down before Calhoun accepted did not
demean the value of the offer.

We may presume that others (such as

Harrison) would have been quite happy with such a position, but Calhoun's
acceptance effectively closed off all other offers.

Even if one grants

that Calhoun had presidential ambitions beyond an idle daydream in 1817
(and there is evidence which suggests that he did), his acceptance does
not necessarily bespeak an unusual amount of ambition.

124

He had risen

metearically during his short time in government, and he had not yet met
with failure or defeat.

It is easy enough to forget that by the time he

became Secretary of War, Calhoun had been in national government for only
six years.
tics.

Especially in the era of good feelings, ambition fueled poli

By 1817, Calhoun's old comrade from the War Mess of 1812, Henry

Clay, already had presidential visions.

Calhoun was surrounded by

ambitious men, and those who refused the post did so only because they
thought they could gain more by staying out of Monroe's administration
than by being in it.
Monroe's search for a Secretary of War entailed little of the
frenzy we have come to associate with cabinet appointments.

The

President was prepared to be content with a reasonable political choice,

December 9, 1817, J. Franklin Jameson, ed., "The Correspondence of John C.
Calhoun," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1899
(Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1900),
2:252 (hereafter cited as Jameson, Correspondence) .
124

See Chapter II, p. 76.
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one which would complement those already made.

Once he found that the

more prominent westerners were not interested in a relatively minor
cabinet post, he doubtless thought that the place could just as well be
filled by a talented newcomer.

As to standards of expertness in affairs

military and administrative, they were of little moment to Monroe or any
one else, and thus tradition was followed in the appointment.
There was a decided lack of public excitement about the cabinet
appointments, as there was about government in general.
appointment was mildly received.

Calhoun's

Several newspapers, including the

Charleston Courier, ran only terse announcements.

125

The leading Federal

ist of the day, Rufus King of New York, speculated that Calhoun would
have little influence in the administration.

Earlier, King had written

to a friend, "of the new cabinet, we hear nothing; it is not talked of,
and with the exception of a few persons, I really believe it is a matter
of much indifference."

Indeed, it seemed to King that the doldrums had

mysteriously moved northward to seize Washington City, its inhabitants,

J its affairs.
•
126
and
King had described Calhoun as "a young man, with honorable views,
so far as they are known," but King was too grudging of the new Secretary.

127

A more common criticism of Calhoun in 1817 would have been that

he had quite too many views, expressed them too easily with great

125

Charleston Courier, November 29, 1817.

126

Rufus King to Christopher Gore, January [n.d.], 1817, Hilliard,
Mason Correspondence, p. 192.
127

Rufus King to Jeremiah Mason, March [n.d.], 1818, C. R. King,
ed., Life and Correspondence of Rufus L. King, 6 vols.
(New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1894-1900), 6:50 (hereafter cited as King Correspondence) .
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certitude, that he was too adept, and that he was altogether too devoted
to serious pursuits.

At the age of thirty-five, he was by most accounts

a severe and humorless pedant.

The signs of a South Carolina frontier

upbringing had been polished away by Yale, the Litchfield Law School,
and legal apprenticeship in Charleston.

He once told a friend that he

was less in love with the law than with the "delicious theme of the
muses, or interesting pages of history," but there is little else to
prove that he was more comfortable with Horace in his lap than with
Blackstone or de Vattel.

128

John Calhoun styled himself a Republican, but any Secretary of
War was perforce a nationalist.

More than any other of the cabinet

officers, the Federalist imprimatur had been stamped on this one.

In

the first years of the republic, politicians had shown that it was
possible to devise foreign policies which were consistent with party
sentiment.

So, too, had the Treasury Department been harnessed to

partisan designs.

When the government fell into Jefferson's hands, the

differences of administration by party became apparent to all who cared
to look.

But the War Department had been the most unerringly nationalist

of all, because within the purview of this office there was little which
could manifestly identify its occupant as anything but a nationalist.
Insofar as political thought may be said to determine political action,
it is proper to speculate just how much the Republican ideology of the

128

John C. Calhoun to Andrew Pickens, Sr., November 24, 1805,
Calhoun Papers, 1:22. He found the practice of law even less to his
liking than the study of it. To his future mother-in-law several years
later, he wrote:
"I still feel a strong aversion to the law; and am
determined to forsake it as soon as I can make a decent independence."
John C. Calhoun to Floride Calhoun, April 6, 1809, Calhoun Papers, 1:41.
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Jeffersonian secretaries impeded their satisfying the requirements of
this office.
job?

How comfortable could a Republican be doing a nationalist's

Republicanism had to change, for nationalism could not.
If Thomas Jefferson had given any thought to Calhoun's particular

creed, and attempted to place him as an "ardent" or "moderate" Republican,
he would have been hard pressed.

Calhoun was certainly more casual about

the greatest question of the Constitution than the old eighteenth century
idealogues; he simply preferred not to quibble about it, as he said to the
House one time.

129

That he could openly assert that constitutional inter

pretation was a matter of modern irrelevance indicated clearly the changes
the party phenomenon had undergone by that time.

Those who yearned for

the idealogical integrity of the 1790s, Federalist or Republican, were
out of date.

The Constitution had begun to live.

Calhoun made his political debut in South Carolina when the
nation was threatened, his national debut when the Republic was on the
verge of war; thus his formative political education took place in the
martial atmosphere of a Congress at war.

Much as young lieutenants were

called to the flag in 1812, Calhoun and his legislative comrades were
unwilling to be retarded in their purpose by the worries of the experi
enced, were quick to act and content to deal with hidden miscalculations
in more peaceful times.

How much the environment of crisis affected the

character of Calhoun's thought can only be surmised, but it is evident
that it was the crisis of national defense which acted as the premise
for all Calhoun's early political views.

From the crisis of the histori

cal moment devolved the notion that only nationalism could insure
129

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on Internal Improvements," February 4,
1817, ibid., 1:403.
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survival.

Once those grounds were accepted by Calhoun, all that was

necessary was to aid in the enactment of certain programs.

To that end,

Calhoun was willing to fight in the Congress for internal improvements
because improvements meant roads, canals, and bridges, and these meant
faster civil and military communications.

He was willing to fight for

national taxes, national banks, and protective tariffs because he thought
that the enlivened and orderly economic structure which would emerge was
so salutary that those who objected from the states would see the wisdom
that particularism meant, first, martial, and then national disaster.
He made the transition from martial politics to those of peace
handily.

The war's recent conclusion insured that his premise would be

generally accepted for a time, perhaps so much so that the premise of
nationalist politics would become commonplace.

His early political

statements mark him, above all, as a progressive politician.

Although

the war's lessons provided the touchstone for his nationalism, Calhoun
was no Frederick the Great, building the garrison state, preaching the
politics of a cordon defense.

Only insofar as those lessons could make

a contribution to civil improvement, to prosperity, and to expansion
were they of interest to him.

His attitudes on war were ordinary:

was neither particularly bellicose nor pacifistic.
one of the instruments of statecraft.

he

He accepted war as

His service in the war congresses

gave him a military as well as a political education, and it was this
experience that he would carry with him into the War Office.

In his

capacity as a Secretary of War (and as a politician), he would find
during the next six-and-a-half years that many of the views he had learned
in his political youth would no longer sustain him.

Eventually, he would

abandon these youthful ideas; but for now he could do no other.
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CHAPTER II

NATIONAL MILITARY POLICY:
TRADITIONS AND AMBITIONS

It is said that in the middle ages, battles were watched over by
referees whose duty it was to agree on the winners.^

Defeat became a

signal for military reform and improvement, and history is replete with
disasters which fostered evolutions of military thought.
observers reported after the War of 1812:

2

No such

the irresolution that had

dominated the American battlefields found its way to the negotiating
tables at Ghent, where a peace as indecisive as the war was forged.

The

agreements at Ghent inaugurated the "era of free security," in which the
United States was left to its own affairs for nearly a century."^

The

military crises which animate so much of the military thought were

■*"John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: The Viking Press,
1976) , p. 86 (hereafter cited as Keegan, The Face of Battle).
2
See, for two works which treat the theme of how national defeat
catalyses the evolution of military thought, R. S. Quimby, The Background
of Napoleonic Warfare; the theory of military tactics in eighteenthcentury France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957; reprint ed.,
New York: AMS Reprints, 1973), p. 3 (hereafter cited as Quimby, Back
ground of Napoleonic Warfare), and Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976), passim.
3
C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," American
Historical Review, 46 (1960), 1-19, quoted in John Shy, "The American
Military Experience: History and Learning," A People Numerous and Armed
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 233 (hereafter cited as
Shy, "American Military Experience").
48
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hardly present.

In this respect, the Civil War was a congenial home

affair, conducted by men who were of the same military mind.

4

Most Americans would have said, if asked, that this inactivity
by the military mind was just as well.

Their animus toward things mili

tary was an Anglo-American tradition, dating at least as early as the
Mutiny Act of 1689, when Parliament finally bridled its dangerous
armies.

5

__
xne alienation between the state and its culture and the

military forces which guarded it was reinforced in the eighteenth century
by radical Whig ideology, which despised standing armies as enemies of
liberty.

As Americans relied upon the British Army during the colonial

period, they were able to indulge their apprehensions.

When Americans

went to war on their own in the Revolution and after, it was with the
feeling that it was not really their vocation, not indeed their virtue,
but rather a distasteful necessity.

A New England pacifist argued at

the close of the War of 1812 that the act of

war itself,even morethan

victory or defeat, corrupted the very marrow

of society:

The depravity, occasioned by war, is not confined tothe army.
Every species of vice gains ground in a nation during a war. And
when a war is brought to a close, seldom, perhaps, does a community
return to its former standard of morality.
4

Foreign observers saw more of importance in the Civil War than
Americans did. See Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959). See also Russell Weigley,
The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 167 (hereafter
cited as Weigley, American Way of War).
^See Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (New York:
Books, 1967), p. 79.

Collier

0
Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation
of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: The Free
Press, 1975), pp. 296-297 (hereafter cited as Kohn, Eagle and Sword).
7
Philo Pacificus [Noah Worcester], A Solemn Review of the Custom
of War . . . (Cambridge: Printed by Hilliard and Metcalf, 1816), p. 14.
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From this point of view, it made little difference whose army one
considered; soldiers were much alike, regardless of their uniforms.
said the arch-Republican newspaper Aurora in 1799:

So

"Privates who exchange

the price of honest industry, for the humiliating duties of soldiers, are
'villains more desperate, and cut-throats equally bloody minded, with the

0
soldiery of the British monarchy.1"
Such views comported well enough with the early American experi
ence:

given its limited production capacity and tractless wilderness,

America had always been unmanageable militarily.

Whereas the immediate

defensive capacities of the country were limited, its potential strength
was formidable.

The :nation

relied mostly upon the militia, whose

reaction was sometimes dangerously delayed, and whose recovery from
disaster was often little short of miraculous.

Strategic reaction, not

anticipation, was consistent with America's military needs and political
ideas.^
However, the need for some sort of military protection was
accepted.

But America's progressive ideology supported only a reactionary

military policy, and the few professional soldiers which the nation
tolerated were viewed as temporary expedients only.

The militia remained

the bulwark of America's defense by the time the War of 1812 began.

Some

who watched the nation go to war did so feeling that the lack of prepara
tion could prove disastrous.
Calhoun wrote to a friend:

Serving in Congress for the first time,
"This is the first war that the country has

0
Quoted in Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 260.
9
Shy, "American Military Experience," p. 239.
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ever engaged in; and the whole of our system has to be commenced and
organised.
The militia's political acceptability hardly added to its mili
tary effectiveness during the war; so dismal was its performance that
some political leaders began to search for new ways to satisfy the
military requirements of a democratic state.

After the war, the militia

figured less and less in the calculations of policy.

Both Monroe and

Calhoun were careful, however, to pay homage to the militia when the
occasion arose; but when the time came to decide upon the character of
the force to be used in the first Seminole War, they instructed Jackson
and Gaines to use regular soldiers only."^

10John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, April 18, 1812, Calhoun
Papers, 1:99.
^ A t the beginning of the Seminole action, the Cabinet decided
to call out the Georgia militia, only to find that some of its members
were difficult to control when sent against the Indians. There was a
massacre of an innocent Chehaw village by a militia Captain, and count
less other difficulties with the allied Indinas. After nearly a year's
experience, Calhoun was recommending that his commanders try to do
without the militia if it could be helped. He made this recommendation
to Monroe also, who by that time agreed. See, Adams, Diary, 4:31. See
also John C. Calhoun to Edmund P. Gaines, September 23, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 3:152, in which Calhoun tells Gaines that he should in the future
use only the Regular Army and Creek allies and avoid "the expenses and
vexations attending militia requisitions." See a letter in a similar
vein from John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, September 21, 1818, ibid.,
3:148-149.
In succeeding years Calhoun did not change his mind: the proper
place of the militia was one that was secondary to the standing army. He
would not have admitted that a nation could rely upon a militia in place
of a professional establishment.
In a letter to Timothy Pickering in
1821, Calhoun made his position quite clear. He wrote:
"It is mere
deception to place our militia on the footing of regular troops and the
referrence [sic] to the militia of Rome, or Swite'zland [sic] is an un
worthy sophism to maintain, that deception. These countries ought to be
considered as cantonments, and their inhabitants the garrison. This
state of things could only be produced, or continued by that constantly
impending danger to which you so justly refer, as its cause. No nation
occupy [sic] a situation so much the opposite, as ourselves. . . . I am
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English historian John Keegan has written recently that "inside
every [professional] army is a crowd struggling to get out."
case of the United States that concept might be reversed.

12

In the

After the

American Revolution an army of sorts was fashioned out of the crowds of
mostly unenthusiastic amateurs, but the nation still held it at a dis
tance and then only grudgingly.

The evolution of the professional army

from the armed crowd was by no means a unique American experience:

it

had been repeated in all the countries of western Europe between the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, and in each case the new army was
watched over by the state with a kind of suspicion that no other group
in society suffered.

After a time these nations became accustomed to a

martial presence; having ingratiated themselves by their actions, the
armies became integral parts of the societies at large.

Keegan has

argued that one of the reasons for the new receptivity to standing armies
was a kind of militarizing of the societies themselves.

Caught up in the

beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, the civilians began to mimic the
supposed efficiency, precision, and purposefulness of their armies.
Crowds were dangerous in any context:

they were disruptive, passion-

ridden, and anarchical, regardless of whether they were crowds of
soldiers or factory workers or c i t i z e n s . I n the era of good feelings
by no means disposed to set the militia aside . . . "
The nation should
"be taught to look to their real use, instead of assigning duties to them,
to which they are wholly inadequate and in which the only results, which
can be justly anticipated, are defeat and an enormous augmentation of the
publick expenditure." John C. Calhoun to Timothy Pickering, April 29,
1821, ibid., 6:81-82.
12

Keegan, Face of Battle, p. 173. Keegan's notion, of course, is
not a new one to military sociology, but he is the most recent in a long
line of expositors. As I indicate in the text, I believe that this con
cept has a good deal to offer American military historians.
13Ibid., p. 175.
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the United States was at the very crossroads which the European nations
had passed not too long before.
The Regular Army that the nation allowed in 1817 and over which
Calhoun had charge was very like a radical democrat's dreams:
had created a caricature of an army.

the nation

The Regular Army was small, dis

persed, inefficient and costly, and dangerous to serve in.

There were

647 officers and 7,799 men in the army when Calhoun took office.

Congress

had allowed a 10,000 man force in 1815, but only during the year 1820
(just before reduction) did the establishment reach its authorized
strength . ^
The numbers of the army did not change much during Calhoun's time
in the War Department; the average strength between 1817 and 1825 was 602
officers and 6,426 men.

After 1821, when Congress mandated a reduction

of the total force to 6,000 men, the averages dropped by about 100 offi
cers and 1,000 men thereafter.

Throughout this period the ratio of

officers to soldiers was about one to ten, but from 1819 on, the number
of officers in relation to soldiers tended to decline.^
Soldiers enlisted then for the very same reasons they always
have:

to get away from home; to hide from debtors or the law; to escape

an unfortunate affair; or, to travel and seek adventure.

But the

ranker's life was no life for a gentleman unless he was in trouble, nor
was it a life for the ambitious.

Immigrants who arrived after the War

of 1812 composed an ever greater part of the army as time went by:

a

survey of incomplete enlistment records for the six years following the
14

These statistics are taken from Weigley, History of the U. S.
Army, p. 566.
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war showed twenty per cent of all enlistees willing to identify them
selves as foreigners.

By the eve of the Civil War perhaps only forty

per cent of the Regular Army was native-born.
The soldiers

16

of the Regular 7\rmy were generally posted to inhos

pitable places.A preponderance of

the army's strength was already

located on the frontier; their stations along the Gulf Coast or in the
Northwest Territory were hardly areas of repose.

Less than 2,000 of the

men in the Army were posted to relatively civilized areas along the
Atlantic seaboard, and although there was quite a number around New
Orleans, only seven men were posted in the city itself, the rest being
in the swamps.

17

army's movement

In 1818 and 1819, as Calhoun began to execute the
into the northwest, the chances of a soldier's being

sent to an easy post diminished considerably.
As in every army since antiquity, most casualties were sustained
because of mishap or disease.

This was particularly true of an army on

the march, as in the Seminole War, but these kinds of casualties could
impede the most ordinary of military operations.

18

One captain reported

16

These figures are widely quoted, but Cunliffe believes that,
apart from their general unreliability, they are much too conservative.
Many enlistees simply did not care to have their national origins known.
Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America,
1775-1865 (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 119-120 (hereafter cited
as Cunliffe, The Martial Spirit).
17

See the charts accompanying "Reduction of the Army Considered,
December 11, 1818," in Walter Lowrie, Walter S. Franklin, and Matthew
St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers. Documents Legislative and
Executive of the United States (1st through 25th Congresses, 1789-1838),
Class V, Military Affairs, 38 vols.
(Washington, D. C . : Gales and
Seaton, 1833-1861), 1:787-790 (hereafter cited as ASPMA) .
■^One study points out that of all the Army's activities in the
west between 1815 and 1845, only a dozen men were killed in hostile
engagements with the Indians. Stanley S. Graham, "The Life of the
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plaintively to the War Department that his attempts to set the founda
tion for a battery at Mobile Bay had been constantly interrupted by
"Hurricanes & disease."

19

Calhoun's energetic new Surgeon General,

Joseph Lovell, was greatly exercised by the wretched general health of
the army.
affairs:

Lovell assigned two reasons for the deplorable state of
recruiting officers did not enlist healthy man in the first

place, and awful rations were given the soldiers.

20

He recommended to

Calhoun that the ration be changed immediately and radically.

"In

fact," Lovell said, "there is probably no service in which the officers
appear to pay so little respect to the character of the soldier as in
ours, or in which so little attention is given to their comfort con
venience and health [sic]."

Lovell supported his argument by comparing

the rations allowed soldiers in France, Britain, and the United States.
American rankers got bread and meat only.
and also some sort of vegetable.

21

The others got these items

In one of his earliest reports to

Congress, Calhoun asked that an improvement in the soldiers' rations
include a complement of vegetables; and, following another of Lovell's
recommendations, Calhoun suggested that the daily ration of a jigger of
whiskey for each soldier be done away with.

22

Enlisted Soldier on the Western Frontier, 1815-1845," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. North Texas State University, 1972, p. 188.
19

James Gadsden to Christopher Vandeventer, December 2, 1819,
Calhoun Papers, 4:464.
20

Joseph Lovell to John C. Calhoun, February 1, 1819, and
November 1, 1818, ibid., 3:534, 249.
21

Joseph Lovell, "Report of the Surgeon General, November 16,
1818," ASPMA, 1:306.
22

1:781.

"Reduction of the Army Considered, December 16, 1818," ibid.,
The whiskey ration was not officially banned until 1830. Some
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The general treatment of the soldier, as Lovell pointed out, left
much to be desired.

Aside from sickness, privation, and simple danger,

the soldier was misused.

Rumors came to Calhoun from various posts of

soldiers being let out as contract laborers.

One officer complained

that two of his men had been ordered to serve under Governor Lewis Cass
at Detroit.

The officer informed Calhoun:

These two men have been constantly employed, to the best of my
knowledge & belief solely for the private employment & advantage
of Gov [sic] Cass; & have been by him placed on the most laborious
& fatigueing [sic] duties, such as working out his road tax, pro
curing timber & pickets, cultivating his farm &c. &c.^3
Apparently some officers considered soldiers as their own labor
pool and that as a perquisite of their rank.
labor outraged Lovell.

The misuse of soldierly

He told Calhoun that "they are not only put upon

menial and fatiguing duties for the accommodation of officers but even
loaned like so many Negroes, to the citizens."

24

Calhoun did little

about all this, and the extent to which the practice occurred has yet to
be investigated by historians.

enthusiastic officers banned liquor in their commands when Calhoun and
Lovell so recommended. See Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the
Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York:
Macmillan and Company, 1969), p. 329 (hereafter cited as Prucha, Sword
of the Republic) .
In an attempt to improve the Army's diet, Calhoun decreed that,
wherever possible, commands should farm for themselves. Colonel Henry
Atkinson was an especially devoted military farmer. After a year's
residence at Council Bluffs, during which floods carried away some of his
efforts, hi^ garrison had sown forage, and planted more than 200 acres of
corn and other edibles. Henry Atkinson to John C. Calhoun, June 19, 1820,
Calhoun Papers, 5:193-194.
23

Morril Marston to John C. Calhoun, September 4, 1818, ibid.,
3:100. Marston was eventually court-martialled by General Alexander
Macomb, the local commander, for trifling with the Governor.
24

Joseph Lovell to John C. Calhoun, November 1, 1818, ibid.,

3:247.
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For the ordinary soldier military justice would have been a
laughable affair had it not been administered in such a draconian way.
Flogging, branding, dunking, binding, imprisonment, and executions— all
were practiced at one time or another.

One unusual letter came to the

War Department from a private soldier stationed at Green Bay in Wisconsin
territory.

He told Calhoun that he had been "severely flogged" on

several occasions for no good reason and bound and "ducked almost to
strangulation with buckets of water."

He brought these incidents to

Calhoun's attention, as he said:
[Because] it has been remarked by a Grecian legislator that the
most perfect form of Government was that in which the complaints
and wrongs of the meanest, were equally listened to and redressed
with those of the most powerful subject.25
The most notorious incident of punishment to come to light during
Calhoun's time in office involved the practice of cropping ears.

In 1820

the Kentucky Gazette reported that Colonel Talbot Chambers had countenanced
such a punishment for two of his men the year before.

26

Once the news

became public, Calhoun had little choice but to order a court-martial for
Chambers, who was found guilty.

27

Chambers was sentenced to be suspended

from service for one month, a judgment which Calhoun thought was too mild
for the offense committed.

In a memorandum to President Monroe on the

Chambers case, Calhoun remarked:

25

Joseph Baxter to John C. Calhoun, July 25, 1821, ibid., 6:279-

280.
26

Willoughby Morgan to John C. Calhoun, September 8, 1820, ibid.,

5:350-352.
27

John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, January 21, 1821, ibid.,

5:268.
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«4,V

The truth appears to be, that the Officers of the Army, at the end
of the war, had a very erroneous mode of thinking, as well on this,
as many other points, which took some years to correct.
I believe
the establishment is now thoroughly reformed of most of the faults,
which grew out of the incidents of the war.3®
Calhoun was wrong; such punishments did not disappear.

Flogging,

which had been abolished in 1812, was reinstated in 1833, a testament to
the real or imagined problems of disciplining such an army.

29

For his service the ordinary soldier was paid five dollars a
month? the officers, depending upon grade, got a little more.

At a time

when the common laborer could earn as much as a dollar a day, one had to
have modest ambitions indeed to go soldering.

Military pay was low

enough, but when Congress considered saving money by further cutting
military salaries, Calhoun protested.

"There is no class in the community

whose compensation has advanced less since the termination of the War of
the Revolution, than that of the officers and soldiers of our Army," he
4.
3 0
wrote.

No wonder, then, that the army which Calhoun sought to administer
sometimes seemed to be gradually melting away.
staggering.

The desertion rate was

This is why the figures for army strength during this entire

period are unreliable; deserters were carried on the rolls in all but the
most final reports to the Secretary of War.

Calhoun's Adjutant and

Inspector General, Daniel Parker, informed the Secretary in 1820 that
"desertions alone, during the last year, in some Regiments exceeded

28
29
30

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, June 18, 1821, ibid., 6:196-197.
Prucha, Sword of the Republic, pp. 325-326.
"Reduction of the Army Considered, December 11, 1818," ASPMA,

1:781.
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one-fifth of the whole & have kept the army far below the [authorized]
31
organization."

Recruiters were pressed even to keep up with the

desertions; in 1823 twenty-five per cent of the number of recruits
deserted, and in 1825, nearly fifty per cent.

32

II
Militarily (and very nearly any other category one would care to
name) the United States was an undeveloped nation.

Although the republic

had succeeded in winning political independence and was on its way to
winning economic independence, culturally the nation was still in its
infancy.

The exertions of Noah Webster to develop an American lexicon

were not finished and a uniquely American literature was only beginning
to emerge.

There was no such movement toward independence in American

military thought.
Furthermore, there was not much sensitivity among military
thinkers about their lack of independence.

On the contrary, it was

believed by most officers who contemplated such matters that the true
font of military knowledge had been discovered.

By all evidence, the

dominant influence upon American military thought following the War of
1812 was French.

33

The Germans had not yet come to the attention of

31

Daniel Parker to John C. Calhoun, January 13, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 4:569-570.
32

Prucha, Sword of the Republic, pp. 324-325.

33This is not to say that there were not other influences at
work.
It has been successfully argued that the Americans' own colonial
experience and British heritage were the most important of these
influences. What I have reference to here, however, is a conscious
attempt by American military thinkers after the War of 1812 to build a
professional army. To those people, the professional army and the
napoleonic army were the same.
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American military men, and would not for some time to come.

The British

were eliminated from consideration both because of their long-standing
enmity and because they were the very model upon which republican preju
dices were founded.

A suggestion to create a British-model army would

have been as well received as a motion to establish a monarchy.

But

gratitude for the old French alliance during the Revolution and ide
ological affinities were sufficiently binding to withstand episodic
strains such as the Quasi-war and other maritime harassments before the
War of 1312.

Regardless of how much American politicians railed against

the policies of revolutionary France in those years, there was a persis
tent sympathy for the only other nation in the world which had dared to
style itself a republic.
And then there was Napoleon.

It is doubtful that many American

military thinkers were much concerned about the more dictatorial aspects
of Napoleonic rule, but the Corsican's success on the battlefields pro
vided American officers with the excitement of witnessing the emergence
of a new age of warfare.

In a world inured to daily excitements, the

modern historian is perhaps ill-equipped to understand how mentally
exciting it may have been for the American officer to have read of
Marengo, Jena-Auerstadt, Austerlitz, and the other great clashes of the
day.

The fact remains that the military image of France captured the

imagination of American minds and continued to do so until the Civil
War.

34

There is no indication that these images, presumably founded upon
34

Denis Hart Mahan and Henry Halleck, two of the better known
soldier-scholars before the Civil War, became almost rhapsodic when dis
cussing Napoleon. Both men produced works on fortifications which were
significantly improved versions of the standard French works by Vauban
and Vernon. See Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (New York:
Macmillan and Company, 1973), pp. 81-88 (hereafter cited as Weigley,
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Napoleonic successes, suffered from a decline in popularity because of
Waterloo.

There was certainly no corresponding rise in affection for

British military ideas.

By contrast, anyone who had been even remotely

associated with the martial glories of France immediately piqued military
Americans' interest.

American newspapers even took notices of such

relatively obscure figures as Baron Henri Antoine Jomini, who was ele
vated to minor celebrity as the newspapers reminded their readers of his
career and his authorship of several illuminating pieces on the campaigns
of 1805-1806.

35

Neither was France's image dampened by the restoration

of the Bourbons under the sponsorship of the Allied powers.

To the

Americans, the Bourbon regime was fully as reactionary as the other
major powers, but the military glitter of the French was hardly affected
by their new politics.

36

Suffusing the political and military Americans' admiration for
things French was the belief that warfare had recently reached a new
plateau.

There was a great deal of talk after the War of 1812 about the

"science of war," a catch-phrase which expressed less a distinct body of
knowledge than a new attitude that warfare was no longer the province of
even the talented amateur, but a business for professionals.

There was

the sense that the United States had come perilously close to disaster

American Way of War); Denis Hart Mahan, A Complete Treatise on Field
Fortifications . . . (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1836; reprint ed., West
port, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968); and Henry W. Halleck, Elements of
Military Art and Science . . . (New York: D. Appleton, 1846).
35

City of Washington Gazette, February 20, 1818.

"^The newspapers were full of hostile remarks about the Bourbons
in 1815 and 1816. See, for example, Niles' Weekly Register, December 6,
1815, September 14, 1816, and November 9, 1816.
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because of the lack of knowledge of this "science."

General Thomas

Jesup explained handily why America had not progressed in this field:
"The speculative energies of our country . . . being directed to politics
and the active energies to Commerce, but little mind was left to be
applied to military affairs," and therefore, "thirty years of peace and
prosperity had left us almost without military knowledge."

37

The best way of acquiring current military knowledge was to send
promising young officers abroad on extended tours of observation.

There

was no question about where to send them; France was the only place one

needed to go to learn about the "science of war."

Scarcely had the War

or 1812 ended than General Joseph G. Swift, Chief of the Corps of
Engineers and the first graduate of the United States Military Academy
at West Point, was pressing President Madison and the War Department for
permission to send two officers to the continent.

Since the military

academy was about to be improved, the mission to Europe could serve a dual
purpose:

the officers could search for books for the academy's library,

and could acquire up-to-date military information.

President Madison

and Secretary of War Alexander Dallas agreed, and in the summer of 1815,
Majors Sylvanus Thayer and William McRee, two officers of engineers, set
sail for France.

38

The instructions given them by Secretary Dallas

attested to the government's main interests.

They were to examine

37

Thomas S. Jesup to John C. Calhoun, March 31, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 4:744-745.
38

Joseph G. Swift, The Memoirs of Joseph G. Swift (New York:
Privately printed, 1890), p. 170 (hereafter cited as Swift, Memoirs).
See also Sylvanus Thayer's note to Swift, asking to be one of the touring
officers "for my professional improvement." Sylvanus Thayer to J. G.
Swift, March 23, 1815, Thayer Papers.
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"military schools, work shops, arsenals and harbours,

[sic] the fortifi

cations, especially those for maritime defense will claim your particular
39
attention."
Thayer and McRee enthusiastically went about their duties, but
they were impeded at times.

When they sailed for France, Napoleon was

still at large; when they arrived, Paris was already occupied by the
Allies and Napoleon was on his way to St. Helena.

40

And when the

American Minister to France, Albert Gallatin, applied for permission for
his young charges to visit the great defensive works at Metz (which was
also the location of the Artillery School), Lille, Cherbourg, and Brest,
it was refused; the Due de Richelieu offered instead to allow the
41
observers to see their wooden models at Galerie des Invalides.

Un

daunted, the officers contented themselves with prowling the bookshops of
Paris for the most recent texts on military subjects.

42

About to leave

France at the end of 1816, Thayer and McRee crated up more than 19,000
43
francs' worth of books and charts for shipment home.
39
Alexander J. Dallas to Sylvanus Thayer, April 20, 1815, Thayer
Papers. Earlier, Swift had instructed Thayer to visit the libraries "in
France, Germany, and England— particularly the first and last named
nations— to collect Books, Maps, and Instruments." J. G. Swift [?] to
Sylvanus Thayer, March 30, 1815, ibid.
40

Eight days after Thayer and McRee sailed on June 10, 1815,
Napoleon had been brought to ground at Waterloo.
41

Albert Gallatin to the Due de Richelieu, January 29, 1817, and
the Due de Richelieu to Albert Gallatin, February 8, 1817, Thayer Papers.
42

From Paris, Thayer wrote Swift, "Since our arrival we have
overhalled the several military bookstores & have acquired a sufficient
knowledge of their contents." Sylvanus Thayer to J. G. Swift, October 15,
1815, ibid.
43

William McRee to J. G. Swift, December 16, 1816, ibid. This
shipment included, notably, the works of Vauban. In dollars, this ship
ment was worth between $4,000 and $5,000.
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While Thayer and McRee were still in France, another young mili
tary intellectual, Captain John M. O'Connor, was translating Gay de
Vernon's Trait de La Science de La Guerre et La Fortifications for the
the army's use.

Vernon's work was reputed to have been the best recent

study produced on this subject, or so O'Connor claimed.

44

Although he

was moody, and a tireless intriguer, O'Connor nonetheless was regarded
as a talented officer.

45

He enjoyed the confidence of such diverse

acquaintances as Monroe, Crawford, Swift, Thayer, and the irascible
senior professor at West Point, Jared Mansfield.

46

O'Connor petitioned

Calhoun in 1818 to approve a visit to France in order to, as O'Connor
said, "perfect my knowledge of Fortifications and other branches of
war."

47

Two years later, another shipment of military books bound for

the West Point Library preceded O'Connor home; among these works were
Saxe's Reveries, Jomini's Trait de Grandes Operations, Carnot's Defense

44

O'Connor did most of his translation at West Point, and until
the writings of Mahan and Halleck it was the standard text on this sub
ject at the school. See, S. F. Gay de Vernon, A Treatise on the Science
of War and Fortification . . . to which is added a Summary of the
Principles and Maxims of Grand Tactics and Operations, trans. by J. M.
O'Connor, 2 vols. (New York: J. Seymour, 1817).
45

Professor Jared Mansfield's daughter Elizabeth pronounced
O'Connor "a man of talents, but of most unhappy temperaments." Elizabeth
Mansfield to Harriet [Drake?], December 8, 1817, The Papers of Jared
Mansfield, The Library of the United States Military Academy, West
Point, New York (hereafter cited as Mansfield Papers) .
46

Entries of May 14, May 26, and June 15, 1817, The Journal of
John Michael O'Connor, The Library of the United States Military Academy,
West Point, New York (hereafter cited as O'Connor Journal). O'Connor was
at that moment promoting his translation of Vernon with high officials
and deeply involved in a shcme to wrest control of West Point from the
command of Captin Alden Partridge.
47

John Michael O'Connor to John C. Calhoun, March 4, 1818, The
Papers of John Michael O'Connor, The Library of the United States
Military Academy, West Point, New York (hereafter cited as O'Connor Papers) .
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48
des Places and, inexplicably, a volume entitled Theatre de Racine.
Military sabbaticals to Europe such as these continued irregularly up to
the Civil War; two visits to Europe thereafter were made, for instance,
by the brilliant Denis Hart Mahan in the late 1820s and George B.
McClellan during the Crimean War.

49

Thayer, McRee, and O'Connor all made the American ministry in
Paris their headquarters during their trips abroad, and there lively
associations doubtless occurred among these young military representatives
and French military figures.

The final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo

prematurely ended the careers of many experienced French officers, some
of whom looked to new opportunities in the United States.

While in

Paris Thayer and McRee had met Claudius Crozet, a graduate of the famed
Ecole Polytechnique and ex-artillerist under Napoleon.

When Thayer

returned to America and took command of West Point, Crozet became the
academy1s first professor of engineering.^

Here, too, Thayer may have

met the dashing William Theobald Wolfe Tone, son of the French general
of that name, and an adopted son of the French Republic, which saw to
his schooling at the Prytaneum and Imperial Lyceum.
young, Tone had a wealth of military experience.

Though relatively

He had been a sub

lieutenant of chasseurs, and aide-de-camp to General Bagneres; he had
also been wounded six times at the battle of Leipzig and was a member
of the Legion of Honor.
48
49

Tone came to the United States in 1816 and

Invoice, dated October 12, 1820, ibid.
Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, pp. 150, 191.

50

Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West
Point (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 97 (hereafter
cited as Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country).
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served for a short time in the Regular Army, but he was a private gentle
man for the most part, writing about military subjects that intrigued
him.

After coming to America, he became a social acquaintance of Calhoun's

and of several other individuals in the War Department.

Tone later wrote

a treatise on cavalry operations, but the American military establish
ment, having no cavalry units nor encouraging their creation, had little
- 4.
5 1
use *for it.

Other military works found ready support from the government.
Calhoun readily supported O'Connor's translation of Vernon's work on
fortifications, and, beginning in 1819, the Secretary supported the
writing and translation of a treatise on artillery by another military
refugee, ex-General Henri Lallemand.

Lallemand's Treatise on Artillery

was written especially to serve as a manual of instruction for the
School of Artillery Practice at Fortress Monroe, the first of the army's
postgraduate schools, which Calhoun also sponsored.

52

Certainly the most controversial of the French military men to
come to America after Waterloo was Simon Bernard, a former General in
Napoleon’s corps du genie and apparently a favorite of the Emperor's.
The Bourbon regime naturally was anxious to keep under police surveil
lance this man whom Napoleon had said was more of a Bonapartist than h e .
Bernard was well known to Americans in Paris.

He had been acquainted

^ J a m e s Grant Wilson, and John Fiske, eds., Appleton's Cyclo
paedia of American Biography, 6 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1886-1900), 6:131.
52

See Henri Dominique Lallemand, A Treatxse on Artillery . . .,
trans. by James Renwick, 2 vols. (New York: n.p., 1820). John Fenwick
to John C. Calhoun, August 6, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:212-213; John C.
Calhoun to James Monroe, July 20, 1821, ibid, 7:267-268; John C. Calhoun
to Patrick Farrelley, January 27, 1823, ibid., 7:442.
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with William Crawford when Crawford was the U. S. minister to the Tuileries, and with his successor, Albert Gallatin.

Bernard had assisted Thayer

and McRee in their tours of observation as well.

Through the good offices

of the Marquise de Lafayette, Crawford, and Gallatin, Bernard was offered
a place in 1816 on the newly formed United States Board of Engineers,
whose mission was the creation of an organized network of coastal
defenses.

53

The Frenchman was to have (by a special act of Congress) a

brevet rank of brigadier with the understanding that he had no chance of
actually commanding the American corps of engineers.

James Monroe, then

Secretary of War, believed that this special arrangement would quiet any
protests from American officers.

Referring to Bernard, Monroe explained

to Andrew Jackson:
It required much delicacy in the arrangement, to take advantage of
his knowledge and experience, in a manner acceptable to himself,
without wounding the feelings of the Officers of our own corps,
53

Although Bernard had returned to service during the Hundred
Days, he nonetheless offered his loyalty to the Bourbons later and asked
to be reinstated in the French Army; the new government refused and ban
ished him to his home, where he was closely watched by the police. This,
however, was not the story he told Francis Wright in New York in 1819.
In this version he said that the King had "twice solicited his services,
but he replied that having been aide-de-camp to the ex-emperor and
honored with his intimacy, he could not enter into the service of the
reigning family without drawing upon himself the suspicion that . . . he
was guided by interest." Instead, he told Wright, he simply preferred
to retire to his villa, where he was constantly harassed by the local
authorities "till his patience became exhausted." Compare his letter
to the Due de Feltre in 1816, quoted in Joseph H. Harrison, Jr., "Simon
Bernard, the American System, and the Ghost of the French Alliance," in
America:
The Middle Period, edited by John B. Boles (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1973) , p. 149 (hereafter cited as Harrison,
"Simon Bernard"); with Bernard's remarks to Wright, in Francis Wright,
Views of Society and Manners in America, edited by Paul R. Baker
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 26
(hereafter cited as Wright, Views of Society) . See also William McRee
to J. G. Swift, September 14, 1816, Thayer Papers. On the means of
Bernard's appointment, see Harrison, "Simon Bernard," p. 150.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68

who had rendered such useful services, and were entitled to the
confidence and protection of their country.54
Contrary to Monroe's expectation, Bernard's appointment stirred
considerable resentment among America's sensitive young officers.
Although General Swift's place as chief of the corps of engineers was
not threatened, Swift chose to take the matter personally; he resigned
less than a year after Bernard arrived in the country.

55

In order to

take advantage of Bernard's skills, all plans for fortifications had
been suspended until the Frenchman had arrived in America.

Christopher

Vandeventer, then attached to the engineers around New York City,
remarked to his old friend Thayer that "I need say but little to expose
the evils to the service and wrongs to the Engineer Officers which will
flow from . . . withdrawing confidence from American talent and exposing
it exclusively in the presumption of adventurers."^
In fairness to Bernard, he was every bit the engineer he was
said to be; no American at the time had the experience and skill of the
Frenchman.

57

Bernard's appointment was, as the outraged American offi

cers said, an admission by leaders of government that American talent
was not quite up to the mark.

The fact that Bernard's appointment was

readily approved by the first postwar American Congress was a tacit
54

John F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United States (Phila
delphia: George Childs, 1863), p. 112 (hereafter cited as Callan,
Military Laws of . a United States).
55

Swift resigned in November, 1818. See Calhoun's letter
respecting this, November 17, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 3:277.
^Christopher Vandeventer to Sylvanus Thayer, June 4, 1816,
Thayer Papers.
57

Bernard's training was impressive? he had studied under
Lagrange and Monge at the Ecole Polytechnique, worked on field fortifi
cations with the Army of the Rhine, and had been in charge of the
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admission that the modest abilities of American engineers could not be
relied upon to begin the vast military building program which the
government had inaugurated.

Bernard clearly did have the confidence of

President Monroe and Secretary Calhoun in the years to come; some said
they were influenced more by this Frenchman than by their own officers.
It was probably true.

58

The wholesale importation of French ideas and men could hardly
have encouraged native military innovations.

France cast a long shadow

over the American profession of arms in these years and influenced not
only the thought, but the form and structure of the American military
establishment.

When Thayer set about modernizing West Point, he and

members of government looked to the Ecole Polytechnique as their model.
When Calhoun was setting up the new Artillery School of Practice at
Fortress Monroe, both he and his officers were anxious to know how things
were done in the French Artillery School at Metz, and Henri Lallemand's
ideas formed the new school's intellectual foundations for its first
years in operation. 59

fortifications at Antwerp in 1811. This last assignment explains George
Washington Cullum's remark nearly fifty years later that Joseph Swift's
work at New York City's fortifications was equal to those done at
Antwerp. Writing in his biographical sketch of Swift, Cullum revealed
the same sort of national chauvinism displayed Ly Swift, Vandeventer,
and others when they heard of Bernard's appointment. See Harrison,
"Simon Bernard," pp. 147-151; Wright, Views of Society, p. 26; and
George Washington Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and
Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York,
from its Establishment in 1802 to 1890, 3 vols. (New York; 1863),
1:50-55 (hereafter cited as Cullum, Biographical Register).
58

Swift, Memoirs, p. 149.

59

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, July 20, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 7:267-268.
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All this is not to say that American officers offered no
resistance to the French way as the only way.

When General Bernard sug

gested that American artillery pieces merely be copied from those of the
French, Ordnance chief Decius Wadsworth protested hotly.

Concerning the

carriage patterns, he declared, "The making of Wheel Carriages is as
well understood in this as in any Country; and we should lose a great
Deal and expose ourselves to Derision, in the Minds of those who know how
Carriages ought to be built, by servilely copying Patterns invented and
established in France 50 or 60 years ago.

SO

Some officers charged that

the government seemed bent on making America little more than an enlarged
France, with military policies and organizations to match.

General Thomas

Jesup made an objection to this way of thinking which, if the truth were
known, did not so much trouble many of his thinking fellow officers.

"An

error prevails in this Country," Jesup told Calhoun, "in relation to the
organization of the Army . . . which may be productive of the greatest
injury to the service."

European military forms were dangerous, to

Jesup's way of thinking.

"Without reflecting on the difference of

situation & circumstances in which we are placed . . .

we suppose that

the same organization is adapted to our service which would answer
there.1,61
Calhoun became enamored of the French military way.

The Secre

tary, impressed by Bernard, willingly assisted the French general in his
disputes with American officers and supported him in the government at

Decius Wadsworth to John C. Calhoun, July 22, 1818, ibid.,
2:413-417.
^T h o m a s S. Jesup to John C. Calhoun, March 31, 1820, ibid.,
4:475.
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large.

"Mr. Calhoun," said a detractor, "aided to infect members of

Congress with an idea that General Bernard had a transcendant genius . . .
as if he had been possessed of intuitive knowledge."

62

It was true that

Bernard had a great deal of influence over Calhoun; for the entirety of
Calhoun's tenure in the War Office, Bernard was a major contributor to
Calhoun's ideas as a representative of the French way of war.

63

The immigration of French military influences to the United
States after 1815 was only the precursor of a greater consequence of the
war:

the nation was on the threshold of a military renaissance which

did not owe its vitality to French ideas alone.

The drive to modernize

the American military establishment had been created in the first
instance by the embarrassments of the war itself.
could hardly have been ignored:

Domestic experience

the rubble which still surrounded the

government in the capital kept the memories alive if nothing else would.
The end of the wTar was a signal for fresh beginnings, and advo
cates of modernization seemed stronger than they had ever been.

Dis

cussions about America's postwar military policy began as soon as
President Madison announced the news from Ghent.

Understanding well

that tradition dictated a rapid demobilization, Madison admonished the
congressmen to take care not to reduce the army dangerously.

64

At the

war's end there were forty thousand men on the army's rolls; Madison

62

Swift, Memoirs, p. 149.

63

Bernard's contributions to American military policy will
become evident in Chapter III, below.
64U. S., Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., p. 255.
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asked that the number be lowered only by fifty per cent.

65

The Senate

was receptive to the administration's proposal, but the House of Representatives seemed ready to cut the army to a mere token force.

66

James

Monroe, then in the War Office, attempted to justify a twenty-thousand
man army; that number, he said, would be hardly sufficient to maintain the
few coastal defenses and garrison the frontier posts in the northwest.
An army of the kind contemplated by the most anti-military members of the
House— 6,000 men— would not even be enough to carry on the military know
ledge the country had acquired during the war, much less put up a
reasonable defense.

67

During the subsequent debates, the administration's

friends in both houses of Congress were unable to agree on only a fifty
per cent reduction.

Disagreements between the Senate and House eventually

forced out a compromise which went further in the direction of orthodox
republicanism;

a bill was eventually passed which fixed the peacetime

army at ten thousand men.

68

One of the few members of the House who had

argued the administration's part was Calhoun.

69

Little did he know that

several years later, he would devise his arguments against reduction
once more from the War Office itself.
The debates over the peacetime army in 1815 were important not
only for the effect they had on the military establishment, but also
65

Ibid., pp.'1265-1266, 1196-1199, 1164; see also, Weigley,
History of the U. S. Army, p. 566.
66Ibid.
67

James Monroe to William Branch Giles, February 22, 18.15,
Monroe Papers LC.
68U. S., Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1272-1273.
69

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Military Peace Establishment,"
February 27, 1815, Calhoun Papers, 1:277-278.

with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73
because they acted as a catalyst for the ideas of the two men who would
dominate military policy in succeeding years.

In a private letter to

Senator William Branch Giles during the army debates, Monroe pointed out
that the late war had closed an era of military an.

irism.

He felt

that it had been this amateurism which had encouraged British hostility
toward America.
cannot go back."

"The late war formed an epoch;" he told Giles, "we
Cautious military policies bespoke a "yielding spirit,"

which could easily be seen in a string of mediocre coastal fortifications
and a military force of similar quality.

The war had demonstrated the

poverty of a conservative military policy by showing up weaknesses every
where.

In the Northwest Territory, the United States was now faced

again with the same problem of taking possession which had plagued the
country since the end of the revolution.

If the nation could not summon

the will to occupy what it already claimed, then the British conceivably
could take it all again.

70

Several times during the next two years Monroe returned to these
themes.

In his first inaugural address, Monroe told his audience frankly

that the nation could not hope to avoid future wars, and he invoked the
embarrassments of the war just over in arguing for military preparedness.
Announcing his determination to continue the fortification program which
Madison started, Monroe reminded his listeners that one only need cal
culate the costs of a ravaged countryside to see the utility of coastal
fortifications, adequately staffed.

A proper army would also be of use

in maintaining the science and implements of war, and with an effective

70

James Monroe to William Branch Giles, February 22, 1815,
Monroe Papers LC.
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militia in support of the coastal defenses, a recurrence of the crisis
on the Chesapeake in 1814 could be prevented.

71

Monroe's desire for a progressive military policy was by no
means an end unto itself, however.

A modern policy, creating a screen

of military protection, would allow the nation to fulfill its ambitions
for expansion and improvements.

National prosperity needed only the aid

of internal improvements; protected by an adequate military force, the
government could connect expanding western settlements "by degrees."

72

Calhoun had been similarly affected by the war, perhaps more so.
Even during the war, Calhoun said in a speech to the House that one
result could already be observed:

"It has already liberated us from that

dread of British power, which was almost universal."

According to

Calhoun, this effect was not merely important by itself, but because the
acquisition of "military skill and means, combined with the tone of
thinking and feeling necessary to their use," would enable the nation to
prosper in the future.

73

When the darker days of the war were over,

Calhoun rose again in the House to sound a note of triumph.

One of the

many dividends of the war, Calhoun said, was a maturing of the nation's
dignity:
The late war has given you a mode of feeling and thinking which
forbids the acknowledgment of national inferiority, that first of
political evils. Had we not encountered Great Britain, we should
not have had the brilliant points to rest on we have now. We, too,
71

James Monroe, "Inaugural Address, March 4, 1817," Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:10-11: £Anon] Narrative of a Tour of Observation . . .,
passim.
7 2 t i

•J
Ibid.

73

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Loan Bill," February 25, 1814,
Calhoun Papers, 1:237.
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have now our heroes and illustrious actions. If Britain has her
Wellington, we have our Jacksons, Browns, and Scotts. . . . It is
impossible that we
can now be degraded by comparisons.^
Throughout the

war Calhoun had seemed hardly touched by the

perils which the nation faced.

When, on the eve of the war, one of his

old law students from South Carolina asked his advice on joining the
Army, Calhoun replied, "Were I a single man I would certainly take a
commession [sic] .

The war will be a favourite one with the country.

Much honor await those who may distinguish themselves."

75

It would be easy to dismiss such remarks as martial bombast, and
yet their very overstatement was a clear announcement that Calhoun was
not in the least susceptible to the anti-military prejudices
Republican forbearers.

of his

To those who hesitated to reinforce the Regular

Army at the beginning of the war, he asked what there was to fear about
such an army when the nation could field a million militiamen?

76

If he

had to choose between a militarized nation and national feebleness, he
said, he would take the former.

77

Always behind Calhoun's military

rhetoric lay the conviction that, at last, the nation was capable of
great things.

His utter faith in the vitality of the nation could not

admit that the political institutions of the country could be threatened
by a creed as impoverished as military despotism.

To have admitted such

^ J o h n C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Revenue Bill," January 31,
1816, ibid., 1:322.
^ J o h n C. Calhoun to Patrick Noble, March 22, 1812, ibid., 1:95-96.
76

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Report of the Foreign Relations
Committee," December 12, 1811, ibid., 1:81.
77

John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Revenue Bill," January 31,
1816, ibid., 1:317.
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a possibility, one would have to betray his confidence in the strength
of the republic itself, and that Calhoun would not do.

It was this very

sense of the nation's inherent strength and potential that animated
Calhoun's career in the War Department.

Earlier politicians had viewed

the standing army as an unpleasant necessity and a potential enemy of
national progress.
of that progress.

Calhoun meant to transform the army into a servant
His first task, therefore, was to fashion the military

establishment to do the nation's bidding and, not incidentally, his own.

Ill
In his old age, Calhoun said that he had taken his first cabinet
post for the administrative experience it offered.

He believed that if

a young politician was to advance, a turn of duty in an executive post
78
would be helpful.

Just a few months before Calhoun left the House of

Representatives for the Monroe administration, he remarked at length
(and disapprovingly) that the structure of American government encouraged
78

[R. M. T. Hunter], The Life of John C. Calhoun, Presenting a
Condensed History of Political Events from 1811 to 1843 (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1843), pp. 24-26 (hereafter cited as Calhoun Biography).
The authorship of this work has been in dispute for a good while. Gerald
Capers, John C. Calhoun, Opportunist (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press; Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 255-256 (hereafter cited as
Capers, Opportunist), argues that while Hunter may have done the actual
writing of the book, Calhoun supplied the materials and determined the
"eulogistic" tone; thus, Capers styles this work Calhoun's "autobiography.”
More recently, James L. Anderson and W. Edwin Hemphill, "The 1843 Bio
graphy of John C. Calhoun: Was R. M. T. Hunter its Author?" Journal of
Southern History, 38 (August, 1972), 469-474, attribute the effort to
Hunter and do so persuasively.
It seems to me that the attribution
question is largely a red herring; Calhoun could only have been pleased
by the work, which is so prone to give him the benefit of every doubt,
and which distorts Calhoun's services in the War Department considerably.
I would only add that this work should be used with special caution, and
that it should be taken for what it is: a document which was designed to
influence the outcome of a race for the presidency in Calhoun's favor.
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ambitious young men to seek their fortunes in the executive branch.

A

question of increasing congressmen's allowances had come before the
House, and Calhoun rose to defend the measure.

The executive branch

attracted the "very best talents," he said, with its habits of rewarding
its members with profit and honor and offering the chance for the
public's esteem.

By comparison, "the only office in the general govern

ment in the gift of the people," the Congress, was in danger of
relinquishing its power by encouraging mediocrity.

The system allowed

the American people to take the political aspirant only so far:
beyond . . . the Executive must take him by the hand."

"to go

At that time,

Calhoun thought that the imbalance of talents could be redressed by
better pay, but ten months after describing the course of political
ambition, he set off along that very road.

79

Although it was true that Calhoun had never held an administra
tive post in government, he was. not a complete stranger to management,
nor was he at all mystified by the workings of the executive branch.
Serving in the House of Representatives during the war, he could hardly
have ignored the maladministration of the War Department and the lack of
direction in the executive branch.

From the first anticipations of the

war, Calhoun had misgivings about the Madison administration's ability
to meet the demands about to be made upon it.

Madison himself seemed

to Calhoun to lack the resolution necessary in a war leader.

"Our

president," Calhoun wrote to a friend, "tho [sic] a man of amiable
manners and great talents, has not I fear those commanding talents

79

John C. Calhoun, "First Speech on Amendments to the Compen
sation Law," January 17, 1817, Calhoun Papers, 1:388.
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necessary to control those about him."

Instead of preparing for war,

Calhoun complained, the administration "reluctantly gives up the system
of peace."

Even more ominous than that, Calhoun reported, Madison

"permits devision [sic] in his cabinet."

80

Eventually Calhoun was satisfied that his misgivings about the
executive's abilities to run a war had been borne out:
What I had strong reason to fear has actually happened. Our
executive officers are most incompetent men; and will let the best
of causes I fear perish in their hands. We are literally boren [sic]
down under the effects of errors and mismanagement.
I am sorry to
say that many of them lie deep; and are coeval with the existence
of Mr. Jeffersons [sic] administration. The organization of the
government I do not think ^s much to blame. Fairly administered it
is a strong government. This is a source of consolation.81
He could not have been much consoled by the events which
followed.

After a disastrous six months of fighting, the War Depart

ment's William Eustis and the Navy's Paul Hamilton left office.

Their

removal "promises som[e]thing," Calhoun allowed, but how little even
Calhoun could not tell.

82

As interested in military administration as Calhoun may have
appeared, other matters occupied his time and he only occasionally dis
cussed military affairs per se.

He defended war programs knowing only

that money and men and military skills were all in short supply.
80

83

The

John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, April 18, 1812, ibid.,

1:99-100.
81

John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, December 25, 1812, ibid.,

1:146.
82

John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, February 2, 1813, ibid.,
1:162. Calhoun and his fellow war hawks had worked for several months
to have both the Secretaries of War and Navy removed. See Wiltse,
Calhoun, p. 74.
83

See, for example, John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Merchant's
Bonds," December 8, 1812, ibid., 1:136-144.
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minor details he left to others better versed in the arcana of military
science; he had yet to read a military treatise of any kind by the time
he came to the War Department.

84

When he did arrive in Washington on December 2, 1817, to take up
his new position, he found at first that he needed his brilliance less
than common sense and physical endurance, for the management of America's
military establishment in this period was largely one which demanded
mastery of details.

85

He immediately plunged into the War Department's business,
learning all he could about the President's policy and current depart
mental problems.

During the first few days he probably talked with

acting Secretary George Graham.

Several days later Calhoun paid a visit

to Monroe in the newly named "White House," and met John Quincy Adams
for the first time.

86

Calhoun also met with General Joseph Swift and

the President on the matter of the department's organization.

From the

first, Calhoun and the President apparently agreed that the major
sections of the War Department should be physically consolidated and
close at the Secretary's hand.

87

Calhoun meant to be deliberate about any changes he would make
in the organization and structure of the War Department.

He first needed

to acquaint himself with the organization and the people with whom he
84

Calhoun Biography, p. 25.

85

Calhoun wrote to his mother-in-law on November 15, reporting
their progress. By then he and his family had been on the road for some
days. John C. Calhoun to Mrs. Floride Calhoun, November 15, 1817, ibid.,
1:420, xl.
86

Adams, Diary, 4:28.

87

Swift, Memoirs, p. 170.
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would have to deal during the next few years.

As a group, these men

would comprise some of Calhoun's most intimate acquaintances and ardent
supporters.

One of these was a young man he had yet to meet, although

he had heard much of him by the time he took office.

The day after he

arrived, Calhoun received notes from both Henry Clay and William Crawford
upon the same subject:
Department.

88

the appointment of a chief clerk for the War

Graham had this post before becoming acting Secretary of

War, and it was assumed that Calhoun would want his own appointee in the
place.

Clay and Crawford had written to recommend the same man:

Chris

topher Vandeventer, late a major on the northern frontier during the war.
Vandeventer had served Generals Jacob Brown and Swift with some distinc
tion, had been taken prisoner during a night action at Stony Creek in
1813, and had managed to escape, only to be recaptured.

89

After parole

and convalescence, Vandeventer began a campaign of his own among a set
of rather influential friends to gain a post in the new Monroe adminis
tration.

Starting only a few days after the inauguration, letters began

to arrive at the War Department recommending Vandeventer
clerk's post.

- the chief

The first was from DeWitt Clinton, but Graham did not

reply, filing the letter for the future Secretary instead.

90

QQ

Henry Clay to John C. Calhoun, December 3, 1817; William H.
Crawford to John C. Calhoun, December 3, 1817, The Papers of Christopher
Vandeventer, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, Michigan (hereafter cited as Vandeventer Papers) .
89

"Register, Rules, and Regulations for the Army in 1813," ASPMA,
1:388; Cullum, Register, 1:91.
90

DeWitt Clinton to Secretary of War, March 11, 1817, Vandeventer

Papers.
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Next, Vandeventer wrote former Secretary of War John Armstrong
for advice.

Armstrong could not imagine why a vigorous young man would

want to make of himself "a mere quill driver for life," and cautioned
Vandeventer against hoping for advancement to a higher position in the
department or the Regular Army.

"Time and chance," wrote Armstrong,

"took [Daniel] Parker [Adjutant and Inspector General] out of that
station and put him at the head of a department, but this is a rare
instance."

91

But since Vandeventer had to choose between remaining in

the army and trying to join the government, Armstrong advised the latter:
. . . because we know that
[sic] or delicacy may be a
selves to believe that any
upon to administer the War
very lightly on the people
Door Keeper.

a blockhead without any sense, knowlege
[General?], whereas we cannot allow our
other than a gentleman will be called
Dept, and if such be called he will sit
about him, from the first clerk to the

By late October, Vandeventer had won a promise from Secretary
Crawford of his good offices "with the new incumbent."

In all, no less

than seven letters in support of Vandeventer had arrived in the War
Department by the time Calhoun got there.

On December 10 Calhoun

finally asked Vandeventer to join the department as his chief clerk.
Such were the trials of place-hunting.

93

The chief clerk's position was an important one, paying two
thousand dollars per year— perhaps more if the occupant were willing to
take advantage of departmental information.
91

94

Calhoun's chief clerk

John Armstrong to Christopher Vandeventer, November 12, 1817,

ibid.
92

Ibid.

93

William H. Crawford to Christopher Vandeventer, October 29,
1817; John C. Calhoun to Christopher Vandeventer, December 10, 1817, ibid.
94

Vandeventer was ambitious, energetic, and not altogether
scrupulous in his dealings at the War Department, and he was not above
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82
was not, as Armstrong had said, a "mere quill driver."

He was an admin

istrative assistant who could act as Calhoun's surrogate in the Secretary's
absence, and Vandeventer often did so.
called an "assistant Secretary."

In a modern system, he could be

Moreover, a firm and close relationship

developed between Calhoun and the young major; in the years following,
Vandeventer would act as one of the Secretary's closest confidants and
also as one of his military advisors.

95

Subject to Vandeventer1s immediate supervision and at Calhoun's
disposal were twenty-one clerks.

96

Even with this large amount of

assistance, Calhoun’s official days were crushingly long.

97

Among tne

various clerks, several were responsible for certain subjects of corre
spondence, such as bounties, accounts, and the like, but with the

using Calhoun in any way he could, nor was he hesitant about misleading
the Secretary on several occasions. Vandeventer eventually became
embroiled in what today would be called a "conflict of interest."
Through it all, Calhoun would stand by Vandeventer. See Chapter III,
pp. 133-137.
95

Considering the strategic position which Vandeventer held in
relation to Calhoun and his work as Secretary of War, it is surprising
that none of Calhoun's biographers have taken much notice of the clerk,
or, indeed, used his papers, now located and well catalogued at the
Clements Library. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that Vande
venter 's papers at the Clements have been used. As shall be seen, they
are quite important to an understanding of this period of Calhoun's
official life and politics.
96

White, The Jeffersonians, p. 234.

97

Calhoun Biography, p. 30. By this account, Calhoun regularly
put in fourteen and fifteen hour days; naturally, he was not too happy
about doing so. Indeed, other cabinet officers complained about their
work loads. William Wirt had only taken his office upon "the calcula
tion of being able to pursue my profession on a more advantageous
ground— i.e., more money for less work." He quickly found, however,
that "the office . . . is no sinecure. I have been up 'till midnight,
at work, every night, and still have my hands full." William Wirt to
Judge Carr, January 21, 1818, Kennedy, Life of Wirt, p. 73.
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exception of the "Pension office," they could hardly be said to have comprised special "sections" within the secretariat.

98

With the exception

of Vandeventer, all were civilians in 1817, although Calhoun eventually
introduced the practice of employing army officers in this part of the
War Office.
Beyond Calhoun's clerical entourage lay the so-called "General
Staff" of the army, and then the command system of the army itself.
These two bodies were different and were separated organizationally and
geographically.

There was no chief of staff, but merely so many bureaus,

each with its own chief, each responsible to the Secretary himself.

99

The provenance of the general staff concept is French; however
imperfectly applied to the American military establishment, at least the
idea had been current in America for some time.

Ordinarily, the Etat-

major was conceived as the staff of the general only; by definition no
staff was superior to any field commander.

This notion was understood

by American military leaders, but like the martial experience of the
nation, was applied only as convenience suited.100

An act to regulate

98
White, The Jeffersonians, p. 234.
99

See the organizational chart accompanying "Reduction of the
Army Considered," December 11, 1818, ASPMA, 1:783.
100Certainly, the British military system afforded no precedent
but confusion, nor was attention paid to the Prussian reforms than pro
ceeding under Gerhard von Scharnhorst. On the other hand, the work of
Jomini on the French art of war was known in the United States at least
as early as 1808. A testament to the influence of the French military
system during this period may be found in William Duane, The American
Military Library; or Compendium of the Modern Tactics, Embracing the
Discipline, Manoeuvres, and Duties of Every Species of Troops, 2 vols.
(Philadelphia: Printed by Author, 1809), l:vii (hereafter cited as
Duane, American Military Library) . Duane writes:
"As the French system
is now adopted by all the nations of Europe, it is essential, that what
ever nation is in danger of being attacked by that system should understand
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the military establishment of 1795 described a "General Staff" which
conformed to the Etat-major, in the sense that the staff was attached to
the commander of the line.101

By 1802 a statute creating the Corps of

Engineers revealed a subtle shift in the line of military authority.
The law stipulated that the corps was responsible to the President, not
the commanders in the field, and his military agent, the Secretary of
War.

102

Ten years later, the Quartermaster's and Ordnance departments

were given places directly subordinate to the Secretary— a trend toward
concentration of military authority in the hands of the chief civilian
officer that culminated in 1813 with a law "for the better regulations
of the General Staff of the Army of the United States," and which left
no doubt that these departments were superintended by the Secretary on
behalf of the President.

103

The machinery that Calhoun actually inherited was little more
than a collection of military fiefdoms.

Responsibility for the military

system supposedly focused upon the Secretary; however, there was no real

it." Apparently, it was Duane's work which transmitted Paul Thiebault's
comments on the modern staff to those interested few in the United States.
Part III of Duane's work is almost wholly taken up by his translation of
Thiebault's Manuel de Adjutants Generaux et des Adjoints Employes dans
let Etat-Majors Divisionaires des Armees (Paris, 1800). For more on
Duane and his work, see Fred K. Vigman, "William Duane's American
Mi1itary Library," Military Affairs, 8 (1943-1944), 321-324. For
Jomini's views on the military staff and its function and organization
see Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of W a r , trans. by G. H. Mendell, and
W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1862), pp. 51, 231-234.
101Callan, Military Laws of the United States, p. 112.
102Ibid., pp. 148-149.
103Ibid., pp. 217-220, 226-227, 245-246. The law of 1813,
however, provided for eight quartermasters, to be attached to divisional
and regimental commands.
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centralization of authority.

The statutes said otherwise, but the dis

organization of the military establishment ruled as no law could.
Within Calhoun's authoritative reach at Washington were, variously, the
Paymaster General (Brigadier General Daniel Brent), the Adjutant and
Inspector General (Brigadier General Daniel Parker), the Chief of Ordnance
(Colonel Decius Wadsworth), and the Superintendent of Indian Trade
(Thomas L. McKenney, a civilian).
There were also departments located outside the capital.

In New

York City, an Apothecary General (Francis LeBaron) purchased medical sup
plies for the post surgeons.

In Philadelphia, Callendar Irvine was the

Commissary-General of Purchases (that is to say, procurement of military
supplies).

General Swift, the Chief of the Corps of Engineers, was

nominally stationed at the military academy at West Point, but in prac
tice, Swift's far-flung duties meant that the corps had a flying head
quarters.

Indeed, Swift put in rare appearances at West Point, and then

. 104
only when things were awry (as they often were during this period) .
The command structure of the army was even more muddled, and the
personalities of the men who made it up made dealing with it all the
more difficult.

The army was split into Northern and Southern Divisions.

From Brownsville, New York, the senior Major General of the army, Jacob
Brown, commanded.

He was assisted by two Brigadiers, Alexander Macomb

in Detroit, and Winfield Scott in New York City (both these men were
brevetted major generals).

A similar arrangement obtained in the

Ibid. See also, "Army Register for 1816," ASPMA, 1:627-635;
and L. D. Ingersoll, A History of the War Department of the United
States with biographical sketches of the Secretaries (Washington:
Francis B. Mohun, 1880), pp. 76-77; and also, W. Edwin Elemphill, "Intro
duction," Calhoun Papers, 2:lv-lvi, lxi-lxii.
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Southern Division, where Nashville served as Andrew Jackson's head
quarters.

His Brigadiers (again, both carrying brevets as major generals)

were Elezar Ripley in New Orleans and Edmund P. Gaines in Augusta.
Attached to the two divisions were two quartermasters-general and two
medical officers, none of whom had (as yet) an office in the War Depart
ment to oversee their operations.

A War Department report to Congress

in 1818 contains an organizational accounting which designates the
"General Staff" as all those officers serving in the Washington offices,
plus these field commanders; thus capturing adequately the martial confusion.

105

The term "General Staff" was commonly used at the time, but

the War Department's organization was more correctly a hybrid of the
concept as it was then known, and with the possible exception of
Bertier's Imperial Staff bureaux under Napoleon, it did not resemble
any other military organization then used.
These staff and command elements, and their locations were above
all creatures of the War of 1812.

The four brigade headquarters at New

York City, Detroit, New Orleans, and Augusta, if considered indicative
of strategy represent the defensive quality which that war acquired
after the summer of 1814.

This arrangement was not, in other words,

reflective of a strategic concept which was suited to a nation then
moving rapidly westward.

Strategically, as well as organizationally,

^^Raphael P. Thian, comp., Notes Illustrating the Military
Geography of the United States, 1813-1880 (Washington, D. C . : United
States Government Printing Office, 1880), passim.
"Reduction of the
Army Considered," December 11, 1818, ASPMA, 1:783.
*L06

"Organization of the Staff of the Army," December 27, 1815,
ASPMA, 1:636.
See also J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 106-111.
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the American military establishment had yet to leave the war behind and
adapt to the newer demands of the nation.
The deficiencies of such a military organization were manifold.
There was no one officer who could serve as liaison between the army and
the Secretary of War, nor, for that matter, between the chiefs of depart
ment and the Secretary.

Calhoun served as his own chief of staff, and

one can only imagine how much his work day increased because of it.

He

had to deal simultaneously with two divisional commanders who were alike
only in their hostility to one another and in their jealousy of their
prerogatives of office.

The offices such as the Apothecary General and

the Commissary General of Purchases that were removed from Calhoun's
immediate control, made for countless inefficiencies, particularly in the
important matter of departmental accounts.

And although the Chief of

Engineers was at that time executing a centrally-directed military
fortifications scheme worth several hundred thousands of dollars, he was
seldom on hand for consultation with his superiors at Washington.
Therefore, there was no great distinction in seeing, as Calhoun
did, that the system of staff and command desperately wanted reforming.
Calhoun's predecessor, William Crawford, recommended to Congress that a
"Staff of the Army" be organized in 1815.

Crawford thought that the

reasons for a reorganization of the military system were self-evident:
The experience of the two first campaigns of the last war, which
has furnished volumes of evidence upon this subject, has incontest
ably established not only the expediency, but the necessity of giving
to the military establishment, in time of peace, the organization
which it must have to render it efficient in a state of war.
It is believed also to be demonstrable, that a complete organiza
tion of the staff will contribute as much to the economy of the
establishment as to its efficiency.10?
107"organization of the Staff of the Army," December 27, 1815,
ASPMA, 1:636.
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107"organization of the Staff of the Army," December 21, 1815,
ASPMA, 1:636.
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Crawford had advocated the centralizing of the Adjutant and
Inspector General's office, the Paymaster's office, and the Quartermaster
General's office at Washington.

The main difference between the struc

ture Crawford asked for in 1815 and the one which Calhoun inherited two
years later was a crucial one:

Congress had declined to establish a

central Quartermaster's office.

Above all, this omission seriously

affected the "economy and efficiency" that Crawford and Calhoun sought
during their turns m

the War Department.

108

Even before Calhoun took his oath of office, the problem of
structure had thrust itself into his attention, intruding during an
interview with the President and General Swift.

109

That chaos was the

real master of the military establishment was conceded generally;
Crawford had said as much, and Monroe apparently agreed.
not long in being convinced:

Calhoun was

less than a week in office, he complained

that "little heretofore has been done to give exactness, economy, and
dispatch to its [the department's] monied transactions."'1'10

He claimed

not to be too sanguine about his chances to alter a system which had
seemingly defied all previous attempts, but his vigorous attack on these
problems during the next few months told otherwise.111

108

Ibid.

Callan, Military Laws of the United States, pp. 272-276.

10°Swift, Memoirs, p. 170.
110John C. Calhoun to Charles J. Ingersoll, December 14, 1817,
Calhoun Papers, 2:16-17.
111Ibid. Within his first year in office, Calhoun had inaugu
rated the system of accountability, the Yellowstone movement, the new
system of coastal defenses, the interdiction of British penetration in
the northwest territories, and the extinguishment of all Indian land
claims east of the Mississippi river. No one ever claimed that Calhoun
was in the least modest about his own abilities.
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It was unlikely that Calhoun needed more convincing of the need
for reorganization than the few days he had spent in the War Office;
but, the first Seminole War had broken out on the Florida border, and as
Generals Gaines and Jackson mounted their operations against the Indians,
Calhoun soon received as much motivation as he would ever need.

The

Secretary found himself acting the part of commanding general sometimes,
and quartermaster general on other occasions.

The ordinary difficulties

of rapidly staging a frontier action were complicated further by a gross
breakdown of the supply network.

A civilian who had been contracted to

furnish the Southern Division with pay and rations had failed to do so.
When General Gaines arrived at Amelia Island, he was greeted by this
news.

Despite sizable advances made to the contractor, Benjamin Orr,

that civilian had failed to send sufficient monies to agents in
Georgia.

112

It was not long before General Jackson complained of the

same difficulties.

Calhoun quickly authorized both generals to purchase

supplies they might need to bring hostilities to a close, and dispatched
Major Milo Mason southward with a war chest of forty thousand dollars.'1''1'3
Thereafter, Calhoun monitored the major’s operations and several times
corresponded with Jackson, Gaines, and several southern governors on
112

John C. Calhoun to Edmund P. Gaines, January 16, 1818, Letters
Sent by the Secretary of War relating to Military Affairs, National
Archives Microfilm Publication, M 6, RG 107 (hereafter cited as Letters
Sent, SWMA). Although the Calhoun Papers reproduce an impressive number
of Calhoun's official and personal letters, some correspondence of use
to this study are only calendared.
In cases where calendared letters
have been cited, I have taken pains to read the actual texts, all of
which are available on National Archives microfilm.
Only when the
calendar notes of the Calhoun Papers convey the sense of my allusions
to those items will they be cited.
In every instance the reader's con
venience in quickly confirming the quote or allusion will be the
deciding factor.
113

John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, January 29, 1818, ibid.
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matters of materiel, personnel, and additional advances sufficient to
carry on the war. 114
Although this was one of the least dramatic episodes of the
Seminole war, it accurately depicts the magnitude of the organizational
problem with which Calhoun was faced.

Knowing little about military

organization per se, Calhoun was nonetheless disturbed by what he repeat
edly called "the dispersed situation of the army," and this applied to
an organizational as well as the physical dispersal of the establish
ment.'*''*'^

This was the greatest obstacle to what he wanted to accomplish:

to make the Army efficient and economical.
Some of the changes Calhoun aimed to make could be done with the
power of his position; other, more extensive alterations required the
approval of Congress.

Just a few days into the new year, Calhoun began

to try to centralize the War Department’s organizational elements.

His

first move was to order the peripatetic General Swift to come to ground
at Washington and fix his headquarters- there after he had settled a
coastal survey which then occupied the engineers.

The Secretary then

began conversations with friendly congressmen who could sponsor the sort
of legislation Calhoun had in mind.

For the moment, the points of origin

for friendly legislation were the military committees of the House and
Senate.

Particularly helpful to Calhoun was the Senate committee chairman,

114

John C. Calhoun to Milo Mason, February 19, 1818; John C.
Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, February 19, 1818; John C. Calhoun to Andrew
Jackson, February 23, 1818; John C. Calhoun to Milo Mason, February 26,
1818; John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 2, 1818, ibid.
'*''*'^John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, December 17, 1817, January 2,
1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:22, 53.
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John Williams of Tennessee, who was to work closely with the Secretary
during the next two months.
By mid-January Williams and his committee were ready to bring
Calhoun's plan before Congress.

Another friendly member, Senator Isaac

Tichenor of Vermont, moved that the Senate consider altering parts of
the old staff legislation as they concerned the medical services and
judges advocate.

Interestingly, he suggested that the Senate determine

how to place the pay and allowances of the "Military and Staff officers"
on a "more economical establishment."

Tichenor's resolutions were

quickly accepted by the Senate, and Williams sent them along to the War
Department, asking for Calhoun's advice.

116

Calhoun replied to Williams on February 5, 1818.

117

The Secretary

admitted outright that he knew little about the intricacies of military
organization, but what was less apparent was Calhoun's blunting of the
sense of Tichenor's resolutions, which seemed to be aimed at retrench
ments rather than additions to the staff.

The Secretary blithely ignored

the implications of Tichenor's motions and recommended that new officers
be appointed "in lieu” of those which were about to be cut.

118

These new

116

U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 129.
Williams and Calhoun had already talked privately about this legislation
for the War Department. John C. Calhoun to John Williams, February 5,
1818; Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 2:133.
117

John C. Calhoun to John Williams, February 5, 1818, ibid.,

2:133-134.
118

The bill was repeatedly referred to by Tichenor and Williams
before the Senate as a "Bill to reduce the Staff of the Army," and yet
there is no intrinsic reason why, under this plan, the staff should have
been reduced. There could have been demotions, or reassignments of per
sonnel, and there were changes in the names of medical personnel, but as
for an absolute reduction in the numbers of staff people, the plan did
not compel it. Whether this phrasing was a ploy to make the new plan
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officers were to be a Surgeon General, a Quartermaster General, and a
Judge Advocate General.

After a brief explanation of the duties which

these officers would perform, Calhoun closed by saying, "I know of no
farther [sic] retrenchments, that would not impair the efficiency of the
staff."

He had proposed staff additions, not cuts; nowhere in his

letter did he contemplate a retrenchment in numbers.

Only by increased

efficiency could retrenchment be achieved; at least this was the way
Calhoun chose to see it.
In the course of his explanation to Williams, Calhoun showed a
keen interest in consolidating his control over the different parts of
the army.

Referring to the medical staff, Calhoun said that it was

"without responsibility; and must; I conceive, remain so 'till its duties
are brought to a centre."

A Surgeon General could inspect medical returns,

supervise post surgeons, monitor the use of medical supplies, and oversee
the general improvement of the army's health.

"It is not to be doubted,"

he wrote,

"that the public sustains great losses

system."

For much the same reason, the establishment of a central

Quartermaster's department was important.

for the want of such a

As he argued for its creation,

Calhoun stated what amounted to the first principle of his system of
management:

"No branch of the general staff is more important or dif

ficult to be managed than the quarter master's; none requires more
eminently the controul of a single and responsible head."

119

To the new

Secretary, all would be well if responsibility could be fixed and

palatable to Congress is not known, but it seems a reasonable assumption
to make.
Mysteriously, by the timethe bill was approved in its final
form, it was known simply as "An Act Respecting the Organization of the
Army." U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 379.
119

John C. Calhoun to John Williams, February 5, 1818, Jameson,
Calhoun Correspondence, 2:133-134.
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authority centralized in the chief officers of the department.

Senator

Williams' reaction to this was to ask Calhoun to draft the new staff
bill himself— in one day.

Calhoun took a week.

On February 18, 1818,

Williams promptly reported Calhoun's bill to the Senate.

120

While the bill made its way easily through Congress, Calhoun was
having to contend with the matter of patronage:
offices of consequence placed in his gift.

these were the first

Dr. Tobias Watkins of New

York was a formidable contender for the Surgeon General's place.
friends in Congress, who are very numerous and influential,

"His

[are] very

anxious" that Watkins should win the place, Calhoun remarked.

121

While

a "great effort" was being made on Watkins' behalf, General Jacob Brown
arrived in Washington with his own favorite for the position:
Lovell.

Dr. Joseph

Brown had arrived at about the same time that Calhoun was

drafting his bill for staff alterations, but the general seemed far more
interested in getting the new post for Lovell than in any sort of
reform.

122

Apparently Calhoun and Brown made a private understanding

about Lovell, for the physician was ordered to Washington well before
the staff bill passed into law.

As a consolation, Watkins was made the

120

John Williams to John C. Calhoun, February 11, 1818; and John
C. Calhoun to John Williams, February 18, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:132,
147. U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 210.

121

John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, April 25, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:259.
122

A letter from Calhoun to Brown puts the general m Washington
on January 20, 1818, ibid., 2:82. This is of some importance, for Brown
ten years later attempted to claim a great deal more credit than the
evidence indicates he was entitled to regarding these reforms. Calhoun
did talk with Brown about the reorganization, or at least part of it.
See Virgil Maxey to John C. Calhoun, March 2, 1827, Jameson, Calhoun
Correspondence, 2:791-793; and John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, April 25,
1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:258-259.
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assistant Surgeon General for the Northern Department, with Brown's
blessing.

123

At the same time, Colonel James R. Mullany was exercising every
influence he could call upon to win the new Quartermaster General's posi
tion.

Early in April, Vice-President Daniel D. Tompkins threw his

inconsiderable weight behind Mullany's pretentions, and a few days later
twenty-one members of the House of Representatives also lent their
support to the colonel.
Monroe.

124

Mullany then appealed directly to President

The Secretary, however, would not have his mind made up by such

an impressive display of support:

on the day Mullany wrote to the

President, Calhoun asked William Cummings of Georgia to take the new
post.

Less than a month later, Calhoun informed Mullany that his ser

vices were no longer required.
On April 14, 1818, the new staff bill became law.
almost everything he had asked for:

It gave Calhoun

the section creating a Judge Advocate

had been trimmed, but he pronounced himself pleased with the results of
123

Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, April 2, 1818; and John C.
Calhoun to Jacob Brown, April 25, 1818. ibid., 2:224, 259.
124

D.
D. Tompkins to John C. Calhoun, April 4, 1818; and John
Spencer, et. al. to John C. Calhoun, April 10, 1818, ibid., 2:227, 239.
125

John C. Calhoun to James R. Mullany. May 2, 1818; and John C.
Calhoun to William Cummings, April 13, 1818, ibid., 2:276. 243. There
was also some question about Mullany's handling of accounts and materiel
during his service at New York City as quartermaster for the Northern
Division. See James R. Mullany to John C. Calhoun, March 3, 1818, ibid.,
2:172. Cummings declined Calhoun's offer of the new post as being
"inconsistent with my present pursuits;" see William Cummings to John C.
Calhoun, April 27, 1818, ibid., 2:262. Although Cummings obviously
enjoyed Calhoun's confidence, the Secretary's second choice, newly
promoted General Thomas S. Jesup, was a happy one; for an idea of the kind
of Quartermaster General Jesup will make, see his letter of acceptance,
Thomas S. Jesup to John C. Calhoun, June 5, 1818, ibid., 2:329-330.
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this first attempt.

126

There was also a bonus:

along with the Surgeon

and Quartermaster Generals, a Commissary General was to be created when
ration contracts with civilians expired in June, 1819.

The bill con

cerned itself much more with this office than with the others.
Commissary was hereafter to be taken from the army.

The new

He would carry the

rank of colonel, and, in a curious departure from the practice of not
requiring bonds of officers, the new Commissary would have to post a
bond ensuring performance.

The act specifically enjoined the officer

from participating in any business which might conflict with his official

* 4.127
duties.
The spectacular failure of contractor Benjamin Orr to supply
General Jackson's columns in the Seminole War probably influenced the
inclusion of this section in the bill, because Calhoun did not mention a
new commissariat to Senator Williams during their exchange of views on
reorganization.
officer:

Calhoun was nevertheless aware of the need for such an

one of the few times Calhoun spoke directly on a military sub

ject during the war was when he recommended that Congress find a way to
supply and subsist the army more efficiently.

128

using civilians to supply the army were numerous.
were not subject to martial law.

The objections to
Civilian contractors

They moved as quickly or as slowly as

they pleased, even when military movements depended upon them.

If

1

Callan, Military Laws of the United States, pp. 285-287.
John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, April 25, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:258-259.
•'■27Callan, Military Laws of the United States, pp. 285-287.
123

U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 212;
John C. Calhoun, "Resolutions and Remarks upon Army Supplies and Disci
pline," November 10, 1814, Calhoun Papers, 1:262-263; John C. Calhoun to
John Williams, February 5, 1818, Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 2:133134.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96
somehow they defaulted on their contracts, civil courts were the only
recourse.

In his original competition for the contract from the govern

ment, the businessman could submit a bid so low that honest contractors
could not compete with the promise of such a thin profit margin.

The

winner of the contract could then resell the contract to a second busi
nessman, and the profit margin would be thinner still.

Sometimes, the

second contractor sold the contract to still other contractors, who, in
the words of one outraged general during the war, "are forced to bear
certain loss and ultimate ruin, or commit frauds, by furnishing damaged
provisions; they generally choose the latter, though it should tend to
destroy the army."

General Gaines was once forced to confine several of

his officers and men who had become greatly agitated over their contrac
tor's shortcomings.

Gaines testified to Congress later that the contractor

seemed immune to threats, or indeed anything short of outright violence.

129

Thus the new commissariat was created at the insistence of Congress alone,
although Calhoun could only have applauded its initiative.
A new Commissary General would not be required until 1819, but
Calhoun chose to fill the place right away, along with his other appoint
ments.

Less than a week after the bill became law, Calhoun had arranged

for his newest officers:

Colonel George Gibson, quartermaster for the

Southern Division and a favorite of General Jackson's, became Commissary
General; Joseph Lovell was from the Northern Division; and Thomas S.
Jesup, the new Quartermaster General, had recently served in both

129

See the remarks of General Winfield Scott and Edmund P.
Gaines in "Subsisting the Army," January 25, 1815, ASPMA, 1:600.
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divisions.

Washington cognoscenti could hardly fail to have noticed the

politically wise split in the appointments between the two divisions.

130

The new act had given Calhoun the skeleton of a good organiza
tion, but it was only that.

The law left Calhoun considerable latitude

to complement the new arrangements with departmental regulations.

Begin

ning in April, 1818, the first of several sets of new rules was issued
from Calhoun's office.

General Swift received instructions which concen

trated in detail on how the Corps of Engineers would be held responsible
for the public monies it spent.

131

were the authorities on the spot:

Henceforth, Swift's project engineers
the civilian agents of fortifications,

who supplied the materials under contract to the War Department, answered
directly to the military engineer, as indeed did all civilians connected
with the project.

For his part the engineer was required to account

specifically for all materials requisitioned and to attest to the quality
of those materials.

Descriptions of civilian laborers, the jobs they

did, and their wages were all to be sent to the War Department every
quarter.

Not a penny was to move without the justification of the

132
regulations.
The weight given in the new Engineer regulations to the dis
bursement of government money presaged a major direction of the Calhoun
reforms.

With the exception of the Adjutant and Inspector General's

department, all the other headquarters offices were as much great

'*''^John C. Calhoun to Milo Mason, April 19, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:251.
131

John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, April 7, 1818, Letters
Sent, SWMA.
Ibid.
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business offices as military centers.

It was to this facet of military

organization that Calhoun's efforts were nearly constantly directed
during his time in office; indeed, at first Calhoun seemed little inter
ested in re-ordering the actual duties of these units, although that was
one effect of the new regulations.
work would never be the same.

To be sure, the project engineer's

133

Eventually, all the bureaus under Calhoun's control were given
similar regulations, and even though each bureau's regulations were
fashioned for the office they governed, the common features of these new
rules best express the new system Calhoun had in mind for the War Department.

134

Calhoun was obviously interested in restricting the access of

civilians to public money.

Wherever possible, Calhoun's new regulations

turned the handling of the department's business over to military offi
cers, who were at least subject to military justice.

Civilian disbursement

agents operating under the aegis of the War Department still numbered in
the hundreds, but at least the principle had been established.

135

133

Calhoun divided Swift's duties into five separate tasks, only
two of which did not directly bear upon the protection of public expen
ditures:
"military reconnoitering," construction and repair of works,
inspection of works, correspondence, and general supervision of
disbursements.
Ibid.
134

Quartermaster General Jesup and Surgeon General Lovell, much
more aggressive in their duties than General Swift ever was, wrote their
own; Calhoun and Monroe quickly approved their regulations. See Thomas S.
Jesup to John C. Calhoun, July 7, 1818; and John C. Calhoun to James
Monroe, September 19, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:390-392, and 3:141.
135

In 1822 the War Department controlled some 291 disbursement
agents.
Those charged with fiscal responsibility included quarter
masters, commissaries, paymasters, surgeons and apothecaries, military
storekeepers, barrackmasters, agents of fortifications, pension agents,
Indian agents, factors, assistant factors, and contractors of various
kinds. It is possible that in 1818 there were many more on the rolls
left over from the war who still drew their salaries but did no work.
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Neither did Calhoun indulge himself with a simple faith in the
fidelity of the army officer.

3.36

On the contrary, responsible officers

now found themselves surrounded by a welter of new requirements for the
proofs of their performance:
every kind.

137

vouchers, receipts, and accountings of

As their information came into the War Department, Calhoun

had his bureau chiefs consolidate these data for his own information and
use.

138

Administratively, it was as good a system as the War Department

had yet seen, and it suited Calhoun's tastes:

he was the center of

action, and to outside observers, the success of centralization depended
upon Calhoun alone.

Ill
In the fall of 1818 the verdict on the changes Calhoun had made
was not yet in; Calhoun was satisfied that the new system would work,

In 1819 General Brown found an "agent of fortifications" at Green Bay,
paid as a Captain, but doing no work of any kind for years— since the
war, in fact. Brown dismissed the agent. Calhoun responded favorably
(and, surprisingly, with a little humor): "So loosely was the business
of the Engineer Department formerly conducted that it was not known to
this Department that there was an agent for fortifications at Green
Bay." Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, September 10, 1819; and John C.
Calhoun to Jacob Brown, September 22, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:313, 342.
"Conditions of the Military Establishment and the Fortifications, and
Returns of the Militia," November 29, 1823, ASPMft.- 2:554.
3.36
Calhoun already had sufficient evidence to the contrary. See
William Lee to John C. Calhoun, February 11, 1818; and William Lee to
John C. Calhoun, February 14, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:131, 138.
137

See, for instance, Calhoun's instructions "To All Military
Storekeepers of the Ordnance Department," October 24, 1818, Letters
Sent, SWMA.
138

John C. Calhoun to Thomas Jesup, Daniel Brent, Calendar
Irvine, Decius Wadsworth, J. G. Swift, and Joseph Lovell, August 29,
1818; and "Regulatios requiring reports, etc. from the several officers
of the Dept [sic] of War," September 5, 1818, ibid.
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but it was a system for the future.

139

Since the centralisation of

authority and the placing of subordinate responsibility were the corner
stones of the reforms he intended, he expectantly awaited the first
influx of reports from the various commands and bureau chiefs.

A report

to Congress on the status of the War Department was due in two months,
and he believed he would then be able to tell the legislators that his
changes were well underway.

Now, he wrote to Andrew Jackson:

I have strong hopes that Qr. masters and other branches of disburse
ments, will hereafter be brought into much more exact method.
Charged, as the Department formerly was, with an infinity, of
details, it was quite impossible to bestow the requisite attention
to any one part without neglecting some other. A responsible heatj
to each branch of disbursements, will hereafter remove this evil.
It remained, however, for the young administrator to undo the
mismanagement of the previous several decades.

What Calhoun attempted

throughout 1818 was by no means a new or exotic procedure for the
governance of an executive department.

The requiring of exact reportage

of disbursements, and fixing responsibility precisely upon the officer
charged with doing a department's business was known then as the system
of "accountability," an administrative form whose origins lay in the
Federalist period.

The leading scholar of early American public admin

istration, Leonard White, has compared the Jeffersonian administrations
unfavorably with those of the Federalists, and assuredly the pre-Calhoun
War Department represented the worst that Jeffersonian talents had to
..
141
offer.
^^Calhoun's 1843 biography gives the reader the impression that
this new system was implemented quickly and rather easily, despite "for
midable opposition" in Congress, and that thereafter, the new system
worked "without a jar." See Calhoun Biography, pp. 25-26.
-*-40john c. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, September 29, 1818, Let-torsi
Sent, SWMA.
141white, The Jeffersonians, p. 162.
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Calhoun's drive for economy and efficiency in the War Department's
administration has impressed many observers; their judgment has been based
largely upon an often cited managerial feat:

when he came to office, the

department's unsettled accounts amounted to forty-five million dollars.
When he left office eight years later, that figure had been reduced to
less than four million dollars.

Calhoun proudly reported this accomplish

ment to President Monroe in 1823, and he repeated it in his campaign
biography years later.
modern scholarship.

143

142

Since then, this claim has become enthroned in

Calhoun was not dissimulating when he made this

boast, and what he had achieved had been considerable, but the impression
left is that Calhoun somehow forced the payment of forty-one million
dollars in back debts to the War Department.

That he certainly did not do.

Confusion on this matter arises from a general misunderstanding,
explained fully by Leonard White (and ignored by most historians), of
what was entailed in the settling of an account.

In 1817 there existed

unsettled War Department accounts dating back to 1798.

The War of 1812

further aggravated the problem, and the number of untended accounts made
a quantum leap into the regions of absurdity.

From the inception of the

republic, vouchers and receipts had been required in the maintenance of
public business, with varying success.

The greatest problem with such

accounts was in collecting the money after they had been settled.

When

civilians were involved, the only avenue for collection from the recal
citrant debtor was by court action.

White points out that not one, but

142

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, November 29, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:385. This report also received public recongition; see,
National Intelligencer, December 16, 1823. See also Calhoun Biography,
25-26.
143se6f for one example, Weigley, History of the U. S. Army,
p. 134.
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two cases were often required:

one to adjudge the settlement, charged to

the account, and another to force the debtor to bring forward his records
for examination.

In the matter of forcing the debtor to obey the settle

ment of the account, the Secretary of War never had any authority over
the civilians and only the power of suasion (official disapproval) over
military debtors.

That affair was left in the hands of the Treasury and

the government's attorneys.

144

Before the spring of 1817 the War Department's accounting opera
tion was handled by several auditors.

From the vouchers and receipts

submitted in justification of expenditures, the auditors, using criteria
in War Department regulations, then determined whether claims were
allowable.

If the person submitting the account were unable to justify

his expenditures on the grounds of regulations or duties performed, he
automatically became liable for that amount.

(One officer pleaded a

lack of vouchers because his desk had been hit by cannon fire during the
war.)

Once a complete accounting was made, and once the auditor con

cluded how much the agent owed the government (it was rarely the other
way around), the account was considered "settled," transferred to the
Treasury for collection, and thereafter to the courts, if necessary, for
resolution.^"
The number of unsettled accounts attracted the attention of a
House Committee in 1816.

All of the departments of the executive branch

had mounds of accounts in arrears, as the congressmen found out when they
144

White, The Jeffersonians, pp. 162-175. Of course, no one
could be sure exactly what the amount of the unsettled accounts were
until they were, in fact, settled.
145

Ibid., p. 162.
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advanced on a tour of inspection, "into a labyrinth, the intricacies of
which increased at every step."

At the same time, the secretaries of

the departments applied themselves to the problem.

In December, 1816,

the report of the four secretaries recommended the abolition of depart
mental auditors, and the establishment of a central auditing operation
in the Treasury.

Furthermore, they argued, all power to effect final

settlement should be vested in the Secretary of the Treasury, who could
be armed with powers of summary judgment and confiscation.

With the

exception of this last recommendation, these provisions were adopted by
the Congress in 1817; thereafter, William Lee and Peter Hagner, the
Second and Third Auditors of the Treasury, would handle War and Navy
146
accounts.
By the time Calhoun had to face the unsettled accounts, then,
much of the settlement machinery was beyond his control.

Only the

administrative task of assembling the pertinent documents justifying
accounts could be done within his department.

With only a part of the

means of settlement within his purview, all that was left for Calhoun
and his clerks to do was climb what must have been mountains of paper.
That they managed to clear away over ninety per cent of it in less than
seven years is a testament to their eyesight and determination.
With the exception of revenues marked for the retirement of the
national debt, the War Department used more of the government's money
146

Ibid., pp. 171-175. Over a year later Treasury Secretary
William Crawford reiterated the need for some sort of summary power of
coercion to assist in the settling of accounts.
In a report to Congress,
Crawford observed:
"The views and opinions presented in those papers
[his previous report of December 6, 1816] not only remain unchanged, but
have acquired additional force from the experience of the past year."
U. S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2349.
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than any other branch.

147

The greatest part of the War Department's

budget was taken up by pay and allowances (and pensions), but the total
of all the other expenditures was larger, and these had to do with
fortifications, and equipping, supplying and moving the army.

148

Regard

less of the particular system under which such great sums were administered,
abuses and fiscal malpractice were to be expected.

Considering the number

of officers and agents charged with protecting the public monies, it is
noteworthy that most performed their duties with fidelity.

Naturally

enough, these agents went unnoticed by Calhoun; those who acted otherwise
were of more interest to him.
The government's way of doing business sometimes aided fiscal
abuses.

The backlog of unsettled accounts meant that a case might not

come up for years, and even then no resolution might be possible.

The

House committee formed to investigate accounts in 1816 pointed out
frankly:
The conviction on the part of an officer that his accounts cannot
or will not be settled for years presents a certain degree of
impunity to embezzlement, and powerfully tempts to the commission
of it. 1-49
147

Between 1817 and 1822 the War Department called upon the
Treasury for about forty million dollars, averaging eight million dollars
a year. By comparison, monies devoted to the retirement of the public
debt in 1818 amounted to $12,600,000, while the War Department drew
$6,000,000 from the Treasury, or 23 per cent of the total revenues for
that year.
"State of the Finances, November 24, 1818," and "Report of
the Comptroller, November 26, 1822," in Walter Lowrie, Walter S. Franklin,
and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers. Documents
Legislative and Executive of the United States (1st through 25th Con
gresses, 1789-1838), Class 3, Financial Affairs, 38 vols. (Washington,
D. C.: Gales and Seaton, 1833-1861), 3:275 and 4:2 (hereafter cited as
ASPFA) .
■*-4®For a breakdown of War Department expenditures by year, see
Secretary of War James Barbour's "Report to the Select House Committee
on Retrenchment, March 3, 1828," ibid., 5:1078-1080.
149

Quoted in White, The Jeffersonians, p. 168.
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The War Department had commonly advanced money to paymasters and
recruiters in anticipation of vouchers during the war, and the practice
of advancing money on government contracts was common as well.

At the

end of the war it was reported that 198 paymasters had outstanding
accounts, and that during a two-year period only fifteen of these had
been satisfactorily disposed of.

150

Calhoun was given a list of pay

masters whose accounts were in arrears, but since the auditors were then
calculating that there were five thousand unsettled accounts, Calhoun
could do but little.

The Secretary sent the list of paymasters on to

Congress and (doubtless with some relief) remarked that "this department
does not possess the power to coerce persons" to pay what they owed to
^

the government.

151

Moreover, the system for monitoring current accounts in the War
Department was s~ill rudimentary.

Paymasters (and any other officer who

disbursed money) could simply take their advances and mix them with their
own money in local savings accounts and draw interest on the whole until
such time came that they actually had to pay the money out.

This prac

tice was probably widespread and was seen merely as a perquisite of
office.

Calhoun was convinced this was so serious that he took the

trouble to issue a general order, requiring that officers keep public
and private monies in separate accounts in the localities, and that

S., Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 23472352, 2358-2360.
^^William Lee to John C. Calhoun, February 14, 1818, and John C.
Calhoun to Henry Clay, February 28, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:138, .1631.05.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106
wherever possible, in the branches of the Bank of the United States.

152

At the same time, Calhoun instructed his bureau chiefs to watch over
large cash advances more closely in the future.

153

Thereafter, those

whom the government owed would have to wait until vouchers arrived in
the War Department and were approved; the overall effect would be
greater fiscal control at the expense of local convenience.
Calhoun's attempts to deal with current accounts were further
complicated by the chaotic monetary system of the country.

Government

bills of credit were very like bank notes, and they did not carry uniform
value in different parts of the nation.

These bills of credit could

therefore become objects of speculation, fluctuating against local bank
notes, and usually they did poorly by the transaction.

Bills of govern

ment credit were usually discounted on the frontier because of the sheer
delay in redeeming them for specie and also because of the poor credit
reputation of the War Department.

This meant that prices to the War

Department had the local exchange added, plus an allowance for a consid
erable (some said inevitable) discount.
considerable.

The loss to the department was

The situation was described for Calhoun by William

Cummings of Georgia:
You will ascertain on enquiry that Q, M. Certificates within six
months have been sold at great discount; & yet that the sellers
have scarcely been the losers, as they added to the ordinary charges
a liberal allowance for this probable or rather inevitable discount.
The bad credit of the Department must I think exceed all its other

152

John C. Calhoun to Thomas S. Jesup, November 11, 1819; John C.
Calhoun to George Bomford, March 12, 1818; John C. Calhoun to Robert
Brent, March 12, 1818; and John C. Calhoun to Daniel Parker, March 12,
1818, ibid., 3:484; 2:186-187.
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evils together.
It is improbable that the total loss from other
causes would equal 10 per Cent on the whole necessary expenditures;
while in fact Q. M. Certificates have been repeatedly 20 a 30 per
Cent below par.^-^
As much as Calhoun tried to minimize this sort of speculation,
there was still ample opportunity for agent speculation on exchange
futures, and he knew it.

Calhoun told a friend;

I have been taking the most effectual measures to take it out of the
power of the officers, to commit a fraud on the government by
pocketing the exchange.
Prevention is better than punishment.
I
do hope and believe that the new arrangement of the staff will enable
me another year, to bring the Disbursements of the Army into very
exact method. The publick has a right to expect it, and if my
health and abilities will permit, it shall be done.-*-^
How this speculation damaged the War Department's image and
credit came to Calhoun's notice shortly after he arrived in office.

The

assistant quartermaster for east Tennessee, Major John Rogers, had appar
ently been selling fraudulent claims against the government.

In

December, 1817, Rogers asked Senator John Williams to intercede on his
behalf with Calhoun for the advancement of more funds.

When Williams

inquired of the Secretary about Rogers' affairs, he was told that no
more advances would be made on Rogers' account until his outstanding
claims had been a p p r o v e d . T h i s
forced Rogers' resignation.

news, when it reached Knoxville,

With speculators concerned, the accounts of

East Tennessee in a jumble, and the Tennessee congressional delegation
calling upon Calhoun to settle these claims quickly, Calhoun took the

154

William Cummings to John C. Calhoun, April 27, 1818, ibid.,

2:262.
155

John C. Calhoun to Abner Lacock, August 26, 1818, ibid., 3:70.

^"^John C. Calhoun to John Williams, December 27, 1817, ibid.,
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best step.

157

He essentially stopped all business by the government in

that area in order to give a new quartermaster time to arrive on the
spot.

The new agent was to gather all the claims and vouchers he could

and transmit the lot of them to the Third Auditor, who would pass on the
validity of the debts.

158

One-third of all the east Tennessee claims

had been bought up by merchants, and it was entirely possible that
Rogers had some of his own as well.
Senator Williams told Calhoun:

Much disgusted by the affair,

"The reputation of the Government has

been injured among the common people by the Petty vilanies [sic] of our
Q masters."

159

The claims approved by the auditor were eventually paid.

With men like Rogers gone from the service, and the new system of
accountability being taken more seriously by the military, Calhoun's
days in the War Office were made easier.

IV
Quite clearly, some War Department business was beyond Calhoun's
ability to control from his office in Washington.

Regulations, once

promulgated, could be either ignored or manipulated to one's advantage.
Policies carefully set in the War Department or decided upon in the
cabinet or Congress could be made a shambles when they were executed.
To his credit, Calhoun never despaired of bringing the unwieldy military
establishment to heel.
157

William Blount, John Rhea, and Francis Jones to John C.
Calhoun, December 30, 1817, ibid., 2:45.
158

John C. Calhoun to Robert Houston, February 10, 1818, ibid.,

2:131.
159

John Williams to John C. Calhoun, July 28, 1818, ibid.,

2:434-435.
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It was perhaps an index of how poorly run the previous War
Department administrations had been that considerable authority had
seeped away to the localities and attached themselves to figures who
were technically under Washington's control.

One of these figures who

had arrogated considerable authority unto himself was General Andrew
Jackson, and he posed problems for Calhoun of a kind the Secretary did
not face elsewhere.
Well before Calhoun took office, a dispute had been brewing
between Jackson and the government over the transfer of one of Jackson's
officers without the general's permission or knowledge.

Monroe and the

acting Secretary of War, George Graham, had handled the affair badly and
had succeeded in elevating a minor communications problem to a matter of
principle of civilian control over the military.

For his part, Jackson

had been neither temperate nor skillful in his dealings with Monroe and
Graham.

By October, 1817, Monroe had been forced into telling Jackson

that "this order involves the naked principle, of the power of the
Executive, over the officers of the army, in such cases, for the depart
ment of war cannot be separated from the President."

By that time,

however, Monroe had temporized considerably by telling Jackson that
while the principle stood fixed, as a matter of practice orders should
follow the chain of command.

160

Jackson would not be conciliated, and

Calhoun, arriving in office, was instructed by Monroe to write to
Jackson, reiterating the administration's position, but telling him also

Andrew Jackson to James Monroe, March 4, 1817; James Monroe
to Andres Jackson, June 2, 1817, August 4, 1817, October 5, 1817,
Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2:281, 296-297, 319, 329.
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that thereafter all orders would be issued through divisional commanders.161
This was hardly a victory for civil control of the military, as
some writers have represented it.

X6 2

At least Jackson thought not;

Calhoun's letter of December 29 explaining the "new policy" bears a note
in Jackson1s hand:

"adopting the principles I contended for."

163

Cer

tainly no other officer in the American army was willing to go so far in
defying civil authority, nor was one likely to be so successful in doing
so.

Neither Monroe nor Calhoun (and indeed few others in Washington)

was willing to deny that Jackson, as an authentic American hero, was
jealous of his prerogatives.

The conciliatory letters written by Monroe

and Calhoun are sufficiently convincing on that point, but Calhoun could
not have been altogether satisfied by the position Monroe had ordered
him to take in this affair.

Subsequent events proved that Calhoun was

extremely sensitive to military presumptions of independence of any kind,
regardless 'of their origin.
Although Calhoun got along with Jackson thereafter, the Secre
tary's private opinions about the hero of New Orleans became progressively
more jaundiced.

When Calhoun and the rest of the Cabinet met to consider

the official reaction to Jackson's illegal invasion of the Spanish
territory of Florida, Calhoun was for all but cashiering the impetuous

X6X

James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, December 2, 1817, ibid.,

2:336-337.
X6 2
W. Edwin Hemphill, "Introduction," Calhoun Papers, 2:lix;
Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, pp. 136-137.
X6 3
John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, December 29, 1817, note
appended to letter in Jackson's hand, Bassett, Jackson Correspondence,
2:343.
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general.

The Secretary was "extremely dissatisfied" with Jackson's

actions in Florida, and he recommended that the President absolutely
disavow the general's activities there.

164

Later, in a conversation

with John Quincy Adams about Jackson, Cahoun remarked, in Adams' words:
He had no doubt that Jackson's intentions were perfectly pure and
upright; but his disposition was to exercise to its utmost extent
every particle of power given to him. He had not sufficient regard
to the genius of our institutions and to the popular o p i n i o n .
No such hero's mantle as Jackson's hung on General Moses Porter.
Less than one year after the administration's dispute with Jackson over
chain of command, Porter was complaining to Calhoun of the very same
problem and defending the same principle of non-intervention in command
that Jackson had espoused.

By this time, however, Calhoun apparently

had decided that if Monroe had not meant to single Jackson out as a
special case, the same procedure should be followed in this one.

The

Secretary of War acknowledged that all orders should be sent through the
field commanders and apologized to Porter for not having done so.
Calhoun's reply to Porter clearly indicated that the administration had
. . .
166
moved away from its original stand of absolute civilian supremacy.
On yet a third occasion, Calhoun was forced to consider, and
then to temporize, his obvious feelings on civil-military relations.
During a Fourth of July oration at Boston in 1819, a speaker (one of
Boston's selectmen) made some indirect and disapproving comments about
General Jackson, and a young officer, James Scallan, who had served
with Jackson and who was present, took umbrage at the remarks.

^^Adams, Diary, 4:107.

The

^^Ibid., 5:370-371.

166

John C. Calhoun to Moses Porter, April 9, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:237.
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officer dispatched a letter to the Selectmen of Boston, demanding a
retraction of the slur.

167

Apparently, the letter was couched in no

uncertain terms; the Selectmen promptly informed Monroe of the contre
temps, and the matter became the subject of several cabinet meetings.
Calhoun was outraged.

He recommended to Monroe that Scallan be cashiered

immediately from the service.

In Calhoun's opinion, this was not a fit

subject for a court-martial, but "a military offense against the civil
authority."

Monroe called for the opinions of all the cabinet officers.

Calhoun's stern line did not prevail:

he was instructed by Monroe to

make known to Scallan and the Selectmen of the President's "decided
disapprobation," but no further action was taken.

168

It was true, then, that Calhoun was ambitious for his country,
for the army, and indeed for himself, but it is also true that he was a
slave to none of these ambitions.

The results of the war which Calhoun

talked about so fondly merely meant to him that the nation could not get
on to greater things:

prosperity and expansion.

He believed that

military establishment, so long merely the nation's unwelcome guest,
could aid in that expansion and national improvement, but only if it
could be brought under control and manipulated to that end.
effect was Calhoun's main goal as Secretary of War.

This last

It was made all the

more desirable by the fact that any successes he had would redound to
his credit.

After all, the shortcomings of the military establishment

were familiar enough to all as shortcomings of the nation's own making.

T_67
Adams, Diary, 4:408-412.
168

Ibid. John C. Calhoun to James Scallan, John C. Calhoun to
the Selectmen of Boston, August 21, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:263.
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CHAPTER III

THE TRANSIT OF MILITARY NATIONALISM

Considering the endemic tension between nation and army, the
survival of the army during the republic's first years was as surprising
as the survival of the nation itself.

In a nation relying upon reaction

rather than anticipatory defense, impulses tending toward independence
in military thought were stunted.

Military policies were set more by

political intuition than by rational considerations of national needs,
capabilities, and resources.

Military policy became at any given time,

therefore, an index of the vitality of old republican ideas about a
standing defense.
This being so, traditional enmity toward preparedness began to
fade with the first urgings of nationalism after the American Revolu
tion.

The United States was anxious to obtain all the implements and

accouterments of nationhood:

a stable government, a reliant economic

structure, and an inventive cultural life.

These things were the work

of generations; military accouterments, accomplishing the same result,
could be more easily obtained.'*'

1Obviously, much more is involved here than the evaluation and
adoption of military ideas and implements. In this view practicalities
become of only secondary importance: it is the image that counts. One
need only look at the fantastic defense expenditures of certain devel
oping nations today to understand that defense is not the only reason
for a sophisticated military establishment.
The importation of military
knowledge and accouterments by underdeveloped nations which have no real
need of them will have to be explained in other than rational terms. In
113
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The military image which most effectively portrayed nationhood
at the turn of the eighteenth century was the fortress, or more particu
larly, the fortresses of France.

The man most often associated with the

system of French fortifications was Sebastien de Vauban, who had done his
work nearly a century before for Louis XIV.

2

In the early nineteenth

century, however, Vauban's work had less to do with military policy than
with the symbolism of national wealth and international prestige.

Mili

tarily, fortresses had long since been redundant.
Americans, however, looked upon the great coastal fortresses of
Cherbourg and Brest as the penultimate in military protection.
defense had long been a national preoccupation.

Coastal

Before independence

there had been British-built gun platforms or earthen redoubts pro
tecting several American ports.

During the Revolution the American

coastline was, for all purposes, an open one, since no American navy
existed to act in conjunction with any of these rudimentary defenses.
Although a lack of time and meager resources accounted for this poor
preparation, there was a lack of mental resources as well:

French

1975 the African nation of Qatar, for instance, expended $106,000,000 on
military equipment, or seven per cent of its Gross National Product to
protect itself against threats which simply did not exist. In this last
regard, Qatar in 1975 was much like the United States in 1800. See
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1976), p. 44.
2

Still the best short treatment of Vauban*s life, thought, and
works is Henry Guerlac, "Vauban: The Impact and Science of War," in
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler,
ed. by Edward Meade Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943),
pp. 26-48. See also Sebastien Leprestre de Vauban, A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification, trans. and ed. by George A. Rothrock. (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968). The regard which Calhoun had for
this military thinker will be demonstrated later in this chapter.
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engineers were imported during the struggle and at the end of the Revo
lution, the "American engineers" contained only one American out of
fourteen experts.
The French general in charge of the American engineers, Louis
Duportain, attempted unsuccessfully to establish a school where native
engineers could be trained, but this resistance to military education
curiously did not extend to fortifications themselves.

3

In 1794 Congress

passed the Naval Act which inaugurated a program of fortifications that
continued for several decades thereafter.

That year eight civilian

engineers were hired to oversee the project; only two did not have
Gallic names.

When Congress recommended so much money for fortifications

that the program actually outstripped the nation's technological capa
cities, then clearly fortifications meant something other than the mere
improvement of the military establishment.

The Due de la Rochefoucault-

Liancourt, traveling through the United States in 1799, noticed what
happened when advanced military technology was embraced by an under
developed nation:
Those [fortifications] which the Union erects and keeps up are
few, and almost all are incomplete. Good engineers being scarce,
the Americans are obliged to employ such as they can get, who are
generally foreigners who do not half understand their business,
and who are generally more attentive to their own interest than
that of the United States. Great plans are drawn, the works are
begun at great expense; there is a want of money the following
year; and the fortifications are either entirely relinquished,
or reduced to so small a scale that they are either good for nothing
or at least defective, so that the money spent the preceding year
may be said to be thrown away.^
3
Don Higginbotham, The War for American Independence (New York:
Macmillan and Company, 1971), p. 310 (hereafter cited as Higginbotham,
War for American Independence) .
4

"Instructions of Secretary of War Henry Knox to Bechet Rochefontaine, March 29, 1794," ASPMA, 1:73; Weigley, History of the U. S.
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Rochefoucault was correct only in part, however; there was a
great deal of money being allowed by the government for fortifications.
Between the Naval Act and the advent of the Jeffersonians, more than
half a million dollars was spent on eighteen different coastal instal
lations, and only in 1796 and 1797 did the money expended decline.^
While expenditures for fortifications generally increased during this
period, the total expenses of the military establishment remained fairly

0
constant, averaging two million dollars annually.

Fortifications, in

other words, were absorbing more and more of the total military budget
of the United States.

At the same time, the nation still relied upon

the citizen militiaman for the bulk of its defense establishment.
The question thus remains:

why was a fledgling nation so

anxious to prevent the growth of a standing army developing a military
building program beyond its capacities to maintain?

Considering the

relative rates of expenditure on fortifications and the military estab
lishment, one answer presents itself:

fortifications did not directly

threaten military amateurism, large standing armies did.

But these

figures tell, as no political rhetoric can, that the nation's makers of
military policy were beginning to doubt that the. militia could serve the

Army, p. 98; Due de la Rochefoucault-Liancourt, Travels Through the
United States in North America (London, 1799), 2:625, quoted in Kohn,
Eagle and Sword, p. 303N.
5

"Statement of Moneys applied for the defence of certain Ports
and Harbors in the United States, in Pursuance of the 'Act to provide
for the Defence of certain Ports and Harbors in the United States,'
passed the 20th of March, 1794, distinguishing the moneys expended for
the Fortifications of each Harbor to the 16th of November, 1801, inclu
sive," ASPMA, 1:153.
^"Military and Naval Expenditures, from 1789 to 1810, April 3,
1.810," ibid., 1:268.
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requirements of defense entirely unaided.
arms was already being subtly eroded.

The ethic of the citizen at

Simultaneously, the fortifications

acted as physical symbols of the nation's ambitions.

7

All this had little enough to do with the effectiveness of forti
fications on the American coastline or anywhere else.

Twelve years and

considerable expenditures after the passage of the Naval Act, Secretary
of War Henry Dearborn reported to Congress that, of twenty different
locations (some of which had more than one installation), only two— Fort
Independence in Boston Harbor, and Fort Trumbull at New London— did not
need extensive repairs.

Five of these, Dearborn said, were either mili

tarily or geographically impractical.

Forts Adams and Wolcott (near

Newport, Rhode Island) were wrongly placed to begin with, and, said
Dearborn, "would not, in the smallest degree, annoy ships of war, but in
one of three open and convenient passages by which Rhode Island may be
g
approached."

At Charleston three sites had been destroyed by a storm

in 1804, and Savannah's Forts Green and St. Mary's were flooded, appar
ently in perpetuity.

All work on these forts had stopped, and it was

believed that they would have to move to an altogether different location,
once the Georgia legislature saw fit to cede lands for that purpose.

9

^There was a growing awareness among military men on both sides
of the Atlantic that militiamen did not operate as well independently as
when they were supported by regulars, increased artillery, or fortifica
tions. Simon Bernard expressed this view in a letter to Wolfe Tone,
August 3, 1820, Vandeventer Papers, which was an extended treatise on
American artillery. Bernard argued for an increase in the artillery arm
of the standing force precisely because of the number of amateurs in the
defense establishment. See David Chandler's discussion of how Napoleon
dealt with a large influx of volunteers in constructing La Grande Armee,
in The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1966),
pp. 332-333.
^"Report of the Secretary of War on Fortifications within the
United States and Territories," ASPMA, 1:192-196.
9Ibid., p. 195.
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Dearborn's remarks on fortifications deserve to be noticed
further, because he was interested in military affairs and at least had
some claim to understanding them.

That he was skeptical of the modern

practicality of fortresses is evident from his reports as a Secretary of
War.

To a Congress which seemed more than willing to spend huge amounts

of money on these military artifacts, he pointed out that warships were
no longer hesitant to engage coastal batteries in order to force a pas
sage.

Referring to the fortifications around the harbor of New York,

Dearborn said:
So many instances [have] occurred of ships of war not only having
passed the best batteries within even point blank shot (which is
less than 500 yards) but of presenting their broadsides to such
batteries, with springs on their cables, and sustaining the fire
for a considerable length of time, and even, in many cases, of
silencing the batteries.
This sort of thing had happened recently, he said, between
British warships and the harbor defenses at C o p e n h a g e n . T h e impres
sion Dearborn's remarks conveyed was that American batteries could not
hope to accomplish what the fine Danish betteries had

failed to do.

And

yet, after all of this, "notwithstanding the experience of the ages to
the contrary," authorities at New York had persisted in emplanting fixed
gun batteries solely to protect the entrance channels to the harbor.
Dearborn's protests went unheeded, and as the

12

War of 1812 broke

out Congress showed no inclination to economize on coastal defenses.

In

1812 more than $750,000 were given over to military building, with the
greatest part going to forts.

During the following year, Congress ap

proved one and a half million dollars for this single item— the largest

10Ibid., p. 193.

i;LIbid.

12Ibid.
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outlay for fortifications in the history of the republic.

In the last

year of the war, only three hundred thousand dollars were authorized,
suggesting that even though the money was available, there was simply not
enough time or skill to spend the sums allotted the year before.

13

The Chesapeake emergencies of 1814 proved this to be the case;
defenses along the bay were in various states of disrepair.

James Monroe

was in the thick of the action, both bureaucratic and military.

The

future president saw an undefended coast, due, he thought, to Secretary
of War John Armstrong's stubborn resistance to preparation.

Monroe then

witnessed a government in sorry flight, and the capitol sacked, while
well-defended Baltimore stood the British raiders off.

Perhaps as much

as any other event, the defense of Baltimore kept the fortifications
program alive when Monroe finally became President.

14

Ignoring all contrary lessons of the war, Monroe threw his
support behind an extensive program of postwar defensive building.

Pro

bably at Monroe's urging, President Madison appointed a Board of Engineers
to devise a system of coastal fortifications.

The promises held out by

the creation of the board encouraged one young officer then on a tour of
the continent.
Swift:

Ex-artillerist James Renwick wrote to Chief Engineer

"I am glad to see a disposition on the part of the Secretary of

War [Monroe] for fortifications. . . .

An inspection of the ports of

13"Expenditures for Fortifications of all categories, including
arsenals, by year, 1812-1820, February 16, 1820," ASPFA, 3:489.
14

Ammon, Monroe, pp. 318-337. Armstrong had repeatedly resisted
preparing defenses for Washington and the Chesapeake Bay because in his
view, neither was of any military importance to the British. All of
which, of course, was true enough, if one neglected the psychological
value attached to a nation's capital if not by the citizenry as a whole
then by its powerful residents. See also Harry Coles, The War of 1812
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 172-186.
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France and Holland made me blush at the small expenditure of money to
which we have been willing to limit the defence of places of infinitely
greater importance."15
When Monroe became President, he announced his intention to continue what had been started under Madison's administration.

16

The new

President's ostensible reason for his northern tour during the summer of
1817 was to inspect that frontier's military defenses

(he was perhaps as

much interested in Federalist political defenses, however), and he took
care to lecture the northerners on the need for extensive coastal fortifications.

17

Appropriations in Congress kept pace (for the time being)

with Monroe's plans.

18

Considering the time, money, and energy which

Calhoun eventually devoted to fortifications, it was easily one of the
most important programs.

Monroe thought so.

He told John Quincy Adams

that the new system of fortifications was "one of the great objects by
which [my] administration may be signalized in the view of posterity."

19

It was also significant that virtually the first high-ranking officer
whom Calhoun met as he entered on his official duties was the Chief of
the Corps of Engineers.
l^Weigley, American Way of War, p. 59. James Renwick to Joseph G.
Swift, May 13, 1816, The Papers of Joseph G. Swift, The Library of the
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York (hereafter cited as
Swift Papers).
l^James Monroe, "Inaugural Address," March 4, 1817, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:10.
^ S e e Monroe's remarks to the citizens of Baltimore in Narrative
of a Tour, p. 18.
18

For the five years immediately following the end of the war,
appropriations for the coastal defense program were at least half a mil
lion dollars annually.
"Expenditures for Fortifications of all categories,
including arsenals, by year, 1812-1820, February 16, 1820," ASPFA, 3:489.
19

Adams, Diary, 5:331.
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If Calhoun was the least hesitant about supporting this grand
program, he did not show it.

With the President so enamored of fortifi

cations, Calhoun would not indulge the slightest doubt that fortifications
were what the nation needed before any other military implement.

The new

Secretary carefully did not intend to take the same position as Monroe's
wartime nemesis, John Armstrong, who had a low opinion of fixed defenses;
and yet Armstrong was right:

the day of the great fortress had gone by.

Watching the new program develop from his exile in New York, Armstrong
wondered when the expensive folly would end.

He wrote to his friend,

Chief Clerk Vandeventer:
A hundred years ago, Europe was fortification-mad and so long as
this disorder lasted the Art of War was retrograde— Frederich saw
all this folly and directed his efforts to perfect his field artil
lery & his infantry and accordingly left all other powers of his
day far behind him; but it was the war of the French Revolution and
the men found in it, who completely broke down the fortification
system, by shewing in its extreme expensiveness & 2d its nothingness
— that it saved no province or kingdom and that strong armies stood
in no need of it as a friend and dispised it as an enemy. When will
our eyes be open to these truths?^
Having no such qualms, Calhoun embraced the fortifications pro
gram as ardently as did his President.

In one of his first reports to

Congress Calhoun pronounced "the existing fortifications . . . wholly
insufficient in the event of a future war."

The new Secretary also gave

it as his opinion that the Regular Army was barely sufficient just to
maintain the few defenses then existing, much less to fend off any sort
of attack.
to suffice.

In the absence of a suitable army, fortifications would have
21

Moreover, Calhoun's acceptance of Monroe's ideas on this

20

John Armstrong to Christopher Vandeventer, November 21, 1819,
Vandeventer Papers.
21

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, December 17, 1817, Calhoun
Papers, 2:25.
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matter (as on others) was politically expedient:

the Monroe-Calhoun

collaboration was a case of nationalists closing ranks.
Once the policy was set, all that remained for Calhoun to do was
manage it.

He fortunately arrived on the scene when a general re-

evaluation of the system was occurring; Madison had suspended all new
work on defenses until the Board of Engineers could finish their survey
of the coastal areas.

Thus, Calhoun was able to concentrate first on

those works which were already in progress, leaving the additions the
Board might recommend till later.
For
wasdone in

the greater time Calhoun was in office, most new building
two strategically important areas.

the Chesapeake Bay.

The first of these was

As an avenue of attack which gave onto some of the

most important centers of the nation, the bay was the most valuable
point on the eastern coast.

The bay's importance had not escaped the

notice of the British in 1814, of course, although they had not taken
full advantage of it.
stages in 1817:

Four works for the area were in the planning

Fort Delaware, on the Pea Patch Island in the Delaware

River, protecting approaches to Philadelphia; Fort Washington, above
Alexandria on the Potomac River; Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort;
and Fort Calhoun, one mile offshore on the Rip Rap shoals.

22

Each of

these was to be of stone construction and pentagonal design; the smalles
of thefour, Fort Washington, was designed to mount
The

140 guns.

23

second area of defensive importance was the western Gulf

Coast, which had been the scene of a considerable landing by the British

22

Joseph G. Swift to John C. Calhoun, December 8, 1817, and
Walter Armistead to John C. Calhoun, November 6, 1820, ibid., 2:4-6,
5-241-242.

2^Ibid.
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in 1814.
office:

Only two defensive works existed there when Calhoun came to
Fort Bowyer on Mobile Point; and Fort St. Philip, along the

Mississippi below New Orleans.

The Board of Engineers had few kind

words to say about these two installations:

Bowyer "could not hold out

three days against an attack," and Fort St. Philip was "much too small
and weak to defend the Mississippi."

24

With several new fortifications in the offing and a number of
other works needing repairs, the strain on the tiny Corps of Engineers
was considerable.

Calhoun had not yet issued his regulations requiring

a supervising engineer for each project, and it was just as well:

there

were only twenty engineers in the entire corps, not all of whom were
available for fortifications projects.

A report by General Swift just

before he resigned in late 1818 showed that only twelve engineers were
available to oversee the construction of seventeen planned installations.

25

The practice in the field became quite different from what

Calhoun had planned, then; the engineers were forced to supervise more
than one site at a time.

The lack of trained and accountable personnel

added to Calhoun's difficulties in making Monroe's dreams of a fortress
America come true.
The amount of money which the administration contemplated
spending on the fortification system was staggering by the standards of
peacetime military operations.

General Bernard's Board of Engineers

24

Brigadier Simon Bernard, Captain Jesse D. Elliot, and Major
Joseph G. Totten to John C. Calhoun, February 7, 1821, ibid., 5:599-616.
25

Joseph G. Swift to John C. Calhoun, September 30, 1818,
December 8, 1817, ibid., 3:175, 2:7. See also, "Engineer Regulations,"
April 7, 1818, Letters Sent, SWMA.
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reported in 1821 that eight million dollars should be enough to finish a
complete system.

26

Of necessity, civilians would have to be contracted

to do the actual building of the fortresses; this left the door open for
all sorts of problems which Calhoun would eventually have to cope with.
When news of the Gulf coast projects at Mobile Bay (Mobile Point and
Dauphin Island) became public, an immediate speculation in coastal lands
broke out.

"The Speculators even anticipate governmental operations,"

one informant told Calhoun, "the system of defense determined upon by
the Executive has awakened all their speculative feelings."

27

The lands

intended for the defense program's use were otherwise worthless sand
hills and swamps, but when the public learned of the government's plans,
claims suddenly appeared which threatened to engross the whole Gulf

4- 28
coast.
The practice of advancing money to a contractor against the ful
fillment of the contract was a long-standing and fully recognized evil,
and one that Calhoun was decidedly against.

Although he avoided making

advances whenever he could, specie was in short supply in the West,
making the practice all the more necessary if the government was to use
any western contractors at all.

Monroe's government was sensitive to

western complaints that eastern businessmen had first claim on the govern
ment's contracts, and Calhoun was thus forced to operate against his

26

Brigadier Simon Bernard, Captain Jesse D. Elliot, and Major
Joseph G. Totten to John C. Calhoun, February 7, 1821, Calhoun Papers,
5:609.
27

James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, June 25, 1819, ibid., 4:116-

117.
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instincts.

29

All government contractors were required to post a bond to

ensure their performance and to protect the government from outrageous
losses, but Calhoun was put on his guard when he was told by an engineer
officer in the West that the civilian businessmen there looked upon "any
government undertaking as a l o t t e r y . T h e

contractors believed, appar

ently, that a government which had been so lenient with defaulters would
not now begin to take up bonds for failures.
The fortifications about Mobile Bay were therefore representative
of the problems arising from the fortifications program at large.

The

contract to construct two forts— one at Mobile Point and another at
Dauphin Island— had been won by Benjamin Hopkins.
was Captain James Gadsden.

The project engineer

There were difficulties from the beginning.

Gadsden did not believe that the firm of "Hopkins and Hanes" had any
business winning the contract in the first place, since they were
entirely ignorant of the techniques of military building.

Hopkins and

Hanes, Gadsden told Calhoun, "have never been engaged in any persuits [sic]
29

Representative Richard Mentor Johnson of Kentucky was, as ever,
interested in encouraging western business (primarily his own). In late
1818 and early 1819 Johnson and Calhoun exchanged several letters having
to do with the encouragement of western manufacturing. Johnson was of the
opinion that western businessmen should be given contracts lasting more
than a year because of the difficulties of transportation, and secondly,
that the government, not the western businessmen, absorb the costs of
transportation. Johnson had particular reference to the encouragement
of a fledgling textile establishment in the west, but Calhoun's tempered
replies indicate that Calhoun was anxious, in harmony with the rest of
the administration, to accommodate the westerners if he could. Monroe's
sentiments regarding the west were illustrated by the fact that it was
in that region that he searched first for a Secretary of War. See
Richard M. Johnson to John C. Calhoun [c. January 3, 1819]; and John C.
Calhoun to Callendar Irvine, January 5, 1819, ibid., 3:411, 450, 452-453.
^^James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, June 25, 1819, ibid., 4:116117.
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which could possibly prepare or qualify them for their present undertaking."

31

Second, although the contract allowed no advances, Hopkins

and Gadsden fell out over whether the government should pay in advance
for the construction of a brickyard in the vicinity.

Fearing that the

project would come to a complete halt, Gadsden reluctantly authorized
Hopkins to draw upon the government, and Gadsden did so with the certain
knowledge that if the accounts were not allowed by the Secretary of War,
he would stand liable for every penny.

32

Gadsden was so vexed by the

dispute that he requested a transfer from the engineers altogether.

33

As for Hopkins, he took his vexations to the grave, or rather transferred
them to Calhoun, for the contractor was carried off shortly by the
"bilious fever."33
Calhoun did not believe Hopkins had died.

Amid rumors that the

contractor was about to fail and go into bankruptcy, the news of Hopkin's
death was altogether too fortuitous.

The Secretary had first learned of

Hopkins' death from Joseph Swift at New York.
tion from a ship's captain in the harbor.

Swift had got the informa

Calhoun promptly sent off a

query to the ex-general:
As it is a matter of some importance that the fact should be accu
rately ascertained, if it does not give you too much trouble, I
would be glad if you could see the Capt. of the Vessel who brought
the Intelligence, & learn the fact from him. I do not put much con
fidence in the character of Hopkins and the whole may be a sham as
the government is considerabley [sic] in advance to him.34
31

James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, June 27, 1819, ibid., 4:122-

123.
32

Ibid.

33James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, August 7, 1819, ibid., 4:215.
34

John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 6, 1819, ibid.,

4:215.
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Only bad news followed.

Less than three weeks after he learned

of Hopkins' death, Calhoun found out that Hopkins had "farmed out his
contract to several sub-contractors" who had done their work as agreed
but had received no money whatever from Hopkins.

A clerk working for

the firm at Mobile Bay believed that the project was about to fail and
that the bonds Hopkins had put up were insufficient to protect the
government.35
Calhoun was so incensed that he refused to believe that Hopkins
was actually dead.

In September, 1819, Calhoun told his friend Swift:

"I fear Hopkins has had fraudulent views from the first, yet I will not
permit my mind to receive any impression to throw embarrassments in his
way unless they become absolutely necessary to secure the government."

36

In October Calhoun finally found out that Hopkins' death was not simply
a low trick, but the Secretary was not relieved.

37

By the end of the

year Gadsden was asking for money to cover advances and pronouncing the
Mobile Point fortification "paralyzed" by the contractor's death.
Gadsden was so disgusted by the entire affair that he recommended to
Calhoun that the government abandon the Gulf projects.

38

35

Christopher Vandeventer to John C. Calhoun, August 23, 1819,
ibid., 4:268.
36

John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, September 29, 1819, ibid.,

4:351.
37

Calhoun learned from a former officer m October that reports
of Hopkins' death were not merely a subterfuge, as the Secretary had
expected. James Mullany took ship at Mobile, bound for Philadelphia;
the fever swept the ship, which was forced to put in at Havanna.
Hopkins was on board; he died at sea. James Mullany to John C- Calhoun,
October 7, 1819, ibid., 4:362-366.
38

John Lind Smith to John C. Calhoun, November 22, 1819; James
Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, December 2, 1819; and James Gadsden to John C.
Calhoun, December 4, 1819, ibid., 4:427, 461-462, and 462-465.
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At this point, the cast of characters changed.

Richard Harris,

Hopkins' surviving partner, sold part of the contract to a group of
Virginia businessmen, led by Nimrod Farrow.

The government seemingly

had no control over such subsequent contractual adjustments; only a re
negotiation of the Hopkins' bond was required to satisfy the government.
Former General Swift had a hand in this interesting transaction.

Farrow

had chanced by Swift's New York office at the very time the ex-general
was writing Calhoun about Hopkins' death; it is thus possible that Swift
was a silent partner m

the new contract.

39

But Richard Harris did not find his new guarantors very con
genial; he and Farrow, who went down to Mobile shortly, fell to arguing,
and Harris complained that Farrow seemed bent on killing the project.
But the construction at Mobile had already become nearly inert:

40

although

the government eventually advanced more than $162,000 to the contractors,
the project showed few signs of improvement.

Subsequent official

reports showed that the value of the work actually done at Dauphin Island
was worth less than one-third of the advances.

41

Nimrod Farrow and his associates executed a bond in August,
1819. It guaranteed the completion of Dauphin Island under the provi
sions of the original contract. That the securities for the contract
were re-negotiated after Hopkins' death indicated official nervousness
that Hopkins' old bond was insufficient. Thus Farrow became Richard
Harris' partner in the works on Mobile Bay. Harris was not consulted
about this trnasaction, and therein lay the trouble between the new con
tractor and the old.
"Performance Bond of Nimrod Farrow,” August 2,
1819; James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, December 2, 1819, ibid., 4:198,
461. See also Swift's letter to Calhoun confirming Hopkins' death in
which he adds the postscript:
"Mr. N. Farrow has just called at my
office." Joseph G. Swift to John C. Calhoun, September 11, 1819, ibid.,
4:319.
40
41

James Gadsden to John C. Calhoun, January 20, 1820, ibid., 4:461.

"Fortifications on Dauphin Island:
February 7, 1825," ASPMA, 2:830.

Commissioner's Report,
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At this point, Congress became involved, and in a most circuitous
way.

General Bernard and his team of engineers had originally recon-

noitered the area around Mobile Bay.
upon the position:

He placed a high strategic value

it would, he said, protect the channel giving onto

the bay; Dauphin Island could further protect the coastwise trade from
Pensacola to New Orleans and prevent the latter city from being invested
from the east.

Yet there was a great deal of shoal water here, too

shallow to handle ships of war.

Thus, the entire bay need not be pro

tected, but it was important, crucial in fact, that all the channels be
charted and fortifications placed so that their guns controlled them.

If

somehow these entrance channels coursed out of gun range of any site on
shore, then fixed batteries were of course useless.
had failed to chart and sound the bay.

Apparently, Bernard

A naval chart appeared in Congress

in early 1820 which showed the bay cut by channels far away from either
of the fortifications under construction.

42

This alarming development occurred just as Samuel Smith of
Maryland, chairman of the House Ways and Means committee, was considering
new appropriations for the coastal defense program.

Disturbed by the

rumors, Smith's committee recommended that all funds devoted to the

Bernard's strategic assessment of Mobile Bay was evident in a
report submitted to Calhoun by Colonel Walker K. Armistead, then chief
of the Corps of Engineers, in 1820. See Walker K. Armistead to John C.
Calhoun, November 6, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:423. The House Committee
on Military Affairs which investigated the Mobile defenses, at which time
the original chart was compared with the soundings on a civilian pilot's
chart. Both charts agreed that the ship channel into the bay ran two and
a half miles away from Dauphin and, in the words of the committee, "no
ship of war larger than a sloop can pass the bar or approach the city of
Mobile nearer than twenty-five miles." "Fortifications for the Pro
tection of Mobile; Report of the Committee on Military Affairs, February
28, 1822," ASPMA, 2:345-346.
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Dauphin Island installation be cut off.

At the same time the committee

voted other monies— $800,000 in fact— for the remainder of the program,
a clear indication that neither Smith nor his fellow committee members
43
were hostile to the idea of forts in general.
Calhoun could not believe that it was possible that an experi
enced engineer such as Bernard could make such an "incredible" mistake,
or that the other board members, Elliot and Totten, were wrong.

The

Dauphin Island case was brought up before the cabinet for discussion.
Both Monroe and Calhoun were displeased by the preemptory demands of
Smith's committee; obviously, by designating how monies could be spent
within a particular program, Congress could go a long way toward con
trolling the Executive.

Against the advice of William Crawford and John

Quincy Adams, Monroe and Calhoun resolved to fight back.

44

In a defiant

letter to Smith, Calhoun explained that the President would decide how
the $800,000 appropriation would be spent and that Dauphin was deemed a
most important point on a defenseless coast.

45

During the following

year Calhoun shifted money which the Ways and Means committee had desig
nated for other installations and applied it toward the building of the
Mobile forts.
43

46

This was the rankest sort of opposition to congressional

Samuel Smith to John C. Calhoun, April 4, 1820, Calhoun Papers,

5:6-7.
44

Adams, Diary, 5:331-333.

45

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Smith, April 12, 1820, Calhoun Papers,

5:27-28.
46

See W. K. Armistead to John C. Calhoun, January 9, 1821, ibid.,
5:543-546. Armistead's report to Calhoun was intended to answer an
anticipated request for information from the Ways and Means Committee.
The report admitted that neither Mobile Point nor Dauphin Island would
be finished by the times stipulated in their contracts, and thus would
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demands, and it earned neither the administration nor its coastal
defense program much good will.
While Calhoun was jousting with Congress the project limped
along much as before.

In October, 1820, Richard Harris, apparently

fearing for his investment because of congressional attention, divested
himself of the contract.

With War Department approval, Harris sold his

contract to Colonel Turner Starke.

Starke had bought into a losing pro-

ject; Harris' move was that of a keen businessman.

47

Finally Congress drastically cut all funds for fortifications in
the spring of 1821, and Dauphin Island was the first to go:

the generous

$800,000 of the year before had been slashed to a little over $200,000,
and that, Calhoun said, "distributed in such a way, as to abandom [sic]
Dauphine [sic] Island, one of the most important position [sic] on the
Gulph [sic] frontier."

48

As Calhoun found that year, he was now dealing

with a very different sort of Congress than the one which had allowed
him to write his own bills his first year in office.

Retrenchment was

the theme in 1821, and retrenchment conveniently satisfied motives far
beyond the economic sense that it made then.

Dauphin Island, a project

doomed from the beginning by mismanagement and a fair amount of chicanery,
default. The report further detailed Calhoun's intention of using unex
pended balances from previous appropriations on the Gulf coast by
applying them to Dauphin now. Armistead also reported that the security
for Dauphin Island was valued at $211,951. Whether this sum included
the original bonds of the deceased Benjamin Hopkins, the report does not
make clear. Obviously Armistead is interested in showing the works to
be fully secured and posing no danger to the government.
47

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, March 14, 1821, ibid., 5:679-

680 .
48

John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 7, 1821, ibid.,

5 :662 .
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was given only a slightly premature end.

The government, having cut the

funding for the fort, now stood liable to the new contractor, who
pressed hxs claim to his eventual satxsfaction.

49

Whenever the dishonesty or unethical practices of a contractor
came to light, Calhoun's view of civilian businessmen dealing with his
department was reinforced.

The Secretary had come to have little regard

for this species of capitalist early in his War Department career, "ever
willing," as he said, to support his officers "against contractors."^0
But those who drew Calhoun's disapproval were the inept ones.

The sums

of money supporting War Department programs were too large not to attract
those with real talent, and there is evidence to suggest that there was a
group of men who knew much more of what they were about than the illstarred Benjamin Hopkins.

And these were men with whom Calhoun was

closely associated during his time in the War Office.
With the possible exception of the Gulf Coast forts, the govern
ment was most interested in erecting a string of fortifications which
could guard the approaches to the lower end of the Chesapeake Bay at the
Hampton Roads.

As Calhoun was coming into office, General Swift was

engaged in a survey of possible sites, and Swift reported later that two
fortifications, one at Old Point Comfort, and another at the Rip Rap
Shoals, a short distance away, could be built for a total of three
million dollars.^
49

The government eventually awarded Colonel Turner Starke $72,000
in damages arising from the stoppage of funds in 1821.
"Fortifications
on Dauphin Island: Commissioner's Report, February 7, 1825," ASPMA, 2:830.
50

John C. Calhoun to Talbot Chambers, September 1, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 3:85.
51

Joseph G. Swift to John C. Calhoun, January 6, 1818, xbid.,

2:61.
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The contract for the first phase of building these installa
tions— the laying of the stone foundations— was let in the summer of
1818 by General Swift in his capacity as the head of the Corps of
Engineers.

The defenses at Old Point Comfort were to be called Fortress

Monroe; those located on the shoals would be known as Fort Calhoun.
Although no law then demanded it, most large construction projects were
let only after advertisement and competitive bidding had taken place.
This was not the case with these works.

52

As the facts later came to light,

there were several questionable aspects of this project which threatened
the reputations of Calhoun and some of his closest associates.
The man who won the contract to supply the stone for the founda
tions of these two works was Elijah Mix, a New York businessman with a
dubious financial reputation.

It happened that he and Christopher

Vandeventer, Calhoun's chief clerk, were brothers-in-law.

At about the

time when General Swift (also a friend of Vandeventer's ) was deciding
upon letting out the contract, Mix appeared at Swift's Washington office
to chat about the project.

53

Swift already knew from various reports

that this contract could not be filled successfully at a price lower
than $3.50 a perch.

Mix was anxious to have the project, even though he

was so insolvent at the time he knew that no bondsman would support his

The customs of advertisement and competitive bidding were ob
served in other cases both prior to and after the letting of the Mix
contract. In the case of Mobile Bay fortifications contracts were
announced three months in advance. Swift later testified that since the
Chesapeake fortifications had received so much publicity anyway he did
not think it necessary to release a special announcement. This, and
other parts of the account of the Rip Rap scandal (as it was called) is
drawn from "Contract for Stone at the Rip Raps and Old Point Comfort,
May 7, 1822," ASPMA, 2:431-449.
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application.

Apparently without an inquiry into Mix's disreputable

finances, Swift awarded the contract to Mix, and Major Vandeventer was
obligingly present as a witness.

Mix agreed to deliver not less than

three thousand perches of stone per month at a price of $3.50 per perch.

54

But having won the contract, Mix still had to find a bondsman.
In order to increase his financial respectability Mix prevailed upon his
brother-in-law to buy into the contract.

In the fall of 1818 Vandeventer

bought twenty-five per cent of Mix's contract; the major later told a
congressional investigating committee that he had first asked Calhoun in
general terms about the legality of such an investment.

Calhoun had

reportedly said that Vandeventer's involvement in government business
was not illegal, but that it might cause doubts about his reputation.
Vandeventer, apparently not caring much for reputation, bought into the
project.

In April, 1819 Vandeventer bought yet another twenty-five per

cent; he was now half-owner of the contract, although Mix was still
liable for the fulfillment of the contract.^
Vandeventer's service to Mix was considerable.
in the venture had enabled Mix to find bondsmen.

His participation

Moreover, Vandeventer

had paid off $18,000 worth of debts which the insolvent Mix had acquired.
By the fall of 1819 Vandeventer saw the chance to divest himself of part
of his holdings and win a profit; he sold twenty-five per cent (half of
what he had) of the contract to the father-in-law he and Mix shared, Major
Samuel Cooper of New York."^
Sometime in early 1820 Calhoun learned that Vandeventer had not
taken his advice (perhaps it was over-subtle for Vandeventer), and the
54

Ibid.

55

Ibid.

56

Ibid.
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Secretary learned it from a most unexpected source:

President Monroe.

Monroe had received an anonymous letter spelling out the extent of
Vandeventer1s involvement with Mix.

57

Shortly afterward Vandeventer

sold the remaining shares of his contract.
Vandeventer1s indiscretions was out:

58

By that time the news of

the National Intelligencer ran an

article on the Rip Rap affair in February, using the incident to impugn
the fortifications program.

59

On March 6, 1820, Congress became involved,

calling upon Calhoun for a detailed accounting of how all contracts of
this kind had been let in the past, to whom, their value, the current
prices, and so on.

60

Calhoun could only comply.

The House Committee on

Military Affairs made a report on the Rip Rap contract on April 4, but
it was tabled, there to rest until two years later when the scandal
could be put to more profitable uses.

61

After the committee's report in the spring of 1820 the Rip Rap
affair dropped out of the public's view, but not from Calhoun's.
prisingly, work was going well at the shoals.

Sur

By the end of 1819

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Gratiot, the supervising engineer for the
Hampton Roads, reported that the stone mole showed twenty-five feet
above the waterline.

62

Mix, however, was still juggling his contract:

57

Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 205.
letter to Monroe.

I have been unable to locate this

58

"Contract for Stone at the Rip Raps and Old Point Comfort,"
ASPMA, 2:431-449.
59
60

National Intelligencer, February 4, 1820.
U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1594.

61Ibid., p. 1951.
62

Charles Gratiot to John C. Calhoun, November 30, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 4:457.
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he sub-let part of it yet again, and by 1821 there were at least two
other firms involved in transporting stone from the York River quarries.
In the course of settling a dispute over the legal status of the Mix
sub-contractors Calhoun may have been startled to learn that his former
Apothecary General, Francis LeBaron of New York, was a partner with
both of the firms cooperating with Mix— Howes Goldsborough and Company,
and Jacob Lewis and Company.

63

Thwarted in his attempt to win legal

recognition from the War Department for his share of the work on Rip
Rap, Lewis charged that an illegal combination existed between Chief
Engineer Armistead, Swift, Mix, and Vandeventer.

64

Even though he was

Lewis’ sole partner, LeBaron claimed that he knew nothing about any such
c o m b i n a t i o n . B e c a u s e of the recent trouble with Vandeventer, Calhoun
felt that he could not ignore such charges; he set an inter-departmental
investigation in motion as quickly as he could, particularly calling
upon Armistead for an explanation.

66

All the legal depositions taken

during Calhoun's investigation predictably denied any collusion between
the accused parties; and Calhoun, armed with these, dropped the inquiry,
especially after Lewis was jailed in New York for avoiding his debts.

67

63
Elijah Mix to John C. Calhoun, April 23, 1821; Howes Golds
borough & Co. to John C. Calhoun, June 14, 1821; John C. Calhoun to
Jacob Lewis & Co., June 14, 1821; Francis LeBaron to John C. Calhoun,
July 1, 1821, ibid., 6:46, 188, 234.
64
65

Jacob Lewis to John C. Calhoun, July 25, 1821, ibid., 6:281.
Francis LeBaron to John C. Calhoun, July 1, 1821, ibid.,

6:234.

66

John C. Calhoun to Walker K. Armistead, August 3, 1821; John C.
Calhoun to Jacob Lewis, August 2, 1821, ibid., 6:312, 309.
67

Francis LeBaron to John C. Calhoun, August 6, 1821, Walter K.
Armistead to John C. Calhoun, August 16, 1821, ibid., 6:318, 337.
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Public men of apparent means and influence in Calhoun's genera
tion habitually seemed to run close to financial collapse.

President

Monroe was so straightened for funds that he was trying to arrange for
a secret high-interest loan from New York speculators after only a few
years in office.

68

Calhoun was obliged to keep up a standard of living

(and his expenses were about to increase) which forced him to watch the
commodities market closely all the time he was in Washington.

There is

little reason to think that either of these men would have taken out
right advantage of their positions.
different matter:

But farther down the ranks it was a

the opportunities thrown in the way of poorly-paid

army officers must have been especially tempting.

With large sums of

money in their charge, casual accounting methods, and the quirks of the
government's contractual arrangements with civilians, there was virtually
no means of policing federal largess.

Once charges were made it was

seldom possible to prove malfeasance unless the thieves had fallen out.
The connections between Calhoun, Vandeventer, and Swift are
particularly interesting.

In Vandeventer's case it is obvious that the

chief clerk was always ready to use his position to improve his career
and not incidentally his finances.

69

Swift's position after his

00
See two very interesting letters from Monroe to General Swift,
December 12, 22, 1822, Swift Papers, in which the President discusses
the matter of a private loan from General [Robert] Swartweout [sic]. To
my knowledge this aspect of Monroe's financial problems (then known in
certain circles) has never been discussed by historians.
69

Vandeventer's ambitions were evident even before he took the
chief clerk's job, which he saw as a stepping stone to a higher War
Department position. See John Armstrong to Christopher Vandeventer,
November 12, 1817, Vandeventer Papers. No one was more pleased than
Swift when Vandeventer won the clerkship under Calhoun. Swift wrote to
Sylvanus Thayer:
"Van deventer [sic] is installed 1st clerk at the War
Dept.
Very good on all sides." J. G. Swift to Sylvanus Thayer,
December 11, 1817, Thayer Papers.
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resignation from the army was most intriguing:

he won the position of

Surveyor of the Port of New York, a job not obviously lucrative until
one considers that this officer had a great deal of influence in locating
new fortifications, docks, and wharves around the port.

70

At the same

time, Swift's friendship with Calhoun was a decided advantage to him in
his new investment, the West Point Foundry, a company which cast cannon
on government contract.

71

The ex-general had also become involved with

the Swartwout brothers of New York in their newest enterprise, the New
Jersey Salt Marsh Company, which was then lobbying for preemption rights
in that state.

72

President Monroe obviously had this connection in mind

when he wrote confidentially to Swift, asking the ex-general to intercede
in his behalf with the Swartwouts for a loan.

73

Clearly, Swift kept up

his interest in fortifications, and his interest was not merely academic;
his Memoirs dutifully record the money appropriated by Congress each
year for defense building, and his fortuitous association with Nimrod
Farrow throws an entirely different light on the troubles at Mobile.

74

That Swift was serving as an informal conduit for various kinds
of War Department business is evident in an episode which occurred well
after he had resigned from the army.

One of Swift's old friends, General

^ T homas Hutchinson to John M. O'Connor, December 10, 1818,
O'Connor Papers; Christopher Vandeventer to Sylvanus Thayer, June 4,
1816, Thayer Papers.

72

A. J. Weise, The Swartwout Chronicles 1338-1899 and the Ketelhuyn Chronicles 1451-1899 (New York: Trow Directory, Printing and
Bookbinding Co., 1899), p. 396. This work details the origin and prin
cipal stockholders in the New Jersey Salt Marsh Company.
73

James Monroe to Joseph G. Swift, December 12, 22, 1822, Swift

Papers.
74

Swift, Memoirs, p. 137, and passim.
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Alexander Macomb, commanded the Fifth Military Department around Detroit
until 1821.

In his position, Macomb had limited control over military

business in the area and was of course accountable for expenditures in
his command; like any other departmental commander, Macomb also had
some control over where he would locate his headquarters and was in a
position to influence troop dispositions and strengths.
Beginning in 1819 Macomb started pressing the War Department for
more troops.

He argued that the presence of Fort Malden, just across

the Detroit River in Canada, was much stronger, and that more troops
were needed for an effective defense.

As matters then stood, Macomb's

own garrison was several miles up the river from the British fort; he
asked that permission be given to locate directly across from the British
installation.

75

The delegate from Michigan Territory to Congress,

William Woodbridge, also wrote to Calhoun, urging the establishment of
a new military depot directly across from Fort Malden.

76

Later that

year Governor Cass added his voice to those of Woodbridge and Macomb.
Calhoun understood well enough that there was some British activity in
that area, but he decided to wait on authorizing reinforcements until
the commander of the Northern Division, Jacob Brown, could inspect the
region and report back to him.

77

In August, 1819, Brown told Calhoun

that reinforcement was "inexpedient."

78

75

Alexander Macomb to John C. Calhoun, February 8, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 3:557.
76

William Woodbridge to John C. Calhoun, March 4, 1819, ibid.,

3:630.
77
78

John C. Calhoun to Lewis Cass, July 26, 1819, ibid., 4:176.
Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, August 9, 1819, ibid., 4:221-

222 .
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Macomb's interest in augmenting the military force around
Detroit could thus far be considered as simply the exertions of a zealous
officer.

But in January, 1821, Macomb wrote to his old friend Swift,

explaining that he had recently purchased 670 acres of land near the
mouth of the Detroit— just opposite Fort Malden; it was, Macomb
reckoned, "a choice spot."

79

If the international boundary line then

being settled gave the island in the mouth of the Detroit River to the
British, then his land would be the only place for American ships to
anchor.

But more important, Macomb said, was that, "in a military point

of view it is the best position for defending this position."

The site

overlooked Fort Malden; it was well timbered and thus would make an
excellent naval depot.

Macomb told Swift that he intended to move his

"Head Quarters there taking with me my staff and endeavor to get a post
office established at the place."

80

When he did that, of course, land

values would rise accordingly.
All this was bad enough, but Macomb's high hopes for encouraging
a town on

his new land did not stop there.

"there is

abundance [sic] of lime stone in the immediate vicinity of

this place."

81

He had

already noticed that

And then Macomb came to the real point of his letter:

If ever the Government make permanent works in this country they
will be built at or near this position and if they had done so
during the late war the country would not have fallen into the hands
of the enemy. It has often been recommended as the most proper
place
for a fortification & military Depot for the frontier. If
Mr. Calhoun could with pressing enter into the speculation hemight
79

Alexander Macomb to Joseph G. Swift, January 12, 1821, Swift

Papers.
80

Ibid.
by his letter.

Just how long Macomb owned the land is not made clear
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serve his country & make his fortune too. Because if troops ever
moved down to this place instead of keeping them at Detroit where
they are exposed to every vice, the merchants would soon follow &
our lots would sell immediately for any p r i c e . ^2
There is no evidence that Swift passed this offer on to Calhoun.
Obviously, this does not mean that Swift was a model of rectitude, but
only that he knew Calhoun far better than Macomb did.

Two months to the

day after Macomb wrote to Swift, Calhoun offered the command of the
Corps of Engineers to General Macomb and Macomb accepted.

83

Since the

Secretary of War was then being attacked regularly by some members of
Congress, it is unlikely that Calhoun would have appointed someone he
knew had a tendency to use his place for personal advantage.
There is no reason to think that Calhoun ever knew of General
Macomb's real estate deals, and that is the real significance of the
affair.

The Secretary regularly received reports from military officers

which called for more troops in a particular area or which suggested a
military post on this spot or that; there was no way to distinguish
Macomb's letters from any other.

Alexander Macomb was not particularly

possessed of an original mind; if he could conjure a way to profit by
his position, others could have also.

Calhoun never gave any indication

that more things were associated with military building than defense
policy.
The Macomb letter demonstrates further how vulnerable the entire
military establishment was during the era of good feelings to illegal
82

Ibid. I am convinced that had Calhoun known about Macomb's
proposal he would have forced Macomb from the service. The Secretary
had already reprimanded Macomb in 1819 for some irregularities in the
officer's accounts for that year. See John C. Calhoun to Alexander
Macomb, March 27, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 3:698.
83

John C. Calhoun to Alexander Macomb, March 12, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 5:675.
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and questionable dealings— dealings which sometimes stultified Calhoun's
military programs altogether.

From the halls of official Washington

where policy was invented to the totals on the vouchers was a long way
indeed, and although few cases of official malpractice were ever brought
to light, a cursory examination of this feature of Calhoun's fortifica
tion program shows that technical and professional shortcoming endangered
it as much as congressional hostility.
These problems illuminate a larger historical concern as well.
Calhoun was anxious to create a professional military establishment— an
army and all its accouterments— with qualities and functions which no
other American army ever had.

For nearly fifty years the United States

had relied upon the arms of the amateur, and many of those sensibilities
which characterized the professional military establishment still
existed.

Waste, inefficiency, divided loyalties— all were the most

obstinate remnants of military amateurism, and Calhoun had only just
touched on some of them before he left office.

II
The expansive (some said grandiose) nationalistic programs spon
sored by Monroe and managed by Calhoun often carried certain liabilities.
Whenever Monroe was committed to a certain program, Calhoun's latitude
was circumscribed.

Usually Calhoun's enthusiasm matched Monroe's, but

as Calhoun was bound to observe departmental form, the President some
times compelled Calhoun to take positions he undoubtedly would not have
chosen for himself.

Certain of these programs caught the public eye,

too; and popular opinion always caused Calhoun a great deal of discontent
he knew neither how to ignore it nor how to use it, and mostly it vexed
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him.

84

When a program coincidentally served business interests, the

liabilities increased.

The involvement of private capital in a public

program, as had been seen, usually meant spectacular success or a
similar kind of failure.

Calhoun came to know this all too well.

All these liabilities and more were inherent in the so-called
Yellowstone expedition, a movement to secure America's possession of
the lands between the Great Lakes and the Rocky Mountains.

At the end

of the War of 1812 American authority barely extended beyond St. Louis
up the Missouri and Mississippi rivers.

In this fur-rich area the

British trader still held sway, operating among Indian tribes generally
hostile to the Americans and often supported by the great British com
panies, the North West and Hudson's Bay.

British presence was actually

strengthened in the postwar period by Lord Selkirk's establishment of a
new colony on the Red River of the North, near Lake Traverse in what is
now Minnesota.

85

By contrast, American authority was represented here

by a few hundred forlorn soldiers garrisoned along the southern edge of
the Great Lakes.

The Indians of the region indicated their disdain of

the Americans by regularly traveling to Fort Malden, opposite Detroit,
and other British outposts in order to trade and receive gifts.
84
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Adams, Diary, 5 :361 .
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The St. Louis Enquirer, November 3, 1819, tacitly admitted that
the area from the Upper Missouri to the Pacific was controlled by the
British. The location of Selkirk's new colony was an important factor
in Calhoun's decisions about troop movements and the location of garri
sons in that area in 1818. See John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, October
17, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 3:215. For an acocunt of the Selkirk colony,
see Alexander Ross, The Red River Settlement:
Its Rise, Progress and
Present State with Some Account of the Native Races and Its General
History to the Present Day, edited by W. C. Morton (Rutland, Vermont:
Charles Tuttle Company, 1972).
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Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, August 3, 1819; Thomas L.
McKenney to John C. Calhoun, April 8, 1818; William Clark to John C.
Calhoun, April 30, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:200-203; 2:234-235; and 4:42-43.
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James Monroe had adduced this hostility in 1815 when he argued
for a large standing army before Congress, and when he became President,
Monroe's interest in the region had been made even more acute by subsequent reports he had received.

87

By late 1817 the United States had

begun to move slowly into the area:

an arc of outposts stretched from

Green Bay (Port Howard), which guarded the Fox River, to Prairie du
Chien (Fort Crawford) at the junction of the Mississippi and Wisconsin
rivers, southward to Fort Armstrong, where the Rock River met the
Mississippi.

The westernmost outpost was Fort Osage, at the great bend

of the Missouri.

88

Calhoun meant to extend the power of the United States beyond
this arc of garrisons if he could.

In the spring of 1818 Calhoun inaugu

rated what came to be known as the Yellowstone expedition, with Monroe's
enthusiastic support of course.
the expedition.

St. Louis was the launching point for

On March 16, 1818, Calhoun ordered General Thomas A.

Smith to prepare for the movement.

89

Extra men were to be recruited in

Ohio and Pennsylvania and marched to St. Louis, where they would be
taken into the Rifle Regiment which Calhoun expected would form the
expeditionary detachment.

Although Calhoun wanted the force to ascend

the Missouri to the Mandan villages

(near present-day Bismarck, North

Dakota), he recognized that the objective would probably not be reached
87

James Monroe to William Branch Giles, February 22, 1815,
Monroe Papers, L C .

88

Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of the
United States, 1789-1895 (Madison, Wisconsin:
The State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1964), p. 5.
89

John C. Calhoun to Thomas A. Smith, March 16, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:194-195.
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until sometime the next year.

In the meantime, he ordered Smith to

establish staging areas along the Missouri and thus a line of communications once the Indian villages were finally reached.

90

As to the purpose

of the movement and the conduct required of the troops, Calhoun left no
doubt in his instructions to General Smith.

Calhoun wrote:

You will instruct the officer who may be detailed to command the
detachment, to use every means to conciliate the Indians, and
impress on them the belief that our intention is friendly towards
them. It is expected the English traders will take unusual pains to
make a contrary impression. They have great advantages in controuling the sa\ages thrtf their commanding station of Red river [sic],
and as our contemplated establishment at Yellow Stone, will greatly
curtail their trade towards the head of the Missouri, we must expect
every opposition from them. No pains must be spared to counteract
such efforts.^1
The Yellowstone expedition was actually part of a two-pronged
movement into the areas of British influence.

While preparations were

in the making in St. Louis, Calhoun ordered General Jacob Brown to
establish a new garrison at the confluence of the Mississippi and Minne
sota [then called the St. Peter's] rivers.

Because of the proximity to

Selkirk's colony and the Sioux tribes, Calhoun recommended that an entire
regiment hold this position.

From here, overland communications could be

established with the projected garrison at the Mandan village.

92

If these plans won favor with the government, they were no less
popular with the western public.

Because it was the more spectacular of

the two, attention focused upon the Yellowstone expedition.
little to do with the expedition's popularity:

Romance had

the troops would be

opening up a lucrative trading area which had been formerly denied to
Americans.

An editorial in the St. Louis Enquirer estimated that the

annual trade in furs from this area alone would come to a million dollars
90Ibid.

91Ibid.

92john C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, October 17, 1819, ibid., 3:214215.
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and called the Indian trade of the region "the most lucrative internal
commerce in North America."

93

An added dividend for those adventurous

few who wished to press beyond the projected American posts into the
Oregon country was also expected:

if one included the Russian fur

trade in that area, the value of the trade west of the Mississippi would
double.

94

"The establishment of this post will be an era in the history

95
of the west ," said the editor of the Enquirer.
As the season approached in early 1819 when the expedition could
get underway, Calhoun's own reputation began to soar in the West.

96

Doubtless the Secretary was pleased, but this meant at the same time
that the stakes of the expedition's success were now personally high.
Concerning part of the expedition, Calhoun wrote Joseph Swift:

"It has

excited too much interest to fail, without producing unhappy conse„97
quences.
But the Yellowstone expedition did fail.

It is known today more

modestly as the Missouri expedition, for after more than a year and a
half of activity on the part of Calhoun and his department, the inter
cession of President Monroe and several other high officials in the West,
and several hundred thousand dollars, the detachment of troops only
managed to ascend the Missouri four hundred miles from St. Louis to the
Council Bluffs, there to remain.
93
94
95
96
97

The failure of the expedition had

St. Louis Enquirer, January 12, 1822.
National Intelligencer, August 14, 1819.
St. Louis Enquirer, September 4, 1818.
Ibid., April 23, and October 2, 1819.
John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 29, 1819, Swift

Papers.
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little to do with the resolution of the troops or their officers, but
with the coincidental political and business interests which the move
ment excited.
The immediate cause for the misfiring of the expedition was the
dubious financial operations of the western businessman, James Johnson.
Johnson was a Kentuckian who had been in the business of army rations
and transportation contracting since the war, and in late 1818 he won
the contracts for the Yellowstone expedition.

Johnson was also the

brother of Richard Mentor Johnson, a hero of the late war, and now a
member of Congress who was close to Monroe, Calhoun, and a host of other
politicos.

When word went out that the War Department was looking for

rations and transportation contractors, Calhoun began to receive letters
recommending Johnson.

98

Aside from demonstrating the range of Johnson's influence, these
letters of recommendation tell a good deal about western business at the
time, and the prospects Johnson's supporters thought the impending
expedition had.

Several letters, including one from Henry Clay, advised

Calhoun that this movement was altogether too important to allow the
usual competitive bidding and consequent speculation.

The implication

was that any government contract which was let in the West under these
conditions was sure to fail; this Calhoun was already finding out in his
dealings with the fortifications at Mobile.

99

98

T. Quarles to John C. Calhoun, August 27, 1818; W. T. Barry to
John C. Calhoun, September 14, 1818; Robert Wickliffe, September 14, 1818;
Amos Kendall, September 23, 1818; John T. Mason, Jr. to John C. Calhoun,
October 1, 1818; and Armistead T. Mason toJohn C. Calhoun, October 25,
1818, Calhoun Papers, 3:72-73, 129, 152-153, 180-181, 233-234.
99

See Henry Clay to John C. Calhoun, September 16, 1818, ibid.,

3:133.
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In late November and early December, Johnson and Quartermaster
General Jesup were working up the details of the unusual contract.

This

contract did not specify the amount that Johnson would receive upon
completion; rather, the instrument provided for "fair payment" once
Johnson had done his job.

The contract also called for Johnson to pur

chase two (and possibly four) steamboats to use in carrying the troops
up the Missouri, even though the first such vessel had yet to navigate
that r i v e r . S u f f e r i n g from the shortage of specie which seemed to
plague every western businessman, Johnson was to draw upon the govern
ment for advances in order to complete the business.

This blank check

was a provision which would cause Calhoun no end of trouble.
Within six months Johnson had alienated most of the army officers,
the citizens of St. Louis, and not incidentally Calhoun himself by his
repeated delays, breakdowns, and pleas for m o n e y . C a l h o u n had come
to have so little confidence in Johnson that he dispatched Quartermaster
General Jesup to St. Louis to oversee the operation, but Jesup1s presence
did not seem to help.

102

By the middle of the summer, Colonel Henry

Atkinson, the putative commander of the putative expedition, had grown
so impatient with Johnson that he set his men off without the steam
boats (and many of the rations they were supposed to carry).
steamboats were becoming the joke of the Missouri.

Johnson's

Of five in all, only

"Transportation Contract of James Johnson," December 2, 1818,
ibid., 3:329-330.
■^■''Such a body of correspondence developed between the Johnsons
and Calhoun that a "James Johnson file" was established in the War
Department. One example among many is James Johnson to John C. Calhoun,
February 12, 1819, ibid., 3:570-571.
102

John C. Calhoun to Thomas S. Jesup, March 27, 1819, ibid.,

3:697.
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three actually attempted to navigate the river, which was still in full
flood above Cantonment Beliefontaine

The problem was not so much the

river itself as the steamboats; in May a steamboat not owned by Johnson
had already navigated the river.
reported to its readers:

104

In August the St. Louis Enquirer

"The sentiment of the country, from the day of

the arrival of Col. Johnson's steamboat, was unanimous that these boats
were unfit for the Missouri.

The truth of that sentiment is now made

manifest.
Meanwhile Calhoun, alarmed by the vast sums Johnson had drawn in
advance on his open-ended contract, had been attempting to limit
Johnson's expenditures.

It was during that summer that President Monroe

was visiting Kentucky, however.

At Lexington Monroe was set upon from

all sides by interested westerners, including, of course, the Johnson
brothers, all of whom explained that the Yellowstone expedition was too
popular in the West to fail for want of government support.

106

Ever

solicitous of western interests, Monroe authorized still more advances
to the Johnsons, even though at the time officers at St. Louis were
advising Calhoun not to allow more funds.

Calhoun knew by then that the

entire Quartermaster's account in the War Department had been drained

^■^Thomas S. Jesup to John C. Calhoun, July 8, 1819, ibid.,
4:139.
104
105

St. Louis Enquirer, July 14, 1819.
Ibid., August 11, 1819.

■I
James Monroe to John C. Calhoun, July 5, 1819, Calhoun Papers,
4:135-136.
Several prominent citizens who went to Lexington to see
Monroe drafted a joint letter to Calhoun, urging support for Johnson.
See Isaac Shelby, Andrew Jackson, W. A. Trimble, John T. Mason, Jr.,
Robert Wickliffe, James Morrison, W. T. Barry, and Thomas Bodley to
John C. Calhoun, July 5, 1819, ibid., 4:136-138.
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by the Johnsons, but he nevertheless followed the President's instructrons.

107

Monroe had authorized another $50,000 in advances for the

Johnsons, but by the end of the year the brothers had gone well beyond
that.

A Treasury auditor eventually reckoned that the total monies

advanced to Johnson was $229,000.

108

By the end of 1819 rumors were flying in the East that the
Johnson contract was about to fail.

John Quincy Adams confided to his

diary that he had heard remarks even in Boston to that effect.
Kentuckian had written him:

A

"Let the Administration be prepared to be

attacked about the Yellowstone expedition."

Calhoun still believed,

however, that the government was protected against ultimate loss by
Johnson's bonds.

109

True to the Kentuckian's prediction, on December21

Congressman John Cocke of Tennessee called for a report from the War
Department on both the object and expenses of the e x p e d i t i o n . C a l h o u n
replied on December 29, but he was careful to remark only upon the
benefits that the expedition promised; that part of his report dealing
with expenses was left to charts which told little about the insolvency
of the Johnson b r o t h e r s P e r h a p s because the troops had at last
moved to Council Bluffs

(without Johnson's help), Calhoun still hoped

107

John C. Calhoun to Thomas S. Jesup and Eleven other Officers,
July 19, 1819, ibid., 4:157-158.
108

Peter Hagner to John C. Calhoun, January 28, 1820, ibid.,

4:611.
109
110

Adams, Diary, 4:472-473.
U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., p. 750.

John C. Calhoun to Alexander Smyth, December 29, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 4:519-523. See this report, complete with attachments showing
expenses, in "Expedition to the Mouth of the Yellow Stone, January 3,
1820," ASPMA, 2:31-37.
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that the expedition would succeed.

Dissatisfied by the Secretary's

report, Congress called for even more information, and with this new
data which Calhoun grudgingly supplied, the legislators voted to stop
funds for the expedition in March, 1820.
Atkinson the news shortly afterward.

112

Calhoun told Colonel

The expedition to the Yellowstone

got no farther up the Missouri; the grand movement into the Northwest
i.
14.
j
H3
was halted.

The military programs which Calhoun was charged with managing
were of a cost and a magnitude unprecedented in the history of the
republic.

Never before during a time of peace had the nation supported

such an enlarged military policy as the one that Calhoun watched over.
Projects under his control literally reached from one end of the nation
to the other, and in the West these projects outstripped the pace of
settlement itself-

The total cost of this military policy placed more

of a burden upon the national revenues than any that came before, and
while he administered the program and the money, Calhoun was required to
depend upon a larger number of subordinates than had ever operated under
the War Department's aegis in time of peace.

More civilians involved

themselves in the War Department's business, and Calhoun was answerable
for their activities even though he did not exercise the authority over
them that he obviously would have preferred.
As these various programs took shape, the young man in the War
Department gained in reputation.

What had at first been President

112

John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, February 2, 1820, John C.
Calhoun to Henry Atkinson, April 10. 1820, Calhoun Papers, 4:630-632,
5:19-21.
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Monroe's policy became Calhoun's policy.

When newspapers praised or

condemned a program or policy, it was Calhoun rather than Monroe who was
increasingly identified with it.

The cabinet member who Senator King

had originally thought would not have much influence had become an impor
tant public figure.

What mattered less to the public was that Calhoun

exercised very little control over some matters, and it was an important
thought for Calhoun's enemies to bear in mind as well.
Throughout it all, Calhoun's military programs depended upon the
goodwill of Congress as well as the dedication of his own subordinates.
Either of these groups could fail him, or betray him, and time and the
stresses of enacting an expansive military program chipped away at what
otherwise would have been solid achievements.

Ill
As the United States settled into the long peace, the rationale
for supporting the military establishment became less and less compel
ling.

Whether Calhoun realized what was happening is unclear; he was

still concerned about Great Britain's activities in the western
hemisphere.

114

Certainly, he did not think that the millenium had

arrived, and he was never beyond averring to foreign dangers when he
justified his military programs.
But Calhoun sensed that America's military establishment could
not be maintained forever by intimidating the nation with suspicions of
war.

The practice of associating the military with constant danger had

been partially responsible for the continued alienation of the army from

114

Adams, Diary, 6:138.
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the nation.

As a result, the exact place and function of the army— the

role of the army in a democratic republic— had yet to be agreed upon.
If somehow the army could be transformed so that it would become asso
ciated with national progress rather than national danger, then Calhoun
would have come to grips with the fundamental problem of how to arm and
protect a democracy.
Calhoun was a nationalist, a civilian, and (aside from the
President himself) the highest official in the military establishment,
and it was in his combination of these roles that Calhoun was most
creative during his War Department years.

A large part of Calhoun's

nationalism had to do with the idea of internal improvements, the
building of roads, canals, bridges and such with federal sponsorship.
Public men disagreed fervently on what the constitution would allow, but
for Calhoun the question turned not so much on the constitution as the
obvious benefits of such programs, benefits which should of themselves
remove all objections.

115

He believed while he was still a congressman

that Congress had the power to sponsor improvements, but the states
would approve these projects nonetheless in statesmanlike cooperation.
There was "room enough," Calhoun said, "for all . . .

to exert their

,,116
resources.
Others were not as ready to give up the dispute as Calhoun.
When President Monroe strongly favored internal improvements in his
first message to Congress, he asked at the same time for a constitutional

"^^See John C. Calhoun, "Speech on Internal Improvements,"
February 4, 1817, Calhoun Papers, 1:398-407.
116Ibid., 1:399.
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amendment in order to eliminate the question al together.J"1''
response to this was confusing:

Congress1

Henry Clay indulged himself with pettish

remarks about the President's usurpation of legislative prerogative be
cause Monroe had delivered himself of opinions in advance of congressional
action.

Money was voted for improvements in early 1818, but there was no

hint that its use was actually authorized.

It was as though all were

holding their breaths, waiting for someone to speak.

Congress called

upon Calhoun for his opinion of the issue in April, knowing well that the
Secretary's ideas were even more progressive than Monroe's.

118

Calhoun was confident that he could follow his constitutional
scruples and remain in the administration.

He wrote to a friend, just

before Congress called for the report, stating that he thought "the
question had been decided before my arrival at Washington.

My sentiments

are so well known in relation to the constitution, that he [Monroe] must
expect in any question of that nature, I will act in conformity with my
established opinion."

119

But the Secretary did alter hxs opinion; when

Calhoun presented Monroe with the report to Congress, it was in conformity with Calhoun's ideas, but not Monroe's.

120

The final version of

the report avoided the constituional question altogether.

121

John Quincy Adams believed that Congress had asked for Calhoun's
opinion on internal improvements out of a spirit of hostility, and he
James Monroe, "First Annual Message," December 2, 1817, Hamilton,
Monroe Papers, 6:33-34.
118

Ammon, Monroe, pp. 388-389.

Adams, Diary, 4:217-218.

119

John C. Calhoun to J. G. Jackson, March 31, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:216.

120

Adams, Diary, 4:218.

121

John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, January 7, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 3:472.
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implied that Clay's disappointments were behind it all.
sense the congressional resolution was a friendly one:

Yet in one
it asked Calhoun

to devise a plan to facilitate military defenses by "such means as are
within the power of Congress."

122

The use of the military in internal

improvements for the expressed purpose of defense was just one of the
several wedges which had been driven in the application of strict con
stitutional interpretation of this question.

When Monroe took his

inaugural tour of the North in 1817, he had personally authorized the
building of a "military road" from Sackett's Harbor to Plattsburg, New
York.

123

As Clay happily pointed out, Monroe's view of the constitu

tionality of improvements did not exactly comport with his building of
this road, military or not.

124

Whereas President Monroe was confused on the issue, Calhoun was
not.

Certain already that it was the duty of Congress to use its powers

in an expansive fashion, Calhoun saw in the use of the military for such
projects several interesting prospects.

The apology that the improve

ments could be used for defense seemed a pertinent one to him; it was a
means by which constitutional objections could be avoided:

if internal

improvements were rationalized on military grounds, perhaps the more
ardent defenders of the Constitution would not be so alarmed.
This was no theoretical argument; opponents of internal improve
ments were already presented with faits accompli.

122

Ibid., 3:462.

Calhoun merely set

Adams, Diary, 4:217.

123

U. S. Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess. , p. 1373,
records Henry Clay's remarks on the Sackett's Harbor road.
Ibid.
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out to justify programs already in effect.

The late war had demonstrated

the need to concentrate large forces quickly and the consequences of
failing to do so.

The very roads and canals which served the civil

public could answer a military purpose also.

Calhoun therefore made no

attempt to argue for the civilian uses of construction; he concentrated
on the military arguments alone.
His first appeal was to frugality, a notion dear to the hearts of
the most hide-bound Republicans.

Small and dispersed armies such as

America's, Calhoun said, were "under the best management . . . more
expensive, even were our supplies equally cheap, than European armies
collected in large bodies, in the midst of populous and wealthy communi125
ties.”

Some of this cost could be avoided by building military highways

to link all the military commands.

Even more could be saved by using

troops to do the labor where possible:

an officer supervising the

Sackett's Harbor road reported that the cost of one year's labor in
completing fourteen miles of the road was $13,000, whereas locals estimated that civilian labor would cost twice as much and take longer.
By the end of 1818 two other roads were being built:

126

one from Detroit

to Fort Meigs, Ohio, and another from Muscle Shoals, Tennessee, to
Madisonville, Louisiana.

127

One of the most assiduous of the military

road builders was Colonel Henry Atkinson, who, soon after arriving at
Council Bluffs in 1819, began cutting a road from there to Bellefontaine.
125

"Reduction of the Army Considered," December 11, 1818, ASPMA,

1:781.
126

Henry Atkinson to John C. Calhoun, January 22, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 3:511-512.
127

John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, January 14, 1819, ibid.,

3:491-492.
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Atkinson planned even more roads to link his command with other military
units up the Mississippi.
siastically:
works."

128

Calhoun could not have approved more enthu

"The troops cannot be more usefully employed than in such
All this activity, apparently, had taken place entirely

without the approval of Congress.
Encouraged by what he had seen so far, Calhoun finally sent his
report on internal improvements to Congress in early 1819.
couched in military arguments only.

129

It was

He asked for authority to build a

military road from Maine to Louisiana, with a canal paralleling it as
far south as Savannah, Georgia.

He also recommended linking the main

eastern cities with the Ohio valley by so many "Cumberland roads," and
canals from Albany and Pittsburg to Lake Erie.

130

Hidden away in the report, and unnoticed by most, was a subtle
appeal for a larger military establishment in order to carry these pro
grams into effect.

After remarking at length on the savings that were

possible from using military labor, Calhoun wrote:
We ought not to be sanguine in the expectation of the aid to be
derived from the army in the construction of permanent military
roads and canals at a distance from the frontiers . . . thinly scat
tered along so extensive a frontier, it will be impossible, I fear,
without leaving some points exposed, to collect any considerable
bodies in the interior of the country to construct roads and
canals.131
A larger army was, then, the price that Calhoun was asking for
internal improvements.

128

In return the army could perform useful and

John C. Calhoun to Henry Atkinson, February 7, 1820, ibid.,

4:646.
129

John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, January 7, 1819, ibid., 3:461-

472.
130..,.
Ibid.

131T,
Ibid.
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efficient services— positive services— for a progressing nation.

The

Secretary of War clearly wanted to weld the nation and the army together
for their common benefit.

Aside from the obvious desirability of his

goal of cutting the costs of the army and increasing the professionalism
of the officers, Calhoun wanted to transform the military establishment
into an institution which was consistent with the requirements of the
democracy.

It was in this spirit that Calhoun reprimanded an officer

whose extravagance had been found out:
render the Army unpopular."

132

"Nothing is so calculated to

In the same spirit Major General Jacob

Brown wrote Calhoun to congratulate him on his report on internal
improvements:
I believe that we shall not again here [sic] of an opposition to the
Army making military Roads; but we may flatter ourselves with the
hope that our fellow citizens of the military establishment will
achieve a victory over some of the prejudices of the country by
their useful labours in peace if they could not by their deeds of
arms in War.-*-33
Brown and Calhoun assumed much on the basis of a slender perform
ance.

At this point the military building program was quite small; a

guess would be that less than a thousand soldiers were engaged in construction at any one time.

134

For his part Calhoun miscalculated the

popularity of internal improvements; he believed that improvements were
universally sought after in the West, but a study by Charles Wiltse has
shown that the West was surprisingly divided on the issue.
support of all came from New York and Pennsylvania.

The strongest

135

132j0hn £_ Calhoun to Alexander Macomb, March 27, 1819, ibid., 3:698.
133jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, June 11, 1819, ibid., 4:99-100.
-*-3^This is an educated guess. There are no figures on military
labor which separate the number of men working on roads from those engaged
in other, more traditionally military projects, such as the construction
of barracks and fortifications.
135wiitse> Calhoun, Appendix B, p. 406. See also John C. Calhoun
to Micah Sterling, October 1, 1823, Calhoun Papers, 8:311.
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However chimerical Calhoun's ideas on internal improvements may
have seemed in the light of the politics of the time, his idea of endear
ing the army to the republic was well founded.

Already military

explorers had caught the nation's attention, navigating the Missouri far
beyond the ill-fated Yellowstone expedition.

Still making their surveys

along the coastline, the Board of Engineers were doing work of national
as well as military importance.

Even if Calhoun's dreams of a vast net

work of interior communications could not yet be realized, there was
still a great deal the army could do for its reputation.

By increasingly

involving the army in affairs associated with the growth of the nation,
perhaps the identification eventually could be made between national and
military progress.
Many of the officers Calhoun used on these programs were engineers,
the elite corps of the military establishment and in many ways the model
for the kind of institution Calhoun wished to make of the entire army.
The Corps of Engineers had the distinction of having been the only part
of the military establishment singled out for legislative protection
from reductions since its creation in 1 8 0 2 . The more technical
aspects of war had long since excluded even the gifted amateur, and the
new appreciation of warfare as a professional matter naturally increased
the stock of those most clearly identified with military knowledge as
were the engineers.

But the engineers had the added advantage that their

skills were readily translatable to civil tasks such as internal improve
ments .

1o /Callan, Military Laws of the United States, pp. 148-149, 266.
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American engineers were aware of the distinction they held, both
within the army and the nation.

They considered themselves a class

apart from the ordinary officer, who may have owed his appointment to
influence alone.

Such men, the professionals believed, did the army no

honor; indeed, as one professional put it, they caused a great deal of
harm;
I honor an intelligent and scientific officer as much as I despise
the puppies who consider their uniforms as giving them the right to
be insolent & impertinent of which character I am sorry to say I
have seen too much in the new levies of our American a r m y . - 1- ^
Thus when General Bernard was imported from France, American
officers full of their new-found confidence were sorely offended.

One

young officer, while complaining about the Bernard appointment, showed
that he understood that the Corps of Engineers had achieved a unique
reputation for a part of the military establishment.

Christopher Vande

venter, while still attached to the engineers in New York, wrote to
Sylvanus Thayer in Europe;
The truth is, the Government is hostile to an Army— and the Corps
of Engineers having done more and deserved more both from its
achievements and abilities, it becomes necessary for their purpose,
to degrade it. The nation have uniformly made this corps an excep
tion from the censure bestowed on the Army; and all parties seemed to
unite in acknowledging the necessity of educating the most promising
youths in the country to the higher grade of the Military profession.
Whenever the Army has been assailed for ignorance and deficiency in
Science, the Corps of Engineers have always been exempted. To it
the friends of a respectable Army have constantly pointed as a proof
of the usefulness of well educated officers.138
Vandeventer was overstating.

Some of the harrowing experiences

of the war had left political leaders convinced of the necessity of
137

James Renwick to Joseph G. Swift, January 4, 1816, Swift

Papers.
138

Christopher Vandeventer [?] to Sylvanus Thayer, June 4, 1816,
Thayer Papers.
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"preserving the science of war," the science which distinguished both the
Corps of Engineers and the school of the corps, the United States Military
Academy at West Point, New York.

Just as Calhoun was making ever more

varied use of engineer officers, the Military Academy was entering upon
its most expansive period of development up to that time, much of which
took place under Calhoun's administration.
Calhoun understood the academy's potential, but he also saw that
the academy had far to go to fulfill it.

The school was as yet a pitiful

outpost along the Hudson River, and it had led a fitful existence since
its establishment in 1802.

The first Superintendent of the academy,

Jonathon Williams, decrying the government's lack of patronage, told
Congress that the school was like a "foundling" in the wilderness.
This was much too romantic a description.
was closer to the mark:

139

One of the academy professors

the place, he said, looked like "a desert camp

of Arabs," with its ramshackled buildings, and civilians, horses, and
cows spreading their offal where they would.

140

The education provided at the academy was at best mediocre.
Cadets, some of them as old as 30, came and went much as they pleased;
instruction was lacklustre when the professors deigned to teach.
was little equipment and few books.

There

The nominal head of the academy was

the Chief of the Corps of Engineers; but when the War of 1812 came,
Joseph Swift had duties elsewhere, and so, as it happened, did the cadets,
who were regularly requisitioned by the army to fill gaps in the officer
139

"Report of Colonel Jonathon Williams, to the Secretary of
War," March 4, 1808, ASPMA, 1:22.
140

Jared Mansfield to Sylvanus Thayer, March 27, 1817, Thayer

Papers.
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corps.

Captain Alden Partridge was left in charge of the post while

Swift was away, and since Swift never returned thereafter when he could
avoid it, Partridge inherited the position of commandant by default.

141

The extraordinary situation which Calhoun found existing at West
Point upon entering office had been in the making for some time:

a

recently contested change of command, with the former commandant in
uncertain exile and the incumbent assailed by a mutinous student body; a
professoriat to whom factional loyalty was more important than their
duties; and a welter of courts-martial, finished, or in the offing.
There was a pretender to the command who had been entirely passed over
and who was still searching for a way to win the prize.
The focal point of all this sordid activity was Alden Partridge.
After the war William Crawford, then Madison's Secretary of War, turned
his attention to improving the school, and he first decided that Partridge had to go.

142

The academy was in a generally deplorable condition,

thought Crawford, but apart from that very good reason, the Secretary had
a positive dislike of Partridge himself.

He considered the captain

Two newer works which cover the history of the academy are
Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, and Thomas J. Fleming, West Point: The
Men and the Times of the United States Military Academy (New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1969) (hereafter cited as Fleming, West
Point). Both contain errors of consequence and are clearly favorable to
the institution and its graduates. A more critical examination of the
institution is Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore, School for Soldiers; West
Point and the Profession of Arms (New York: Oxford University Press,
1974). The literature of West Point probably surpasses that on any
other education institution in the United States, and most of it is
favorable to the academy. Beginning with George Washington Cullum's
works, West Point has had an excellent "press," sometimes at the expense
of accuracy. To my mind, a critical history of West Point has yet to
be done.
142

Swift, Memoirs, pp. 141-142.
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uncouth, considerably lacking in style and social grace.

143

Crawford

began pressuring General Swift to replace Partridge in 1816, but Swift
resisted, saying the most self-respecting officers considered the posi
tion a dead end.

Having just learned of Simon Bernard's appointment,

Swift was not on friendly terms with the secretary either.

144

In the meantime there had been considerable trouble between
Partridge and the professors.

Captain Partridge and the senior pro

fessor at the academy, Jared Mansfield, had seemingly despised each
other at first sight.

When Mansfield first arrived at the school

Partridge h~d at first refused him quarters on the post, "all this,"
Mansfield fumed, "forsooth, because he happened to have company, or
because he foolishly supposed, he might trifle & sport with me his
[sic] superior in rank, age, & I hope in moral & intellectual requirements."

145

Partridge had another enemy in Captain John M. O'Connor,

who was then on the post translating Vernon's treatise on fortifica
tions.

O'Connor had ambitions for the commandant's position, and with

Mansfield's aid he set about trying to take it from Partridge.

146

O'Connor journeyed to Washington in early 1817 and there formed
an alliance with William Crawford.

The ambitious young officer was

sufficiently convinced of Crawford's support to write to Mansfield from
143

Ibid., p. 170. John Quincy Adams remarked in his diary that
when the cabinet was discussing a matter at West Point, "there was some
desultory conversation about Captain Partridge, against whom he [Craw
ford] told several very ugly anecdotes." Adams, Diary, 4:429.
144
145

Swift, Memoirs, pp. 141-142.
Jared Mansfield to Joseph G. Swift, August 26, 1814, Thayer

Papers.
146

Jared Mansfield to John M. O'Connor, August 21, 1821, June 28,
1819, Mansfield Papers.
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the capital, urging the professor "to strike the final blow."

147

The

final blow was coming, but not from the quarter O'Connor had expected,
and not in his behalf.

In May, 1817, President Monroe asked Sylvanus

Thayer, who was returning from his sojourn in France, to take command of
V. ! 148
the school.
That summer there occurred, as Mansfield said, "the most extra
ordinary events."

When Thayer arrived to take command, Partridge, with

the moral support of a group of cadets, virtually ran Thayer off the
_____ L49__.
_________ ,______ „___ .___ .. ._____ .
,________ .
post.
Partridge had- already piacecT^Ehe entire faculty under arrest
for plotting against him.^^^

General Swift, being informed of the con

tretemps, stood by Thayer and ordered Partridge to give up the command;
a series of charges, including mutiny, was levelled at Partridge.

151

Eventually Partridge was cleared of the most serious of the
charges and allowed to resign his commission, but the entire incident
was embarrassing to the institution and was hardly an auspicious begin
ning to Thayer's administration.

The newspapers had not failed to

notice the disturbance and were acutely sensitive to the possibility

147

Entries of May 14, 26, and June 15, 1817, O'Connor Journal.

148

George Graham to Joseph G. Swift, May 20, 1817, Thayer
Papers. Swift finally received this letter in 1855, when Thayer sent
it to him. Graham had neglected to actually send the order, but of
course Thayer had been informed of the President's decision.
149

Jared Mansfield to Joseph G. Swift, August 30, 1817, The
Papers of Alden Partridge, the United States Military Academy, West
Point, New York (hereafter cited as Partridge Papers) .
150

Alden Partridge to Joseph G. Swift, July 24, 1817, Thayer

Papers.
Joseph G. Swift to Sylvanus Thayer, September 1, 1817, Thayer
Papers.
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that a mutiny had actually occurred at the school.

152

As for O'Connor,

his plans were entirely thwarted by Thayer's appointment.

Even Partridge

and his friends were elated that Thayer, not O'Connor, had won the
post.

153

O'Connor went off to France the next spring, and Partridge

began a new career of trying to destroy the academy.

For the next few

years Partridge was interested in any rumor coming out of the school and
rushed into print with every accusation which had the slimmest evidence
behind it.

154

The confusion, divided loyalties, and outright hostility created
by the feud remained for Calhoun to deal with.

Swift most likely ex

plained the affair to Calhoun, with the result that whenever Alden
Partridge demanded court-martials of the faculty (as he did several
times), Calhoun ignored him.

155

Since Thayer's appointment, there had

152

New York Columbian, September 1, 1817; Niles' Weekly Register,
September 6, 1817; National Intelligencer, September 27, 1817; and New
York Evening Post, September 29, 1817.
153

Benjamin 0.
Partridge Papers.

Tyler to Alden Partridge, August 17, 1817,

154

Partridge was still criticizing the academy in 1830. That
year he accused Claudius Berard, the French instructor, of selling
cadets "very cheap watches" for six or seven dollars. Americanus [Alden
Partridge], The Military Academy, at West Point, Unmasked: or Corrup
tion & Military Despotism Exposed (Washington: Privately printed, 1830) ,
p. 17 (hereafter cited as Americanus, The Military Academy).
155

Joseph G. Swift to Sylvanus Thayer, December 11, 1818, Thayer
Papers. Swift's part in the controversy was no doubt difficult for
Partridge to fathom. Swift apparently told the captain at one time that
if he could prove a cabal against him, he would support Partridge's
demand for a court-martial of those responsible for his troubles. No
doubt he suspected a plot himself, and so did Partridge. Proving col
lusion between Mansfield and O'Connor and others, however, was another
matter. Partridge promised Swift that he would fight on until justice
was satisfied. See Ambrose's account in Duty, Honor, Country, pp. 61-62.
Partridge eventually preferred charges against his old patron Swift, but
Calhoun disallowed them entirely. See John C. Calhoun to Joseph G.
Swift, April 11, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:242.
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been in effect two camps at the school:
the other to Partridge.

one loyal to the new regime,

156

One of the first officers to owe his appointment to Thayer was
Captain John Bliss, the new commandant of cadets, who was responsible
for the discipline of the corps.

After the lax discipline under Partridge,

Bliss was sure to be unpopular, and to Partridge's favorite old cadets
Bliss seemed representative of the Thayer command.

157

For the better

part of a year the cadets had been restless because of the unorthodox
change of command.

153

Then Captain Bliss made the mistake of manhandling

and cursing one of the cadets; a cadet grievance committee was formed,
and it demanded redress of Thayer.
nation:

Thayer could not tolerate insubordi

group action against authority now had occurred twice since his
156

Various letters among the correspondence of Alden Partridge
described the divided academy after Thayer took over. It seems that the
academic staff was generally on Thayer's side, while a few garrison
officers and a faction of the cadets were on Partridge's. See E. J.
Lambert to Alden Partridge, July 25, 1817, Alden Partridge Papers,
Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Library of Congress Partridge
Papers). See also J. Wright to Alden Partridge, August 4, 1817,
Partridge Papers.
157

Expose of Facts, concerning Recent Transactions relating to
the Corps of Cadets of the United States Military Academy, West-Point,
New York (Newburgh, New York: Printed by Uriah C. Lewis, 1819), pp. 1213, and Sylvanus Thayer to Walker K. Armistead, November 30, 1818,
pp. 39-40 (hereafter cited as West Point Expose) . This is a very rare
pamphlet containing reproductions of much of the correspondence con
nected with this case. This copy is from Duke University Library.
158

Ruminating on these events in his old age, Thayer told George
Washington Cullum that he believed the whole story of the famous change
of command had never been told. He wrote:
"In fact, the history of the
Acad'y [sic] from 1813 to 1817 is sui generis. It requires a separate
investigation & all parts of it should be viewed in connection otherwise
[sic] much of it could not be well understood. It is altogether a queer
history.
It is covered with a thick veil. I do not pretend to have
fathomed all its mysteries, but as before remarked I have had a peep
behind the curtain & may raise it for you to take a look one of these
days should I think it worth while, [revenous] a nos mou[n]tons."
Sylvanus Thayer to George Washington Cullum, March 2, 1853, Thayer Papers.
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arrival.

Thayer dismissed the cadets from the academy pending a court

of inquiry.

159

In the meantime the suspended cadets unleashed a public

relations campaign against Thayer and his new rule at West Point; eventually a congressional investigation was forced.

150

Both the court of

inquiry at West Point and the congressional investigation found that both
parties had been wrong;

Bliss for his temper and zeal, and the cadets

for the manner in which they protested their mistreatment.

161

Calhoun, of course, had been following the matter of the errant
cadets all along, keeping President Monroe informed.
came before the cabinet.

In 1819 the case

The President was prepared to be lenient and

reinstate the cadets if they seemed to be reasonably contrite, but the
cadets presumed to carry their complaints to Monroe himself.
said the President, was considered improper.

162

This,

After the cabinet dis

cussed the affair for the better part of three days, Monroe called upon
Attorney General William Wirt to render an opinion on whether the cadets
were subject to martial law.

The court of inquiry had side-stepped the

issue, and although the cadets were suspended, their sentence had more
to do with the academic rules of the school than with military law.
Hardly conversant with military law himself, Wirt delivered himself of
the opinion that the cadets were, like enlisted men, subject to military
159

Lt. James D. Graham, "Orders," November 27, 1818, West Point

Expose.
160

"Complaints Against the United States Military Academy,
April 11, 1820," ASPMA, 2:138.
Ibid.
162

N. H. Loring, Thomas Ragland, W. M. C. Fairfax, C. Vining,
and Charles R. Holmes to James Monroe [September, 1819?], West Point
Expose, pp. 44-46. See also Adams, Diary, 4:424-427.
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justice.

President Monroe instructed the court of inquiry to reconvene

with Wirt's opinion in mind; once again the court did not decide upon

4-163
the question.
Calhoun did not agree with Wirt's opinion; neither did the
faculty at the academy.

Jared Mansfield, still acting as spokesman for

the professors, addressed several long and detailed arguments to Calhoun.
Mansfield believed that the school should follow its own regulations, as
indeed the academy had done since 1815.

164

It is problematical that the

Secretary was convinced by Mansfield's arguments.

Calhoun held his view

in common with John Quincy Adams, whose opinion he respected at the
moment.

Both men believed that the governance of the academy could best

be accomplished by the regulatory powers of the War Department, rather
than by legislation."*"^

The immediate case of the cadets' indiscretions

had long faded from importance.

When new regulations were drawn up for

"‘"''"'See Calhoun's remarks to the House of Representatives on the
matter of the governance at West Point in "Military Academy at West
Point," February 25, 1820, ASPMA, 2:76. There is a good deal of con
fusion on this case in the standard secondary works. The case of the
cadets did not end with Wirt's decision; in fact, the cadets' c?' 3 was
theoretically a separate affair. The judgment had already been nade on
them. Several works imply that after 1819 the cadets at West Point were
under martial law, but Wirt's opinion did not make it so. The courtsmartial were not obliged to follow an opinion of the Attorney General at
that time. Compare Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, p. 79; Fleming, West
Point, pp. 43-44; Cunliffe, The Martial Spirit, p. 157. See also General
Daniel Parker's order for a re-trial in "General Order," September 23,
1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:344-345. Concerning Wirt's lack of information
on military justice, see his letter to Calhoun, asking for books on the
subject, July 20, 1820, ibid., 5:227; and Calhoun's summation of the
case to Henry Brush, February 2, 1820, ibid., 4:629-630.
164

For example, see Jared Mansfield to John C. Calhoun, May 31,
1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:138.
165

Adams, Diary, 4:424-427.
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the army by General Winfield Scott in 1821, West Point's rules were
included in the compendium.
Throughout the first turbulent years of Thayer's rule at West
Point Calhoun had always taken the new superintendent's part.

Both men

had seen what had happened when Partridge had lost the confidence of the
government:

cadets and professors up in arms, newspapers crying military

uprising, and the institution's reputation blemished.

Thayer had much to

make up for, and Calhoun was inclined to support the major.

167

The Secretary of War could not have asked for a more devoted
superintendent.

Certainly, Thayer took as long to become attached to

West Point as the academy did to him.

Nine months after he arrived,

when it seemed sure that the congressional investigation would be
launched, Thayer asked to be relieved of command.

168

was ignored, and he stayed at the school until 1833.

Thayer's request
These were the

most formative years of the "desert camp of Arabs" on the Hudson.

Not

only did Thayer improve the discipline and academic system of the
academy, but beginning in 1817 he and other friends of the school began
building a formidable system of patronage and protection which trans
cended the administration of a single secretary of war.

1 C.C.

Winfield Scott to John C. Calhoun, May 25, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 6:146.
167

In 1820 when the House Committee on Military Affairs was
investigating the cadets' complaints, Calhoun saw to it that the head
of the committee, Alexander Smyth, received unofficially a laudatory
report by the Board of Visitors on recent improvements at the school.
See John C. Calhoun to Sylvanus Thayer, January 15, 1819, and John C.
Calhoun to Alexander Smyth, February 1, 1820, ibid., 3:500, 4:628.
168

Sylvanus Thayer to Joseph G. Swift, May 12, 1818, Thayer

Papers.
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From the academy's first days those associated with it had a
keen sense of its uniqueness and were determined to see it prosper.
Since the academy was in effect the government's university, West Point
was susceptible to influences and pressures which were foreign to other
institutions of higher learning.

Officers who considered the matter did

not necessarily see the academy's intimacy with government as dangerous;
on the contrary, governmental patronage was considered essential for the
school's growth and acceptance by the nation.

Like Calhoun, General

Jacob Brown, and other officers who sought to bind the army to the
country, academy advocates were ever watchful for any opportunity to
endear the school to the nation and its leaders.

In part at least this

meant that the academy's friends had to be sensitive to political and
social influences.

It was by just such a method that the European mili

tary schools had become important institutions.

An academy graduate

touring Europe remarked upon how this patronage could be won;
The Military School at West Point is a glorious institution, did it
receive such patronage from our government as to make it, as it
easily might be made, the best seminary of education in the United
States were its advantages not confined to those who actually enter
the service of the US [sic], but the children of the opulent
admitted on the same terms as at other scientific institutions &
their fees applied to the support of additional teachers, it would
do more to spread a military spirit among us than anything else.
The Military Schools of France & Germany are the favourite schools.
In the light of this need for patronage, Wi 1xXcmi Crawford's
objections to Partridge become sensible.

Although Partridge did have a

way with the cadets, he cared not for society, nor was he particularly
interested in improving the image of the institution, physical or

169

James Renwick to Joseph G. Swift, January 4, 1816 Swift

Papers.
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academic.

170

As a place where luminaries might visit, some friends of

the school considered Partridge's neglect of "police" reprehensible.

171

By contrast Sylvanus Thayer clearly believed that part of his duties was
improving the appearance as well as the public image of the place.
Thayer did not ignore any opportunity to enhance the academy1s academic
reputation, but he also saw to it that the school's progress to celebrity
did not rely entirely upon well-educated graduates.
By all accounts Thayer was a natural master of public relations.
Under his superintendence the academy was transformed into a showplace.

172

Thayer took the corps of cadets on marches to show off his students, and
he made himself far more accessible to society than Partridge had ever
been.

173

His students may have seen Thayer as a stern taskmaster, but

his social companions found the new superintendent of West. Point a gay
addition to any gathering.

174

ft

170
Papers.

Andrew Ellicott to Joseph G. Swift, February 10, 1815, Thayer
Entry of June 15, 1817, O'Connor Journal.

171

Thayer was quick to sense the value of allowing visitors on
the post; after he began his superintendency there was a parade of
American and foreign visitors, all of whom spread glowing reports about
the school.
172

Jared Mansfield to John M. O'Connor, February 19, 18.18,
Mansfield Papers.
173

Fleming, West Point, pp. 51-52.

174

There are numerous testimonials from Thayer's friends about
his affability when he was out of the sight of the cadets. More telling
comments come from Partridge's friends. See, for instance, 0. G. Burton
to Alden Partridge, March 12, 1818, Partridge Papers. One disgruntled
officer still at the Point told Partridge:
"Thayer would count or unit
in a French ball room much better than in the American Army but our
Government is as fond of french [sic] manners as a frenchman is of
Soup.” J. Wright to Alden Partridge, April 10, 1819, Library of Congress
Partridge Papers. For a well disposed view of Thayer, see Elizabeth
Mansfield to Daniel Drake, March 8, 1818, Mansfield Papers.
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In his campaign to increase the standing of the academy, Thayer
was assisted by well placed friends.

Joseph Swift, influential with

Calhoun both before and after his resignation, was acquainted vvxth Thayer
when the superintendent was himself a cadet.
of the academy.

175

Swift was the first graduate

Vandeventer was a graduate and a friend of Thayer's.

When Calhoun was first appointed Swift and Vandeventer were the first two
military officers he saw.

After Vandeventer won the clerk's position

Swift wrote triumphantly to Thayer:
1st [sic] clerk at the War Dept.

"Van deVenter [sic] is installed

Very good on all sides."

176

The clerk

reassured his friend Thayer when the latter was still surrounded by
controversy over the change of command:
Whenever I can communicate any thing useful to you or the institu
tion of course I shall do it: and shall especially be careful to
prevent as far as representation can do it, the introduction of any
measure which may be injurious to our Military 'aimer mater.'177
The most important protection West Point could acquire, however,
was by appealing to the self interest of the nation's public figures.
Because admission was based upon the candidate's parent's service to the
nation, those in charge at West Point had to be alive to the influences
which sustained the school through its students.

When in 1816 acting

Secretary of War George Graham heard complaints about punishment at
West Point, his reaction was tempered by his sense of how important this
form of patronage was; he explained to the academy's officers:

175

Sylvanus Thayer to Joseph G. Swift, October 16, 1818, Thayer
Papers, asking about impending legislation.

176
177

Joseph G. Swift to Sylvanus Thayer, December 11, 1817, ibid.
Christopher Vandeventer to Sylvanus Thayer, February 2, 1818,

ibid.
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All such punishment must necessarily partake of disgrace; but in
such an institution as the military academy, composed of the sons
of the most respectable families of the country, and many of whom
are destined to fill the highest military stations in the Army,
they should not be d e g r a d i n g . 1^8
Thayer’s successful management increased the number of applica
tions for places at the school.

West Point had already become something

of a refuge for privileged sons, however.

On the eve of Thayer's

arrival, the academy counted among its number the nephew of the President
of the United States, two sons of former Secretary of War John Armstrong,
a son of DeWitt Clinton, four sons of George Graham, as well as other
representatives of the "first families" of the land, as one cadet
recalled.

179

Academic integrity suffered accordingly.

Thayer put a

stop to the admission of some of the more grievously unqualified candi
dates, but he and his entrance examination came into play only after the
appointment had been made by the Secretary of War.

Cadets could not be

dismissed by unilateral action of the faculty; they could only advise
the Secretary of War that the student was unacceptable.

1.80

At the end

of Calhoun's period in the War Department, statistics showed that many
more prospective cadets had been accepted than rejected.
178

181

By then the

George Graham to J. G. Swift [?], October 29, 1816, ibid.

179

Major General George Douglas Ramsay, "Recollections of the
U. S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1814-1820," unpublished
typescript, n.p., n.d., Library of the United States Military Academy,
West Point, New York, p. 18. Although there has yet to be done a com
prehensive study of the lines of influence enjoyed by the academy during
these years, enough research has been done by one scholar to enable him
to declare flatly that "the institution in the second third of the nine
teenth century had an importance for prominent American families far
beyond its present standing." See Cunliffe, The Martial Spirit, pp. 161166.
180

White, The Jeffersonians, p. 255.

181Ibid., p. 256.
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Secretary of War's exclusive hold over the appointments was already
recognized as a valuable source of patronage, and while he was in office
Calhoun benefited by it.

182

As if to reaffirm his faith in the value of West Point, Calhoun
recommended in 1818 that several other academies should be created.

In

an attempt to make an elite academy palatable to the democracy, Calhoun
and other of the academy's friends pointed out that the best protection
against military despotism was for military knowledge to spread throughout
the citizenry.

183

This was the image which the officers at the Point

took care to convey to impressionable visitors such as Francis Wright.
This usually realistic observer wrote after a visit to the academy:
You will understand, from what I have said upon this military aca
demy, that the object of the government, under whose eye and at
whose expense it is conducted and maintained, is not to rear a band
of regulars . . . the slender force which is maintained at the
national expense and which is barely sufficient for the hard duties
in which it is engaged . . . admits but of few openings to such as
might be ambitious of so arduous a service. . . . There is little
fear in these pacific states of any portion of the citizens acquiring
a taste for military glory.^84
A great deal of such praise was romantic.

The facts were that

all of the cadet's training was directed toward convincing him that he
was a class apart and above mingling with the nation's military amateurs.
One cadet who learned this lesson well probably spoke for many of his
fellows when he said, "They talk about 'these young gentlemen becoming
officers of militiai
182

Hem! . . .

If they ever see a Cadet among the

Adams, Diary, 6:106; and Niles' Weekly Register, March 16,

28, 1822.
183
184

"Additional Military Academy," January 15, 1818, ASPMA, 1:834.
Wright, Society and Manners m

America, p. 82.
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militia, I am very much mistaken."

185

At the same time Fanny Wright was

marvelling that "the army is the people," Calhoun's War Department had
just announced that the lack of state militia returns made it impossible
to give an accurate account of the civil force which could be called out
for emergencies.

186

If the militarizing of the entire nation had really

been on President Monroe1s or Secretary Calhoun1s minds, there were
plenty of opportunities for doing so; Monroe had received an extensive
plan for upgrading the militia shortly after he reached the White House,
and nothing came of it.

187

Calhoun, especially, was not interested in

militarizing the nation— he wanted to nationalize the military.
At no time while Calhoun was Secretary of War was the army or
the academy threatened with utter extinction, even while the War Depart
ment itself was under constant attack.

One congressman made a dubious

reputation for himself recommending such a course, attacking the military
institutions as anti-democratic, but he was not so popular because of it
to prevent his defeat at the next election.
185

188

From exile in Connecticut

Quoted in Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, p. 85.

186

Wright, Society and Manners in America, p. 82; Niles1 Weekly
Register, January 16, 1818.
187

Monroe received an extensive and well informed proposal out
lining how the American militia might be upgraded considerably shortly
before the inauguration. See Major John Clark to James Monroe, December
16, 1816, Monroe Papers L C .
188

Congressman Newton Cannon of Tennessee, known as "The Tennessee
Cannon," introduced several bills to abolish the United States Military
Academy and upgrade the militia, all to no avail. He and Alden Partridge
carried on a little correspondence during this time. See Newton Cannon
to Alden Partridge, January 8, 1822, Library of Congress Partridge Papers,
in which Cannon remarks:
"I have always believ'd [sic] there were great
abuses in the military academy at West point [sic] on the part of the
officers.
It savours too much of the aristocracy for my political
notions and is not indeed the proper mode to infuse military science
into the great body of the people, nor does it at all favour the prin
ciples of equality."
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Alden Partridge became such an ardent critic of the regular army that he
was (in most circles) thought of as a quixotic figure.

189

Yet as he

opposed the existence of West Point, he laid the foundations for the
modern reserve officers' training corps.
West Point's immunity from serious or threatening criticism
during the Calhoun years reflected a general agreement by members of
government that the school served a purpose beyond that of educating an
army.

There were still politicians who dutifully attacked the military

establishment as a rhetorical device, but the forbearance of these very
same men concerning the academy showed that they saw the school in a
very different light.

Education, even of the military sort, could posi

tively assist the growth of the republic.

This was the status which

Calhoun sought to achieve for the military establishment as a whole.
189

For two of Partridge's more notable attacks on the academy
and the professional military establishment, see Americanus, The Military
Academy, passim; and Alden Partridge, Captain Partridge's Lecture on
National Defence (n.p., n.d.), pp. 1-14. At the same time that Partridge
and Cannon were working together against the academy, an army officer in
Washington informed Sylvanus Thayer that there was nothing to fear from
the government. The officer was quite right. See Henry Stanton to
Sylvanus Thayer, January 16, 1822, Thayer Papers. At various times when
the War Department was under political attack, Thayer received letters
from politically knowledgeable officers, assuring the superintendent
that the academy was safe.
After Partridge was out of the army he established a private
military school at Norwich, Vermont (the parent school of Norwich Univer
sity) . Hearing that two sons of a South American general were about to
be transferred to Partridge's academy, General Winfield Scott had this
to say about Partridge;
"Now as I know that P[artridge] is cursed with
genius & eccentricity in equal quantities, that he never did, & never
can, impart more than a superficial knowledge of any branch of learning,
& that he has not one practical military idea in his head, I am anxious
to save these young Colombians from the mischief of falling into such
hands." Winfield Scott to Christopher Vandeventer, March 9, 1823,
Calhoun Papers, 7:510-511.
190

Thomas M. Spaulding, "Alden Partridge," Dictionary of American
Biography, 14:281-282.
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In each of the major programs which Calhoun oversaw, his confi
dence and ambitions outstripped his control.

What began as an expansive,

nationalistic military policy was stopped short of fulfillment.

His

attempts to associate the growth of the nation with military progress
were the fullest expression of Calhoun's nationalistic thought, and
indeed the fullest expression of military nationalism in the history of
the republic.

The combination of civil and military nationalism offered

the army a place in American life that it had never had:

deeply involved

in national progress, the army could ingratiate itself to a suspicious
nation in peace as well as war.

These ambitions displayed Calhoun's best

qualities as a Secretary of War.
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CHAPTER IV

"TELLING WELL IN HISTORY":

CALHOUN

AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY

In 1820 the Reverend Jedediah Morse of New Haven undertook a
commission from President Monroe to make a survey of the Indian tribes
then living in the United States.'*'

The results of Morse's reconnais

sance provided the most complete picture of these folk up to that time
and verified what most makers of national Indian policy then suspected.
From a prehistorical population numbering perhaps in the millions, the
peoples who once had constituted a formidable human frontier to arriving
Europeans had dwindled to near extinction.

2

Morse counted a total of

I am aware that some confusion exists presently over what name
one should use in discussing the native people of America. Objections
have been made that the term "Indian" unnecessarily homogenizes these
people. This is a fair representation of what whites did in Calhoun's
time, when observations of the aboriginal peoples were, at best, unsci
entific. The Indians of America had really only three features in
common: they were aboriginal, they were pre-literate, and they had a
"white problem." The pages which follow have much less to do with the
Indians than with the whites and their misconceptions about the Indians,
and I have therefore employed those terms in use during Calhoun's day,
bearing in mind the views which informed them.
2

Estimates of pre-contact Indian numbers in the continental
United States have ranged from slightly over one million to as much as
twelve million.
See a discussion of population figures and the pitfalls
in making them in Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America:
Indians,
Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976),
pp. 15-31 (hereafter cited as Jennings, Invasion of America).
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less than half a million Indians.

3

More telling than Morse's statistical

tables, however, were his summaries of the natives still in the eastern
states.

He reckoned that in Virginia,

"of these tribes [the Nottaways,

Pamunkeys, and Mattaponies], twenty-seven of the former, and a still less
number of the two latter, it seems are all that remain of those numberous
tribes, who once constituted the formidable Powhatan confederacy."
found no Indians at all in Kentucky.

Morse

There were none in Pennsylvania,

where, Morse remarked, "they have been scattered and diminished in the
4
manner that hundreds of other tribes have been before them."
Morse drew a dismal enough picture, but compared to other esti
mates, his was optimistic.

Five years after he made his report to the

government, the War Department rendered an official statement showing
that only about 130,000 native people lived in the United States and its
territories, claiming for themselves a mere seventy-seven million
acres.5

If the recitation of these cold figures were not enough, there

was evidence aplenty that the natives of America were the victims of a
precipitous cultural decline.

A majority of whites seemed bent on has

tening the Indians' destruction.

Members of both races understood that

the Indians could stave off extinction only by means of utter cultural
surrender.

Jedediah Morse, A Report to the Secretary of War of the United
States on Indian Affairs (New Haven: Printed by S. Converse, 1822; re
print ed., New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1970), p. 375 (hereafter cited
as Morse, Report on Indian Affairs) .
4

Ibid., pp. 30-31.

5
Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, January 1, 1825, Calhoun
Papers, 9:486.
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Originally, the Indians of America had served whites in several
valuable ways.

They were wilderness tutors, military auxiliaries, and

important consumers.

They were also landlords.

As the white population

increased in size and confidence, the value of native functions was
sloughed off gradually.

By the last decades of the eighteenth century

natives were no longer crucial to military action.

Only their value as

consumers and trading partners forestalled their wanton destruction, and
even these relations were no longer conducted in an atmosphere of racial
equanimity.

When the whites arrived at this point, their claims of

sovereignty over the Indians and their affairs were no longer hollow.
Indeed, white demands of the Indians were met with such facility that
there seemed to be a touch of the providential about the whole process;
what happened seemed to whites to be sadly inevitable.

Some whites

began to consider how the Indians might be snatched from their fate.

7

If

civilization could bring the Indians to such a sorry state, civilization
might be able to save them as well.
Such a view at least partially informed the earliest attempts of
the Crown to regulate Indian affairs? and they had been resisted stead
fastly by the colonials and their governments.

At a time when centrali

zation of any kind was held in the lowest repute, all parties in America

0
Jennings, Invasion of America, p. 41.
7
This concern took the form of attempts to cordon off the
Indians in a protected area of their own, free from white interference.
The efforts of Sir William Johnson and other Crown officials after the
French and Indian war to establish an "Indian country" are well docu
mented. For a discussion of these attempts see the summary of Francis
Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian
Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834 (Lincoln: The University of
Nebraska Press, 1970), pp. 5-25 (hereafter cited as Prucha, American
Indian Policy).
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insisted upon dealing with the Indians just as they found them, indi
vidually.

Relations between these two races were best left to the

occasions of the frontiers, not to the protective attempts of some Crown
agency.

Despite the best efforts of Sir William Johnson and John

Stuart, the first British Superintendents of Indian affairs for the
Crown, American-Indian relations retained their chaotic and dangerous
character.®
Once the American Revolution had succeeded, individual traders,
land companies, and the various states all competed assiduously for
sovereignty over the tribes in matters of land and trade.

Leaders of

the new republic found that resistance to official control over Indian
affairs would not cease merely because one government had been exchanged
for another.

All these competing jurisdictions made the conduct of

Indian affairs "incomprehensible," said James Madison.

He argued that

9
only the national government should deal with the natives.

Eventually

it became clear that any attempt by the government to monopolize the
affairs of the Indians would advance only in the face of the stiffest
resistance from the individual states and their frontiersmen.
It has been customary for scholars to portray the government and
the frontier as having been somewhat estranged from one another on the
question of Indian affairs."*-^

Yet the only real difference between the

^Ibid.

9

William Hagan, American Indians (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1971), pp. 34-37 (hereafter cited as Hagan, American Indians) .
See Madison's remarks in Number 42 of "The Federalist," in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: The New American Library,
1961), pp. 268-269.
■^Arthur DeRosier, for instance, portrays Calhoun as a moderate
on the Indian question, which he undoubtedly was, but DeRosier miscon
strues the role of moderates in the whole scheme of Indian-white
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two concerned the rapidity of the Indians' eclipse by civilization.

The

first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, came to the conclusion that violence
against the Indians was simply inefficient.

Natural forces then

operating on the frontiers, he believed, could accomplish much more than
punitive expeditions or wars of conquest.

The subjugation of the Indian

was inevitable because the march of white civilization was inevitable.
To deny one would have been to deny the other.

Thus, just as the govern

ment was about to launch a pacification campaign among the tribes of the
Northwest, Knox told George Washington:
As populations shall increase, and approach the Indian boundaries,
game will be diminished, and new purchases [of land] may be made for
small considerations. This has been, and probably will be, the
inevitable consequence of cultivation. 11Several judgments were hidden in Knox's hypothesis.

Presuming

cultural superiority, Knox had no fear that this process would be in the
least impeded by Indian resistance.

Further, regardless of the policies

set by government, the real policies would be played out on the frontier,
not in the capital.

Leaving matters to the frontiersmen, then, was

practical and wholly within the means of the new nation for which Knox
spoke.
Men of Knox's high position indulged themselves by seeming to
disapprove of what happened between Indians and frontier whites.

Lest

relations. He and Professor Prucha see the government as fighting a
sort of holding action against the perpetually genocidal frontier. I
see a community of the attitudes held by the government and the frontier.
See, in particular, Arthur DeRosier, The Removal of the Choctaw Indians
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), pp. 55-57 (hereafter cited as
DeRosier, Removal of the Choctaws).
"^"General Henry Knox, Secretary of War, to the President of
the United States, in continuation," July 7, 1783 [1793?], in Walter
Lowrie and Walter S. Franklin, editors, American State Papers, Class II,
Indian Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton), 1:53 (hereafter cited as
ASPIA).
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they be confused with the westerners and their unremitting avarice, these
more leisured thinkers looked for exoneration.

History would have to be

satisfied.
In his remarks to Washington, Knox relied upon a theory which
elevated the American experience to a principle of natural law.

The

Secretary traced the reason for the inevitable conflict between the races
to their modes of subsistence.

Whites long had been fond of depicting

the Indian as an inveterate hunter, consumed by the excitement of the
chase.

The hunt was symbolic of the anarchic freedom and utter savagery

of the Indian and most separated him from the qualities of white culture.
Since Indian hunting was rarely a solitary business, but rather one
which required group participation for a proper return, it enhanced that
anathema of white social organization— the tribe.

The fondness of the

Indian for the hunt also seemed to explain the way in which the Indians
regarded their lands:

as vast hunting parks in which the value— the

game which coursed over it— fluctuated and was mobile.

Individualized

possession of specific property being impossible, communal ownership was
thereby reinforced.

Because it appeared that the land was of subsidiary

importance to the Indian, and because a vast amount was required for the
poorest existence, it followed that this casual devotion to the soil was
made doubly sinful by the inefficiency of its use.

Yet all these notions

were palpably erroneous, as even the most cursory observation told the
whites.

They served the cause of white expansion much more ably than

they did the truth.

12

12

None of the tribes east of the Mississippi River survived en
tirely by the hunt, but were in some combination hunters, gatherers, or
agriculturalists.
Far from being ignorant of the value of agriculture,
the Indians of the eastern woodlands practiced a kind of agriculture
that was considerably more efficient than that of the earliest white
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Civilized people were as committed to farming as savages were to
hunting.

So bound up, in fact, was farming with the idea of civiliza

tion that it became a basic quality of civilization itself.

Savages,

being so, could not possibly possess an attribute of civilization.

Even

if they did sometimes farm, it could not mean the same things to them
that it did to whites.

Whether Indians actually did farm or not, there

fore, was quite immaterial.
These notions, although current for some time, were finally
canonized in the eighteenth century by the French legal theorist, Emmerich
de Vattell, in The Law of Nations.

Accepting the farmer-hunter dichotomy,

Vattell reasoned that there would one day be far more farmers than
hunters, if only because farmers were more efficient producers of food.
In a passage reminiscent of Malthus, Vattell hinted that one day mankind
would not be able to afford the luxury of allowing hunting to continue.
At any rate, hunters had historically made way for cultivators of the
soil, and this process of replacement was nothing less than the law of

farmers on the continent. Indian farming was based upon a balance
between soil fertility, labor availability, and population. Only when
the whites arrived, throwing off balance the third variable— population—
was native argiculture itself endangered. Because of their partial
attraction to farming, the Indians were far less mobile than white
theorists believed at the time. Although tribal ranges sometimes num
bered in the hundreds of square miles, the locus of tribal activity was
always found around permanent villages where the annual tillage was done.
A rough estimate of the duration of village occupancy among the eastern
Indians indicates that soil fertility would give out once every ten
years or so, at which time another village would be founded not far away
from the original site. It was not unusual for a tribe to eventually
return to the first site after having moved several times over a genera
tion or two. This pattern of native activity was implicity recognized
by whites during the colonial period, when the burning of Indian crops
by whites on the warpath was a favorite tactic. Whites fighting the
Indians knew well enough the agrarian proclivities of their enemies.
See Jennings, The Invasion of America, pp. 60-73, for a discussion of
Indian farming.
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nature in operation.

Lands could therefore be taken justifiably from

those who used them poorly.

13

When Vattell wrote, the Indians were still obstinately resisting
white encroachment, and he did not bother even to consider that an endan
gered culture might be receptive to adaptation.
the most brutal sort of cultural imperialism.

His theories justified
No wonder, then, that

white Americans took to Vattell's theories so readily.

14

It would seem, considering this, that attempts by a few wellmeaning whites to prevent the destruction of the Indians were inconsistent
with the tenets of Vattell and the realities of the frontier.

Surely

most frontiersmen, not given to refinements of thought, considered them
so.

There is little doubt that these concerned whites felt that their

ambitions for the Indians were more enlightened than those which the
frontiersmen entertained.

Yet the method by which whites hoped to pro

tect the Indian depended utterly upon what the frontiersmen accomplished.
Cultural reform was a continuation— albeit subtler— of the same process
of destruction begun on the frontier.

And although both parties liked

to view themselves as competitors in determining the fate of the Indians,
they were in fact cooperating in the same campaign.

As the frontiersman

sought to eliminate the presence of the native, the reformer sought to
13

This work was originally published in 1758 as Le Droit du Gens;
ou, Principes de la Loi Naturelle. The translation most likely used in
America was Emmerich de Vattell, The Law of Nations; or principles of
the Law of Nature; applied to the conduct and affairs of Nations and
Sovereigns [translator unknown] (New York: Berry and Rogers, 35 Hanover
Square, 1787). See pp. 67 and 165 in this edition for remarks on the
primacy of farming cultures.
14
included,
regularly
Indians.
on Indian

American statesmen of the early nineteenth century, Calhoun
showed a thorough familiarity with Vattell's work, and they
pressed his notions into service in their dealings with the
Morse significantly included remarks on Vattell in his Report
Affairs, p. 281.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186

eliminate his very identity.

15

This is why there were few disputes

between the forces of reform and interests in any of the Indian areas
which threatened a real crisis of thought among the whites.
White humanitarians in America had long thought that the survival
of the Indian depended upon the native's ability to imitate the society
which was overwhelming him.

Reformers had selected certain highly-valued

elements of their culture which they felt were worthy of Indian adoption.

That men directly involved with the Indians on the frontiers
took a less than philanthropic stand will be demonstrated later in these
pages. As for the reformers, their comments about whites on the fron
tiers constituted a critique of their fellows in which frontiersmen were
consistently portrayed as lower class, ill-educated, and generally
avaricious. The presence of the missionaries in these Indian areas
attested to the concern reformers had that only the "right kind" of
whites could help the Indians out of their quandary. The only work that
I am familiar with which addresses this question is Robert K. Berkhofer,
Jr.'s, Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions and
American Indian Response, 1787-1862 (New York: Atheneum, 1972) , pp. 89106 (hereafter cited as Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage). Much work
remains to be done on this interesting subject.
Bernard Sheehan's recent work is the most extensive on the
question of Indian reform during this period. We disagree on the role
which civilizing programs played in the over-all scheme of Indian
affairs and policy.
Sheehan takes these programs largely for what the
whites imagine them to be: as philanthropic attempts to save the
Indians from extinction. He accounts for the failure of these programs
(and for their irregularity of application) by saying that "the main
reason for the programmatic deficiencies of Jeffersonian philanthropy
could be found in its basic optimism. The philanthropists had no more
than an inkling of the obduracy of the task before them." This stand
leads him to assert that there had long been a selfless desire by whites
to convert the Indians, yet the work of Francis Jennings and Edmund S.
Morgan has shown recently how programs of civilization in the colonial
period were much more productive of subjugation than civilization. John
Eliot's praying villages of Indians in Massachusetts and the so-called
Indian college at Henrico, Virginia, serve as pertinent examples.
Jennings' and Morgan's work, plus my own reading of the sources convince
me that civilization programs were adopted precisely because they served
the more important goals of dispossession and eclipse. Bernard Sheehan,
Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), pp. 120, 122 (hereafter cited as Sheehan,
Seeds of Extinction); Jennings, Invasion of America, pp. 240-244; and
Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of
Colonial Virginia (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 98.
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Those most readily pressed into the cause of Indian protection were
language, religion, and cultivation.

Of these, Thomas Jefferson believed,

cultivation promised the greatest return to the whites.

16

However beneficial whites believed their language and religion
were to the Indians, it was evident that the immediate benefits to the
whites of religious or linguistic conversion were small.

The picture of

ex-savages praying in English was doubtless an uplifting one, but the
fondest sight of all was an Indian giving up his land.

By transforming

the native into a red yeoman, whites believed that they could strike at
the heart of native solidarity.

The newly-converted Indian would engage

in the labor-intensive form of agriculture practiced by whites.

Using

"civilized" techniques, natives would begin to consume goods for which
they had heretofore had the smallest use.

The acquisition of new tech

niques and tools in turn demanded a different appreciation for the land
they occupied.

Needing only individual tracts rather than hunting

parks engrossing miles of forest, the Indians' physical world would
shrink to accord with that of the whites.

The final dividend of a

transformation by the means of cultivation was the ultimate destruction
of tribalism.

Being the obverse of white civilization, tribalism was

the enemy of reform.
Reform had arisen in the first instance when whites became con
cerned by the rapid degeneration of the tribes who had been encircled by
white settlements.

These natives seemed simply to disintegrate, and by

the 1820s many native areas in the East were little more than "slums in

16

DeRosier, Removal of the Choctaws, p. 28.
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the wilderness," according to one close student of this period.

17

Since

Sir William Johnson's time, men had thought about somehow moving these
endangered natives away from the deleterious effects of too intimate an
association with frontier settlers.
a movement became possible.

With the purchase of Louisiana, such

Prior to the purchase, Indians had ceded

their lands in return for money or goods, both of which were quickly
spent, leaving the Indians impoverished in their forest ghettos.

It was

suspected by white reformers that there would come a time in the degenera
tion process when it would no longer be possible to rescue the native
from his decline and that extinction would soon follow.

The presence of

the Louisiana territory provided the time to arm the natives culturally
against the white advance and its sorry effect upon them.

New lands in

the territory could be exchanged for threatened homelands east of the
Mississippi River.
"Emigration"— as this notion was called— challenged neither the
basic idea of civilization nor the ambitions of the frontiersmen to
somehow wrest all lands from these Indians.

President Jefferson believed

that the very influences which had formerly convinced the Indians to
cede land— the decline of game, the intrusion of white squatters, indebt
edness, and social degeneration— could now be put to use to persuade the
eastern Indians to move across the Mississippi.

18

Jefferson meant removal to be gradual and voluntary.
was not to be used for the time being.

Overt force

Superficially, it appeared that

17

See Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the
Senecas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 184-202 (hereafter cited
as Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Senecas) .
^ D e R o s i e r , Removal of the Choctaws, p. 28.
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emigration was an idea born of the noblest intentions and thus was in
direct conflict with the exterminationist sentiments on the frontier.

In

fact, emigration took its place in the white scheme of things and com
plemented these other notions.

This gradualist policy justified all the

more the necessity to extinguish every Indian claim east of the river,
for Jefferson had no intention of giving Louisiana entirely to the
Indians.

If an exchange of land was to be the selling point in per

suading the eastern Indians to move, the cost to the United States could
be minimized by extinguishing land claims before the final exchange was
arranged.

In this way, fewer western lands would have to be given over

to the Indians.

Jefferson hoped that the eastern Indians would become

indebted to the new government-supported trading posts.

If the chiefs

could be mired in debts, they would be all the more willing "to lop them
[their debts] off by a cession of lands," Jefferson said.

Thus, between

removal by brute force and a happy jaunt to the west, there lay a range
of coercive techniques which the whites had been developing for a good
while and meant to bring into play in this case.

19

The notions of civilization and emigration, although consonant
with the less refined ideas on the frontier, constituted the most humani
tarian view of the Indian and his problems in the early nineteenth
century.

From the American Revolution on, they were held with remarkable

unanimity by white statesmen responsible for overseeing Indian-white
relations.

If their perceptions were so riddled with illusion and were

conveniently self-serving, they nonetheless served as the foundation for
beliefs which were acted upon with conviction and sincerity.
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now, however, the question was how effective a defense sincerity could
be.

Those who made Indian policy and formulated programs based upon

these ideas took the only way they felt was open to them which would not
bring down upon them the condemnation of history.

20

Some editorial

remarks by Hezekiah Niles in 1820 illustrate well the anxiety of enlight
ened convention to be vindicated by history.

Niles wrote:

We do hope that a remnant of this people may be saved— that something
may be done to stand as a monument of desire to prevent their exter
mination— to shew posterity, by irresistable evidence, that if our
honest efforts to introduce them within the pale of civilization
failed of success, the fault was in the character of the original
possessors of the soil, not in ours.
We have several times spoken on this subject, for we are deeply
interested in it, not more perhaps for the benefit of the Indians
than on account of the national reputation. We desire to have some
thing that will "tell well in history."21
Thus the contest between white culture and history itself had
been joined.

All knew that the battle between civilization and savagism

had been won.

II
The Superintendent of Indian Trade, Thomas L. McKenney, was in a
hopeful mood.

Having just spent some months working with the new Secre

tary of War, McKenney observed to Christopher Vandeventer about their
secretary and Indian affirs, "Our excellent friend Mr. Calhoun has got

20

Sheehan feels that white philanthropists were sincerely moti
vated; he writes that the "white man dealt with the Indian as he
perceived him," and the implication is, of course, that the Indian
received from white reformers as good a treatment as was available at
the time. Yet there were those who on rare occasions placed themselves
directly at odds with the ideas of both the frontiersmen and the
reformers by taking what was perceived as an unprogressive and racially
disloyal position. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, p. ix.
21

Niles' Weekly Register, December 30, 1820.
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it in his power to promote the welfare of this people; and in doing so,
to erect a monument to his memory."
wrong.

22

McKenney could not have been more

Of all the problems Calhoun faced in his official life at the

War Office, none was more resistant to his reforming impulses than that
of Indian affairs.

In his attempts to modernize the army, Calhoun con

fronted prejudices sufficiently long-standing to endanger his every
program; and yet, compared to those he would encounter in his supervision
of Indian affairs, anti-army sentiment was patently superficial.
Calhoun inherited Indian policies and programs which had been
evolving without much real purpose since Knox's first administration.
Officially, the United States had committed itself to the regulation of
Indian trade and the monopolization of all land transactions between
natives and whites.

A series of trade and intercourse acts stipulated

that all such activities be monitored and supervised by the War Department
and its chief officer.

Government agents were dispatched to several

tribes in order to enforce these acts with the help of the local military
commander.

Working directly under the Secretary of War, the Indian

agents (and sometimes sub-agents) policed private traders (to whom they
issued licenses), settled disputes between races and tribes, negotiated
treaties, and administered payments legally due the tribesmen as the
result of past settlements.

23

Beginning in 1796, a system of government trading posts— or
"factories" as they were called— was established to offer the Indians an

22

Thomas L. McKenney to Cheistopher Vandeventer, June 21, 1818,
Vandeventer Papers.
23

White, The Jeffersonians, pp. 496-511.
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alternative to duplicitous private traders.

More symbolic of official

benevolence than anything else, these factories never seriously threatened
private trading operations since the system was inadequately capitalized.
The system's nuisance value apparently was quite high, however, because
this arrangement was eventually destroyed by its private competitors.

24

While Calhoun watched over relations with the tribes generally,
the Superintendent of Indian trade was responsible only for the factory
system.

This officer was theoretically the government's wholesaler and

warehouseman for the goods which went out to the tribes through the fac
tories.

In practice, however, the Office of Indian trade in Georgetown

became a clearing house for intelligence about the tribes and their
affairs.

Much could be told about the situation on the frontier from

the factors' letters to their Superintendent, and on occasion the Indian
agents wrote the Superintendent as well as the Secretary of War about

year when Calhoun came to the War Department.

A Quaker, a Marylander,

and a failed Georgetown businessman, McKenney was thirty-one years old
when he went into government service.

He likely owed his appointment to

influence, for he was no expert on the Indians, and although he threw
himself into his duties with ardor, his views and opinions were based
upon an education far removed from the tribes themselves.
24

Ibid.

His knowledge

See also pp. 231-240 below.

25

Herman J. Viola, Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's
Early Indian Policy, 1816-1830 (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1974), pp. xi-5,
8-20, 26, for a summary of the day-to-day duties of the Superintendent
and the doings of his office. On the whole, Viola assumes a general
agreement on Indian affairs between McKenney and Calhoun and a far
greater impact upon Indian policy than I am willing to concede, as shall
be seen later in this chapter.
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of Indians, gained during the course of his duties, came from occasional
meetings with deputations of Indians in the capital on business.

He did

not get to the frontier hims&Li until after Calhoun had left office.
McKenney was nonetheless available to Calhoun on short notice; he pos
sessed a fund of information and advice, and he was an impassioned
advocate of Indian reform.

26

There was little about the Indian policy of the Monroe adminis
tration to distinguish it from its predecessors.

As the President made

plain in his first annual address to Congress, the United States was
still bound to extinguish the Indian claims to all lands east of

the

Mississippi, to persuade the Indians to move west, and to civilize them
if possible.

The over-all success of the Monroe administration in pur

suit of these goals is best told by the number of Indian land cessions
negotiated between 1817 and 1825.

Under Calhoun's supervision the

national government obtained forty-one cessions, while in the previous
eighteen years only fifty-seven had been managed.

27

Although Monroe

acknowledged that it was necessary to make some provision "for the pre
servation, improvement, and civilization of the native inhabitants," he
forthrightly defended the avid expansion which had made the Indians
objects of concern.

Looking forward to the settlement of the Mississippi

basin, the President told Congress that "the rights of nature demanded
it."

28

And even though it was hardly likely that the westward movement
26Ibid.

2^Charles C. Royce, comp., "Indian Land Cessions," Eighteenth
Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington, D. C . :
Government Printing Office, 1899), pp. 660-774.
2®James Monroe, "First Annual Address," James D. Richardson,
comp., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, 11 vols.
(Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Literature, 1899), 1:585 (here
after cited as Richardson, Messages and Papers).
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would be hampered in the least by humanitarian concerns for the plight
of the native, Monroe called upon Vattell for justification; he wrote:
The hunter state can exist only in the vast uncultivated desert.
It yields to the more dense and compact form and greater force of
civilized population; and of right it ought to yield, for the earth
was given to mankind to support the greatest number of which it is
capable, and no tribe or people have a right to withhold from the
wants of others more than is necessary for their own support and
comfort.29
Few whites would have cavilled with the sentiment expressed here,
so unlimited were its assertions.

Monroe's friend and predecessor, James

Madison, wondered idly about the implications of the new executive's pro
nouncements.

"It might also be not easy," Madison cautioned, "to repell

the claims of those without lands, in other countries, if not in our
own, to vacant lands within the U. S. likely to remain for a long period
of years unproductive of human food."

30

However, Monroe had no patience

with such ruminations and he did not relent.
The President did not enlarge upon the foundations he laid for
his Indian policy.

As in most matters, he set general policy and let

his underlings add substance as necessity arose.

Reflecting the impor

tance he assigned to dispossession and civilization, government
functionaries devoted considerably more time, money, and energy to
outright dispossession than to any sort of cultural transformation.
Dispossession, either by means of emigration or outright land cessions,
and civilization were presumably pieces of the same cloth; and if we are
to believe the rhetoric of policy-makers, civilization was regarded more

James Madison to James Monroe, December 27, 1817, Monroe
Papers, L C .
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highly until the balance between the two ideas frankly shifted in the
1830s to forced removal.

Yet the real goal of government policies can

be seen in the appropriations having to do with these two programs.
emphasis upon dispossession is evident.

The

In 1819 Congress voted an annual

sum of ten thousand dollars for the education of Indian children.

31

After

five years of operation, this program used something on the order of
twelve thousand dollars annually; yet private contributions in 1824 to
the same end— mostly coming from missionary societies— amounted to over
$170,000.

The niggardliness of the government's participation becomes

evident when one considers that the expenses associated with but one
land cession could easily exceed that spent by the government on a program
which presumably lay at the heart of the policy of civilization.

32

In his assiduous pursuit of Indian lands and his nominal dedica
tion to the concept of civilization, Calhoun conformed with the priorities
laid down by his government, but during his first years in office Calhoun
seems to have entertained the notion that it was possible to satisfy
government priorities and reform the Indians' affairs at the same time.
His first inclination was to adopt the rhetoric of reform, and this was
one reason for McKenney's enthusiasm over Calhoun's appointment.
Secretary's confidence matched that of the Superintendent.

The

"Our system

in relation to the Indians," Calhoun told a missionary in 1819, "ought
to undergo an entire and radical change.

The great point is, by

313 Stat. 516 (March 3, 1819).
32

Thomas L. McKenney, "Condition of the Indians," April 20,
1826, ASPIA, 2:669. The Georgia Creeks, in whose lands the national and
state governments were considerably interested, cost the Indian depart
ment more than $20,000 in negotiation expenses during the year 1024
alone, and even then no cession was agreed upon.
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instruction to prepare them to become a part of our community."

33

But

McKenney's remark that Calhoun had an opportunity to build a monument
for himself made an observation more profound than the Superintendent
intended.

Calhoun was educated to the futility of reform only gradually.

Five years after he made this remark, Calhoun had rejected the assimilationist ambitions which had been born of his optimism and had recommended
the creation of an Indian enclave in the West in which the natives could
be protected from white encroachment.

34

The remainder of this chapter

chronicles the progress of his change of heart.
Calhoun's first order of busines was always the extinguishment
of Indian land titles.

The War of 1812 had provided a brief respite in

the campaign to acquire Indian lands, but the war's end signalled a
resurgence of interest.

Between 1817 and 1825, thirty-one of the forty-

six treaties negotiated by the government entailed tribal movement of
some kind because of lands ceded.

35

A great deal of this campaign

against Indian title was conducted in the southern states, where the
pressure of white population had created considerable hostility to native
possession, and in the instance of Georgia, the United States had agreed
by means of a compact with that state in 1802 to eliminate native possession

33

John C. Calhoun to J. H. Hobart, March 24, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 3:686.
34

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, January 24, 1825, ibid.,

9:516-517.
35

Charles J. Kappler, com., Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties,
5 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904-1931; re
printed edition of vol. 2, New York:
Interland Publishing Company,
1973), 2:138-230 (hereafter cited as Kappler, Indian Treaties) .
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35

as soon as it could be done peaceably.

As it happened, the natives in

this area were the most numerous and cohesive of all the eastern wood
lands Indians at the time.

Collectively, they were known as the

"Civilized Tribes," whose members were Cherokees, Choctaws, Creeks, and
37
Chickasaws.
By Calhoun's time it had become almost axiomatic that when
native groups were surrounded to the degree of the southern Indians,
extinction was soon to follow.
ceeded Independence."

38

"Helplessness," he ventured, "has sue-

That being so, the debility of the encircled

tribesmen made the pretense of treating the tribes as independent
nations all the more absurd.

"They neither are, in fact, nor ought to

be, considered as independent nations," Calhoun observed.

39

As Calhoun

learned more and more about the wretched prospects of the Indians, his
knowledge of their situation and the need to treat them as independent
peoples clashed.

In his first report to Congress on Indian affairs,

Calhoun concluded that "it is only by causing our opinion of their
interest to prevail that they can be civilized and saved from extinction."

40

The paternalism which Calhoun's attitudes embodied was, in
36

For a summary of the Georgia Compact of 1802 and the circum
stances of its creation, see Ulrich B. Phillips, "Georgia and State
Rights: A Study of the Political History of Georgia from the Revolution
to the Civil War, with particular regard to Federal Relations," Annual
Report of the American Historical Association for 1901, 2 vols. (Wash
ington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 2:44-49 (hereafter
cited as Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights").
37

The Seminoles are usually included as a distinct part of the
Civilized Tribes, but the Seminoles were actually renegade Lower Creeks,
or at least they were so regarded by the Creeks.
38

John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 3:342.
39

Ibid.

40

Ibid., p. 350.
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fact, hostile to any exercise of native independence.

It made possible

the use of coercive methods otherwise unthinkable.
Calhoun's was not a unique view.

He had at his disposal a

coterie of like-minded men who had close contact with the tribes.

The

most active were officers of the so-called "Indian Department" of the
War Office, the agents and the regional Superintendents of Indian
affairs (who were, with one exception, governors serving in an ex officio
capacity).

Keen to satisfy the land hunger of their constituents, these

last officials were eager to cooperate with Calhoun on any program which
promised dividends in Indian lands.

41

Missionaries were attracted by

the pagan souls, yearning to be converted.

Private individuals from

both races involved themselves for reasons which were best known only
to themselves and about which Calhoun never inquired.
As long as none of these individuals threatened his own objec
tives, Calhoun unselfconsciously exploited them all.

The first

requirement for those who participated in Indian affairs was the support
of the government.

Calhoun felt no remorse about summarily dismissing a

sub-agent because he "countenanced and aided the Indians" in their oppo
sition to a proposed treaty.

He accounted for this lapse of fidelity by

the agent's marriage into the tribe.

42

Of course, Calhoun had control

over all those who operated in an official capacity among the tribesmen,

41

The only difference of substance ever to arise between Calhoun
and these governors concerned the speed at which the government's policy
of dispossession was carried out. Not surprisingly, the most energetic
and cooperative of these men was Governor Joseph McMinn of Tennessee,
where a large population of Cherokees lived.
42

John C. Calhoun to John Crowell, January 13, 1825, Calhoun
Papers, 9;492-493.
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but since Calhoun took such a proprietary interest in the Indians, he
insisted that outsiders hew to government policy also.

The missionaries,

requiring the good will of the government, were susceptible to Calhoun's
influence.

He let it be known that he expected from the missionaries,

too, "a proper support of all its [the government's] measures, growing
out of our best relations with these tribes, and prompted by our best
policy."

43

Because there was such racial and programmatic unanimity to

begin with, there were few incidents of this kind, but they were all the
more noticeable because of their rarity.

Disloyalty of any kind was

construed as an exploitation of the Indians' weakness, and Calhoun,
along with other officials, was exceedingly close-minded about it.

44

Indians who resisted government policy were considered in much the same
way.

The Secretary could not suppose, he said, "that those who make

such violent opposition . . . are governed by a regard to the good of
the [Indian] nation."

45

To him there was little difference between

white and native obscurantism.

46

43

John C. Calhoun to Thomas L. McKenney, February 16, 1818,
ibid., 2:241. After rumors were heard that a missionary had been
working against the idea of emigration, the secretary of the missionary's
board felt obliged to reaffirm his organization's support of government
policy and assured Calhoun that those under his charge had been instructed
"to withhold themselves sacredly from even colour of interference" with
the government's designs. See Samuel Worcester to John C. Calhoun,
February 6, 1818, ibid., 2:124-125.
44

See two letters from New York Representative David Ogden on
the intrigues of one Jabez B. Hyde, a schoolmaster, against the emigra
tion of the Six Nations. Ogden was torn between ignoring Hyde and
prosecuting him under any law that could be found. David Ogden to John C.
Calhoun, November 7, 1818, ibid., 3:255; and David Ogden to John CCalhoun, November 24, 1818, ibid., 3:295.
45
46

John C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, July 29, 1818, ibid., 2:437.
See on this matter Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, pp. 143-144.
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If whites were generally agreed on the wisdom of the government's
programs, the Indians certainly were not.

Their opinions ran the gamut

from those who were willing to forsake tribalism altogether and assimi
late to those who threatened to kill Indian agents who advocated a
program such as emigration.

47

As Calhoun and others who had an interest

in moving the tribes west increased pressure, native factions broke out
which the Secretary always attempted to manipulate to the government's
advantage.

Having no qualms about ignoring lines of tribal authority, he

placed his faith and his sanction in more pliable men who he thought
would be able to educate the obstinate members of the tribe to his con
ception of their best interests.
In 1817 the Eastern Cherokees of Tennessee had agreed to an
exchange of their lands for an equal acreage in Arkansas Territory.

48

47

It is doubtful that the number of Indian assimilationists was
very high at this time. Those who wrote to Calhoun, petitioning for
individual headrights or expressing other assimilationist sentiments—
such as an appeal for schools— certainly were not matched by letters
arguing for tribal or territorial integrity. Letters of the former kind
were, of course, much more pleasing to Calhoun, who may have let such
letters, combined with the optimistic reports of his agents and the
missionaries, shade his opinions of how well the Indians were progressing.
My impression is that the resisting Indians were much less visible than
the assimilationists, even though the former probably composed a majority
of the tribesmen. See, as examples of assimilationists sentiments,
Richard Brown to John C. Calhoun, January 14, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:57;
Abraham Williams to John C. Calhoun, May 1, 1818, ibid., 2:273; and
John Jolly to John C. Calhoun, January 28, 1818, ibid., 2:99.
48

Kappler, Indian Treaties, pp. 140-144. This agreement of
July 8, 1817, was negotiated by Andrew Jackson at the Cherokee Agency,
Tennessee, and it was the first treaty of exchange agreed upon after the
war. It called for an equal exchange of lands and allowed those remain
ing behind 640 acres as "life estates." After the death of the family
head, title would revert to fee simple. No date was fixed for the
exchange, because the amount of lands involved was to be determined by
a native census yet to be taken. Any monetary payment to the tribe as
a result of the exchange depended upon the census also.
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Although it appeared that a considerable number of Cherokees would make
the move west quite soon, there was significant resistance from within
the tribe.

Established tribal authority was opposed to any precipitate

emigration.

In an attempt to circumvent tribal authority, white offi

cials cooperated.

Senator John Williams of Tennessee sent to Calhoun's

office Major David Walker, a Cherokee chief who had been opposed to emi
gration.

Now, Senator Williams believed, Walker's "friendship and aid

can be procured."

Williams suggested that Walker be given an appointment

to help take a census required by the late treaty.

"I wish you to have

a confidential conversation with Major Walker on the subject," Williams
told Calhoun.
appointment,

49

Walker represented himself well; he was given the

A month later Calhoun told Governor Joseph McMinn of

Tennessee that Walker "has entered warmly into the notion of emigrating
. . . it is a matter of great importance to keep him well affected to
the removal of the Cherokees West of the Mississippi.
Official optimism that the treaty would soon be executed was
dashed

in early

1818 when rumors went out fromthe Cherokee towns that

serious resistance was developing among the headmen of the tribe.

As

Governor McMinn was attempting to arrange a meeting with the Cherokees
on

the subject,

Chiefs Path Killer and CharlesHicks called a meeting

of

the national

council in which opposition toemigration was so domi

nant that it was resolved to put to death any Indian who advocated
fulfillment of the treaty.

It was said, furthermore, that any who tried

49

John Williams to John C. Calhoun, March 9, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:183.
^°John C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, April 11, 1818, ibid.,
2:241.
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to emigrate stood in danger of having their lands confiscated on the
pretext of "bad debts" to the nation.

Since the amount each Indian was

calculated to give up had a direct bearing upon how much he got across
the river, this rumor was quite intimidating.

51

Major Walker returned from Washington just in time to accompany
Governor McMinn into the Cherokee homelands to the town of Oostallanny.
Walker was not much help.

The governor's party was greeted, by his

account, by two thousand very drunk and very hostile natives of the
Southern and Underhill clans.

If he even mentioned emigration, McMinn

was told "they would chastise me with their light-horse [native
police]."

McMinn nevertheless tried to convince the Cherokee chiefs of

the errors of their position, but Charles Hicks carried the standard of
opposition and argued forcefully against the provision of the treaty
which granted "life estates" to those who remained behind.

This stipu

lation, Hicks said rightly, took the control of tribal lands away from
the chiefs.

Hicks reminded McMinn that the Cherokees were still an

independent nation.

All that McMinn could do was to propose a very

large bribe and hope that this would cause the Indians to agree to move
within two years.

The chiefs flatly refused.

McMinn laid the blame

for the misfired treaty squarely upon Hicks and his party.

"Were it not

for these declarations," said the governor, "I should be able to enrol
[sic] nearly their whole nation."

52

^Joseph McMinn to John C. Calhoun, January 18, and June 8, 1818,
"Extinguishment of Indian Title to Lands in Georgia," ASPIA, 2:281.
52

See McMinn's correspondence to Calhoun, detailing this inci
dent in "Plan for Extinguishing the Cherokee Claim to Land in Georgia,
Tennessee, and Alabama," January 12, 1825, ibid., 2:526-529.
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When Calhoun received McMinn's dispatches from Oostallanny, the
Secretary allowed himself a fit of temper.

He was shocked by the hos

tility which McMinn had encountered at the Indian town.

His initial

optimism disappointed, Calhoun told McMinn;
It is in vain for the Cherokees to hold the high tone which they
do, as to their independence as a nation, for daily proof is exhi
bited, that, were it not for the protecting army of the United
States, they would become the victims of fraud and v i o l e n c e . 5 3
If the Cherokee leaders wished to be independent-minded, he said, let
them indulge themselves in the only place where that sort of conduct was
possible— west of the river.

"Let them reflect," Calhoun said heatedly,

"how nation after nation have sunk before the United States, and they
will see the necessity of coming into our views."

54

Calhoun was not content, however, merely to leave the Cherokees
to their ruminations.

In the months that followed, white officials were

busy persuading Indian leaders and sounding out their reasons for opposition, and then bluntly appealing to their self-interest.

55

Cherokee

^ J o h n C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, July 29, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:436.
54

John C. Calhoun to Joseph McMinn, July 29, 1818, ibid., 2:438439. This is a different letter than the one previously cited. The
first letter to McMinn on that day was Calhoun's immediate reaction, in
which he simply vented his spleen against the Cherokee chiefs. The
second was more moderate in its tones. It began, "after mature
reflection . . . "
55

The first order of business was to get the Cherokees to meet
with McMinn and discuss the emigration question at all. The fact that
such an agreement was made in the fall of 1818 was taken as a good sign
that the Indian leaders' opinions were changing. See John C. Calhoun
to Joseph McMinn, October 13, 1818, ibid., 3:200. McMinn thought all
along that Hicks was the chief to convert; so great was his prestige,
his conversion would perforce solve much of the opposition problem.
See McMinn to John C. Calhoun, January 26, 1819, "Extinguishment of
Indian Title to Lands, ASPIA, 2:482-483.
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agent Return J. Meigs singled out Charles Hicks as the principal target
for the government's campaign against resistance, and Meigs and McMinn
sought to isolate Hicks from his fellow oppositionists in several
meetings during late 1818.

McMinn gave bribes to all the principal

chiefs except Hicks and added to the cash the promise that when the
treaty went through, those chiefs who cooperated would receive grants of
land in fee simple for their p a i n s . ^

As Hicks watched his fellow

chiefs defect, he too became more receptive to emigration.

3y the begin

ning of 1819 plans were in the making for the chiefs to visit Washington
for discussions with Calhoun.

McMinn informed Calhoun that Hicks was

beginning to moderate his views:
His mind had, however, undergone a considerable change, insomuch as
to be visible to many who attended the last conferences; and this
change is to be accounted for, in a great degree, by the loss which
the nation sustained in the selection of those persons named in my
report of the 24th instant [in which McMinn stated the amounts of
money given to each of the chiefs]. The remarks will particularly
apply to [Major John] Walker, [Walter S.] Adair, and [Richard]
Taylor; the latter having been in the employment of the United States
for some time in attending the delivery of corn to the Arkansas
settlers .^
Thus, when the Cherokee delegates arrived in the capital, all of
them had been seduced in some degree by the government.

Hicks took the

lead in the discussions with Calhoun, and the delegation's main concern
seemed to be how much land was to be ceded and how the members of the
delegation would be affected by the agreement.

58

Calhoun meanwhile

56

Joseph McMinn to John C. Calhoun, January 24, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 3:519.
57

Joseph McMinn to John C. Calhoun, January 26, 1819, "Extin
guishment of Indian Title to Land," ASPIA, 2:482-483.
58

See Charles Hicks to John C. Calhoun, February 12, 19, 1819,
Calhoun Papers, 3:569, 588-589.
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pressed his advantage.
observed.

59

"The tone of the nation has greatly altered," he

The Secretary said he sympathized with their desire for

some guaranteed homeland in the East, but he cautioned the delegates in
no uncertain terms:
To secure such great benefits, it is indispensable that the cessions
which they make should be ample, and the part reserved to themselves
should not be larger than is necessary for their wants and convenience.
Should a larger quantity be retained, it will not be possible by any
stipulation in the treaty, to prevent future cessions. So long as
you may retain more land than what is necessary or convenient to
yourselves, you will be inclined to sell and the United States to
purchase; the truth of what I say you know cannot be doubted,
as
your own experience and that of
all Indian nations, proves it
tobe
true
The Cherokee Treaty of 1819 was the first of two with which
Calhoun was directly involved.

Its

concerns of the chiefs; the bulk of
tection of their lands.

provisions spelled out in detail the
the treaty had to do with the pro

In the document, these individuals were referred

to as "persons of industry, and capable of managing their property with
discretion."

A list of names of the principal chiefs, detailing their

property improvements, was appended.

The provisions of the treaty of

1817 were reaffirmed, but no lands in addition to those already mentioned
* ^ 61
were ceded.
Calhoun obviously had ambitions to extinguish the entire Cherokee
title during these negotiations, but he had fallen far short of that.

As

he predicted, the failure to rid themselves of all but their most necessary
59

John C. Calhoun to
4:428. Hicks protested that
had never been so opposed to
had said. See Hicks to John

Joseph McMinn, December 27, 1818, ibrd.,
McMinn had misrepresented him, and that he
the execution of the treaty as the Governor
C. Calhoun, February 8, 1819, ibid., 3:555.

^ J o h n C. Calhoun "To the Cherokee Del egation," February 11,
1819, ibid., 3:565.
^Kappler, Indian Treaties, p. 178-179.
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lands would eventually cause the Cherokees a great deal of trouble.

A

residue of ill-will was created among the whites of the South which
would lead to the forced removal of the Cherokees fifteen years later.
Calhoun's part in these proceedings is illustrative of the
larger role he played as the nation's highest Indian officer.

These

negotiations were Calhoun's baptism of fire in Indian affairs, and
during their course he countenanced acts which, in any other undertaking,
he would have condemned as blatantly unscrupulous.

While dealing with

the Indians, Calhoun discovered an ability in himself to lay aside his
principles for a time; these were the niceties of civilized intercourse
only.

In doing so, he could have made no clearer demonstration of the

disdain he held for the legitimacy of the views which uncooperative
natives had to offer, whatever the justice behind them.

The denial of

the native's ability to decide his own fate was the real price of the
humanitarianism which Calhoun and other reformers then professed.
Because of their numbers, territorial claims, and the growing
militance of the states involved, the southern tribes were particular
objects of official concern.

But every eastern tribe faced the possi

bility that they might be asked to give up their lands and move west.
There were no official criteria which told Calhoun that the time for a
tribe's removal was propitious, but when other political, speculative,
and humanitarian groups evinced an interest in a particular tribe's
removal, Calhoun was bound to act, if only to represent the government's
position.
This was the case of the remnants of the once-great League of
the Iroquois of New York.

Altogether, the Six Nations occupied fourteen
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reservations in New York state which engrossed more than a quarter of a
million acres from the Mohawk valley west beyond the Finger Lakes, a
distance of some two hundred and fifty miles in which the Indian pre
sence was noticeable.

A little more than 4,500 natives claimed

aboriginal title to this vast'estate.

62

Such was their situation that

unofficial interest groups fixed upon them as candidates for emigration
even before the government did.

Calhoun had no thought to initiate emi

gration talks with the Six Nations until private interests brought them
to his attention.

63

Alarmed by the poverty, alcoholism, and violence among the Six
Nations Indians, missionaries had been moving into their areas before
the War of 1812.

The missionary campaign coincided with the emergence of

a revivalistic, anti-Christian religion among the Indians.

For about

twenty years Handsome Lake (Connediu), a Seneca Chief, had been preaching
among the nations and had made considerable headway by the time he died
in 1815.

It would have been difficult for Handsome Lake to have devised

a creed more opposed to the tenets of civilization as the missionaries
and the government saw them.

Led now by the remarkable Seneca Chief,

Red Jacket, the Handsome Lake adherents were also suspicious that human
itarian interventionists served purposes uncongenial to their national
welfare.

Above all, the Handsome Lake religion dictated temperate self-

reliance and tribal integrity, two concepts which ran directly contrary
to the white outlook.

64

For the missionaries, and later for Secretary

62

Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, December 3, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 3:336.
r

t

John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, March 14, 1818, ibid., 2:294.
64

Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, pp. 32,1-337.
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Calhoun, one standard of how well civilization was being accepted was
the lack of progress of this new apostasy.
The Ogden Land Company naturally was less interested in souls
than the missionaries.

Since the company had acquired the rights of

preemption to Iroquois lands in 1810, the company stood to benefit if
the Indians could somehow be persuaded that emigration was in their
interests.

And since the company had no portfolio to treat directly

with the Iroquois, company directors attempted to manipulate tribal
strife, missionary philanthropy, and in the end, Calhoun himself.
company stood a good chance of success in this last task.

The

Several of

the company's directors were at one time or another members of govern
ment themselves and were well connected in the capital.

David B. Ogden,

Robert Troup, James Wadsworth and Peter B. Porter all dealt with Calhoun
on behalf of their company's interests.^
Calhoun first became involved in the affairs of the Six nations
in 1818, when Congressman David Ogden told him that the Indians might be
induced to emigrate if the government could find suitable western lands
for their new settlements.^^

Calhoun did as Ogden asked, but he had

considerable evidence already that Ogden had misrepresented tribal senti
ment.

Only a short time before, a group of Six Nations Chiefs had let

Calhoun know that they were apprehensive that the government was about to
force a land exchange upon them.

67

This was not true, and so he told

k^Ogden, Troup, and Wadsworth were all large landowners and con
gressmen representing New York. Peter B. Porter was a former Secretary
of War.
^ S e e John C. Calhoun to David B. Ogden, May 14, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:293.
67

Six Nations Chiefs to John C. Calhoun, January 1, 1818, ibid.,

2:50.
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the chiefs.

Calhoun's feeling that the Indians would be better off if

they emigrated certainly applied to the Iroquois too, but he clearly did
68
not see the Iroquois in the same light as the Cherokees.

On the other

hand, the recent Cherokee treaty was the very model of what the Ogden
Land Company hoped to arrange.
Although the War Department received several other such memo
rials from anxious Iroquois during the course of the year, Calhoun's
own convictions moved him to at least a partial association with the goals
of the land company.

69

When he found a place for the Iroquois m

Arkansas Territory and the Iroquois rejected it as being too unhealthy
for them, he reacted in much the same way he had when he had first heard
of Cherokee resistance:

he attributed opposition to "officious and

designing men" influencing the tribesmen.

70

Despite the continued atten

tions of the land company, the efforts of the missionaries, and even a
blunt message from President Monroe, the Iroquois majority held firm in
their refusal to move.

71

Calhoun had explained the government's policy

68

John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, March 14, 1818, ibid.,
2:294. In this letter, Calhoun outlined the government's intentions
toward the Iroquois, which were simply that there was no plan to remove
the Indians by force or otherwise, but that if sentiment existed favor
able to emigration, the government would have no objection to it. The
letter emphasized the voluntary aspect of emigration.
69

In November, 1818, a group of Oneida chiefs protested the idea
of emigration, arguing that it would impede their progress toward civili
zation. The Oneidas, however, were the most thoroughly Christianized of
the Six Nations, and thus the most receptive to government persuasion.
See Oneida Chiefs and Warriors to John C. Calhoun, November 11, 1818,
ibid., 3:262.
70John C. Calhoun to David Ogden, August 19, 1818, ibid., 3:56.
71

In early 1819, President Monroe took the unusual step of ad
dressing the Six Nations on their welfare. Probably in response to the
protest from the Oneida Chiefs lodged earlier, Monroe told these Indians:
"You cannot become civilized 'till you advance one step farther." That
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that all such moves west were to be arrived at voluntarily and that the
choice was up to the Indians.
Calhoun's mind, chose wrongly.

The Iroquois took him at his word, and, to
72

Already feeling the strains caused by white encirclement, the
Iroquois had split into at least two groups, which were identified as the
"Christian party" and the "Pagan party," the last of which drew its sup
port from disciples of Handsome Lake and Red Jacket.

The disagreement

between the parties turned at least partially on how the Six Nations
should confront the problems presented by white encroachment upon their
lives and lands.

Confronted now with the prospect of emigration,

factional antagonism magnified considerably.

The Christian party was

the smaller of the two, and it was not initially unified on the emigration
question.

73

Neither were the members of the Pagan party, but they were

possessed of a creed which justified social resistance to white cultural
one step had to do with the division of their lands into family lots
with titles in fee simple. James Monroe to the Six Nations, January 15,
1819, ibid., 3:499. Ogden and his company arranged, over Indian pro
tests , a conference between the Six Nations and commissioners from New
York to discuss emigration and the extinguishment of the Iroquois title,
but the conference fell through.
Interestingly, Calhoun appointed a
federal representative to attend this state conference and oversee the
welfare of the Iroquois. See John C. Calhoun to Morris Miller, March 27,
August 17, 1819, ibid., 3:698, and 4:216. Calhoun was by no means happy
that the state conference had misfired; on the contrary, he told Miller,
"I only regret, that the Indians had not sufficiently understood their
interest to have accepted the liberal offers."
72

John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, March 14, 1818, ibid.,

2:294.
73

As late as 1820, Jedediah Morse believed that all of the
Iroquois were undecided on the issue of emigration, party notwithstanding.
See Jedediah Morse to John C. Calhoun, May 31, 1820, ibid., 5:160. In
1824, after a considerable expenditure of missionary, speculative, and
political effort, the most optimistic census of Christians among the
Iroquois counted just less than 2,200, or less than half the total
number. See Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, February 5, 1824, ibid.,
8:52-521.
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influences, and thus they were more firmly set in their opposition to
emigration, and, indeed, to civilization programs as well.

The chances

of whites manipulating the Pagan party were therefore more remote, while
the Christians were at least not doctrinally opposed to white advice.

74

Accordingly, it was the minority party of the Six Nations which won the
sponsorship and patronage of white interests.
The cause of these interests won two important supporters in
1819, important because they were prepared to involve themselves directly
with the internal affairs of the tribes in the name of the righteous
mission.

The first of these was an educated son of an Onondaga chief,

Eleazar Williams, who had been working among the Oneidas as a Presby
terian lay-reader since 1815.

Williams was at that moment falling under

the spell of Episcopalianism as a result of the efforts of the Reverend
Jedediah Morse.

75

Williams was introduced to Calhoun by the Episcopal

Archbishop of New York, J. H. Hobart.

Hobart thought that Williams

might be of some use in the difficult task of convincing the Iroquois to
emigrate to the west, and Calhoun, ever mindful of the worth of any
native assimilationist, agreed.

16

At the same time that Williams was

being brought to Calhoun's notice, Williams' new patron., Morse, was at
tempting to educate the New York authorities to the cause of philanthropy.
74

See Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Sececa, passim; and Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage, pp. 131-132, for a discussion of the
internal stresses upon the tribes and how they affected Iroquois politics.
75

See Morse's own account of Williams' conversion to Episcopa
lianism and Williams' background in Morse, Report on Indian Affairs,
Appendix M, pp. 79-80, n; and Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage, p. 132,
for a modern appraisal. Williams is credited with having converted a
substantial number of Oneidas to his newest creed as well as the out
right conversion of some of -the Pagan party.
*7^
John C. Calhoun to J. H. Hobart, March 24, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 3:686.
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Morse had become committed to emigration after a visit to that state's
Indian towns in 1819, and he was interested in removing and civilizing
as many natives as he could lay hands on.

Sordid and humanitarian

interests converged as Morse enlisted the aid of the Ogden Land Company.
After a meeting with David Ogden in Albany, Morse went about his business
with the company's happy sanction, not to mention influence.

Ogden wrote

to Calhoun about Morse:
It is his intention to be at this place [Albany] at the Meeting of
our Legislature early the next Month, to obtain a Law authorizing
the Executive of this State, to co-operate with that of the United
States, in adopting such measures as may promote his Benevolent
views; he then proposes visiting Washington to develope [sic] his
plan and solicit the aid & patronage of the General Government.77
Blessed with such an upright ally as Morse, the company tried to
make sure that Morse received a proper hearing in the capital.

Another

director of the company, Robert Troup, asked Senator Rufus King to use
his influence on Morse's behalf.

Troup wrote:

I am informed that Dr. Morse, and his friend Mr. Williams— an Indian
Catechist of the Oneida tribe— are at Washington in prosecution of
their plan for civilizing the Indians, by getting them to concen
trate on some particular reservation or remove farther West. Such
is also supposed to be the plan of the government; and it is one
that would promote the interest of my self and friends owning the
reservations in this State. As far as you can with propriety favor
the success of Dr. Morse with your advise & influence, I should be
happy if you would do it.-^®
From all points of view except the Indians', Morse's and
Williams' visit could hardly have been more successful.

Morse received

a commission from the President to begin the tours of the Indian nations

77

David B. Ogden to John C. Calhoun, December 10, 1819, ibid.,

4:475.
78

Robert Troup to Rufus King, February 16, 1820, King Correspon
dence , 6:275.
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which would eventually result in the publication of his report on Indian
affairs in 1822.

Calhoun's instructions to Morse reflected the govern

ment's general concerns at the time.

Morse was charged to gather

information in order "to devise the most suitable plan to advance their
civilization and happiness."

Calhoun wanted summaries on each tribe's

condition "in a religious, moral, and political point of view," their
customs, and significantly, "the character and disposition of their most
influential men."

An accounting of the number and character of all the

missionary schools was to be made also.

79

As for Williams, Bishop Hobart had well prepared the Onondagan's
way.

Calhoun was predisposed to take advantage of any Indian assimila-

tionist in behalf of his goals, but it was obvious to the Secretary that
Williams was no ordinary native.

"It is more desirable to make use of

the Indians themselves to bring about so great a change," Calhoun said,
"and where a native so intelligent as Williams, can be found, much good
may be effected by giving a proper direction to his zeal."

80

Hobart had

suggested boldly that Calhoun purchase Williams' support by appointing
the Indian to "an authoritative superintendence over them," in order to
secure to the government the aid of his "important services."

31

Calhoun

followed Hobart's advice and gave Williams a special commission of his
own.

The Secretary allowed Williams several hundred dollars and the

support of the War Department to conduct a number of Iroquois on a tour
79

John C. Calhoun to Jedediah Morse, February 7, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 4:648-649.
80
81

John C. Calhoun to J. H. Hobart, March 24, 1819, ibid., 3:636.
J. H. Hobart to John C. Calhoun, January 25, 1820, ibid.,

4:604.
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of the Great Lakes to search for colonization sites.

82

This was as good

as an announcement of the War Department's hopes for the Iroquois.
Williams' subsequent activities took place against a background
of ever-stiffening resistance by the Pagan party.

Williams and his

fellow Christians had been patronized indirectly by the national govern
ment from the start, but the New York state legislature voted several
thousand dollars to aid in the emigration of those Indians who chose to
move, and of course the Christians had the moral support of missionaries
such as Morse.

83

The more evident it became that the minority party had

the favor of white interests, the more obstinate were the Pagan party
members.

In 1822 Williams arranged for the right of settlement around

Green Bay with the Menomini and Winnebagos.

Calhoun and Monroe quickly

voiced their approval, but a convocation of the Six Nations chiefs did
4. 8 4
not.

Indians and whites alike identified Red Jacket as the champion
of the opposition.

David Ogden, chagrined by the failure of Williams'

treaty at the central council, laid the blame squarely on Red Jacket and
explained the old chief's views to Calhoun:
The Pagan Party, being the most numerous, and being
led by Red
Jacket, whose Talents give him
a powerful ascendancy, control the
affairs of the Seneca Nation.
He lays it down as a
principle,that
no Indian Nation has ever adopted Civilization, without becoming
merged, in the White Population, & losing their National Character
and respectability. He asserts that an Indian is incapable indi
vidually of providing for himself, or of taking care of his Property,
& he Cites himself as an example of this.88
82

John C. Calhoun to Eleazar Williams, February 9, 1820, ibid.,

4:656.
83

David Ogden to Christopher Vandeventer, March 2, 1822, ibid.,

6:723.
84

Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, June 22, 1822, ibid., 7:178.

S^oavid B. Ogden to John C. Calhoun, May 9, 1822, ibid., 7:103-104.
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Until 1822 white patronage did not fix upon a particular segment
of the Iroquois:

any Indian who took the white line could count on the

affections of interested whites.
of defections from the opposition.

This allowed for the greatest number
But as the dispute between the parties

intensified, such hopes of mass desertions dwindled.

Regardless of the

views of the Indians, they were still loyal to the decisions of the cen
tral council of the League, and there Red Jacket was in control.
Red Jacket and his party began to apply pressure of their own
kind against the presence of both white ideas and persons; and the
Christians, among whom the greatest inroads had been made by these influ
ences, Red Jacket believed, were the first who needed pressuring.

Rumors

went out that all those who emigrated against the wishes of the council
would have their lands confiscated along with any improvements which had
been made upon them.

Since the Christians were the least propertied of

the Iroquois to begin with, this was an important consideration.

It was

said, furthermore, that those who went west might lose any claim to pro-

. .

ceeds from future land sales or government annuitxes.

86

Several

Christians attested to Red Jacket's new animosity toward them when they
told Calhoun that "were it not for Red Jacket and Captain Cole [another
Pagan leader] we believe there would be [no opposition].
opposed to us in all our ways."

87

These men are

Red Jacket and his party had also

®^David B. Ogden to John C. Calhoun, May 9, 1822, ibid., 7:103104. Parrish was informed definitively by the Six Nations Chiefs that
if some of their tribesmen were bent on moving west, it would have to be
done without tribal money, and that it was indeed true that the leaders
of the League would consider whether any future monies would be allotted
to the emigrants. Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, June 22, 1822,
ibid., 7 :178.
^Jasper Parrish identified the Christian party as the group most
amenable to government policies.
Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun,
November 29, 1821, ibid., 6:543. See also Colonel Pollard [a Christian
party leader], Silver Smith, Big John, et al, to John C. Calhoun, June 19,
1820, ibid., 5:199.
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begun a campaign to rid the reserves of direct white influence as well.
Already one Baptist minister had been forced to leave the Buffalo
reserve, and there was talk that the Pagan party was asking the local
District Attorney to remove yet another.

The Christians and their spon-

88

sors were being assailed from all sides.

The government of the Six Nations was already a democratic
legend in the United States, praised (if in an off-handed way) by
Benjamin Franklin at the Albany Congress, and much later by Calhoun him
self in his Disquisition on Government.

But the majority decisions of

the central council, however admirable theoretically, did not prevent
Calhoun and other whites from condemning these decisions.

For the time

being, Calhoun thought democracy was admirable only if it was the product
of civilized minds.

89

New subtleties began appearing in the communications of those
committed to the government's views.

These remarks forecast a change in

the official attitude toward the parties of the Six Nations.

Describing

the Iroquois factions after the Williams treaty had been rejected, sub
agent Jasper Parrish said that the two parties were "at variance upon
almost every issue,” but, he added, "the most respectable part of the
88

Zecharaiah Lewis, Domestic Secretary of the United Foreign
Missionary Society in New York, informed Calhoun of these proceedings,
and innocently recommended that Calhoun merely tell the pagans to quit
bothering the missionary.
Zecharaiah Lewis to John C. Calhoun, Septem
ber 2, 1822, ibid., 7:264.
89

John C. Calhoun, "Disquisition on Government," The Works of
John C . Calhoun, ed. by Richard Cralle, 6 vols.
(Charleston, S. C.:
Walker & James, and New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1851-1856), 1:37-38,
48-49, 64-73. Franklin had attempted to persuade fellow delegates at
the Albany Congress in 1754 that in attempting to form a plan of union,
whites ought to be able to do at least as well as "Six Nations of
ignorant savages." Quoted in Hagan, American Indians, p. 20.
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Chiefs" were Christians who were happy to take the government's advice.90
Parrish recommended that President Monroe take a hand in the dispute.
Calhoun laid the matter before Monroe and later conveyed to Parrish the
news that the President "views their [the Pagans'] conduct with marked
disapprobation."

91

The Pagans' lack of "respectability" had robbed

their actions of legitimacy in the eyes of the government's officials.
Further explaining his own and the President's disapproval of the tribal
strife, Calhoun instructed Parrish to tell the Pagans:
The [educational and religious] institutions in the Six Nations,
having been established with the consent of a number of the most
respectable Chiefs, and with the approbation of the government, a
continuance of the violent opposition which they have lately mani
fested towards them, against which the wish of so many of their own
people, and that of the government, will be considered as highly
unjust to the former and disrespectful and offensive to the latter;
That if they do not choose, themselves, or their children, to profit
by them, it is an act of selfishness and injustice to attempt to
deprive those of their people that do.92
In his attempt to intimidate the Pagans by shaming them, Calhoun
was cheered on by the supporters of the government policy.

Peter B.

Porter, one of the Ogden directors, was convinced that "the difficulties
now existing amongst our Indians, are principally to be ascribed to Red
Jacket, who is a man of great talents, and a great intriguer."
urged Calhoun to persevere, and sternly, in his present course.

Porter
93

90

Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, January 11, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 6:616.
91

John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, September 6, 1822, ibid.,

7:266-267.

93

Peter B. Porter to John C. Calhoun, October 21, 1822, ibid.,

7:266-267.
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In September, 1822, for the first time, Calhoun decided to wed
the government to the Christian party explicitly.
Christian party leader, Young King:

He wrote to the

"While you pursue this wise course,

you will always receive the approbation and support of the government."

94

But the Secretary's frank alliance with the minority party only seemed
to encourage the growth of the Pagan party.

Early in 1823 leaders of the

two factions traveled to Washington to meet with Monroe and Calhoun.

The

Christians may have entertained the hope that the President and the
Secretary of War could persuade the Pagans to relent in their purges of
white influences on the reserves and in their opposition to emigration.

95

But Red Jacket, who made the visit over the objections of the Christian
delegates, wanted nothing at all from Calhoun.

For his part, the Secre

tary made clear to the delegation that if any compromising was to be done,
it would have to be the Pagans who gave in.

He told the delegation:

You say there are two paths— one for the Whiteman and another for
the red man. This was the case and did well enough many years ago
. . . but now . . . necessity will eventually compel the Red man
to leave his path and travel in that of the whiteman.^
Later in a private interview with Calhoun, Red Jacket was not
in the least contrite about his refusal to be guided by the government's
opinion of his welfare.

"He appears to be inveterately opposed to

removal and declared it to be his intention to live and die on the lands

94

John C. Calhoun to Young King and other Deputies of the Chris
tian Party of the Six Nations, September 2, 1822, ibid., 7:264.
95

Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, October 21, 1022, ibid.,

7:311-312.
96

John C. Calhoun, "Speech to the Iroquois Delegation," enclo
sure in John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish, March 14, 1823, ibid., 7:522.
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he now occupies," Calhoun observed.

97

Doubtless, Calhoun would have

liked to persuade the old chief otherwise, but Red Jacket was one of the
most experienced Indian diplomatists then living.

Moreover, Calhoun was

limited by the necessity of sustaining the myth of voluntarism.

Some

actions on behalf of Indian welfare were difficult enough to justify on
the grounds of philanthropy, but to have even hinted at the use of offi
cial force would have called the entire concept into question.
Thus the majority party continued its purges of white influences
in the Seneca areas where they were the strongest.

By Calhoun's last

year in office Parrish was reporting to the War Office that the Pagans
intended "to dissolve the compact entered into between the Indians & the
Missionary Society and break up their Establishment altogether."

98

The

Reverend Thomson Harris, one of those harassed missionaries, asked his
Christian charges to plead his case before the central council, but to no
avail.

Harris' plaintive report to Jasper Parrish on the council pro

ceedings was a testament to the vitality of the Pagan party.

Harris

wrote:
The Chiefs of the Christian Party have requested me to inform you
that they have experienced a severe defeat in the transactions which
have lately occurred here. Red Jacket, they say, is at length per
mitted to triumph. He has trampled them under f o o t . "
The Pagan party was not inclined to stop with the missionaries.
Sub-agent Jasper Parrish, like Calhoun himself, had so thoroughly
97

John C. Calhoun to Thomas L. Ogden, March 15, 1823, ibid.,

7:524.
98

Jasper Parrish to John C. Calhoun, March 13, 1824, ibid.,

8:578-579.
99

Thomson Harris to Jasper Parrish, March 10, 1824, ibid.,

8:572.
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identified himself with the Christian party that he had alienated the
most powerful segment of the Six Nations and was clearly no longer of
much use to the entire native population.100

Several times, the Pagans

asked that Parrish be replaced with someone who would enjoy their con
fidence as well as the government's and the Christians'.

Thomas

McKenney was now installed as the new Superintendent of Indian affairs,
but he replied with Calhoun's voice in a way that was tantamount to the
breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Iroquois hierarchy.
McKenney told Parrish not to fear for his position:
The Government condemn [sic] the proceedings of the Pagan party;
and consider [sic] them hostile to the interests and prosperity of
the Six Nations. No attention is due, and none will be paid, to
the representation of Red Jacket and his party, they being not
only hostile to the views of the larger, and more respectable por
tion of the Six Nations, but also to their own interests, and to
the recognized policy of the government towards them.-*-®-'The Cherokee and Iroquois cases were but two pieces in the huge
mosaic of Indian affairs.

Calhoun dealt with a multiplicity of other

eastern tribes, and as he did so he became more convinced than ever that
his view of their best interests should prevail, as though the social
debilities of the natives somehow diminished the legitimacy of their

The Pagan party had been trying to rid themselves of Parrish
for some time. In August, 1822, the central of the Six Nations held
at Tonowanda condemned Parrish and his interpreter, Horatio Jones, and
demanded their removal, making in the process several charges against
them both. Calhoun laid on an investigation, but he significantly
appointed General Peter B. Porter, an Ogden Land Company director and
friend of the beleaguered Parrish to conduct the inquiry. Porter found
that the charges against the sub-agent were "without foundation." See
Peter B. Porter to John C. Calhoun, September 23, 1822, and January 6,
1823, ibid., 7:276-277, 407; and also Younnontalae, et al to James
Monroe, April 5, 1824, ibid., 9:15.
101Thomas L. McKenney to Jasper Parrish, April 9, 1824, ibid.,
9:25.
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views.

Thinking that the eastern tribes were on the very eve of

their extinction— an extinction which would not "tell well in history"—
Calhoun and his fellow reformers sought to "save" the Indian and also
themselves.
Setting out on this noble mission, involved whites were occa
sionally uneasy about the less than noble methods which they used to try
to persuade the Indian to accept reform.

Even the classic Indian-hater,

Andrew Jackson, was anxious lest these methods somehow impugn those who
used them.

Jackson wrote:

The Strength of our Nation is now sufficient to effect any object
which its wisdome [sic], humanity and justice may please to adopt
with regard to those unfortunate people. And it is now discovered
that no thing can be done with the Indians without corrupting their
Chiefs— this is so inconsistant with the virtue, and principles
of our Government, it is high time the Legislature should interpose
its authority and enact Laws for the regulation and control of the
Indian Tribes.
Nevertheless, white reformers continued to believe that somehow the
Indians were not fit subjects for the exercise of scruples, and philan
thropy itself was their justification.

Thus assured, Calhoun and his

subordinates used bribes, threats of one kind or another, and recruited
pliable Indians, gullible missionaries, and self-interested businessmen
in order to interfere wantonly in the internal affairs of tribes marked
by one interest or another.

104

102

The most recent and detailed study of one tribe's experience
with philanthropy is DePosier's Removal of the Choctaws. The techniques
of manipulation war are admirably discussed within Sheehan's Seeds of
Extinction.
^ ^ A n d r e w Jackson to John C. Calhoun, August 24, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 4:271.
104

At one time or another Calhoun threatened to withhold annuities
and to withdraw protection from white intruders on Indian lands if the
tribes did not accede to his wishes. The cutting of roads through tribal
territories was a reliable means of intimidation as well. A list would
be very nearly endless.
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III
It was in the East that the rhetoric of philanthropy was given
its fullest play; western whites tolerated little pretense of charity
toward the Indians, and although they were forced to treat the natives
with more circumspection, the currency of Indian-white relations in the
West was force, violence, and chicanery.
If only because population and the government had not yet over
whelmed the Indians of the West, the opportunities for manipulation, in
whatever cause, were fewer here.

Calhoun recognized that the case of the

western tribes was different from that of those in the East, not only
because the western Indians still retained their "original character and
customs," as Calhoun said, but also because of the character of the
frontiersmen themselves.

105

The ordinary hostility between the races proved difficult enough
for Calhoun even to keep up with, much less to influence.

Calhoun's

sense of justice was offended when he found out that while white mur
derers of Indians generally went unpunished, Indian murderers of whites
rarely survived to stand trial.

106

Even in areas where Calhoun offi

cially had control, it was all the Secretary could do to oversee the
dispensation of justice for Indian defendants.

When two soldiers were

murdered by Winnebagos, Colonel Henry Leavenworth told Calhoun that he
would not "trouble with civil authority," and hinted elsewhere that he

■''^John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 3:346.
^ W i lliam Clark to John C. Calhoun, April 20, 1820, July 10,
1821, ibid., 5:67, 6:251.
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would "Jacksonize" the Indians once they were found.

107

After an Indian

family was murdered on the western Ohio, however, Calhoun was forced to
take the extraordinary step of paying for guards for the captured white
offenders for fear that they would be rescued from jail before trial.

108

As if conflict between whites and Indians were not enough, wide
spread wars between tribes on the prairies also erupted; at least one of
these clashes seemed to owe its origins to the effects of emigration.
The so-called "western" Cherokees, who had moved to the Arkansas terri
tory before the War of 1812, were engaged for several years in hostilities
against the Osages.

The sudden appearance of the Cherokees in an area

where there was already a delicate cultural balance may have set off the
sporadic violence which so plagued white officials and threatened white
settlers.
In the northernmost reaches of the western territories, however,
a wholly different situation obtained.

There, most of the tribesmen had

107

Henry Leavenworth to John C. Calhoun, May 14, 1820, ibid.,
5:117; and Henry Leavenworth to Daniel Parker, June 10, 1820, ibid., 5:171.
108

See John Johnston to Thomas L. McKenney, December 22, 1824,
ibid., 9:459.
109

While Army officers were attempting to quell the violence
between the Cherokees and Osages, Niles' Weekly Register reported that
the Indians seemed well disposed toward the whites and seemed to attri
bute this development to the wars between the tribes.
"They are at war
with other Indian tribes and ever will be at war with one another unless
their thirst for blood be not turned
against the whites by a general
peace among themselves, which has been too often effected by a mistaken
philantropy existing at Washington!!!" See Niles' Weekly Register,
July 4, 1818; and also a dispatch from an Army officer attempting to
effect such a peace as Niles feared, William Bradford to John C. Calhoun,
July 8, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:366.
Aside from hostilities between the
Cherokees and Osages, there were, at
one time or another during this
general period, wars between the Chippewa and Sioux, between the Winne
bago and the Pottawattomies, between the Winnebagos and the Kickapoos,
and incessant skirmishing.
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been British allies during the late war and what peace existed from the
Great Lakes to St. Louis was maintained only by precarious treaties
negotiated since Ghent.110

Having won the territory, the United States

now hoped to win the trade of the area as well.

Americans were sensi

tive, therefore, to the slightest hint of a continued British presence
or foreign influence among the Indians with whom the lucrative fur trade
was carried on.
Officers and agents of government pointed to British encroach
ment— real or imagined— at every opportunity.

Doubtless influenced by

the bitterness hanging over from the war, Americans automatically con
sidered every foreign trader as a British agent provacateur.

Agent

Benjamin O'Fallon arrived at Prairie du Chien (formerly a British furtrading post) in 1817 and was greeted, so he said, "by numerous British
traders . . . whose conduct during the late Indian war was the most
unprincipled, the most inhuman, and disgraceful to civilized man."

He

was convinced that "the faithless Mackinac traders" were alienating the
Indians against all Americans.

These men, he believed, had encouraged a

band of Chippewas "to massacre and rob" him, and he was certain that had
not a party of friendly Sioux arrived to protect him he would have been
the worse for wear.

111

The remotest American Indian agent at the time

110The Treaty of Spring Wells, for instance, September 8, 1815,
allowed pardons to Indians who allied with Britain during the war in
exchange for a promise of loyalty to the United States. Those tribes
participating included bands of Wyandots, Delewares, Senecas, Shawnees,
Miamis, Chippewas, Ottawas, and Pottawatomies in Ohio and Michigan and
Indiana territories. Spring Wells was just one of a welter of treaties
of friendship negotiated with the Indians of the northwest after the
war. See "Treaties with Twenty-One Tribes," December 6, 1815, ASPIA,
2:12-25.
111Benjamin O'Fallon to Governor William Clark, May 10, 1817, in
Thwaites, Wisconsin Historical Collections, 19:378.
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wrote from the outpost of Michilimackinac in no uncertain terms:
The object and policy of the British Government in their Indian
relations cannot be mistaken. . . . [It is] to alienate the Indians
from the American Government and people, to attach them to the
British Interests by every and by any the [sic] most insidious
means.
In their eagerness to assert American power in the Northwest,
many westerners did not bother to separate the actions of the British
Indian department from those of private British subjects who operated in
the area.

The Indians contributed to American suspicions by making occa

sional pilgrimages each year to British posts on the Great Lakes.

At

Fort Malden, opposite Detroit, and at Drummond's Island, not far from
Mackinac Island, British agents welcomed Indians from the United States
with traditional gifts meant to cement good relations between themselves
and the natives.

This practice continued for much of the decade following

Ghent, much to the chagrin of Lewis Cass, Michigan's territorial governor.
In one of the first of his many letters complaining of these visits, Cass
told Alexander Dallas, then Secretary of War, that he had "every reason
to believe that the Indian Department opposite to us are about to adopt
the same systematick [sic] course of measures which they have so long
and so successfully pursued"— that of estranging Indians from Americans
by means of lavish gifts and trade.
112

113

William Puthuff to Lewis Cass, May 14, 1816, ibid., 19:409.

113

Cass estimated "that at least Three [sic] thousand Indians
have visited Malden this season and that the quantity of goods, of arms,
and of ammunition which has been distributed to them greatly exceeds
anything which they have heretofore received for the same term, either
in peace or war." By the next year (1820), the number of visiting
Indians had doubled.
See Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, October 8,
1819, and December 16, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 4:367, and 5:497; and Lewis
Cass to Alexander J. Dallas, June 20, 1815, Thwaites, Wisconsin Histori
cal Collections, 19:377.
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Causing even more concern, however, was the campaign to the West
then being mounted by fur trading companies in the area, and the fact
that there were so few Americans actually engaged in the trade.

John

Jacob Astor's South West Fur Company (soon to become the American Fur
Company), though nominally an American concern, regularly used the more
experienced engages of French and Indian extraction to carry on the busi
ness of the trade.

With better and cheaper goods, the British traders

had little difficulty in dominating the market.

114

Astor's company,

114

Astor had arranged with the North West Company after the war
ended to assume operations in American territory; in the process of
doing so, he inherited virtually all of the personnel of the old company
who, according to one source, were all Canadians of one stripe or another.
Astor professed to believe that Americans "will not submit to the hard
ships and habits of living which they have to endure" in the Indian
trade. Although it was true that Canadians had more experience in the
trade, Astor had other reasons for wanting to use the Canadians. His
agreement with the North West Company had stipulated a five-year partner
ship, provided the American government did not prohibit such an
arrangement. Astor told Monroe, then Secretary of State, that he hoped
that such a prohibition would be made. Then, he would succeed to the
trade and company facilities below the border, and the North West Company
could have little to say about it. See John Jacob Astor to James Monroe,
December 30, 1816, quoted in Kenneth W. Porter, John Jacob Astor:
Business Man, 2 vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), 2:691
(hereafter cited as Porter, Astor). See also Henry Schoolcraft, Per
sonal Memoirs of a Residence of Thirty Years with the Indian Tribes on
the American Frontiers (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, and Co.,
1851), pp. 485-486 (hereafter cited as Schoolcraft, Memoirs).
Factor George Sibley at Fort Osage gave it as his opinion that
"a prejudice has already gone among the Indians that the American cannot
make goods of a good quality. They believe that all blankets, cloths,
&c. of common quality, are of American manufacture, and that the British
only make the best kind.The traders tell them
that there are none but
American goods for sale at the factory, and that, although they are sold
at low prices, they are, nevertheless, very dear, considering the quality;
but that their goods are of the real British kind." George Sibley to
Thomas L. McKenney, January 3, 1818, "Operations of the Factory System,"
ASPIA, 2:363.
Indian Agent Thomas Forsyth at St. Louis went even
farther: he believed that goods on the open American market were even
better than those at the factories. See Thomas Forsyth to John C.
Calhoun, April 22, 1833, Calhoun Papers, 7:59.
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plus the formidable Hudson's Bay Company and the North West Company,
moreover, were all heavily capitalized.
Competing with all these concerns, and poorly, were the govern
ment trading posts, the "factories," which were supposed to provide a
humane alternative to the less than philanthropic private traders.

When

Calhoun came into office, there were only three such trading houses in
the far north, at Green Bay, Chicago, and Prairie du Chien.

116

Because

these government establishments were forbidden to deal in whiskey or
credit, the Indians did not hold them in much esteem.

117

The factories

Thomas McKenney's best estimate of the capitalization of the
North West Company alone exceeded one million dollars.
It was reported
in 1820 that the best market value of the furs collected by that company
in that year was more than $700,000. See Thomas McKenney to John C.
Calhoun, December 31, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 3:442; and Thomas S. Jesup
to John C. Calhoun, April 26, 1820, ibid., 5:76-77.
'L'''^There were five other factories besides these three: Fort
Mitchell; Chicasaw Bluffs; Fort Confederation; Fort Osage; and Sulphur
Forks. The operating capital for the factory system was set at $300,000.
Since the factories were supposed to pay for themselves, this principal
was not supposed to be touched. In addition, the salaries for the
factors was a separate annual appropriation which, by 1818, was set by
Congress at almost $20,000. See John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay,
December 5, 1818, ibid., 3:344.
117

The Intercourse Act of 1802 forbade trafficking m liquor,
and in 1822, Congress additionally provided for the confiscation of all
goods of traders who violated the law. See U. S. Stat. II, 146; U. S.
Stat. Ill, 682-683.
On the matter of the government houses refusing credit, one offi
cial close to the business attributed this refusal to the failure of the
factories.
Ninian Edwards, then territorial governor of Illinois,
argued that advancing native hunters enough goods to make the winter1s
hunt was the traditional practice in the northwest territories. Trap
ping fields were even then as much as 300 miles away from the factories.
Indians did not wish to leave their families in the wilderness while
they trekked back with furs to sell for more provisions. Moreover, it
was the long-standing custom of the area for the Indians to sell furs to
whomever had advanced them credit. Edwards pointed out that the engages
who worked the area were also more adept at trade because of their mobi
lity and aggressiveness.
"If we want to go into competition with them,"
he told the Secretary of War, "then we must do the same." See the notes
appended to the letter by Ninian Edwards to William Crawford, November,
1815, in "Indian Trade and Intercourse," ASPIA, 2:66.
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were also fixed to one location and their native customers had to go to
them, whereas the private traders pursued the Indians into the wilder
ness.

'The Chicago factory, although well situated to interdict the

Indian portage from Lake Michigan to the Upper Mississippi, did not do
enough business during one six-month period to pay the factor's salary
of $650.

118

To Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas McKenney, the

factories were a means whereby the government could protect the Indians
"from oppression," and any interference with the Indians by private
traders was harmful.

It made little difference to him that some traders

might be working for an American company and others for a British company, or still others were totally independent.

119

He attributed to

them all the downfall of the Chicago factory and said to Calhoun:
The csuss v.Thi ch has so successfully prostrated the once flourishing
hopes of this establishment is so notorious as hardly to need
refering [sic] to. It lies deep in the influence (principally
British) which is spread so generally over that region and in the
combinations which have been entered into to do away, from amongst
the Indians inhabiting that Country, whatever control the U.S. may
essay to acquire over them, either by the Factory or any other system. 120
118

Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, July 7, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:243.
ll^Prucha argues that, contrary to what McKenney believed, there
were considerable differences between the small, independent trader, the
so-called "whiskey traders" (actually peddlers), and the company men.
Prucha infers that Astor's men did not use liquor in their trade, but
offers no evidence. The fact that Astor once petitioned the government
to allow him to use liquor in order to combat the operations of rivals
does not mean that he was not using it himself. Making the practice
legal could have saved a great deal of trouble and money, and Astor was
always looking out for a way to cut costs. There is no doubt that liquor
was very nearly a necessary part of doing any business with the Indians.
Even McKenney acknowledged that, all things being equal, the trader with
the whiskey got the business. See Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 110
111; and Hiram Martin Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the Far West,
3 vols.
(Stanford: Academic Reprints, 1954), 1:26 (hereafter cited as
Chittenden, The American Fur Trade) .
120

Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, July 7, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:243.
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But because the American factory system was inadequately capi
talized, the government of necessity had to allow private business to
operate, lest the proceeds of the fur trade (in money and in influence
over the Indians) fall back into British hands.

The palladin of the new

American fur trade in this area was John Jacob Astor, whose western
headquarters was Mackinac Island.

This made the island truly a hardship

post for the agents stationed there, and it was from them that McKenney
and Calhoun formed their opinions of the effects of private trade upon
the Indian.'^'*'
Since the end of the war, Astor had been by no means hesitant to
operate the way he pleased in the northern territories.

The Indian

agents who were supposed to control the private trade through a licensing
system were rightly intimidated by the power of Astor's company.

When a

new law was passed giving President Madison discretionary power over the
licensing of foreigners in the trade, Astor pleaded with Madison to give
him the authority to issue the permits.
was aghast.

The agent at Mackinac Island

"I wish to God the President knew this man Astor as well as

he is known here," the agent remarked.
his disposal."

"Licenses would not be placed at

122

121

Astor's reputation for sharp trading did not make him the
most popular man in the West, but it did reflect the power he and his
company wielded. No doubt his willingness to go over the heads of local
agents did little to improve his image. McKenney was the recipient of
all sorts of complaints about Astor.
See, for instance, Thomas L.
McKenney to George Graham, March 19, 1817; William Puthuff to Lewis Cass,
June 20, 1816; and Talbot Chambers to Willoughby Morgan, September 19,
1817, in Thwaites, Wisconsin Historical Collections, 19:452, 423-424,
478-479; and also Schoolcraft, Memoirs, 485-486.
122

William Puthuff to Lewis Cass, June 20, 1816, Thwaites,
Wisconsin Historical Collections, 19:423.
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Armed with reports from the upper Mississippi that "the blackest
of characters" were regularly being issued licenses, Superintendent
McKenney managed to convince President Monroe to suspend the licensing
authority of the agents in November, 1817.

123

Astor, however, had only

the remotest interest in the character of his employees, and he was not
about to let this threat go unchallenged.

Astor himself called first in

Washington and, failing to see Calhoun, later sent one of his most
trusted associates, Ramsay Crooks, to the capital "to ascertain defini
tively the ground on which private citizens engaged in this trade are to
be placed."

Crooks apparently had his interview with Calhoun in mid-March,

1818, during which he handed Calhoun a letter from Astor which complained
of the interference in his trade by government officers.

If this sort of

harassment continued, Astor said, it would be "ruinous" to the company.

124

A few days after Crooks and Calhoun talked, the Secretary issued new
regulations to all the territorial governors to allow foreigners licenses
as interpreters and boatmen.

125

For all purposes Calhoun had re-created

the wide-open trading climate which had previously existed, because no
one was to tell when one of these licensees was in the wilderness exactly
what function he served.

X 26

1?3

See the letter of John W. Johnson, Factor at Prairie du
Chien, dated January 8, 1817, extracted in Thomas L. McKenney to George
Graham, March 19, 1817; and Thomas L. McKenney to George Graham,
September 30, 1817, ibid., 19:452, 480-481.
124

John Jacob Astor to John C. Calhoun, March 14, 1818, Calhoun
*.i?.&pers, 2:191-192.
125

John C. Calhoun to Lewis Cass, William Clark, Ninian Edwards,
et al, March 25, 1818, ibid., 2:209.
126

Porter, Astor, 2:691.
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If Calhoun seemed to give in too easily to Astor's representa
tions, it was because the Secretary of War had other plans in mind which
would regulate the private trade more strictly than ever before.

At the

very time Crooks was on his way to Washington to treat with Calhoun, the
Secretary was setting the Yellowstone movement in play.

127

Calhoun's

avowed purpose was to counteract British influence among the Indians of
the area, but Army troops could regulate the activities of "American"
traders as well.

At the same time, the Yellowstone movement could

materially assist the business of St. Louis fur traders then going up
the Missouri.
But not even the Army could ensure the success of the factory
system.

Astor had vowed to destroy the system if he could, and there was

a consolidation among the fur interests to effect this end.

128

In view

of the inefficiency of the factories in winning business and influencing
the Indians, the private traders' hostility is difficult to account for,
but as one close student of the furtrade has pointed out, the factory
system was an anomaly in a nation committed to nothing if not to free
enterprise.

129

It was not easy for an aggressive frontiersman on the

127

John C. Calhoun to Thomas A. Smith, March 16, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:194-195.
128

Matthew Irwin, United States Factor at Green Bay, reported to
McKenney that "the Agents of Mr. Astor hold out an idea that they will,
ere long, be able to break down the factories; and they menace the Indian
agents, and others who may interfere with them, with dismission from
office, through Mr. Astor."
"Extract of a Letter from the United States
Factor at Green Bay to the Superintendent of Indian Trade," [1818?] ASPIA,
2:360. The forlorn and perpetually troubled George Boyd (John Quincy
Adams' brother-in-law) wrote Calhoun that at Mackinac there was a "fixed
and settled plan . . . to harrass [sic] & bring into disrepute, the
affairs of the Government in this quarter." George Boyd to John C. Cal
houn, December 13, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:433.
129

Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 84-85.
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make to be sympathetic to a system that was founded on humanitarian
principles, that took any amount of business away just at the time when
a promising market had appeared, and that did not work.
system was only a government's dream.

The factory

And, finally, it was a system

which did not have the full support of the government, including
130
Calhoun.
A congressional resolution in 1818 forced an evaluation of the
entire system upon Calhoun.
interested officials.

As was customary, Calhoun consulted with

Not surprisingly, McKenney stoutly defended the

factories, claiming that their abolition would "blast, at once, the
happiness of thousands of Indians who now enjoy its benefits." McKenney
told Calhoun that he had "never detected any evidence to shew the least
unwillingness on the part of the private adventurer to adopt any resort
that should promise to favor his scheme of profit."

131

Whereas the profit motive was the bane of the Indian in
McKenney's opinion, it was his salvation as far as Lewis Cass was con
cerned.

Cass looked forward to the abolition of the factory system,

whose existence he believed was an insult to the integrity of the
citizens engaged in the private trade, an ingenuous view at best.
Abuses, said Cass, would automatically be curbed by increased competition
130

Chittenden and later scholars have contended that the American
factory system had a good chance of success until the American Fur Com
pany began its campaign against it. It is easy to blame, as McKenney
did, the demise of the factories on the company, but had not Astor begun
operations, others would have. The fur trade of the west was about to
explode in activity.
Individuals, as well as companies, would have
eventually brought the factories down, especially since high members of
government were rather ambivalent about the factories after 1818. See
Chittenden, The American Fur Trade, 1:12-16.
1-^Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, August 19, 1818,
Calhoun Papers, 3:47.
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and by the perspicacity of the natives themselves, who, he said, were

shrewd businessmen when they were not drunk.

Cass would limit the

whiskey trade only and trust thereafter to humane capitalism.

132

Cass and the fur trading interests had the West only in mind
when they attacked the factories, even though most factories were
located in more settled areas.

In the East, for entirely different

reasons, the factories were not operating with a great deal of success.
At Fort Mitchell, Georgia, for instance, the Indians were "independent
of U. S. supplies" because the chiefs themselves had monopolized the
trade with their own people in cooperation with white sutlers.

133

Besides, in the South the peltry had been trapped out and the natives
had precious little to trade anyway.
In the end the policy on the factories had to be decided by
Calhoun.

He was careful not to claim too much for them, since it was

widely understood that the system was a shambles.

Instead, he told the

Congress:
132

Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, September 14, 1818, ibid.,

3:123-127.
133

Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, July 26, 1818, ibid.,
4:181-183. The apparent leader of this combine of Indian traders was
the Creek General William McIntosh, who was a partner in a store on
Creek territory with David B. Mitchell, the Agent to the Creeks, who was
later fired for having trafficked in contraband slaves on agency grounds.
Andrew Jackson believed that McIntosh allowed fellow tribesmen to run up
enormous debts at his store in order to take their annuity payments when
they were made. Considering the state of national finances at the time,
when specie was in limited supply and when goods were easier to get,
McIntosh may also have been an important supplier of specie in southern
Georgia, for annuities were usually paid in gold or silver.
In this
enterprise, McIntosh had the assistance of a party of the stronger
chiefs of the Lower Creek towns, including the well-known Big Warrior.
McIntosh was later killed by a fellow tribesman for agreeing to a land
cession. See Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, January 12, 1822, ibid.,
6:618-619.
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It was commenced, and has been continued, from motives both of pru
dence and humanity; and though it may not have fully realized the
expectations of its friends, it has no doubt produced beneficial
effects.
If wars have not been entirely prevented by it, they
probably, without it, would have been more frequent; and if the
Indians have made but little advances in civilization, they pro
bably, without it, would have been less.'*"34
Behind this lukewarm defense of the factories, there was scant
encouragement waiting for private enterprise.

The Indians themselves

had been forgotten by most of the parties in this dispute; McKenney
defended the factories as though they were sacrosanct, and Cass was much
too sympathetic to the business dealings of Astor.

135

Calhoun reminded

his readers that the basic point of the government's participation was
still the protection of the Indians "against the fraud and violence to
which their ignorance and weakness would, without such protection, expose
them."

The Secretary therefore presented a scheme which would increase

the regulation of private trade.

X36

In the settled areas, traders would be required to fix their
establishments, pay for licenses, post bonds, and keep accounts so that
Indian agents could inspect them on demand.

For the trade in those

areas beyond the line of settlement, Calhoun proposed a semi-public
corporation, a monopoly supervised by the government for a term of twenty
years.

All other traders would be excluded.

In essence, Calhoun wanted

134_
John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, ibid.,
3:341-355.
135

Astor's biographer indicates strongly that Governor Cass had
close relations with the businessman. See Porter, Astor, 2:702, 723-725,
n. 54. See also a letter from Cass to Calhoun defending Astor and other
private traders, July 30, 1818, Calhoun Papers, 2:440-442.
3.36
John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 3:341-355.
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to remove the anarchy which then existed in the private trade.

"The

mere objection that it would create a monopoly," he argued, "ought not
to outweigh so many advantages.

The Indian trade had never been opened

entirely to private citizens; the government had always attempted to
regulate the business in some way."

137

It is clear from the Secretary's report that Calhoun and McKenney
were not of one mind on how the Indian trade should be regulated.

The

Superintendent of Indian Trade had not managed to enlist Calhoun's out
right support of the factory system.

McKenney was hostile to the

licensing system administered by the Indian agents; in his view, if the
government had to choose between licensing and the factories, the licenses
should go.

X38

Calhoun had said in his report, however, that he suspected

that the very existence of the factories had impeded the licensing
system, and if Congress chose not to accept his plan for a government
corporation, licenses should be relied upon more heavily than ever
before.

139

McKenney had insisted that the protection of the Indian

could hardly be served by such a system.

"An invoice upon the horns of

a stag would be as easily got at, as would be the Indian adventurers,
who might wish, even if the law should forbid it, to extend their
1^7

Ibid.

138

McKenney's views on the relative merits of the licenses and
factories are best expressed in his report of August, 1818, to Calhoun.
Significantly, he believed that were the factories abolished, all trade
would then "be soon swallowed up in one vast engine of monopoly."
Calhoun would hinge his recommendations five months later on the bene
ficial effects of monopoly.
The two officials were obviously not of one
mind on this question. Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, August 19,
1818, ibid., 3:44-56.
139

John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, ibid.,

3:341-355.
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enterprise into the wilds of Missouri," the Superintendent told Calhoun
after he made his report.
Congress took no final action on Calhoun's report following its
submission, and the Secretary used the time to gather as much informa
tion as he could on the fur trade and the activities of the "Indian
adventurers," as McKenney called them.

Hoping to anticipate any further

licensing authority he might be given, Calhoun asked for Indian agents to
accompany the military expeditions to the upper Mississippi and Missouri
rivers.

As a sign of what he intended, Calhoun told his new agent for

the upper Missouri not to take action against unlicensed traders until
the military posts had been established.
trader was to be evicted from the region.

After that, any unlicensed
141

When Senator Walter Leake of the Committee on Indian affairs
asked Calhoun in early 1820 to compose a bill "better calculated to
secure the peace of the frontier," he quickly responded with his most
extensive licensing plan to date.

142

He recommended that the authority

to issue trade permits be vested in the President or in those whom he
might specially commission, and he insisted that only those who could
afford large bonds would be involved in the trade in the first place.
If a licensee engaged in wrongdoing, the permit could be recalled by the
President at any time, and the bond (from one to ten thousand dollars)

140

Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, December 31, 1818,
ibid., 3:442.
141

John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, December 5, 1818, ibid.,

3:341-355.
142

Walter Leake to John C. Calhoun, January 29, 1820, ibid.,

4:615.
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would be forfeited.

In addition, a fine would be levied up to one

thousand dollars, along with six months imprisonment.

143

American Fur Company officials looked on in horror while the
Senate actually considered Calhoun's bill, passed it, and sent it to the
House.

The fur interests were galvanized into direct political action.

In April, 1820, Ramsay Crooks told William Woodbridge, Michigan's terri
torial representative to Congress, that Vice President D. D. Tompkins
had agreed to lobby with House members in opposition to Calhoun's pro
posals.

There were already some in the House, Crooks said, "who I trust

will especially aid us in defeating this outrageous license system about
to be imposed on u s ."

He asked Woodbridge to "please suggest any thing

you may think will aid our cause with Mr. Calhoun's new license system,
and I will do all I can to meet your wishes."

144

By the end of the session Crooks' efforts had stalled Calhoun's
bill.

A vote in the House was never taken.

Crooks afterward reported

confidently to Astor, "I have not the smallest doubt, had the bill been
brought forward, but the monster would have been strangled."

This

victory was only the opening shot in the fur interests' battle to win
the field entirely from interference by the government.

145

Crooks believed that Calhoun's bill was merely a ruse to eliminate the American Fur Company and thereby rejuvenate the factory system.
143

John C. Calhoun to Walter Leake, January 31, 1820, ibid.,

4:623.
144

Ramsay Crooks to William Woodbridge, April 7, 1820, Thwaites,
Wisconsin Historical Collections, 20:163.
145

Ramsay Crooks to John Jacob Astor, May 30, 1820, quoted in
Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 95-96.
146 , . ,
Ibid.
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Convinced of the Secretary of W a r 's hostility to private trade in general
and to the American Fur Company in particular, Crooks urged Astor to take
preventive action against the other of the two government programs, the
factory system itself.

With the survival of the company at stake, Crooks

told Astor that the only remedy was to "interest some of your numerous
friends to obtain if possible the abolition of the Factory system."

147

In the fall of 1820 Crooks and fellow employee Russell Farnham
began to

lobby with a new-found dedication.

verts was Thomas Hart

One of their

easier con

Benton, then still only a territorial delegate to

Congress from Missouri, but soon to become a Senator.

Both agents took

up lodgings in the same Washington hotel as Benton that winter.

This

happy coincidence gave the agents the opportunity to tutor Benton in
preparation for the coming fight over the factories.

By Benton's own

account, many conversations occurred between the three men that winter
of 1820.

When Benton finally took his seat at the winter

1821, he

had gathered an impressive array of anti-factory

already.

148

session of
testimony

With Benton installed in the Senate, Crooks wrote to his

employer that he meant to use "every fair means to obtain a decision on
the Public Trading House System."

149

Once Benton's hearings began, it was evident that much of the
testimony was to come from Calhoun's Indian agents.

There was no surer

indication of the administration's lack of resolve to defend the system

148

Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years' View, or a History of the
working of American Government for Thirty Years from 1820 to 1850,
2 vols.
(New York: D. Appleton, 1854), 1:13; and Porter, Astor, 2:713,
732, n. 92.
149

Quoted in Porter, Astor, 2:713,
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than the assistance rendered by official men.
faith in the factories is evident.

Calhoun's own lack of

The Secretary of War was not above

forcing his subordinates to hew the line on other policies; that he did
not in this case is significant.
the same:

The tenor of the agents' comments was

factory goods were inferior to both British and American

commercial goods; the factories charged too much and even then they lost
money; the factories were too few, and being stationary, did not attract
Indians to them; therefore, even the pretense of their civilizing effect
was lost.150

Significantly, only one factor gave testimony.

George

Sibley of the Fort Osage factory condemned the system for being no
system at all.

Since the Osages had a treaty which guaranteed them

their own factory, Sibley had no fear of losing his office.151

All that

remained was for the only trader who testified— Ramsay Crooks— to administer
the coup de grace.

He told the committee that the liquidation of the

entire system would not "create a murmur loud enough to disturb the primeval stillness of the forest."

152

Thomas McKenney's attempts to save both his position and the
system were thwarted further by the adverse testimony of a well-known
"friend" of the Indian, Jedediah Morse.

Morse, in his recently-printed

150The most extensive remarks on the system came from Agent John
Biddle at Green Bay, and Benjamin O'Fallon, agent for the upper Missouri.
Colonel Henry Atkinson and Major John Bell, associated with the Yellow
stone movement, were decidedly against the factories as they were then
constituted. See all this testimony collected in "Operations of the
Factory System," March 8, 1822, ASPIA, 2:326-332.
151Sibley remarked concerning the factory system:
"I said
'Indian trade system;' so it is called; but it is no more like a system,
than the yells of an Indian are like music." Ibid.
152

Ramsay Crooks to Thomas Hart Benton, January 23, 1822, ibid.,

2:329-332.
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Report, argued against the factories and for his own plan of civiliza
tion, which was little more than an exalted version of the existing
system.

153
Indecisively supported by the government, failing in both its

humanitarian and practical goals, and assailed by the rapacious and
enlightened alike, the factory system was struck down by Congress on
May 6, 1822.

154

Arrangements were made to phase the system out gradually

to minimize the effect on the Indians, if any, and George Graham was
appointed as executioner.1^

Although the reasons were many for the

abolition of the factory system, Superintendent McKenney put the blame
squarely on the fur traders.

"No man knows better than Mr. Crooks the

causes of this decline, and the means which it is necessary to adopt at
any time to produce the same results elsewhere," McKenney had told the
committee.1^6

Earlier McKenney had undertaken to explain to Calhoun why

the factory at Prairie du Chien was in trouble.

His remarks on that

occasion would serve as a fitting epitaph for the system as a whole.

As

he said to Calhoun:
The multitude of traders, British, and all other sorts, made a sort
of wall about the Factory. Few Indians could get to it. The Prin
ciples emenating [sic] from it, which are enlightening and humane,
and which all tend to attach the natives to our Government, could
not operate.157
153
154

Morse, Report on Indian Affairs, pp. 92-93.
U. S. Stat., Ill, pp.

679-680.

155After having attacked the system partly on the basis of the
inferiority of the goods sold to the Indians, Ramsay Crooks was piqued
because the government would not allow his company to take over the dis
posal of those same commodities. See Porter, Astor, 2:714.
156Thomas L. McKenney to Henry Jackson [Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs], n.d., "Operations of the Factory System,"
ASPIA, 2:356.
157Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, July 17, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:293.
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IV

Contrary to McKenney's expectations, Calhoun erected no monu
ments to himself in- his dealings with the American Indians.

And as

McKenney continued to make the most sanguine forecasts for native
improvement, Calhoun came to believe that true Indian reform was a task
for the generations; history weighed more heavily upon the Indians and
the whites than he had imagined.

2.58

During his tenure he had failed to

demonstrate that even coercive philanthropy could work the radical
changes he had earlier believed possible.

A number of Indians had

accepted the ideas of civilization which the reformers then purveyed,
but many more had not.

The activities of Calhoun and his associates

among the Iroquois and the Cherokees actually intensified tribal resis
tance to humanitarian intervention.

The story was much the same elsewhere:

after years of the most avid work by the government's best Indian handlers,
the Choctaws of Mississippi brought in their verdict on voluntary emigration.

No more than fifty of this tribe had resettled west of the river.

159

Religious philanthropy produced small results, even with government help.
Missionaries operated thirty-two schools in 1825, most of which had begun
operations only in the last five years.

The increase in the number of

these schools had less to do with Christian enthusiasm than with the fact
that the government made it easy for anyone to receive grants; most of
the money spent in this program went to buildings rather than minds.160
158

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, February 8, 1822, ibid.,
6:680; Thomas L. McKenney to Solomon Davis, October 26, 1824, ibid.,
9:355.

159

DeRosier, Removal of the Choctaws, p. 98.

16°Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, November 24, 1824,
ibid., 9:402-403.
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From the Seneca reserve at Buffalo, where it was said the greatest native
hostility to mission schools still existed, one Seneca argued that after
thirteen years of missionary presence, "not a single schollar [sic] has
been produced . . . who can attend to his private concerns with any accuracy."

161

The tragedies of forced removal in the following decade had

as much to do with the failure of these programs as with Andrew Jackson's
frontier style of Indian reform.
Calhoun was a conservative, restrained philanthropist:

tradi

tion said, and Calhoun agreed, that when national weal and native life
clashed, it was the latter which gave ground.

No Indian program ought

to be considered, he said to Monroe, which failed to take national interests into account.

162

Since the factory system was not his, and since he

knew that its administration was a shambles, he made no attempt to save
the dubious program.

His position on the factory system defined the

limits of his benevolence.

And again, when the Georgians began their

campaigns against all the Indians in their state and accused the Monroe
administration of bad faith, Calhoun's only concern (other than not
wanting to "bully" the Indians) was to preserve the prestige of the
national government and to face down the Georgians' impertinence.

163

He held his views of the Indians and their problems with com
placence.

There was something too facile in his policy; his affectation

of the rhetoric of Indian reform, his professions of regret at their
161
162

Jacob Jimeson to John C. Calhoun, July 15, 1824, ibid., 9:225.
John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, January 24, 1825, ibid.,

9:516-517.
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Adams, Diary, March 11, March 26, 1824; John C. Calhoun to
James Monroe, March 29, 1824, Calhoun Papers, 8:608.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243

demise, his bringing of a delegation of "almost naked" Indians to a
formal Washington party, and his easy magnanimity toward the once-hunted
Seminoles.

164

There was no emotional cost to any of this:

simply performing his off:cial duties.

he was

It was expected.

Being for the present a nationalist whose faith in progress was
even more intense than that of most of his race, Calhoun faced in the
Indians' way of thinking an attitude which, had it appeared in his own
culture, he would have despised as the worst kind of conservatism.

But

for him, as for other whites, the civilized verities did not penetrate
the forests and had no meaning there; thus, he was not obliged to exer
cise them except as his own private dictates moved him.

In his way,

Calhoun may have recognized that the Indians were not so much enemies of
progress as strangers to it.

Eventually, Calhoun embraced a reactionism

of his own devising, but he could not make the same apologies as the
Indians had for theirs.
164

Adams, Diary, July 16, 1819; John C. Calhoun to John R. Bell,
September 28, 1821, Calhoun Papers, 6:395.
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CHAPTER V

THE WAR DEPARTMENT UNDER SIEGE

One of the more enduring American myths tells of a military
establishment which has assiduously remained neutral in the course of
political agitations, and of army officers and War Department function
aries trusting in their civilian masters to support their cause, without
regard to the philosophy of one faction or another.

Professing all the

while to be content, the military establishment, until recently, has
been viewed as a passive agent in the political working of the republic,
more a victim than victimizer.

Yet studies now exist which span the

entirety of American history and which demonstrate that, at various
times, what might be called "the military factor" in politics was hardly
negligible.'*'
During wartime, of course, political leaders in America have
been keenly sensitive to the tendency of military institutions to
increase their power in the operations of civilian government.

2

But the

times of peace have brought with them their own special opportunities
for the extension of military influence as well, and for the most part,

"*"Two works which bear upon this general period and which have
been particularly helpful to me in understanding its civil and military
interrelationships have been Kohn's, Eagle and Sword, and Cunliffe's,
The Martial Spirit.
2

During the Army debates of 1821 Speaker of the House John W.
Taylor confessed that he was "fill[ed] with apprehension that our liber
ties after a war or two more are to be controlled by our standing
armies." U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., p. 367.
244
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historians dealing with the era of good feelings have not taken this
influence into account.^
Scholars have generally agreed that the War Department and the
military establishment as a whole were caught up in the political acti
vities which inaugurated the second American party system.

The assault

on the War Department w m c h followed has been attributed to Calhoun's
presence, which, once his presidential ambitions were known, acted as a
magnet for his competitors.
Calhoun himself.

The War Department thus became a proxy for

The most detailed studies of his period of Calhoun's

life have focused upon his relations with fellow cabinet members and
with the congressmen representing the various factions contesting for the
4

presidency.

But the reaction of the various officials in the War

Department and the military establishment has not been examined.

For

the most part the military has been viewed, again, as merely the passive
institution, accepting as its due the vicissitudes of political contro
versy.

Yet it would be surprising indeed if Calhoun had not sought to

use every means at his disposal first, to thwart attacks upon his candi
dacy, and second, to protect the very institution which had elevated him
3

By the same token military historians have treated their subject
as most episodic, governed in their work by what seems to be an ineluc
table desire to discuss war only. As always there are exceptions, such as
Weigley's, American Way of War, and his History of the U. S. Army, as well
as T. Harry Williams', Americans at War. Cunliffe's The Martial Spirit
defies categorization and comes closest to a sensible appreciation of the
interrelationships between the American society and the American military
during this period. Political historians seem to believe that only civi
lians can participate in presidential contests: I have not found one who
even approaches a satisfactory appreciation of the military factor in the
American politics of this time.
4

For all the work done since it was written, Wiltse's Calhoun is
still the study which best covers activities within the military estab
lishment. His, of course, is a much broader focus than that of ' M s work.
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to the status of candidate.

As this renewal of avid partisanism devel

oped over the presidential election of 1824, members of the American
military establishment underwent a politicization which largely has gone
unnoticed by historians.
The spell of partisan controversy, so intense during the war,
diminished only momentarily as James Monroe assumed the presidency.
Federalist debility was only partly responsible for the political con
fusions of this period; some Republicans such as Monroe and Calhoun were
busily preempting much of the Federalist credo while more orthodox party
members were attempting to decide between loyalty to party and loyalty to
doctrine.

Others consulted their ambitions, mostly, and there was ambi

tion aplenty in the councils of national government.

There seemed at

first to be indecision upon what policy was dictated by the requirements
of the nation, and it is likely that the congressional support for the
early programs of the Monroe administration derived from lack of agree
ment about national goals rather than from a solid consensus.
consensus would not wither so quickly as this support did.

A solid

And although

Monroe ruminated about the withering away of parties, John Quincy Adams
professed an indefinable anxiety about what the political future held.
"It is a sort of instinctive impression that Mr. Monroe's administration
will terminate by bringing in an adverse party to it. . . . All the
restless and uneasy spirits naturally fall into the ranks of the
opposition.
Because they seemed more justified in their ambitions by reason
of experience, position, and age, there has never been any question but

Adams, Diary, 5:119.
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that Adams, Clay, and Crawford all had their eyes on the presidential
succession as early as 1817 or 1818.

Calhoun, less justified by experi

ence and age, and less well represented by a diary such as Adams' has
been censured for his unseemly hurry to reach the top.6

More sympathetic

biographers of Calhoun have traced his presidential ambitions to that
time when he could no longer stand by and watch his nationalist programs
in the War Department being assailed by other, smaller-minded Republi
cans,

Only then, it has been said, did Calhoun contemplate entering the

contest for the White House.

7

Yet this view gives Calhoun little credit

for the original and aggressive mind that he was already known to have
had.
From congressman to cabinet member in five years was a dizzying
ascent for a man as young as Calhoun was when he became Secretary of
War.

With such a record behind him, could the presidency be far beyond?

His spectacular rise in national politics doubtless had a great deal to
do with a characteristic of thought for which Calhoun later became well
known:

an autocratic mentality which admitted no possibility of error,

which transcended the pettiness of any faction, and which presumed to
represent the best interests of national progress and genius.

It was a

cast of mind that was rapidly obsolescing.
Calhoun's faith in the superiority of his views encouraged a
certain amount of inflexibility even at an early date.

Still a congress

man, Calhoun rose on the floor of the House to discuss the extent to

6See Gerald Capers, John C. Calhoun, Opportunist (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1960), pp. 83-85 (hereafter cited as Capers,
Opportunist).
7
The reactionary aspect of Calhoun's presidential ambitions is
well represented by the chapter title in Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 249,
"Calhoun fights back."
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which a constituency could require their representative to do their
bidding.

Some argued that the congressman was merely a creature of the

voter and no more.

Calhoun argued to the contrary:

"The Constitution is

g

my letter of instruction," he said.

To a friend Calhoun wrote about

himself and his political temperament on the eve of the War of 1812:
"Want of firmness!

All know, that in the short time I have been in pub-

lick service, I have ever stood obstinate against all local, party, or
factious interest.

...

I love just renown; but to me undeserved

popularity ha[s] no charms."

9

All that followed merely confirmed and accentuated Calhoun's view
of himself and his place in American politics; he took these sensibil
ities with him into the War Department in 1817.

To a man with such

enlarged views of himself, there was only one place remotely free of
localism, parti-santem, and faction, and that was the presidency itself.
The cabinet and the Department of War could serve as the avenue of his
rise to power.

During the first few years in the cabinet, Calhoun

played his role as the transcendent politician well enough to impress
the critical Adams.

After having dealt with his younger colleague only

a short time, Adams recalled:
He [Calhoun] observed that it would be of great advantage to this
country to have statesmen of a philosophical turn of mind. He is
himself of that character, and it has brought him to a high dis
tinction at a very early age. But he is the only man of the present
administration who does possess it. We are obliged to live from
hand to mouth, and to leave posterity to take care of itself.10
g

John C. Calhoun, "First Speech on Amendments to the Compensa
tion Law," January 17, 1817, Calhoun Papers, 1:387.
9

John C. Calhoun to James MacBride, September 10, 1821, ibid.,

1:61-62.
^Adams, Diary, 5:221.
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Adams would eventually change his mind about Calhoun and heap
the score upon the young secretary which he had earlier reserved for the
likes of Clay and Crawford.

It is difficult to tell when reading Adams'

tirades against Calhoun, whether Adams is merely angry at the defection
of a potential supporter or disappointed that Calhoun's pose as a
statesman has been tarnished.
In his first two years as Secretary of War, Calhoun was the bell
wether of nationalism.

His programs of fortification and military

expansion, and internal reforms made him even more of a public figure to
reckon with than he had been before.

A mind as lively as Calhoun's

could hardly have resisted contemplating what the future held.
applied to others who were associated with Calhoun as well.

This

Sometime in

early April, 1818, Calhoun's chief clerk produced an extraordinary docu
ment which had all the marks of a campaign biography.

Christopher

Vandeventer entitled his piece, "The Secretary of War," and it bears the
signs of his superior's cooperation.

Vandeventer wrote:

The career of this young statesman has been active and elevated.
He has aimed to advance the true interests of his country untrammelled
by party and unbiased by sectional prejudices— He already occupies a
wide space in the public view, and an analysis of the past will to
us the best hopes of his future career.
To a mind active and discriminating he adds strength and solidity
of judgment; he forms his opinions by a rapid intuition, but he
forms them correctly, for having settled in his own breast certain
general principles he brings to this standard any subject which pre
sents itself. With a moral intrepidity which fears no consequence
when the [illegible] call to action is honest he had [sic] uniformly
appeared as the champion of national interests at times at war with
the peculiar traits of all parties but invariably consistant [sic]
with himself.
The change of rulers in the eventful contest of 1801
produced a corresponding change ["of policy," interlined] measures?
and in th'e heat of the conflict the true interests of the nation
were sometimes forgotten.— When Mr. Calhoun came forward on the
theatre our Statesmen pursued the lines of party demarcation fixed
and unswerving.
They adhered to early opinions with the pertinacity
of bigots, and seemed willing to aspire even to the character of
martyrs in defense of their faith. Now that the period of excitement
is over, and public opinion has consecrated leading national measures,
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the history of past times appears almost incredible. Will posterity
believe that in the management of our external relations, the policy
of the federalists [sic] since this epoch was to render this country
subservient to England? That instead of wishing to assume the
position which Providence has assigned to us, they seemed determined
to place us in an attitude secondary and humiliating, [sic] Hence
when our commercial rights were assailed, our Flag disgraced, our
citizens incarcerated, the federalists [sic] as a party virtually
advocated submission; They [sic] went further and declared that
England had done us no essential injury ...........................
While the nation was thus destracted [sic] with the prejudices of
the two political parties in 1811-1812 Mr. Calhoun appeared in our
national Legislature [sic]. The crisis was eventful and the aspect
of the time portended the storm which was to follow. There were
associated with him from his own State [sic] two colleagues of whom
I shall only here remark that they possessed commanding talents and
the most elevated patriotism— His [sic] views soon developed them
selves as resting upon the basis of the national welfare. He refined
the gold [?] from the drip of both political sects and adopted the
amalgamation as the standard of his policy. He wrested from the
administration opinions which time had consecrated, and the opposi
tion have since repented their follies in sack cloth and ashes— on
the subject of our foreign relations he sought to protect our
sovereignty, to defend our lawful commerce as a vital right, and to
place the nation in the attitude she now sustains, commanding,
respected, and feared. To accomplish these objects it has been the
constant effort with reference to internal measures, to organize
our institutions to enlarge our modes of thought to expend our views
to lofty principles of action [sic]. He combatted on the side of
the administration when it determined to make [the community?] a
citadel and protect it with the national force. He brought all his
talents into action for the increase of our naval establishment for
the abandonment of the system of commercial restrictions, for the
creation of a bank as necessary to our finance as well as our com
merce.
The loss of this statesman from the halls of Congress will be
severely felt, but in the new duties in which he is called we
predict the nation will reap a higher benefit from his intelligence
and services.— In the Cabinet [sic] he will give weight and to the
army reputation; the former will receive the full benefits of an
intellect which analyses the future almost with the spirit of pro
phecy; The [sic] latter will we are confident experience new vigor
from the decision and energy which marks his character. The impor
tant duties of fortifying our different frontiers so as to present
an armor calculated for any contingency; of reforming and elevating
our military school, of establishing at every point capacious
arsenals and depots; of exploring our country in all directions, and
concentrating the result in a board of topography at the capitol [sic];
imparting new life to the officers of our little army; and rendering
them habituated to that mental exertion which leads to distinction
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in science as well as in arms.
These we trust will occupy his
attention and distinguish the epoch of his present employment.
As a Legislator [sic] the nation in adopting his principles
has marked him out as one of her brightest ornaments; as the chief
of an important department . . . we feel assured he will exemplify
these principles by the whole course of his administration.H
It is difficult indeed to believe that John C. Calhoun did not
have a hand in the composition of this panegyric on his young life.

The

candid Calhoun is revealed here, his nationalism and his self confidence
in full flood, a transcendent politician who had heroically rescued the
nation.

Appended to this document, in Vandeventer1s hand, is a post

script which re-emphasizes the real message, one which would have to be
integrated with the body when the piece was later polished:
At times he opposed each party in some antequated and favorite creed
and he came off victorious, in every conflict. The highest eulogium
which can be paid to his political career is the circumstance that
all parties have adopted his leading opinions as settled axioms of
national policy and have awarded his talents and virtues unanimous
approbation.12
That the document was written less than five months after he
became Secretary of War is significant.

Presuming Calhoun's connivance,

if not authorship (the writing is a poor imitation of Calhoun's syntax),
the purpose of the document can only be surmised.

Certainly its author

put Calhoun in the best possible light, writing with a cavalier regard

I have reproduced this document very nearly in full here for
two reasons: first, because it portrays what I believe to be an unguarded
side of Calhoun's thoughts about his and the nation's past and future at
a relatively early time, and because it demonstrates how completely
Calhoun identified his own progress with that of the nation. Second,
this document is used here for the first time, and its reproduction may
be of some benefit to future students of Calhoun's life and thought.
The
manuscript was found at the William L. Clements Library. See Christopher
Vandeventer, "The Secretary of War," April 5, 1818, Vandeventer Papers.
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for the truth.

Perhaps the Secretary of War saw it after it was written

and decided to delay the campaign for popularity which the document pre
saged.

The eulogy may have been only the result of Vandeventer's

ambition to ingratiate himself with his chief; if that is so then Van
deventer had penetrated to the core of his superior's personality and
politics in a very short time and the paper is a testament to the young
clerk's precocity.

In either case, this document reflects the close

personal relationship which had already emerged between the secretary
and the clerk.

Despite some anxious moments the relations between the

two would deepen in the following years.

More importantly, Vandeventer's

commitment to Calhoun's cause reveals in miniature what happened to the
American military establishment while Calhoun was in the War Office.
The Secretary of War kept his counsel for the time being.

Any

announcement on his part would have been grossly premature, and at any
rate he was far too busy for the present to do anything but think about
his prospects.

In the meantime factions were already taking shape within

the Republican party.
the political winds.

John Quincy Adams was particularly sensitive to
Occupying the seat that Henry Clay had wanted,

Adams saw Clay working against him in Congress from the very beginning
of the Monroe administration.

13

And although it seemed to take longer

for him to decide, Adams soon began counting upon the enmity of William
Crawford and his friends as well.

14

Soon after the beginning of the

Sixteenth Congress, Adams had concluded that the delicate Republican
consensus had broken apart.

"All public business in Congress now

connects itself with intrigues," Adams observed,
13

Adams, Diary, 4:119.

"and there is great

14
rbid., 4:407.
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danger that the whole Government will degenerate into a struggle of
cabals.
This forbidding aspect of public affairs was compounded by the
first hints of the Panic of 1819.

By January, 1819, the buoyant postwar

economy broke into so many pieces:

banks had already begun to fail the

previous year and so had some eastern businesses.

The reverberations of

the general collapse were not to affect the West for a few months, but
already cotton prices had fallen precipitously and land prices would
shortly follow.

In May Adams called the prospects "alarming" in a con

versation with Treasury Secretary Crawford.

The Secretary of State

described a dark picture to his diary:
The staple productions of the soil, constituting our principal
articles of export, are falling to half and less than half the
prices which they have lately borne, the merchants are crumbling to
ruin, the manufactures perishing, agriculture stagnating, and dis
tress universal in every part of the country. The revenue has not
/et been, but must very sensibly and very soon be affected by this
state of things, for which there seens to be no remedy but time and
patience, and the changes of events which time effects. Crawford
showed me his last bank returns, which are as large as usual, and
the condition of the Treasury is daily improving. But there will
be a great falling off in the revenue of the next year.-*-®
For once Adams was not overstating.
Calhoun discussed the worsening depression.

Later that year, he and
Calhoun thought that "we

shall unavoidably come within a year to a paper-money currency."

17

How

much the depression would have to do with his own political career,
Calhoun did not yet perceive, nor, probably, did other political leaders.
The panic was the harbinger of the Industrial Revolution in America, and
with it came the first stirrings of Jacksonian nationalism.

15Ibid., 4:212.

16Ibid., 4:375.

18

17Ibid., 4:401.

18

This summary is based upon a reading of George Dangerfield1s ,
The Awakening of American Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
pp. 72-96; see especially p. 89 (hereafter cited as Dangerfield, American
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By the end of 1819 it was evident that this had been a year of
portentous beginnings.

Adams thought that the next year would see the

fulfillment of his worst fears.

He told Monroe that "the great battery

opened upon the Administration at the session before last was South
America.

That of the last session was the Seminole War."

The next

session of Congress promised to be agitated in the extreme:

"Before the

Congress will be all the moneyed [sic] embarrassments of the country,
the affairs of the bank [of the United States], the manufacturing claims
[for protective tariffs], and the Missouri slave question, which might
excite ardent debates."

19

Calhoun had little of his own reputation invested in the diffi
culties of the past few sessions of Congress, and so at the start of
the session in December, 1819, he was relatively self-satisfied.

The

extended debates over Jackson's invasion of Florida the previous session
had little to do with Calhoun personally, and his stand against Jackson
in the cabinet had befuddled Adams.

"I had not exactly understood what

he meant or what he was after," complained the Secretary of State.

20

Calhoun's main concern during 1819 was about the effect the failure of
the Yellowstone expedition would have upon the next military appropria
tions bill.

Because the expedition had virtually bankrupted the

National] srr.); and Bray Hammond's , Banks and Politics in America from the
Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957), pp. 251-285, and passim. On the interrelationships of the new
partisanism to national economic problems, see also Charles Sydnor, The
Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1948), pp. 134-156 (hereafter cited as Sydnor,
Southern Sectionalism); and William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War.
The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 7-133 (hereafter cited as Freehling, Prelude
to Civil War) .
19

Adams, Diary, 4:473.

20

Ibid., 4:307.
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Quartermaster's account, the entire War Department budget might be
scrutinized more closely.

And since the extent of the financial panic

daily became more evident, he was concerned that certain retrenchmentminded congressmen would have much more to say about the standing army
than had been the case.

In the summer of 1819 Calhoun told General Brown

that because of these two problems, "I consider the next Session [sic]
as the most trying for the Army [sic] of any which will probably occur
„21

in many years.

Crawford's report on the state of the Treasury at the end of
1819 was alarming.

Because of the decline in revenues, Crawford recom

mended a loan to defray the five million dollar deficit
increased expenditures.

caused by

He believed that, whether expenditures were

decreased or not, the loan would still be necessary in order to offset
future deficits which he expected would occur.

22

The drive for retrenchment began in Congress in the wake of
Crawford's gloomy report.

The first moves against the War Department

were tentative, but the congressmen putting retrenchment into action
against the department were all easily identifiable as friends of the
Secretary of the Treasury:

Lewis Williams of North Carolina, John Floyd

of Virginia, and John Cocke and Newton Cannon of Tennessee.

By the

first of the year, Eldred Simkins, who held Calhoun's old seat from
Abbeville and who was one of Calhoun's past law students, wrote to
Calhoun's cousin, Patrick Noble, that it looked as though the main
21

John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, August 15, 1819, Calhoun
Papers, 4:249.
22

See Crawford's report, dated December 10, 1819, m
Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 719-723.

U. S.,
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contenders for the presidency in 1824 were already limbering up their
batteries.

The importance of this intelligence for Calhoun was evident

to Simkins:

"Crawford s Adams both appear very friendly to Calhoun per

sonally, but the friends of the first show a spiteful spirit towards the
War. Dept, almost constantly."

There was every prospect that the defense

of the nation could be "prostrated" by the combination of retrenchment
23
and presidential maneuverings.
Newton Cannon and John Cocke were the most active congressmen in
their pursuit of military retrenchment.

Just two days after Simkins had

complained of the activities of Crawford's friends in Congress, Cannon
moved that the House Committee on Military Affairs consider suspending
appropriations altogether for coastal defenses, and Cocke devoted him
self to stopping the Yellowstone expedition by denying little more than
operating money to the Quartermaster's accounts in theWar Department.

24

This business was put aside for the time being in late January
as the concerns of the House of Representatives turned to the admission
of Missouri to the Union.

It was not until the middle of March that the

opponents of the military establishment were able to return to the attack.
On March 8, Newton Cannon introduced a bill to reduce the army to five
thousand men, and it was no trick for Cannon to link reduction with
retrenchment.

He told his fellow congressmen:

It might appear a little astonishing to the people of this country
that, notwithstanding the vast revenue that had been brought into
the public Treasury, from various sources, since the termination of
23

Eldred Simkins to Patrick Noble, January 8, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 4:560.
24

U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 891, 936.
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the late war, to find that we are unable to meet the current demands
against the Government; that such has been the extravagance of our
public expenditures on this Military Establishment, as well as others
equally useless or unnecessary, that there now seems to be a deficit
to the amount of five millions of dollars, and this too during a
time when we are enjoying the most perfect peace and boasted pros
perity.^
Cannon's proposed bill stirred army supporters to action.

A few

days after William Lowndes1 Committee on Foreign Relations proposed
that Congress virtually order President Monroe to seize Florida by force,
but Lowndes had no thought that the recommendation would pass the House.
Even though Lowndes protested that he would vote for such a bill him
self, it was widely said that he had merely meant to excite the House
to foreign dangers in order to help Calhoun's military appropriations
requests through.

John Quincy Adams thought that this was the case, and

since Lowndes and Calhoun were very close friends, it was a reasonable
assumption to make.2^
At the same time, Eldred Simkins championed the War Department
and the military establishment on the floor of the House, using some of
the very same arguments which Calhoun had employed five years before.
"Can a single gentleman in the House," he asked, "believe that ten
millions of enlightened freemen are endangered by an army of ten thousand
men, divided at eighty-five posts, and spread over a space of several
thousand miles?

I will not discuss the proposition."

27

Furthermore,

said Simkins, the army was no longer the band of idlers which had so

25Ibid., p. 1598.
26

Adams, Diary, 5:16-17, 34: and U. S. Annals of Congress,
16th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1618-1620.

21

‘u. S., Annals of Congress, 16th. Cong., 1st sess., p. 1610.
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drained the treasury in past years:

"The camp of your army will not be

a seat of idleness and corruption, if it is properly organized and
judiciously attended to? and is it not true, that your soldiers are
already employed in constructing valuable roads; in raising provision
for their support."

28

*

The vote on money for fortifications came up on March 14.

Josiah

Butler of New Hampshire gave the final speech for the anti-military
forces.

His remarks were illustrative of the general unease in Congress

about several problems, not the least of which was the growing power of
the executive branch.

Butler said:

Now our Treasury is empty, we are required to increase this expendi
ture $300,000. You are told that contracts are made; that the
Secretary wants the money; that he must have it; nothing less than
the demands will do. This plea of necessity you have at every
session.
If you propose a reduction of the expenditures, you are
charged with want of confidence in the departments. Thus, sir. you
are the humble servant of the Executive. Passing appropriation bills
has become a matter of course.
It is even considered uncivil to
hesitate in giving the sum demanded. . . . If you propose a reduc
tion of the Army, there is a cry of war, and a war bill is laid on
your table. If you propose to abolish the Military Academy, that
sink of dissipation, you are told that military science will be for
gotten, and martial spirit and ardor will become extinct in your
country.
If you propose to stay your hand in fortifying your
extensive coast and building islands in the sea, large specks of
war are seen, your cities will be demolished, unless the work is
done without delay. Sir, your expenditures are increasing faster
than your revenues.29
Despite Butler's rather accurate portrayal of the importunity of
the executive branches, the fortifications moneys were voted by a large
margin:

103 to 5 1 . ^

Among the fifty-one dissenting votes was a

phalanx of men determined somehow to reduce the military establishment
if they could.

28

Ibid.

Not yet strong enough to force a reduction immediately,

29

Ibid., p. 1636.

30

Ibid.
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the best that they could do was to pass, nearly at the end of the session,
a resolution calling upon Calhoun for a plan to reduce the army to six
thousand m e n . ^
Calhoun took all of this with seeming equanimity.

He did not

think, as his young friend Simkins obviously did, that there was any
move afoot in Congress against him.

Discussing the attacks on the

Missouri (or Yellowstone) expedition with Micah Sterling of New York,
Calhoun said that he could not believe "that the vote in the House . . .
had much relation to me individually.
be found in the state of the Treasury."

The real cause, will principally
32

This, of course, was before

the House resolved to demand a plan for army reduction at the end of the
session.

But still, Calhoun did not waver in his opinion that he was

not the target of these votes even after the resolution on reduction was
passed.

He further miscalculated the depth of the panic and its conse

quent effects on the War Department, particularly those expansive
programs that he had begun.

He ascribed the vote on the Yellowstone

expedition to the "accidental state of publick affairs at the time that
the vote was taken."

33

He told Andrew Jackson that he hoped that "a

better state of feelings will exist in Congress at the next session."

34

After the resolution was passed Calhoun told the general that the move
was undoubtedly due to the "low state of the Treasury;" still, he thought

^ T h e resolution was agreed to on May 11, 1820.
was not taken. See ibid., pp. 2232-2233.

A roll call vote

32

John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, April 15, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:40.

34

John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 27, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 4:735.
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it was probable that "Congress will not reduce the Army [sic]."

No

"sound mind," Calhoun thought, would really consider such a reduction
proper.

35

II
The military men of the United States watched all this congres
sional activity closely.

General Jacob Brown, then in Washington, was

rather more gloomy on what the session portended for the army than his
Secretary of War.

In January, 1820, Brown wrote to Joseph Swift in

New York; the major general thought that the anti-military sentiments in
Congress had more to do with Andrew Jackson than the army itself, but he
presumed that some sort of alteration would be made in the military estab
lishment as a result of hostility toward Jackson.

Brown wrote:

You must not consider the vote taken upon the Army as indicating the
sentiments of the national legislature on this subject. The
deliberations of Congress upon the military peace establishment will,
I confidently believe, result in an organization that can be
approved by military men. As I write to you in great confidence I
may venture to say that much of the opposition to the Army grows
out of the deadly hostility of some of the members to the Hero of
New Orleans— this interest has been joined by many others hostile
to the Exec. Govmt. [sic] the Army or any of its permanent officers.
. . . I consider it next to impossible that the Bill [sic] you have
seen or anything like it can become a lav;— Even the majority of
the House of Representatives do not expect or desire this— But there
is, I fear, a fixed determination at all hazards to legislate
Genl [sic]
Jackson out of the service.
The Pres, [sic]
and Sec. on
1
OC
1
this point find it a duty to yield.
Brown's solicitude for the army is not difficult to fathom.

He

had faced reduction before, and so had every other officer who had served

^ J o h n C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, June 1, 1820, ibid., 5:164.

36

Jacob Brown to Joseph G. Swift, January 25, 1820, Swift Papers.
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since the War of 1812.

The American military establishment had, in fact,

been confronted with the threat of extinction since it had come into
being.

For the intelligent and observant officer, thecontinuing exist

ence of his institution was always

in the balance; for

the politician who

favored a standing army, the problem was how the republic could fashion
a military establishment which enhanced rather than endangered democracy.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the most astute of
America's military men were extremely sensitive to political trends and
that they had evolved a sophisticated response over the years to this
very problem.
Their response was known as the "expansible," or "skeleton" army.
Put simply, an expansible army was

a peacetime military establishment

arranged so that it could mobilize

just by calling for recruits.

The

organization of an expansible army— the general staff, command structure,
order of battle, and logistical systems— theoretically remained constant
in peace or war.

The substance of the army— the number of men in actual

service— varied according to the military requirements of the nation.
When war approached, a skeleton army stood ready to receive levees who
would complement the standing forces to battle strength.

If all went

well, only the number of private soldiers in each company would change.
This concept is hardly exotic today, but on the eve of the War
of 1812, the United States Army was organized virtually in the face of
the enemy.

An expansible army, by contrast, bespoke a degree of readi

ness that the pell-mell army did not have.

Command duties increased

only by degree; there was little qualitative difference between leading
a company composed of one hundred than one of fifty.

This kind of army

was more efficient economically; the cost of maintaining it during
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peacetime, it was argued, was more than offset by a prompt resistance
which prevented early enemy depredations while an unprepared army
mobilized.

Moreover, it was less costly to fill up an existing organi

zation than to build one anew on the eve of a war.
But these military and economic benefits were no more important
than the fact that this was a concept which was politically feasible in
the United States.

In a nation long wary of standing armies, an expan

sible army did not threaten the nation or the liberties of its citizens.
At the same time, it provided a modicum of protection that, for all its
suspicions, the nation could not profitably neglect.

The expansible

army was therefore the smallest effective army possible for the republic.
Its power, potentially great, could be adjusted as political sentiments
demanded.

It was the next evolution in military organization and policy

for a new nation anxious to protect the fruits of its progress.
Scholars have credited Calhoun with the invention of the expansible army concept.

37

Calhoun’s friends considered his proposal for this

kind of army as one of his most noteworthy acts in the War Office.

38

But

the concept of the expansible army antedates Calhoun's period in the War
Department by some years, and earlier references to this unique military
37

Calhoun's most authoritative biographer says that the expan
sible army had been on Calhoun's mind since 1815, but there is nothing
in the Calhoun Papers to support this conclusion. Calhoun was present
during the debates on the peacetime army in 1815, and he took the admin
istration line there, but he did not refer then or in the years succeeding
to an expansible army.
See Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 224; and U. S., Annals of
Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1215-1217.
38

One need only consult Calhoun's own correspondence between
1821 and 1824 to see how importantly both he and his friends regarded
this plan. Throughout, Calhoun never hinted that the expansible army
plan he had presented to Congress had any precedents at all. See, for
instance, Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, January 4, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 5:528.
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idea suggest that it was a well developed concept by 1817.

Calhoun

became an expositor of the expansible army concept, but it was by no
means original with him.
Richard H. Kohn has recently pointed out that William Heath
recommended such a concept to George Washington while the future presi
dent was writing his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment" in 1783.

Con

tending with many of the same problems Calhoun would be facing forty
years later, Washington also sought, in Kohn's words, "the bare minimum,
politically feasible army."

39

Aside from the actual numbers involved,

General Washington devised a kind of army which, he said, "will give us a
Number of Officers well skilled in the Theory and Art of War, who will be
ready on any occasion, to mix and diffuse their knowledge of Discipline
to other Corps, without that lapse of Time, which . . . would be necessary
to bring intire [sic] new Corps."

40

It is reasonable to expect that the merits of this concept from
the military professional's point of view could not go unheeded.

It was

a rational concept which took into account the anti-military proclivities
of the nation as well as the need for some sort of army.

That an expan

sible army was not created along with the republic simply indicates the
depth of anti-military feeling at the time; in no wise was the concept
itself degraded.

It remained a favorite response of army advocates to

39
Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 45-46.
40

George Washington, "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,"
May 2, 1783, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manu
script Sources, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols.
(Washington, D. C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1931-1944; reprint ed., West
port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), 26:374-400.
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the threat of military retrenchment, for in a sense it was timeless,
having more to do with political climate than with military danger.
James Monroe believed in 1815 that the time was propitious to
bring the concept into play once more.
that year.

Peace was at hand in February of

One of the first questions before Congress after Ghent was

announced was the adjustment of the American military establishment to
fit the new peaceful situation.

There was no danger that the army would

be abolished altogether, and Secretary of War Monroe pondered the next
logical question:

if there was to be an army, what kind would be allowed

In a letter to Senator William Branch Giles, Monroe argued for a twenty
thousand man army, an army which he probably knew the House of Represen
tatives would never approve.

In the course of his remarks to Giles,

Monroe wrote:
Two modes have occurred by which to regulate the reduction [of the
army]. One by retaining the skeleton of every corps now in service,
dismissing as many officers and men in each as will reduce the estab
lishment to the proposed number, the other by reducing the number of
regiments, down to that standard.
A few days before Monroe's letter to Giles, General Swift visited
him.

The subject of reduction was discussed, and later Swift recalled

that "the general idea of Congress seemed to be to reduce the army to a
standard upon which an army of fifty thousand men might be engrafted."

42

Following Monroe's proposal to Giles, Congressman George M. Troup of the
Committee on Military Affairs

put the plan to his colleagues in some

detail, arguing for the retention of "skeletons of regiments" at the very

41

James Monroe to William Branch Giles, February 22, 1815,
Monroe Papers L C .
42

Swift, Memoirs, p. 137.
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least.

43

But the bill fixing the military peace establishment did not

reflect the proposal; it summarily cut the army to ten thousand men.

44

Apparently it was only the reluctance of the Senate to cut the
army more that prevented the House from going even lower; proposals were
heard in the House which went as low as five thousand men.

45

The bill

of 1815 was therefore a compromise between the two houses of Congress.
Army officers were watchful of any move in Congress thereafter to reduce
further the military establishment as the passage of time made it clear
that foreign dangers were subsiding.
At leaS't one professional soldier perceived a threat of further
reduction late in 1817.

As the first session of the Fifteenth Congress

opened in December, Brigadier General Winfield Scott suspected that the
army was due for a reduction of some kind.

Newspaper articles did

appear that month which alluded to military reorganization.

46

Scott was

anxious that Congress was about to look closely at the army once more.
The letter that Scott dispatched to the War Department on
December 16 would have startled the newly appointed Calhoun, had he
actually received it; but there is some doubt that the new Secretary of
War ever saw Scott's letter.

47

It contained a plan, unsolicited by

Calhoun (or anyone else), to reduce the army in accord with the expan
sible army concept.

There is no record that Calhoun replied to Scott on

this matter or ever acknowledged that he had seen the proposal.
43
44
46

For

U. S., Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1196-1197.
Ibid., pp. 1272-1273.

45

Ibid., pp. 1196-1216.

Niles- Weekly Register, December 20, 1817.

47

Winfield Scott to John C. Calhoun, December 16, 1817, Letters
Received, SWMA. See also, pp. 267-268, below.
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U. S., Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1196-1197.
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Niles' Weekly Register, December 20, 1817.
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reasons which will become clear, Scott's letter bears going into.

The

letter was hastily written, but the plan the general proposed was as
detailed an exposition of an expansible army as Calhoun later saw.

In

an apologetic tone, Scott assured the Secretary that if he had had time
to develop his arguments properly, he would not have marked them "confi
dential."

He nonetheless offered this plan, he said, because he had

seen "that a disposition exists in The [sic] House of Representatives
to reduce and otherwise modify the army."

48

Although he thought that the army was already too small for its
mission, Scott believed that "if reduction be resolved on, the parts the
least essential should doubtlessly be the first [lopped?]."

When Scott

wrote, the army was composed of eight regiments of infantry, one regi
ment of riflemen, and one corps each of light and regular artillery.

He

thought first of all that the rifle regiment could be converted into a
ninth infantry regiment and that two companies could be added to each of
the new regiments.

These extra companies would act as "flank" companies,

serving as riflemen or grenadiers.

To lend authority to this scheme,

Scott observed that "this organization is believed to be the most perfect
that has yet been devised.

It is that of France at present."

49

Having outlined the new military organization, Scott turned next
to the actual number of reduction.

The ideal combat strength of a

company was one hundred men; Scott proposed that company strength be
reduced to fifty-five privates and a small non-commissioned cadre.

If

similar arrangements could be made in the two corps of artillery, Scott
estimated, 1,690 men could be trimmed from the rolls without deranging
48_, .
Ibid.

49

..
Ibid.
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the army organization.

This was the foundation of Scott's plan.

He

wrote:
In this view it is hoped that the present number of companies may
not be diminished, because on that number depends the capacity of
the base for the reception of a war establishment. I will rather
hope that this base will be enlarged altho' the total of the army
should be reduced. The enlargement might take place in the infantry
without any augmentation of the rank & file or rather or aggregate
[sic] & the reduction be made in the rank and file o £ tiiG other
50
corps.J
By this method, Scott argued, "the aggregate of the new regiment[s]
will be precisely that of the old— at the same time the base for the
reception of a war establishment is one fifth greater!"

51

Eventually Calhoun would be exposed to the ideas contained in
Scott's 1817 proposal, but the Secretary of War would not know that they
were the general's.

The distinction of being the first to acquaint

Calhoun with the merits of an expansible army belongs to Christopher
Vandeventer.
On January 16, 1818, one month after Scott made his proposal to
Calhoun, Vandeventer composed a memorandum for his chief on this very
subject.

A comparison of the texts of the two plans reveals considerable

agreement between them.
the same.

Scott's and Vandeventer's plans, in fact, were

In Vandeventer's memorandum grammatical indiscretions which

appeared in Scott's proposal were corrected, but in content and form, both
proposals were identical.

There were no

references to Scott's plan in

Vandeventer's memorandum.^

Ioid.
52

Christopher Vandeventer
Vandeventer Papers. There is, in
and Vandeventer's proposals, that
one of many examples, compare the
letter of December 16, 1817: "It

51t,
Ibid.
to John C. Calhoun, January 16, 1818,
fact, so much agreement between Scott's
only one conclusion may be drawn. As
following passages; from Scott's
is believed that the peace establishment
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After Calhoun left the War Office some years later, a dispute
arose between Generals Brown and Jesup over which of the two was the
first to educate Calhoun to the possibilities of the expansible army
concept.

Both men claimed the honor, but it was by then fairly well

known, as one of Calhoun's friends said, that "VandeVenter [sic] . . .
was the first who laid before you the project of the Central Staff."

53

This means that Calhoun actually saw Vandeventer1s memorandum, because
both Scott and the chief clerk extended their comments to that subject
in their proposals as well.

What Calhoun actually saw in January, 1818,

was a plan plagiarized by his chief clerk from the letter of a general
who, disturbed by rumors and preferring to believe the worst, hurriedly
produced a way to blunt the effect of yet another army reduction.

It

seems clear enough that Vandeventer had taken Scott's plan and passed it
off as his own.

As far as can be told, Calhoun was never the wiser.

54

General Scott had misread congressional intentions in 1817; an
enlarged military establishment could still be tolerated.

Perhaps Scott

did take alarm unnecessarily, but he knew that army reduction was always
possible in the United States during peacetime.

That he concocted a plan

is already too small for the objects to which it is applied or for which
it is intended: nevertheless if reduction be resolved on, the parts the
least essential should doubtlessly be the first [lopped?];" and from
Vandeventer's memorandum:
"It is believed that the peace establishment
is too small for the objects for which it is intended; nevertheless if
Congress determine to reduce it, the parts the least essential should be
discarded."
53

Virgil Maxey to John C. Calhoun, March 2, 1827, Jameson, Cor
respondence , 2:791-792.
54

Despite the fact that Vandeventer eventually became involved in
the Rip Rap scandal, the chief clerk never lost favor in Calhoun's eyes.
In the middle of the presidential campaign, Calhoun used a trip to Balti
more to attend Vandeventer's wedding in order to meet several political
confederates.
See John C. Calhoun to Samuel L. Gouverneur, October 4,
1823, Calhoun Papers, 8:299.
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like this in so short a time suggests that the expansible army concept
already had some currency among American military thinkers.

Such was

the nature of the plan that it could be held in readiness, an answer to
the periodic dismantling of an army that served political requirements
so well and the national defense so poorly.
Scott’s fears were needless.

On the whole, however,

It was true that the army was larger than

normal for peacetime, but military dangers had not yet disappeared by
the time Scott wrote.

General Gaines was fighting in the south, soon to

be joined by General Jackson; Spain's reaction could not be estimated.
There was no financial crisis to threaten government expenditures;
revenues were still high enough for Congress to have abolished taxes
without apprehension.

For the time being, there was no political turmoil

in which the army could serve as an issue.

A certain residue of mock

good will existed among the politicos, sufficient at least to create the
image of partisan harmony.
All this had changed by the summer of 1820, of course.

Secretary

Calhoun began soliciting advice on the reduction of the army from his
senior officers.

Between July, 1820, and the fall the Secretary received

memoranda from Generals Brown, Jackson, Gaines, Macomb, Scott, and
Jesup.

55

Each of these men thought that the problem they faced had less

to do with the army's practicality than with its political acceptability.

55

Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, October 6, 1820; Andrew Jackson
to John C. Calhoun, August 9, 1820; Edmund P. Gaines to John C. Calhoun,
July 27, 1820, ibid., 5:377-380, 317-319, 293-296. See also Alexander
Macomb to John C. Calhoun, September 30, 1820; and Winfield Scott to
John C. Calhoun, August 20, 1820, Letters Received, SWMA. The plans of
Macomb and Scott are calendared in the Calhoun Papers; the references
above contain the complete plans, with accompanying charts.
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Like Calhoun these generals to a man professed surprise that the congress
men were willing to go so far against the new army.

The generals believed

that the congressmen's thinking was out of fashion:

they were looking at

the old army when the resolution was passed.

The professional army could

hardly be so undeserving of their support.^

Thus when they wrote their

reports, the generals began by answering a question which had not been
asked.

The generals argued for the survival of the army, but the army's

existence was not at stake.

In a neat juxtaposition of the old Republi

can creed, they insisted that if the new army were harried into obscurity,
liberty would be endangered all the same.

57

Having made their objections to any reduction at all, the generals
considered next how, if reduction were unavoiadable, the disruption of
the army could be minimized.

Several of the plans argued for minor reor

ganizations in the line and staff only.

A recommendation common to all

plans merged the- two branches of artillery, for instance.

This merger

meant, at least, that one full colonelcy would be created along with
several more staff positions.
with reduction at first glance.

None of this seemed to have much to do
But this proposal and several others of

the same kind aimed for the same effect:

the profc ition of the officer

corps from the dislocations that reduction were sure to bring.

If some

how the staff could be exempted from reduction, and if somehow more
officers could be moved from line to staff positions, the best of the

^Thomas Jesup to John C. Calhoun, March 31, 1820, and John C.
Calhoun to Jacob Brown, July 21, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 4:744-745, 5:274.
57

■ .
Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, August 9, 1820, ibid.,
5:317. Jackson was dismayed that there was some prospect for the army
other than "a gradual annual increase."
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officer corps could be preserved.

In such an interest, then, the

generals who reported to Calhoun during the latter half of 1820 construed
the congressional resolution so that the officer corps, whatever the final
reduction, would remain unscathed.

This interpretation of Congress'

resolution was entirely unwarranted, of course, but it did answer the
most basic requirements of an expansible army concept.
pointed out again in 1820:

As General Scott

"If reduction be unavoidable, the parts the

least useful should be sacrificed to those more so [Scott's italics].1,88
The congressional resolution had reawakened the officer corps'
instinct for survival.

In framing their reduction plans, the generals

tested just how successfully the army had ingratiated itself with the
republic.

Calhoun's efforts since taking office had been directed toward

that very end; if in fact the military establishment had been made poli
tically defensible, then perhaps the officer corps (or more narrowly, the
staff) could be exempted from the evils of retrenchment, just as their
58

This passage is based upon a "composite" view of the generals'
reduction plans. Of the whole set of recommendations, Jackson and Gaines
seemed less emphatic about the keeping of an officer corps at the expense
of the rest of the army. Gaines bitterly told Calhoun that it was better
to dismantle the army altogether if it was to become only a token force.
The generals of the Northern Division and the War Office, however, were
the most insistent that the officer corps not be reduced at all. For
Scott's comment, see Winfield Scott to John C. Calhoun, August 20, 1820,
Letters Received, SWMA. Once again, Scott's plan was one of the more
extensive of those which Calhoun received, and it bore a marked resem
blance to his 1817 plan which Calhoun had seen with Vandeventer's help.
See also note 55, above.
As for the generals' interesting interpretation of the congres
sional resolution, the preservation of the staff or, indeed, any other
part of the army was not comprehended by the resolution. When the vote
was taken in early May, 1820, Samuel Smith of Maryland attempted to alter
the resolution so that it read only "six thousand— exclusive of officers."
Lewis Williams of North Carolina rushed forward to re-amend the resolu
tion, apparently seeing what Smith was about, so that the entire army
would stand at 6,000 men, officers and all. See these final moves in
U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2233-2234.
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brother officers in the Corps of Engineers had been since 1815.

Need

less to say, the actual number of soldiers in suclT^iPari^4^ - .U££V_ nearly
irrelevant to this design.
While the generals of the army were pondering their fate, Calhoun
was thinking about his own.

By the middle of the summer Calhoun had

decided that right-thinking congressmen would not countenance another
reduction of the army, but he was anxious to arrange the affairs of the
department so as to "present nothing at the next session, which will
enable those opposed to our Military institutions to take any advantage."

59

On August 15 Calhoun began a long-needed rest and tour of the
northern states, ostensibly to examine military defenses m

that region.

60

He was gone nearly two months from Washington and went as far north as
Montreal; it was a "very pleasant and useful excursion," he thought.^
While the Secretary was gone, his young friend and staunch supporter in
Congress, Eldred Simkins, carefully monitored his progress through New
York and Pennsylvania.

In September Simkins wrote to Christopher Vande

venter, who was acting Secretary of War in Calhoun's absence:
Will you be so very obliging as to inform me particularly by the
return of mail what papers or journals in the State of N. York
are friendly to Mr. Calhoun, & more especially those (if any) which
would be favorable to his future political rise and ascendance?
. . . It wd [sic] seem that Mr. Crawford's friends are of opinion
that they had gotten rid of Calhoun, by calling him a man of genius,
a very growing character, but too young.* C and others, a little
more ill natured, say he would [illegible] with his army.— They also
59

John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, July 21, 1820, Calhoun Papers,

5:274.
60

Christopher Vandeventer to James Monroe, August 15, 1820,
ibid., 5:330.
61

John C. Calhoun to John Ewing Colhoun, October 23, 1820, ibid.,

5:408.
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say (I mean the ill natured class) that he is a visionary chimerical
politician. . . .
*Remember that by the 4 March 1825 he will be about 42 years of
age— Pitt, governed [sic] the Parliament at about 25.62
How is one to regard Simkins' candid solicitude?

It is evident

that Simkins felt that Calhoun was presidential material, and his frank
ness with Vandeventer indicated that the subject was not a new one to
the chief clerk.

Just how much Simkins' letter reveals about Calhoun's

presidential ambitions at this point remains an open question.

The most

that can be said is that by September, 1820, some of Calhoun's closest
friends thought he could be president in 1824, and that they believed
firmly that the congressional friends of William Crawford were already
trying to eliminate Calhoun as a possible candidate by demolishing the
army.

If on the other hand one views Calhoun's actions in the most cyni

cal light, the Secretary's northern tour was a political reconnaissance,
calculated to measure the sources of possible support in the wake of the
Missouri debates and financial crisis of the previous year.

Unfortunately,

cynicism seems to be the best guide for the student of the election of
1824.

Whatever the case, the Simkins letter is the first extant evidence

which suggests strongly that Calhoun was preparing for the presidency
even before President Monroe was elected for his final term and was doing
so a year or more before that fact was generally known.

Eldred Simkins to Christopher Vandeventer, September 11, 1820,
Vandeventer Papers. This is just one of several pieces from this col
lection which have never been used before. I do not wish to hedge on
the importance I assign to this source; had not scholars been ignorant
of this letter, I believe it would have materially altered the interpre
tation of Calhoun's activities during this period. I believe it
indicates that Calhoun was seriously considering the presidency over a
year before previous scholarship has argued that his ambitions took
shape.
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After his return to Washington the Secretary's complacency began
to moderate.

He wrote to his old friend Charles Tait (who was neverthe

less a friend of Crawford's) that "our political horizon[s] present no
reason to expect a storm."

63

Samuel Ingham in Pennsylvania:

Yet less than two weeks later Calhoun told
"Your opinion, that the storm will next

turn in this direction concurs with my own; provided any point be presented with the least hope of success."

64

Calhoun thought that he could ride the storm out.

He counted on

Congress' providing for a loan if revenues were still too far below
expenditures.

There was no doubt but that a retrenchment-minded Congress

would be able to see clearly the savings already made in the War Depart
ment, and he estimated that the department would need no more than five
million dollars out of a total government expenditure of sixteen million
dollars.

He was even willing to concede that some sort of reduction

could be made in the army, but beyond a minimal dislocation, he said, "I
would hesitate much."^5

He was at this moment working upon his expan

sible army report.
By November 12 the outlines of his report to Congress had taken
shape.

The Secretary gave Jacob Brown a preview of what he intended to

recommend:
I am strongly inclined to think, that if the Army should be reduced
as proposed, still the officers both of the line & staff, ought to
be retained with very few exceptions. I know this will not suit
the wishes of many both in & out of Congress, yet, as I have always
63

John C. Calhoun to Charles Tait, October 26, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:414.
64

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, November 6, 1820, ibid.,

5:425-426.
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found it preferable to discharge my duties faithfully without
regard to unjust clamor, I am of the opinion, that a regard to the
same principles, will in this case induce me to shape my report so
as to make but little derangement in the existing establishment. I
still hope that even the rank & file will not be touched.^6
While Calhoun polished his report, General Brown (and no doubt
other officers as well) was calculating every advantage that the army
could win for itself in the short time that remained before Congress
took up the reduction question once more.

Having learned that the Maine

congressional delegation was, as Brown put it, "less friendly to the
Army than, perhaps, they would [be] if an additional military Force was
ordered to that State," he frankly appealed to Calhoun for military
pork-barrel; Brown continued, "Their new condition naturally tends to
increase their pretentions [sic], and comprising as they do a most impor
tant Flank of the Confederacy I think it will be seen that their claims
to some additional national Troops, and Fortifications, are not unreason
able .1,67
One week into the second session of the Sixteenth Congress, the
batteries of retrenchment opened up on the War Department once again.
John Cocke of Tennessee moved that the House instruct the Committee on
Military Affairs to discuss the expediency of reducing the army.

68

Crawford's report on the state of the nation's finances followed shortly.
The Secretary of the Treasury estimated that the coming year's deficit

66

John C. Calhoun to Jacob Brown, November 12, 1820, ibid.,

5:432.
67

'Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, November 14, 1820, ibid.,
5:436-437.

68

U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., p. 444.
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would be even more severe than that of the year before; he put the figure
at $7,452,000.

Coincidentally, the estimate which Crawford gave for

projected military expenditures was $7,445,000.

69

The similarity of

these two figures, it seems, did not escape general notice, and certainly
not Calhoun's; both figures quoted by Secretary Crawford were far off
the mark.
Calhoun sent his report on the expansible army to Congress some
eleven days later, on December 12, 1820.^

The Secretary of War readily

adopted the sum and substance of his generals' recommendations.

Cal

houn's report was perhaps more elegantly phrased, and pretended to more
high-mindedness than those of the officers, but certainly the expansible
army concept which it contained was not a Calhoun creation.

One might

be moved to grant that Calhoun recognized a good idea when he saw one;
and as has been pointed out, the concept had the crucial merit of adapta
bility to the republic's needs, especially at this time.

But even if

Calhoun had been disposed to extensive military retrenchment, there
would have been little profit in opposing his own military constituency;
there certainly would have been no commensurate gain in his congressional
popularity and by this time Calhoun knew it.

He was not, of course,

favorable to what he called "false economy."

Calhoun believed that the

principles for which he and his generals stood were immutable.

And prin

ciples of military nationalism, he felt, were not fit subjects for
partisan bartering.
69

Ibid., p. 493.

Figures are rounded off to the nearest thousand

70

The discussion of the expansible army which follows is based
upon Calhoun's remarks and the charts attached in "Reduction of the Army,
December 12, 1820, ASPMA, 2:188-198. The text of Calhoun's message may
be found in John C. Calhoun to John W. Taylor, December 12, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:480-491.
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Unlike his generals, the Secretary wasted no time arguing for a
standing army; he observed that the resolution at least took that much
for granted.

He was more interested in the character that the new army

would assume and the principles which governed its maintenance.

Knowing

that the question before him was no longer the old one of militia versus
standing army, Calhoun was not hesitant about expressing his preference
for the latter.

Friends of the militia, therefore, saw no defense of

that institution in Calhoun's remarks.

Instead, the Secretary's jaundiced

view of the militia, confined until now in his private correspondence,
assumed full expression.

In Calhoun's opinion the rapid advancement of

the science of war had passed the militia by; at the most, they could
serve as auxiliaries to the Regular Army or as a sort of home or terri
torial guard.

It was as sweeping an attack on military amateurism as had

ever been delivered in the United States by a public official; the fact
that Calhoun made it at this particular time indicates that there was no
longer a serious competition between military professionalism and military amateurism.

71

The foundation of Calhoun's plan, like those of his generals,
was premised upon retaining the officer corps very nearly intact.

That

corps, educated and trained in peacetime, was the essential difference
between an armed crowd and an effective defense, Calhoun said.

This

being so, Calhoun devoted the majority of his report to convincing
Congress that somehow the officer corps should be preserved and presenting
a plan which did so.

71, ..
Ibid.

72.

72., ..
Ibid.
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What Calhoun actually recommended to Congress was an amalgam of
the different plans he had received earlier in the year.

The generals

had been so well agreed in their plans that Calhoun really did not have
to choose between them.

Under Calhoun's proposal, the rifle regiment

would merge with the infantry, making nine infantry regiments in all.
The light and heavy artillery would be merged also and absorb the old
Ordnance department to form a Corps of Artillery, which for the first
time, would have a chief and staff.

Officers of this new branch would

rotate between the three different elements of the corps, learning the
techniques of each.

Both the artillery and infantry companies would be

maintained far below combat strength:

an artillery company would be com-

prised of 64 non-commissioned officers and men, an infantry company, 37.

7

Calhoun took this opportunity to try to fill out the general
staff by recommending the creation of a Judge Advocate General, a pro
posal he had made in 1818 and which had been refused even then.

This

post would fill out a complement of general officers supervising the
distinct branches of the Regular Army, all of whom would be located in
Washington under the control of the Secretary.
there were three distinct parts of the army:
artillery, and the infantry.

Thus, in Calhoun's plan
the general staff, the

Charts accompanying Calhoun's report

showed that this army would total 6,391 officers and men after reorgani
zation.

These charts were incorrect:

including the 737 officers in the

staff and the line the total number of men in this new army would be more
than 7,000 men.

This expansible army had become expanded indeed:

between the congressional resolution and Calhoun's report, it had
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increased by 1,000 men.

Gliding over the mathematical error in the

charts, Calhoun estimated that simply by augmenting this skeletal structure, a wartime force could be raised quickly to a level of 20,000 men.

74

The report was the signal for the anti-army forces to gather in
Congress, and they were considerable.

Crawford's erroneous treasury

report did not so much initiate this undercurrent of feeling as reinforce
it.

"Our good, & pure Republicans of Virginia & elsewhere are displeased

with the military parade, as they call it, the same smelling strong of
Monarchy & military Govt,

[sic] ," observed Rufus King.

75

Even before

Calhoun delivered his report, Newton Cannon was protesting the Military
Academy's expenses again, hoping either to eliminate the institution or
curtail its operations altogether.

76

Congressman Cocke rammed through a

resolution asking for a new report from Calhoun on the Johnson contract.

77

By all evidence it seemed that the army question would be

forced into debate early in the session.
Army officers watched ejqpectantly as retrenchment-minded
congressmen made their first moves and persuaded themselves that the
worst could not happen.

Out in Missouri Henry Atkinson wrote to General

Jesup:
I have at no time before been under much apprehension of a reduc
tion, and I think if the Army escapes a triming [sic] down by the
present effort we may look to something like permanency. In
revolving the matter over in my mind I do not see how Congress is

7^See the chart marked "A," in ibid., 5:191-192.
75

Rufus King to Christopher Gore, December 1, 1820, King Corre
spondence , 6:364.
76

U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 502-503.

77Ibid., pp. 473-476.
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very easily to begin a reduction. Genl [sic] Jackson is the
favorite of the South & West & Cenl [sic] Brown of the North &
East, and if they reduce at all one of these gentlemen must go out.
If neither party yields the Army may escape.^®
From his headquarters in upstate New York General Brown had seen
Calhoun's report to Congress by the end of December.

Brown thought that

it was all that it should have been, but he told the Secretary that he
still "most anxiously hope[d] that the Army will not be reduced."

79

The

general thought that any reduction would have a "demoralizing influence."
Besides, Brown argued, the army had real value now in peacetime:

"Let

us erect as many military works, improve as many roads, & cultivate as
much land as you please.

Such labours will improve the moral & physical

powers of the military establishment & aid much in sustaining this most
important arm of the country."

80

The debate on the military peace establishment began in earnest
in early January, 1821.

The pro-War Department forces were led by the

ineffectual Alexander Smyth of Virginia and Eldred Simkins.

Simkins

began, on January 4, by accusing Newton Cannon of harassing Calhoun by
calling for information on the Military Academy.

Cannon's repeated

demands for reports from the War Department amounted to little more than
a tactic "calculated to give needless trouble to the public officers,"
said Simkins.

81

Smyth was the chairman of the Committee on Military

affairs, and his loyalty was suspect since he had been appointed by
78

Henry Atkinson to Thomas Jesup, December 27, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:516.
79

Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, December 30, 1820, ibid.,

5:518.
Ibid.
81

U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., p. 735.
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Crawford partisan John W. Taylor of New York, the Speaker of the House.
Nevertheless, Smyth managed an able defense of the army by maligning the
militia.

He told the House:

The militia are a portion of the people; and we should remember that
the regular troops are also a portion of the people. We are apt to
view the latter as if they were strangers. It is the difference of
organization that constitutes the difference between the militia
and the regular troops in the service of the United States; both are
composed of citizens; and the same man may alternatively serve in
both.82
The militia, Smyth said, was not deserving of "the confidence of
the nation for carrying on w a r .i: They were expensive to maintain and
deranged the economy when they were called out.
Smyth, was everything the militia was not.

83

The Regular Army, said

Shortly afterward Simkins

spoke again (and at length) in defense of an enlarged army, but aside
from Smyth and Simkins only one other congressman, Alfred Cuthbert of
Georgia,, spoke for the Calhoun proposals.

Withal, it was a poor showing

for the army.
It remained only for the leaders of the "economy" faction to
state their case.

Only a few days after Calhoun's report went to Con

gress, Crawford had issued a correction of his earlier mistake in
computing the deficit; because of the different methods of accounting in
the various departments, Crawford said, there had been an error in
reckoning the deficit of almost three million dollars.
went largely unnoticed during the army debates.

84

This statement

Lewis Williams of North

Carolina carried the retrenchment banner and cast most of his remarks
against Calhoun personally.

fty

Williams declared:

QO

Ibid., p. 745.

Ibid.

^Ibid., pp. 689-691.
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The Secretary of War . . . has invariably adhered to this branch of
the Army [the officer corps] with wonderful tenacity. That he should
have done so, in the report made at the present session, is, to me,
a matter of perfect surprise. He knew well the condition of the
Treasury; he knew there would be a deficit of several millions; he
also knew that the officers materially contributed to the expense of
supporting the Army, and, yet, after all this information, he gravely
recommends that the officers should be retained. I should have sup
posed that a very different course would have been pursued.
Aside from the economy argument, proponents of reduction concen
trated on the most obvious shortcoming of Calhoun's report:

the

secretary's attempt to save the officer corps from retrenchment.
Calhoun's response to the resolution had not, of course, been a straight
forward one, and his attempt to circumvent the real sense of the
resolution was pointed out on several occasions.

One of the army's

opponents paid a compliment to the Secretary of War for his audacity.
Thomas Cobb of Georgia told the House that Calhoun's report was accept
able except insofar as it retained the general staff.

Notwithstanding

this and other serious difficulties with Calhoun's proposals, Cobb said,
"I yet agree that it is the ablest, most ingenious, and, upon the whole,
the best defence of a standing army in time of peace which I have seen
in print since the commencement of Mr. Adams' administration to the
present day."

86

All that being so, Cobb concluded, "I can see no

utility in an army of officers."

87

Lewis Williams claimed that "all

have seemed to think, that the number of officers in the Army was unneces« „88
s a n•liy great.

On January 23, 1821, the House of Representatives voted 109 to
48 in favor of reducing the army, officers and all, to 6,000 men.
85
88

Ibid., p. 778.
Ibid., p. 778.
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89

Ibid., p. 728.

87

Ibid., p. 729.

Ibid., p. 937.
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Andrew Jackson, as General Brown had predicted he would be the year
before, was virtually legislated out of the service by a provision in
the bill that there be only one brigadier general in the service.

The

light and heavy artillery were combined, as Calhoun had recommended, but
the Ordnance department remained a separate entity.

A Judge Advocate

General was created (Calhoun had long wanted this) in the House version
of the bill, but the position was later excised in the Senate.

90

The one consolation to supporters of the army was that through
out the debates in Congress, no one had advocated eliminating the military
establishment.

Apparently not even the retrenchment bloc was strong

enough (or willing) to destroy the army.

To Senator Mahlon Dickerson of

New Jersey this was not a very consoling revelation.

Dickerson told his

fellow senators:
The exertions which have been made, and I fear successfully made, to
produce a revolution in the public mind, upon the subject of standing
armies in time of peace, I will confess, fill me with apprehension.
. . . The apathy of the people upon this subject, to judge from their
silence, would indicate that their former jealousies of permanently
standing armies, by some strange influence, had been put to rest
forever
Once again, while considering provisions for West Point,
Dickerson worried aloud about the military influence in the United States
and how it had grown.

He had no particular objection to the Military

Academy, Dickerson said, except "that it may enlist too many friends in
favor of standing armies."

92

Dickerson need not have bothered himself about the army's
friends.

Other observers agreed that pro-military forces had not been

able to put up much of a fight.
90

Ibid., pp. 934-935.

Rufus King found congressional affairs
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Ibid., p. 367.
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Ibid., p. 372.
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"in a most extraordinary condition."

As the administration's programs

were being assailed daily by advocates of retrenchment, "no one offers
himself to explain or to support those measures wh.
to have the recommendations of the Extive.

[sic]."

[sic] are supposed

93

William Plumer,

Jr., of New Hampshire agreed; he wrote to his father:
We have lately given a pretty strong proof of the little influence
possessed, by the Administration, over the House of Representatives,
by the passage of the Army bill— The Secretary of War & all his
friends, in & out of doors, opposed it by every expedient in their
power— The President was known to be against it— & probably other
members of the Cabinet— but it was carried, notwithstanding many
defects in the details of the bill, by an overwhelming majority.
Naturally, the friends of the army were stunned.

Major Stephen

Long, newly returned from the Missouri exploration, wrote bitterly to
Calhoun after hearing of the House vote:

"In this enlightened age,

where patriotism is valued according to the wealth it yields, I am
inclined to think that Cincinnatus himself would be loath to turn
farmer."

95

This hostility to Congress was not Long's alone.

Major

John J. Abert, for one, thought that there was much more to the army
vote than the ordinary anti-military hostility.

Abert wrote to Vande-

*
venter in late January:
This vote on the Army bill beats all I could have imagined. If
reduction was to be made, the project of the Secretary is the only
one in which System & Science [sic] were incorporated and which had
the Singular [sic] advantage of lessening our numbers without weak
ening our means. But it seems to have been entirely disregarded—
93

Rufus King to C. King, January 19, 1821, King Correspondence,

6:378.
William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 27, 1821,
in Edward Somerville Brown, ed., The Missouri Compromise and Presidential
Politics, 1820-1825 (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1926),
p. 63 (hereafter cited as Plumer Correspondence).
95

Stephen Long to John C. Calhoun, February 18, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 5:636.
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Surely the State [sic] of intelligence in the house of Reps [sic] is
far behind him; and their conduct if I may judge, very from the
wishes of the people.
The West wishes to avoid the possibility of taxing their lands—
there lies the rub— And to effect this they have gull'd the Atlantic
over into our abandonment of the defenses of their towns; for to say
nothing of the erroneous plan on which the reduction is to be made,
it will all be taken on the line of the Atlantic. The West will
make a-hell-of-a-noise, if a move the less is on their frontier.
And from where are the garrisons for Florida to be taken? The Reso
lution [sic] requiring a System [sic] of reduction from the Secretary
was made when it was probable we should not acquire this, the event
proving otherwise, even that, excellent as it is, I should have
thought would not have been adopted. But when determined to reduce,
to turn their backs upon the ablest plan of reducing an Army, ever
handed in by any war minister under our government, and to adopt one
of the shape of that in the present bill . . . I s [sic] to me most
singular. So let me into the Secret [sic] .
For other officers in the army the shock of reduction wore off
much quicker than Abert’s anger.

An excited scramble for places began

even before Congress passed the final reduction bill.

Quartermaster

General Jesup asked for Calhoun's permission to assign young officers to
work with him in that department, taking the place of civilian clerks.

97

Bartlett Yancey wrote from North Carolina on behalf of a local boy's
retaining a captaincy.

98

General Winfield Scott, obviously unconcerned

about his own security, brought "the extraordinary pretensions" of Abram
Eustis to Calhoun's notice.

99

Calhoun had his favorites, too.

He

consoled Major Stephen Long, assuring him that reduction would not affect
96

J. J. Abert to Christopher Vandeventer, January 25, 1821,
Vandeventer Papers.
97

Thomas Jesup to John C. Calhoun, February 3, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 5:592-593.
98

Bartlett Yancey to John C, Calhoun, February 9, 1821, ibid.,

5:623-624.
99

Winfield Scott to John C. Calhoun, February 12, 1821, ibid.,

5:625-626.
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the young explorer.

100

The Secretary made sure that Andrew Jackson knew

that one of his favorite young officers, Colonel James Gadsden, would
emerge from reduction unscathed.'*'^
In order to determine the fate of officers who were perhaps less
well connected, Calhoun set up a "Board of General Officers," which convened in April with Jacob Brown as chairman.

102

As the board did its

work during the following weeks, it too had to deal with political
influence.

One irate officer, Colonel Roger Jones, threatened Brown

that he would use his connections with the Virginia delegation in Congress
. .
103
to abolish Brown's position.

Jones was retained.

At the end of the Congress' last session Calhoun and John Quincy
Adams walked home together.

Adams thought that Calhoun seemed "dispirited"

because of the attacks upon him and his department.

The Secretary of War

ruminated on the causes of the agitation against him in the Congress.
tried to fix in his mind where the administration had gone wrong:

He

the

repeal of internal taxes, a huge revenue-consuming pension bill for
veterans of the Revolution— both of these acts had been a mistake, Calhoun
thought.

Calhoun was habituated to thinking in terms of issues, even at

that late date.

104

''■^Stephen Long to John C. Calhoun, February 18, 1821, ibid.,
5:636.
-*-0^John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 7, 1821, ibid., 5:664.
102

Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, April 11, 1821, ibid., 6:40-41.
Here Brown describes the criteria the board will use in determining
which officers to retain in service and which others to discharge.
103

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, August 18, 1821, ibid.,
6:348-349. Monroe took a direct interest in rearranging the officer
corps after reduction was mandated. These rearrangements would even
tually become an issue at the next session of Congress.
104

Adams, Diary, 5:314-315.
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It is interesting to watch the progress of Calhoun's thoughts
during the spring of 1821.

At the beginning of the year, he merely dis

approved in general of those who wanted to reduce expenditures; he
thought that they were seeking fugitive advantages in temporary popu
larity.

By the time he walked with Adams, Calhoun personally

identified the coalition which wreaked havoc on the War Department.
Calhoun's obvious disapproval of retrenchment was now widely known, and
Adams thought that Crawford saw Calhoun mainly as somebody else's— maybe
Adams'— supporter.

With that egoism which always makes one believe that

he is the subject of others' calculations, Adams thought that the attack
on Calhoun was merely an oblique means of attacking himself.

But of

Crawford's responsibility for the dismantling of the army, Adams had no
doubt.

106

Neither did Calhoun.

He told Andrew Jackson shortly thereafter

The Individual [sic] to whom you attribute the disorders in our
affairs or rather the House of Representatives is not free from
suspicion here. What part he may have taken, I cannot say, but it
is certain that his personal friends have many of them been very
active to embarrass. They have in particular been very pointed in
their attacks on me personally. My course is fixed and nothing will
turn me from it.-*-^
The work of the last session of Congress had devastated Calhoun's
departmental programs.

Reduction of the army had, as General Brown

feared, disrupted the officer corps significantly:

some of these offi

cers had become even more politically sensitive than they had been
formerly and would eventually take a direct hand in the upcoming presi
dential election.

The money for fortifications had been reduced by

"^^John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxey, January 14, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 5:557.
^^Adams, Diary, 5:314-315.
107

John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 7, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 5:663.
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seventy-five per cent.

Although the new reorganization law had mandated

the continuance of the Ordnance department, no funds had been set aside
for its operation.
.

.

...

cleanly in half.

The appropriation for Indian affairs had been cut

108

The immediate political cox;iaquences of Calhoun's defeat notwith
standing, the Secretary's attempted War Department reforms were not so
chimerical as his friends and opponents believed.
had its reasons for thinking so:

Each of these parties

his friends wanted his advancement;

his enemies understood better that visions made for poor politics.

The

Secretary's reputation as a visionary invested his reforms with that
quality; his contemporaries would have said the reverse.
In only one respect was Calhoun the innovator:
this nation's first national security manager.

he was perhaps

Unconcerned by anti

military traditions, Calhoun sought to weld the military establishment to
the cause of national progress.

In order to do so Calhoun needed a pro

fessional military establishment with a repertoire of functions far more
extensive than had ever existed.

But an enlarged and improved army was

merely an end to a means, as Calhoun saw it, and this is what most
differentiates him from the crass militarism of which he was later
accused.

Calhoun never submerged himself into the military culture;

always, he was the civilian nationalist.
It is interesting, therefore, that it was his report on the
expansible army which set his reputation in American military history,
and not his report on internal improvements, for it is the latter which
best represents Calhoun's philosophy of managing the nation's security.
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The expansible army report would never have been written but for the
demands of Congress, and even had this kind of army been created, Cal
houn's ambitions for the American military establishment would not have
been realized.

The report nevertheless came to be considered as the

professional army's best defense against democracy during the nineteenth
century.

In 1879 General William T. Sherman, testifying before Congress

on peacetime military requirements, referred directly to Secretary
Calhoun's report, then over half a century old.

The report was, in

Sherman's opinion, "so exhaustive . . . nothing more need be written."

109

Later, when General Emory Upton urged (again) the creation of a profes
sional army, he spoke of Calhoun's report in glowing t e r m s . T h e s e
men misunderstood, however; the expansible army was Calhoun's reaction
to congressional pressures.

It was not a bonafide reform.

Ill
The Secretary of War was fond of saying that he stood on his
principles and that those who opposed him were merely looking for advan
tages in the passions of the moment.

Calhoun suspected the proficient

politician, and he himself was not, after all, a very good politician if
one considers William Crawford as the best representative of that breed.
And although Calhoun did attempt the contest with Crawford and his kind,
there was always the feeling of distaste when he did so.

109

Quoted in Walter Millis, ea., American Military Thought
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966), p. 164.
lirjEmory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Wash
ington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. 149158.
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Calhoun's first substantial moves to promote himself politically
had to do with the Speaker's position in the House of Representatives.
Anticipating trouble in the fall of 1820, Calhoun attempted to persuade
his old friend and fellow South Carolinian, William Lowndes, to run for
the Speaker's chair, which Henry Clay was known to be vacating for the
time b e i n g . C a l h o u n thought that the time was propitious for a change
in the House leadership.

With the nearly obligatory re-election of

James Monroe assured, the republic's debt to the Virginia dynasty would
be paid; the Federalists did not even bother to put up a candidate.
This boded ill for any programs the administration might wish to sponsor
in the future:

there would be few in the House who would care to stand

by the obsolescing Monroe.

112

Calhoun knew he had a friend in Lowndes.

In the course of trying to convince the ailing Lowndes to stand for the
speakership, Calhoun remarked:

"I consider the measures of this govern

ment, as very much depending on the Speaker of the house [sic].

It is

certain, that no elevated course of policy can be well sustained, without
an enlightened and firm Speaker.
Lowndes did stand for the position, and as the session opened,
led the balloting for the first few votes.

His principal opponent was

John W. Taylor of New York, a known supporter of Treasury Secretary Crawford.

After twenty-three ballots, Taylor won the victory.

114

The

‘'■'^John C. Calhoun to William Lowndes, October 12, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:390.
112

Rufus King to C. King, January 19, 1821, King Correspondence,

6:378.
113

John C. Calhoun to William Lowndes, October 12, 1820, Calhoun
Papers, 5:390.
114

U. S., Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 435-438.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

291

importance of Taylor's election shortly became evident.

"Mr. Speaker

Taylor has done us much mischief, by carefully arranging the military
and naval comts.

[sic] of the House so as to secure a majority hostile

in each, to both Army and Navy," remarked General Brown.

115

In April, 1820, after the Sixteenth Congress had done its work,
Calhoun publicly aired his complaints.

Still seething over Congress'

destructive assault on his programs, Calhoun wrote an article for the
National Intelligencer entitled "Fortifications," and signed it
"Vauban."

116

Calhoun's piece was only nominally about coastal defense,

however; he reserved the bulk of his comments for those who had attacked
the department's programs.

Chief among his complaints was the "unfor-

Lu.iate formation of the important committees."

117

Those in the House of

Representatives who were genuinely interested in retrenchment, he wrote,
combined with "the few who were really hostile to our military and naval
establishments" and the latter "acquired . . .
just standing."

118

an influence beyond their

The whole majority, Calhoun thought, "evidently acted

under a panic, arising from the supposed state of the Treasury."

119

He

had no objections to an honest reduction of expenditure, but retrench
ment, he argued, applied to "improper or useless expenditures," none of

■''■''^Jacob Brown to Joseph G. Swift, February 3, 1820, Swift Papers.
116

"Vauban [John C. Calhoun]," "Fortifications," National Intelli
gencer , April 10, 1821. See the text of this article in Calhoun Papers,
6:31-39. The authorship of this article was not attributed until
recently, when the editors of the Calhoun Papers found a note of Calhoun's
to Virgil Maxey, April 11, 1821, ibid., 6:41-42. References below refer
to text in Calhoun Papers.
117Ibid., 6:32-33.

118Ibid., 6:33.

119Ibid., 6:32.
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which had to do with War Department programs.

"Similar conduct in pri-

vate life would invariably be called folly," Calhoun said.

120

It is doubtful that many in Washington were deceived by Calhoun's
nom de plume.

Suspicions that Calhoun had his eye on a higher office had

been current since the beginning of the year, and they had been dismissed
as unreasonable:

Calhoun was too young.

121

"So many are visibly before

him in the race," observed William Plumer, Jr.

122

Throughout the trying year Calhoun frankly communicated his dis
appointments to any correspondent who would listen.

Calhoun and Jackson

commisserated with each other over the duplicity of William Crawford,
particularly after Jackson was banished to the governship of the new
Florida territory.

123

Calhoun's private correspondence began to concen

trate noticeably on several states:

New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.

All were states in which Calhoun's view of internal improvements, protec
tionism, the bank, and other of his nationalist sentiments would stand
him in favor.

The Secretary was heartened when his old friend, Micah

Sterling of New York, bid fair to win a congressional seat.

He congratu

lated Sterling by saying, "We want talents, frankness and firmness much
in the House."

124

And as Calhoun realized that the nationalism upon

Ibid., 6:33.
121

William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 27,
1821, Plumer Correspondence, pp. 63-64.
1 2 2 T W ^

Ibid.
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John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, April 8, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 6:25-26.
124

. ..
John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, April 23, 1821, ibid.,

6:67.
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which his career had thus far been based was in danger, the more intrans
igent he became.

"My course is fixed," he said.

the high destiny of this country."

125

"I will not tamper with

There were those politicians who

still listened to this kind of rhetoric, and Calhoun was particularly
susceptible to it when it was turned in his direction.

General Jackson

was especially handy with this kind of phrase:
The course pursued by last Congress [sic] is universely [sic] con
demned, whilst your course, & report is approbated by nine-tenths of
the citizens of the country through which I have passed; indeed it
is approved by all who, from political and popular views have been
with the majority— and finding themselves now in the minority cannot
consistantly [sic] retreat.
But Calhoun did not really need such praise to drive him on.
have formed no connection with anyone," Calhoun said that summer.

127

"I
In

all probability Calhoun had by that time decided that it was up to others
to form connections with him.

In August, 1820, Calhoun took his family

to Bedford Springs, Pennsylvania, to "take the waters" for his health.
And although no direct evidence exists which shows that this trip was
anything more than personal, it seems highly likely, as two of the fore
most Calhoun scholars suggest, that it was here that Calhoun formed an
alliance with the so-called "Family party" of Pennsylvania.

128

By the

time he returned to Washington in September, Calhoun was predicting that

125

John C. Calhoun to Charles Tait, April 23, 1821, ibid., 6:70.

^^Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, May 22, 1821, ibid.,
6:142.
127

John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, July 3, 1821, ibid.,

6:237.
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See Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 232; and Capers, Opportunist, p. 84.
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the coming session of Congress would at least be an "interesting" one.
He fully expected a repetition of the agitation in the last session of
Congress, and he expected to be involved in it.

129

Since in all likelihood Calhoun already had the assurances of
Pennsylvania's support, he once again attempted to influence the election
of the new Speaker of the House.

Moving into the highly charged atmos

phere with foolish confidence, Calhoun believed that he was providing
the administration with the support which had been so noticeably absent
during the previous session.

He was sure that the other leading con

tender for the presidency, John Quincy Adams, had little support either
in the House or in his home section and therefore could not carry on
administration programs.

Although he had likely heard rumors of Calhoun's

ambitions, Adams did not yet see Calhoun as a competitor.

For his part,

Calhoun had already decided that Adams' was an ineffectual candidacy,
opening the way for the calamity of a sweep of Congress and presidency
by William Crawford's "radicals."

Calhoun thought that Adams, "with

bitter temper and views, the dread of insinuations, growing out of his
former political opinions would render his policy feeble and timid."

130

Whether Adams suspected it or not, Calhoun was already drawing
up plans for a national political organization devoted to his election
to the presidency in 1824.
light as yet.

He had no thought to move into the public

"My age and my position, would both seem to require, that

129

John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, September 24, 1821; and
John C. Calhoun to Moses Waddell, September 25, 1821, Calhoun Papers,
6:386-387.
130

John C. Calhoun to Lewis Cass, December 9, 1821, ibid.,

6:560-561.
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I should be protruded on the publick notice," he told Lewis Cass in
December.^^
The way [Calhoun said] ought to be prepared by conversation and
correspondence, where it can be safely done, previously to any
publick demonstration, and when that is to be made the proper points
to commence would be Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York, particularly
the two first.
Meanwhile, the contest for Speaker of the House went badly for
Calhoun.

Before the session began John Quincy Adams and Taylor had

apparently agreed that Taylor would have the support of the administra
tion in return for more favorable appointments to the House committees.
When Adams talked with Calhoun about Taylor's re-election, Calhoun would
not go along.

Instead, the Secretary of War was bent on keeping Taylor

out of the Speaker's chair at all costs.

Calhoun was strong enough to

prevent Taylor's being seated and unwittingly paved the way for the
election of Philip Barbour, a Crawford radical.

133

Although Calhoun

could hardly have believed it, Taylor was moderate compared to Barbour,
who promptly filled committees in the House loyal to Crawford.

Because

of the momentous issues awaiting the House, the stresses and strains of
twelve hotly contested ballots before Barbour was chosen caused "more
dissension in the House than there was in the whole of the last
Congress."

134

One immediate result of this agitation was Taylor's

135
recruitment to the ranks of ‘the radicals.
1

Ibid.

132

.
Ibid.

133

For two accounts see William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer,
Sr., December 3, 1821, Plumer Correspondence, pp. 64-65; and Adams,
Diary, 5^451.
134

Adams, Diary, 5:451, 474.

135

William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., December 11,
1821, Plumer Correspondence, pp. 67-68.
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A few days after the speaker's election, the General Assembly of
South Carolina caucused and nominated William Lowndes for the presidency
by a vote of fifty-eight to fifty-four.

The fifty-four votes went to Calhoun.

Lowndes was on his way to Washington at the moment of the vote.

136

One

scholar speculates that the news of Lowndes' nomination reached Washington
before Lowndes did.
on December 18.

137

It is possible; the South Carolina assembly voted

Ten days later a group of Pennsylvania men went to Calhoun's

house and arranged to support the Secretary's own nomination.
this occurrence was out the following day.

138

The word of

Several days later Calhoun

took pains to explain the sequence of events to Virgil Maxcy, and the Sec
retary intimated that Lowndes was already in Washington and that they had
already discussed Calhoun's decision to run for the presidency when word
arrived from South Carolina.

Calhoun declared to Maxcy:

It so happened before we heard of this rash measure, that I had a full
and free conversation with Mr. Lowndes, in which I stated, that I had
determined, that I would not resist the opinion of those, who thought,
that at any hazard, I ought to be brought forward, and my reasons for13g
this determination, in the sufficiency of which, he fully acquiesced.
Calhoun added that he thought the movement in South Carolina "very
rash and foolish."

140

Whether or not Calhoun knew in advance about

Lowndes' nomination, it is highly unlikely that Calhoun would have
altered his course.

Believing (as he said) that Adams did not have

enough northern support to combat Crawford in a national contest,
Calhoun had long since decided that he was the man to take Crawford on.
1.36
On the local context of the South Carolina General Assembly's
nomination of Lowndes, see Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 105.
137

Capers, Opportunist, p. 83.

138

Adams, Diary, 5:466.
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Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, December 31, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 6:595-597.
140

Ibid., 6:595.
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One scholar has taken Calhoun to task for not deferring to
Lowndes' nomination.

If Calhoun was interested only in stopping the

radicals, so the argument goes, he should have fallen in behind Lowndes'
candidacy rather than staking out a claim of his own.
easy enough to see Calhoun's thinking at this point:
be an ailing man.

142

141

But it is

he knew Lowndes to

Lowndes had a limited constituency, whereas

Calhoun was by now a national figure.

Lowndes had managed to win the

nomination only because the caucus had been boycotted by a third of the
members of the assembly.

143

So while Lowndes had only a part of South

Carolina, Calhoun had almost as large a part, plus Pennsylvania as well.
It was true, as Calhoun's friend Micah Sterling told Adams, that
the nomination of Lowndes (and Calhoun's) "would set the whole continent
to premature electioneering."

144

The leading contenders and their friends

were galvanized by the news from South Carolina and Pennsylvania.
"Nothing has been said or thought of, for some days past, but the Presi
dential election, & almost everybody has been sounded on the subject,"
observed one friend of Adams.

145

Another of Adams' supporters entreated

the Secretary of State not to be so quiescent; "if something should not
be done to counteract the caballing, public opinion would be forestalled,

141

Capers, Opportunist, p. 85.

142

Lowndes died less than one year later. He resigned at the
end of the first session of the Seventeenth Congress. He died at sea
on his way to England in October, 1822.
143
144

Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 105.
Adams, Diary, 5:470.
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William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 3, 1822,
Plumer Correspondence, p. 71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

298

and a party too strong to be broken would be formed," said Adams'
partisan.

146

Adams merely fumed at his young colleague's pretensions.

Even before the year was out Calhoun was sure that he could win
the election.

Although he had been upset by the Lowndes nomination, he

nevertheless thought that "it demonstrate[d] to the North Mr. Crawford's
want of popularity to the South, which I am satisfied, that time will
continue to confirm":

Crawford, he thought, had "gone down rapidly."

147

Calhoun, meanwhile, was simply not willing to face up to his
desire for the presidency.

It was every bit as keen as was Adams', or

Crawford's, or Clay's, but from the beginning the Secretary of War cast
his candidacy in the guise of a crusade for progress.

This unreality

was a parody on the disinterested, elevated politician of the republic's
past, and Calhoun never overcame the pose.

His own motives, which he

believed were so noble, were in the observer's eyes transparently selfinterested.
Calhoun took pains to explain himself and his new course to John
Quincy Adams.

Perhaps Calhoun thought that Adams, of all politicians,

would understand his motives, but Adams came to think of Calhoun only as
a grasping spoiler, little better than William Crawford.

When Adams'

friend Plumer went to see Calhoun shortly after the announcement of
Pennsylvania's support, Calhoun talked long and apparently freely to
Plumer, doubtless knowing that Plumer would tell Adams all (as he did).
The Secretary went on at length about haw his candidacy was a "qualified"

146

Adams, Diary, 5:468.

147

John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, December 31, 1821, Calhoun
Papers, 6:596-597.
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one:

he was standing not so much against Adams as against Crawford.

Plumer was not disposed to see the difference; what Plumer did see was
"the eagerness with which he grasps at the splendid phantom which plays
before his eyes . . .

a proof of equal ambition and want of judgment—

or rather the blindness of self-love."

148

148

William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 3, 1822,
Plumer Correspondence, p. 73.
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CHAPTER VI

"THE SPLENDID PHANTOM":
CALHOUN AND THE ELECTION OF 1824

"I have set my life upon a cast,
And I will stand the hazard of the die:
I think there be Six Richmonds in the

field."
Richard III

Scholars have analyzed the presidential campaign of 1824 to
distraction.

The roles of the various actors have been studied on both

the national and state levels.

The issues which animated the campaign,

those chosen by the candidates such as internal improvements, protec
tionism, the national bank; and those which the electorate forced upon
them, such as the death of the caucus and the expansion of suffrage,
have all been considered in depth.

The narrative of the campaign, with

some exceptions, has been explained repeatedly in these works.

More

philosophical and ideological conjurings have been inspired by this
period than nearly any other:

old and new Republicans, old and new

nationalists, the radical reaction under Crawford, Jackson and the vox
populi— all have been compared, contrasted, contrived, discounted, trum
peted, dismissed.'*'

Those who wish to write more on the subject are left

only with reduction, prolixity, or mere redundancy.

^See, for a few examples, Dangerfield, American Nationalism,
pp. 212-230; Sydnor, Southern Sectionalism, pp. 134-156; Norman K. Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 175-256 (hereafter
cited as Risjord, The Old Republicans) ; J. D. Russo, "Southern
300

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

301

Thus the following remarks are concerned less with the election's
history than with Calhoun's.

His activities have been well documented

also, but the motives and attitudes of this complex man have been less
satisfactorily explained than perhaps any other actor's in the campaigns
of 1824.

2

There is, first of all, considerable disagreement on this

man's character among scholars.

3

This is important on two counts:

evalua

tions have generally turned on how different the actual Calhoun was from
the figure he believed himself to be.

Scholars have implicitly confronted

the problem of evaluation by trying to judge Calhoun's sincerity.

Either

the Secretary of War was true to the nationalist beliefs he espoused, or

Republicans and American Nationalism, 1817-1825," unpublished Ph.D. dis
sertation, Yale University, 1966, pp. 293-326 (hereafter cited as Russo,
"Southern Republicans"); Mooney, Crawford, pp. 269-301; Philip S. Klein,
Pennsylvania Politics, 1817-1825: A Game without Rules (Philadelphia:
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1940; reprint ed., Philadelphia:
Porcupine Press, 1974), pp. 132-187 (hereafter cited as Klein, Pennsyl
vania Politics); C. H. Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824 in New York,"
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1904 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. 177-201 (hereafter cited as Rammel
kamp, "The Campaign of 1824"); T. R. Hay, "John C. Calhoun and the
Presidential Campaign of 1824," North Carolina Historical Review, 12
(January, 1S35), pp. 20-44 (hereafter cited as Hay, "Calhoun and 1824");
Bemis, Adams and the Union, pp. 11-32.
2

The differences between Calhoun's thought and action (the first
too professedly noble to be quite true— the second, ineffectual) have
produced the greatest disagreements about Calhoun's character. For two
extreme views, compare, Margaret Coit, John C. Calhoun: An American
Portrait (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950) and H. E. Von Holst, John C.
Calhoun (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1882).
^It is possible to classify scholarly views of Calhoun in terms
of the opinions held by his adversaries during the campaign of 1824.
Crawford thought Calhoun was brilliant, but chimerical and impractical.
Adams saw Calhoun as a deceitful political adventurer. Jackson even
tually thought of Calhoun as a secret enemy. Clay viewed him as
presumptuous. Calhoun thought of himself as a disinterested statesman.
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he was an ambitious charlatan.

4

Other Calhoun students have been more

relativistic, but somehow their moral disapproval of Calhoun shows
through.^

Scholarly determinations having been made, their suspicions

remain that, for all his nationalist rhetoric, the forging of the "castiron" man was done here in the era of good feelings.

These are still

proper matters for consideration.
One important aspect of the election has been neglected.

To

some Americans Calhoun was as much an "army candidate" as General Andrew
Jackson.

Jackson's heroic image precluded his being attacked as a "man

on horseback":

the hero was indomitable; neither the British nor the

creed of militarism could dominate his character.

The hero's mantle

freed the general from such institutional loyalties.

Unlike Jackson,

the Secretary drew much of his image from these very institutions.
Calhoun was comfortable with institutions because he believed that he
could dominate them.

Compare Russo, "Southern Nationalists," pp. 293-294, with Von
Holst, Calhoun, pp. 55-58.
The latter scholar was the first to use John
Quincy Adams' diary, then only recently published; accordingly, Von
Holst's view of Calhoun is that of Adams' after the Secretary of State
was spurned by the Carolinian in late 1821.
5
"'Capers, Opportunist, pp. 83-85.
£
By this is not meant that Jackson was not perceived as a mili
tary figure. He was, but by and large Jackson's image did not contradict
the nation's anti-military traditions. In fact Jackson's celebrity
confirms that these traditions were still alive and well in some
quarters. As shall be seen, some observers did not make refined dis
tinctions between the associations which Jackson and Calhoun had with
the military establishment. On the question of Calhoun's success with
other institutions, his rapid political rise hardly needs pointing out.
Obviously, Calhoun had learned well how to manipulate political insti
tutions in order to advance his career.
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One of those institutions was the army.

Jackson certainly felt
7

less community with the professional army than Calhoun did.

Just as

Calhoun and Jackson were divided in their sentiments on the professional
military establishment, so too were the views of the officers toward the
Secretary and the general.

In the ensuing presidential campaign both

contenders would recruit military workers to their causes.

So would

some of the other candidates, but it is clear that of all the contes
tants for the presidency, Calhoun depended upon the military establish
ment for support far more than did any of his competitors.
was likewise the army's candidate is less clear.

Whether he

However, it is

important to note that of the several candidates for the presidency in
1824, two had intimate connections with the military establishment, and
not all of those connections were seen by the public eye.

Not since the

election of George Washington had a candidate been so identified with
things military.

From then until the election of 1824, political aspi

rants were required to be impeccably civilian in outlook and manner.

By

the time Calhoun and Jackson had set their courses for the White House,
a military association was obviously no longer a political liability.
This fact, when considered in connection with the exertions of several
military men at high levels of the campaign, make the election of 1824
one in which the army took an inordinate, direct interest.

The activi

ties of Calhoun's War Department operatives, then, added a new and
unique element to the Secretary of War's presidential campaign.

7

See Jackson's criticism of the Executive in his letter to Henry
Atkinson, May 15, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:63; and his pointed view of
the War Department in Andrew Jackson to Winfield Scott, December 3,
1817, Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2:338-339.
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The extent to which military men were involved in the campaign
tells a good deal more about the army than about Calhoun, however.

He

had not become "militarized," but he had gone far to cultivate the poliQ
tical senses of a group of important and well placed military figures.
Consequently there was no military caballing, no plans laid on for
military revolt; instead, members of the War Department establishment
who rallied to Calhoun's side adhered to the rules of the political game,
such as they were, and gave no thought to militarizing the political
process.
The War Department was nevertheless of considerable value to
Calhoun during the presidential contest; likewise, he could be of use to
certain military figures.

When Calhoun became an acknowledged candidate

for the presidency in December, 1821, the opponents of the army in
Congress had just presented him with yet another opportunity to wield
his power over the officer corps by deciding which officers would be
kept after reduction and which would not.

Although the Board of General

Officers had been constituted, retention was, after all, a political
question, and the mere existence of the board did not mean that the
Secretary had capitulated to retrenchment.

9

All of the other candidates—

Crawford, Adams, Clay— with the exception of Andrew Jackson called upon
0
"Military figures," as it is used here has reference to men who
were in the army or recently retired from service, or civilians who were
connected with the War Department in some way. Outsiders, for instance,
differed little in the case of Thomas McKenney, who, although a civilian,
was a War Department employee for most of Calhoun's career as Secretary.
It was almost automatically assumed that whatever McKenney did politi
cally was dictated by Calhoun himself.
q

In fact Calhoun and President Monroe deliberately attempted to
circumvent or otherwise blunt what they considered to be the more egre
gious effects of retrenchment.
See pp, 311-312 below.
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their political kingdoms for assistance as did Calhoun.

The Secretary of

War had by now a large circle of correspondents in various states; he had
influence over appointments within the War Department and an opportunity
to influence presidential appointments at times.

He could control troop

dispositions if he wished (there is no evidence that he used this device
as perhaps it could have been used), and of course he had the benefit of
official franking (which he did use extensively).

Perhaps most benefi

cial to Calhoun were the military men themselves, stationed at various
points, known to each other, and fairly well agreed that elevating
Calhoun to power could hardly be against their interests.

When the cam

paign was finished, however, there was no indication that any of the
candidates had actively and consciously sought out the support of the
army as an institution in their quests for power.

II
Calhoun was encouraged by his Pennsylvania visitors and from the
first he counted on that state's support in the campaign to influence
still other states where he was not so strong.

But the assurances of

the Family party's backing, contrary to what Calhoun believed, did not
automatically confer that state's blessing upon him."^

Calhoun thought

that his Pennsylvania ancestry and northern education would endear him

^ T h e leaders of the Family party in Pennsylvania were Samuel
Ingham and George M. Dallas. Both were young, well-placed, rising poli
ticians in their state. The leading scholar of this state's politics
during this period has described Ingham as "the front," and Dallas as
"the brains" of the party. Ingham was the backer of the Bucks County
Messenger and had some claim to the fine arts of political management.
Dallas was the son of Alexander J. Dallas and, though young, was possessed
of as m u c h political talent as his late father. Other members of the
party were Thomas J. Rogers, and Richard Bache, of the Philadelphia
Aurora, a grandson of Benjamin Franklin. See Klein, Pennsylvania
Politics, pp. 90, 128-129.
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there; if he could split Crawford's strength in the South and use Penn
sylvania as the belly/ether of his campaign in the Middle Atlantic states,
then the Presidency was within his reach.^

He did not know (and probably

would have discounted it if he had) that Andrew Jackson had already
received a letter from a Pennsylvanian in August, 1821, hinting of widespread support.

12

Exactly one year after Calhoun received his Pennsyl

vanians, the Jackson movement in that state held its first mass meeting
• Greensburg.
„
u
13
in
For good or ill the campaign of 1824 was underway.

One of the

several peculiar aspects of the contest was that the politicians did not
choose the issues.

Only a relatively few persons were concerned with

the issues that interested Calhoun.
on nationalism:

He saw the election as a referendum

to him it was to be a choice between progressive and

atavistic Republicanism, upheld by Crawford.

14

To Crawford it was a

contest between orthodoxy and the new amalgam of old Federalism and new
Republicanism— heterodox, and dangerous to state sovereignty.

15

These

were merely niceties, however; the real matter at hand was the power of
political office, and none of the leading politicians were beyond sub
verting any position as long as power could be achieved.

^ R . H. Holworth to Azariah Flagg, December 28, 1821, quoted in
Hay, "Calhoun and 1824," p. 24.
12

Samuel Overton to Andrew Jackson, August 1, 1821, Bassett,
Jackson Correspondence, 3:105-106.
13

Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 123.

14

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, November 2, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:326-328.
"''^Robert Garnett to Joseph G. Swift, August 12,

[18]]?], Swift

Papers.
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Crawford meant tu uSiCG the presidency in the very same way
earlier candidates had:

by dominating first the Congress, and thereby

the congressional caucus which ultimately decided upon the Republican
candidate.

Early in his deliberations Crawford took his prospects of

election somewhat for granted.

Power over the congressional caucus

ordinarily meant that there would be little need to take notice of the
states themselves.

Even though the support of the New York-Virginia axis

which had made presidents for a good long while was still crucial to
Crawford, he was still complaisant.

He said in 1821 that he had "never

been so silly as to expect anything in relation to myself" from New York.
So long as the state's congressional delegates were managed by Martin Van
16
Buren, there was no need for Crawford to be anxious.
But by then the caucus itself was becoming an issue.

The low

repute in which the caucus was held by this time was made abundantly
clear by Hezekiah Niles during the first days of 1822.

Niles wrote that

he would sooner "learn that the halls of Congress were converted into
brothels, than that, caucuses . . . should be held in them."

17

Throughout

the campaign Niles did not relent in his opposition to any kind of "poli
tical management," and for this reason the Niles' Weekly Register,
although not committed to any one candidate, worked against any pro-caucus
candidate.^
All this agitation over the caucus meant that Calhoun and his
fellow candidates, if they were to stop Crawford, had somehow to change

"^Mooney, Crawford, p. 231.
17
18

Niles' Weekly Register, January 26, 1822.
Ibid., November 9, 1822.
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the scene of the contest.

Crawford's power in Congress (made evident by

the dismantling of Calhoun's military programs during the last session)
would have to be somehow blunted.

That being done, Calhoun and the

other candidates had to make sure that the contest would be moved from
Congress to the individual states, where, by various means, the succes
sion of Monroe could be decided.

This strategy assumed, of course, that

Calhoun would first have to survive what the Crawfordites had in store
for him during the present session of Congress.
It was almost a certainty that the Crawford radicals would renew
their attacks on Calhoun and the War Department.
cause to do so.

He had given them every

The news of his pretensions was out.

As the members

returned from, the holidays they were greeted by a report in the Washington
Gazette entitled, "Training for the Presidency," which read that "members
of the Legislature of South Carolina, taking 'time by the forelock,' are
trying Mr

Lowndes

[sic] and Mr Calhoun [sic], in advance on the political

turf of that state."

19

Moreover, Calhoun had wantonly interfered in the

election to choose a Speaker of the House for two years in a row, and his
vindictiveness was so great against John Taylor that the second time
Calhoun opposed Taylor, the Secretary did not even have a substitute in
mind.

Adams thought that James Barbour, who had been able to slip into

the Speaker's chair because of Calhoun interference, was "ten times
worse" than Taylor.
agree with Adams:

19
20

By the end of the session Calhoun was inclined to
the Secretary of War's spring had been very unpleasant.

City of Washington Gazette, January 3, 1822.
Adams, Diary, 5:474, 524.
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The radicals had shown every willingness to renew their campaign
against the War Department in the spring of 1822.

Dominating the most

important committees in Congress, radicals forced examinations of the
Rip Rap and Dauphin Island fortifications contracts in the Senate and
the expenses of West Point in the House of Representatives.

21

Thomas

Hart Benton pressed home his assault on the factory system from his new
seat on the Senate committee on Indian affairs.

All of these investiga

tions produced recommendations hostile to Calhoun and his department.
But the prospects of the War Department improved when the work of the
radical committeemen reached the floor of the Congress for debates.
Secretary of War had recently acquired some new support.

The

The impetuous

and combative George McDuffie had just arrived to become South Carolina's
newest representative; so had the erudite Joel Poinsett.

From New York

and Connecticut came Micah and Ansel Sterling; Micah and Calhoun had
been friends at Yale.

Now, too, several members of the Pennsylvania dele-

gation were voluble in their defense of Calhoun and the War Department.

22

The results of the session, therefore, were neither as salutary
as Calhoun had wanted, nor as bad as he had every right to expect.
West Point emerged unscathed.

Only

The House had pointedly censured Vandeventer

and Mix for their association in the Rip Rap project, but funds were not

21

U. S., Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., p. 345.

22

Ibid., p. 343. Of the newest congressional champions of the
War Department, George McDuffie got the highest marks, even from hostile
observers. John Elliot, editor of the anti-administration Washington
Gazette, said of McDuffie1s defense of the War Department during debates
over the military appropriations that the young South Carolinian's
speeches were "incomparably the best," although they were marked by a
"want of tenderness" toward other members of the House. City of Wash
ington Gazette, April 18, 1822.
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stopped completely, as in the case of the fort on Dauphin Island.
Thomas McKenney's Office of Indian Trade and the factory trading system
were both abolished.

24

Radical demands for retrenchment seemingly had

alienated more moderate members of Congress, and it is reasonable to
assume that the appearance of McDuffie, Poinsett, the Sterlings, and
some Pennsylvanians to champion War Department programs moderated radical
demands.^
The attention that Calhoun and Crawford paid to each other in
early 1822 indicated that each man saw the other as his main opponent.
Of the two, Calhoun was the easier target of criticism:

he administered

revenue-consuming programs, whereas Crawford merely managed the available
monies for government.

The operations" of the Treasury Department were

simply beyond the understanding of most people (politicians included), but
all flattered themselves that anyone could fathom military administra
tion— it was a subject requiring minimal knowledge and was ready made for
simplistic judgments.

23

A move was made by the radicals in both houses to implicitly
censure Elijah Mix by voting funds for Forts Monroe and Calhoun, but
stipulating that the appropriation did not imply approval of Mix's
contract.
It was voted down by the House meeting in a committee of the
whole. See U. S., Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1876, 1895
24

U. S. Stat., Ill, pp. 679-680.

See also Chapter IV, pp.

above.
25

Professor Wiltse shows Calhoun's programs emerging from Con
gress during this session in rather better shape than I do. Presidential
politics had galvanized this session, with the friends of the several
candidates acting in various combinations which are virtually impossible
to trace from the surviving data. Inasmuch as Crawford was then con
sidered the front runner for the presidency, the friends of his opponents
logically could be expected to work against him. This is not to say
as Wiltse does, however, that Calhoun was that much stronger. Wiltse,
Calhoun, p. 253.
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During the winter of 1821-1822 Crawford and his supporters
attempted to turn the disruption caused by the Army Reorganization Act
of 1821 to their advantage.

By late 1821 the work of the General Board

supervising the reduction was finished, and quite naturally there were
many dissatisfied army officers for the Crawfordites to exploit.

By

December Crawford was being very solicitous of disgruntled officers who
had been removed from the service or transferred to another command.

26

Public notice was given early in January that the Crawfordites in Congress
meant to make officer displacement an issue.

The Washington Gazette

reported that John Floyd of Virginia was about to bring on an investigation of how the army bill had been executed.

Floyd had reportedly

complained that "there are many respectable officers, who consider
themselves aggrieved by the appointments" made under the reorganization
act.

27

On January 21, 1822, President Monroe sent a new list of military

appointments which reflected the reorganization to Congress.

Monroe had

recommended Colonel Nathan Towson to be Paymaster Gei ral and Colonel
James Gadsden to be the new Adjutant General of the army.
officers were known to have close ties with Calhoun.

28

Both these

In the Senate,

which had to confirm Monroe's proposed appointments, Towson's and Gadsden's
nominations ran into heavy opposition.

"The organization of the Army is

making great noise here," reported a Jackson man to his chief.

"I am fear-

ful that our friend Gadsden will be placed in an unpleasant situation."

25

2% i l l i a m Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., December 11, 1821,
Plumer Correspondence, pp. 67-68.
^ City of Washington Gazette, January 2, 1822.
28

John C. Calhoun to James Monroe, March [n.d.], 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 6:720-721.
29

U. S., Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 476, 478,
509-510. James C. Bronaugh to Andrew Jackson, February 8, 1822, Bassett,
Jackson Correspondence, 3:147-148.
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President Monroe took the unusual step of withdrawing the two
nominations and resubmitting them with an explanation of how he had con
strued the reduction act of the year before.
President:

This difficulty upset the

"I have never known such a state of things as has existed

here," he told Madison, "nor have I personally ever experienced so much
embarrassment and mortification."^0

In the end both officers were denied

their appointments, but Monroe and Calhoun saw to it that they were
given the jobs unofficially, intending to submit the appointments again
when the political climate was improved.

31

Although it was no doubt true, as Monroe said, that there was
"great discontent" in a "host of disbanded officers," Calhoun's opponents
suspected that there were a great many more officers who would support
their Secretary of War.

32

For example, Colonel Gadsden had already been

aciing in Calhoun's behalf.

As early as November, 1821, Gadsden had

asked General Jackson for his confidential opinion on the presidential
chances of Adams and Calhoun.

33

Colonel Towson was shortly recruited by

Calhoun to use his influence in his home state of Maryland; having suf
fered at the hands of the radicals, Towson was pronounced "perfectly
safe" by the Secretary of War for political uses.

34

James Monroe to James Madison, May 10, 1822, Hamilton, Monroe
Papers, 6:286-289.
Ibid.
32

Ibid. The officers of the army could at least count on Calhoun
not to be actively hostile against their interests if he were elected
president.
They had no such confidence in any other candidate.
33

James Gadsden to Andrew Jackson, November 20, 1821, Bassett,
Jackson Correspondence, 3:132-133.
34

John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, June 25, 1822, Calhoun Papers,

7:182.
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Another recruit to the Calhoun camp was General Winfield Scott.
Always in the eye of controversy, he had been carrying on a dispute with
General Gaines over which was higher in rank since the reorganization
act.

Scott had recently finished his compilation of army regulations,

several passages of which had a direct bearing upon his dispute with
Gaines.

Radical congressman John Floyd had singled out these items in

the regulations and accused Scott publicly of crying to fix the new rules
in such a way that Gaines was inferior to Scott in rank.

Already con

templating leaving the army because he was tired of disputes of this
kind, Scott threw caution away and dispatched seconds to call on Floyd
to apologize or to demand satisfaction; wisely, Scott's seconds asked
for Floyd's explanation first.

The congressman explained that his

charges had been based upon an error which the printers had made in the
final composition, and cheerfully (and publicly) apologized.

Scott,

nonetheless, continued to entertain dislike for the radicals who had
brought this latest controversy upon him, and took up Calhoun's cause
against them.

Scott's new loyalty to the Secretary of War was made

easier because he had gained the impression from Calhoun that when
General Brown retired, he would be Brown's replacement.

It was said

later that Calhoun had also promised General Gaines the same thing, but
this allegation is more likely a demonstration of Scott's ability to
delude himself.

35

35

Charles W. Elliott, Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man
(New York: Macmillan and Co., 1937), pp. 227-233 (hereafter cited as
Elliott, Winfield Scott). Elliott bases his account of Calhoun's dup
licity upon Adams' diary. Wiltse's, Calhoun, pp. 261-262, disputes
Adams' account. There is an aide memoire, dated March 16, 1825, in the
papers of Christopher Vandeventer which recalls a recent meeting between
Scott and Calhoun on this question in which Calhoun is represented as
having "invariably refused" to decide between the two generals.
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William Crawford pretended to know nothing of the origins of the
appointments dispute in Congress, but he felt sure that Calhoun had
poisoned Monroe's opinion of him.

There had been so much discussion,

moreover, in cabinet and Congress about the controversy, Crawford was
36
surprised when the public paid so little attention to it all.

It is

difficult to take Crawford's protestations of innocence very seriously;
when he made them, the Washington Gazette had already sided with the
Secretary of Treasury, and Calhoun had been the paper's main target for
37
some time.
In mid-March that exemplar of old republicanism, John Randolph,
set sail for Europe on a leave of absence from Congress.

His sympathies

being with Crawford, Randolph fired off a parting shot at Calhoun.

It

was, said Randolph, his special ambition to be a part of the government
which would eventually choose the next president.

This was important to

him, he said, because "for the first time since the institution of this
government, we have presented to the people the army candidate for the
presidency, in the person of him, who, judging from present appearance,
will receive the support of the bank of the U. States [sic] also."

The

outcome of the election, he predicted, might well decide the character
of the government— "perhaps forever."

38

36
William Crawford to Albert Gallatin, May 13, June 26, 1822,
Adams, Gallatin Correspondence, pp. 580-582, 583; Adams, Diary, 5:488.
37

Until the end of April, 1822, the Washington Gazette printed
some articles which came to Calhoun's defense. By May, 1822, this was
no longer so; after that time the tenor of articles printed by the
Gazette were clearly to Crawford's benefit and took the radical line.
38

Niles' Weekly Register, March 30, 1822.
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The Washington Gazette's editor, Elliot, seized upon Randolph's
phrase, "army candidate," with alacrity.

Elliot's position on the presi

dential candidates was clear only in that he generally■attacked Calhoun
and wrote little untoward about Crawford, but he was still "for sale" as
yet.

The Rip Rap scandal had been given full play almost daily since the

investigations had begun in Congress, and Elliot had continually assumed
that Calhoun was interested in some way in the contracts for the fort
that carried his name.

39

But Elliot had been careful not to make a

general attack on the administration; noticing John Randolph's farewell
speech, in which, along with his cutting remarks about Calhoun, Randolph
had referred to Monroe as an "incubus" sitting atop the government,
Elliot attacked Randolph for his "hypocondriacal vapouring."

40

In March

Elliot was still making distinctions between members of the administra
tion.

The editor would not do so for long.

Elliot approvingly reprinted

an attack on Calhoun in mid-April which originated with the Richmond
Enquirer and which played heavi.ly upon an anti-military theme.

The

Enquirer's editorial read:
What ever propriety there may have been in the selection of Washing
ton, as the first to fill this highly responsible station it should
be the prayer of the patriot and lover of the American constitution,
that he should be t^| last military chieftain upon whom the office
shall be conferred.
Thereafter Elliot used his paper against Calhoun savagely.

He

denied that Calhoun had accomplished anything in the War Department.

39
40
41

City of Washington Gazette, April 1, 22, May 16, 1822.
Ibid., March 28, 1822.
Richmond Enquirer, April 16, 1822, reprinted in ibid., Aprxl 19,

1822.
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Thereafter Elliot used his paper against Calhoun savagely.

He

denied that Calhoun had accomplished anything in the War Department.
"At what period," Elliot asked, "in a time of profound peace, has the
administration of the War Department been more wretchedly . . . more
42
shamefully and corruptly managed." [sic]

The anti-military rhetoric

rose to a new hysteria in early June, when the editor accused Calhoun
and his supporters of laying a trap for the people by advertising the
peaceful attainments of the army in an attempt to "soften the terrors of
the bayonets."

43

It is a testament to Calhoun's confidence that he went through
these travails without being shattered.

Throughout the spring of 1822

the Secretary of War kept up an almost cheerful correspondence with those
on whom he intended to rely during the months ahead.

At the very height

of the army debates in Congress Calhoun calculated that Lowndes would
not stand in the way of his own candidacy.

In his estimation Lowndes

had many admirers, but none who was "warm" or "ardent" for his candidacy.
This, of course, meant that Calhoun could have South Carolina all to
himself.

For once at least the Washington Gazette had been accurate

when it reported that "Mr. Lowndes has found a rival where he expected
to find a friend."

44

Furthermore, Calhoun saw the radicals' assaults

upon him and his department as acknowledgments of his new strength as a
presidential contender.

Toward the end of the session Calhoun was con

fident that the radicals had been turned back in their mad retrenchment

42

Ibid., May 15, 1822.

43

Ibid., June 10, 1822.

44

John C. Calhoun to John Ewing Colhoun, March 19, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 6:754; City of Washington Gazette, January 15, 1822.
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schemes.

45

Although still cheerful in his letters to relatives and

friends, Calhoun was becoming obsessed with stopping Crawford, and the
Washington Gazette had become, in Calhoun's mind, the voice of the Secre
tary of the Treasury himself.

Now Crawford had become "the hand behind

the curtain" to the Secretary of War.

Earlier Calhoun had lightheartedly

told a relative that "my friends the Radicals have selected me as the
object of their peculiar favors;"

46

but shortly afterward he told a

Pennsylvania supporter that "the Gazette [sic] continues to pour its
torrent of filth against me, but with effects different from what it
• „ - „47
intends.
In this estimation of radical popularity, or lack of it, Calhoun
may have been right.

Crawford himself believed that Calhoun had emerged

from the spring session's trials a stronger candidate than when Congress
opened the previous December.

"The Secretary of War is now, in the

estimation of the public, lord of the ascendant," Crawford observed in
May, 1822, and it was evident to him that Calhoun had acquired popularity
at radical expense.

48

. . . .
Robert S. Garnett, a conservative Virginia

republican, was anxious lest the excesses of the congressional radicals
damage the reputation of orthodox republicanism.

Reflecting on the work

of the radicals at the end of 1822, Garnett wrote:

45

John C. Calhoun to John Ewing Colhoun, May 14, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:111.
46

Ibid.; Adams, Diary, 5:538-539.

^ J o h n C. Calhoun to Thomas J. Rogers, June 9, 1822, ibid.,
7:155.
4ft
William H. Crawford to Albert Gallatin, May 13, 1822, Adams,
Gallatin Correspondence, p. 580.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission

318

One thing is certain, the people did not support their representa
tives in the intrigues & wrangling of the last session, and that
circumstance, together with the failure of the Rip Raps [sic] and
Russell schemes, has taught them a great deal of discretion. . . .
It is very clear, that the radicals have been forced, as Tom Crib
says, to sing small.49
Garnett thought of the radicals at this point as ideological hooligans.
None of the candidates' views entirely pleased him; he had objections to
all and he believed that the election would eventually come down to a
choice between evils.

The Virginian told one of Calhoun's friends that

his view of Crawford, who was already claiming Virginia's support,
depended upon "how far Crawford, is connected with the radicals and sup
ports them, because my respect for him would be in great measure
determined by it."^°
Meanwhile "the army candidate" was availing himself of certain
political opportunities which the army reorganization act had presented.
In order to make certain that there were no radical sympathizers in the
War Department, Calhoun used the reorganization to his best advantage.
Most of the higher functionaries in the War Department were either
enthusiastic about their Secretary's candidacy or were circumspect
enough not to reveal their opposition.

General Jacob Brown, for instance,

harbored resentments against Calhoun because of the Secretary's tendency
to gather unto himself as much organizational control as he could.
Brown was nevertheless careful not to let Calhoun know of his feelings,
and only when it seemed certain that the Secretary would fail in his
presidential aspirations did the general openly take sides with John
49

Robert S. Garnett to Joseph G. Swift, December 28, 1822, Swift

Papers.
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Quincy Adams.

51

The same was true of General Thomas Jesup, who eventually

favored Clay for the presidency.

52

However, Adjutant and Inspector

General Daniel Parker was no stranger to political controversy, and he
was not so cautious as his fellow officers.

Parker had originally come

to the War Department as a chief clerk, appointed by Secretary of War
William Eustis.

During the War of 1812 Parker had not been on good

terms with Secretary of State James Monroe and, besides taking Secretary
of War John Armstrong's part in the Chesapeake strategy disputes, had
gone so far as to complain to President Madison about Monroe's inter
ference with the War Department.

Parker, then, was a friend of

Armstrong's, who was no friend of Monroe's; and Parker was a friend of
Eustis', who was certainly not friendly to Calhoun.

Eustis was in 1822

a Crawford partisan, and it was Eustis Who had lately presided over the
House committee on military affairs with radical zeal.
concluded that Eustis' sympathies were those of Parker.

Calhoun naturally
The Secretary of

War's hostility toward Parker was confirmed when it was rumored that
General Parker had criticised one of Calhoun's i
establishment.

An extraordinary scene followed.

In 1823 General Brown wrote to Ambrose Spencer, a New York
judge then seeking a federal position, that it might be well to send some
letters recommending him to Calhoun: "Finer hands never touched paper,"
Brown said. By early 1824 Brown was acting as an Adams' partisan,
attempting to woo DeWitt Clinton into the Secretary of State's camp. See
Jacob Brown to Ambrose Spencer, April 7, 1823, and Jacob Brown to DeWitt
Clinton, January 8, 1824. See also Jacob Brown to Ambrose Spencer,
December 14, 1824, on relations between Adams and Calhoun at this impor
tant point. All these letters may be found in The Papers of Jacob Brown,
William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
(hereafter cited as Brown Papers). Concerning the matter of Brown's
eventual hostility toward Calhoun because of the Secretary's centraliza
tion of War Department programs, see Entry of November 1, 1825, Vandeventer
Diary.
52

Entry of January 12, 1825, lbxd.
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Calhoun called General Parker to his office, where, in the pre
sence of a witness, the Secretary of War interrogated the general about
his criticism of the report which Calhoun had written-

Parker equivo

cated when Calhoun asked him whether he was the author of these adverse
remarks.

But now the Secretary was bound to remove Parker from the

staff if he could, and the reorganization provided Calhoun with the per
fect opportunity.

When Parker's position as Adjutant General was

eliminated by the reorganization act, he had become the Paymaster General
for the army.

In the spring of 1822, when Colonel Nathan Towson's

appointment as a regimental commander had been blocked by the Senate,
Calhoun and Monroe had resubmitted Towson's name as the new Paymaster
General, thus displacing Parker.

Regardless of the fact that the Senate

blocked this appointment also, Towson was still given the job temporarily,
and Parker was out of a place.

In desperation and feeling ill-used by

Calhoun, Parker solicited John Quincy Adams' advice and told the whole
sorry tale to the Secretary of State.

53

Cal'noun had been correct in his assumption of Parker's hostility.
Newly displaced from office and highly resentful, Parker had told Adams
that "the management of the War Department had been inefficient and extra
vagant, which was very susceptible of demonstration."

Throughout the

spring Parker had been in contact with Crawford and his friends as well.
Crawford had sent Parker word that "there was an intrigue for turning
him out of office," and the Treasury Secretary had eventually offered
Parker a clerkship in the Treasury.

54

There was also one other factor

which may have led to Parker's abrupt dismissal by Calhoun:
53
Adams, Diary, 5:527; 6:3-9.

54

Ibid., 6:8.
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Vandeventer, undaunted by the Rip Raps investigation, was probably seeking
Parker's job for himself.

Vandeventer's ambitions were well understood

by his friends, and as early as 1819 it was rumored that the chief clerk
had his eye on a staff position.

William McRee wrote General Swift con

cerning the clerk:
I am told, that our friend Vandeventer, intends applying for the Pay
Mastr Genlship [sic]. If it is true, and he succeeds I am satisfied
he will ultimately repent it. It leads to nothing. It is a stopper.
It may enable him to live comfortably and even genteely, at the city
of W [sic]; but it will enable him to do nothing else.55
Calhoun had far more pleasant relations with his military friends.
General Winfield Scott was then considering running for Congress from his
home state of Virginia, but by the summer he had decided instead to become
a partisan of Calhoun's.

During the following months General Scott would

also become one of Calhoun's propagandists in the radical stronghold of
Virginia and a contributor, despite his limited funds, supporting a proCalhoun newspaper in New York City.

56

in the West Colonel Henry Atkinson

declared himself for the Secretary of War in a cautious way.

In a confi

dential letter to Vandeventer, Atkinson discussed western politics at
length and speculated upon Henry Clay's strength, which he thought was
greater than that of all the other candidates.

If Clay somehow made a

misstep, however, Atkinson thought that Calhoun would benefit the most.
Clay and Calhoun were the only two candidates spoken of in St. Louis,
and Calhoun was Atkinson's favorite, or so the colonel told Vandeventer.
"My own feelings toward Mr. Calhoun urges

[sic] me to take an active

^William McRee to Joseph G. Swift, September 27, 1819, Swift
Papers.
"^Elliott, Winfield Scott, pp. 233-234.
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part in his favor," Atkinson said, "but I fear to do it loudly lest it
might be injurious to him,

[my] being in the Army."

57

Atkinson was rightly cautious about his involvement in the cam
paign, for politics was a dangerous business for American soldiers to be
interested in; miscalculations could end one's career prematurely, as
Daniel Parker had found out.

For a candidate such as Calhoun, who was

closely identified with his department, it was all too easy for his
opponents to cast him as "the army candidate."

The Secretary of War's

natural aggressiveness also played into the hands of his critics; such a
trait fitted all too well into supposed military characteristics and
could be turned by the opposition candidates to their advantage.
the newspapers opposing Calhoun did just that.
Elliot wrote of the Secretary of War:

One of

Washington Gazette editor

"We cannot refrain from a decided

opposition to the man who advances to the presidency, as though he was
58
resolved to take it by a coup de main."
Some of Calhoun's most avid partisans came from the War Depart
ment establishment.

Aside from Scott, Christopher Vandeventer was of

course acting as a political correspondent for the duration of the campaign.
The former and present aides-de-camp to General Brown, Charles K. Gardner
and John A. Dix, were both involved with the New York Patriot, which was
created specifically to promote Calhoun's chances in New York.

Acting as

a free-lance political correspondent as well as being involved with the
New York Patriot was the ex-engineer general, Joseph G. Swift, who had

57

Henry Atkinson to Christopher Vandeventer, November 14, 1822,
Vandeventer Papers.
58

City of Washington Gazette, May 27, 1822.
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family as well as military connections in North Carolina which were put
to good use.

59

Paymaster Nathan Towson had connections m

Maryland

which Calhoun did not hesitate to make use of, and because Towson was
indebted to the Secretary for his new place on the staff, the colonel
could hardly refuse to help in Calhoun's campaign.60
Another member of Calhoun's political entourage was drawn from
the Secretary's official associations.

Because Congress had abolished

the Office of Indian Trade during the last session, Superintendent
Thomas McKenney found himself without a place.

By May, 1822, the

Washington Gazette had come out openly in favor of William Crawford, and
Calhoun wished for an "independent newspaper" solely, he said, "to
expose the intrigues" of Clay and Crawford.

Adams, with whom Calhoun

was talking on this subject, replied wryly that an "independent news
paper" would be welcome in the city of Washington.6-*- Just how impartial
the newest paper in the city was when it came out later that summer was
open to question, but the new Washington Republican and Congressional
Examiner, with former Superintendent of Indian Trade McKenney as the
59

Hay, "Calhoun and 1824," p. 27; Jabez D. Hammond, The History
of political parties in the state of New York, from the ratification of
the Federal Constitution to December 1840, 3 vols.
(Syracuse: Hall,
Mills & Co., 1852), 2:130 (hereafter cited as Hammond, New York Politics)
Swift, Memoirs, p. 192. Professor Hay writes in the piece cited above
that General brown was "warm" for Calhoun's candidacy, and the involve
ment of Gardner and Dix in Calhoun's campaign in New York City is given
as evidence of the general's attachment. But Gardner and Dix were much
more enthusiastic about Calhoun than Brown ever was; Brown was ill at
this time, and being his aide, Dix's duty was to be at his side. Dix
decided, however, to stay on in the city to work with the Patriot.
Christopher Vandeventer, of course, was a native of New York as well,
and he made several trips to that state in Calhoun's behalf.
60John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxey, June 25, 1822, Calhoun Papers,
7:182.
61

Adams, Diary, 5:538-539; 6:46.
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editor, left no doubt that it opposed the radicals.

After only the first

few issues, a newspaper war was raging along the banks of the Potomac.

62

The political roles avidly played by the men of the War Department
and the anti-military campaign rhetoric used against Calhoun by his oppo
nents suggest that a martial shadow was cast over this presidential
contest.

Calhoun's presence among the contenders was responsible in the

first instance for the unprecedented involvement of the American military
establishment in the politics of the nation.

A Secretary of War had

never run for the highest office in the land before, nor would a Secretary
of War ever again attempt to use the War Department as a springboard to
the White House.

63

The involvement of soldier-politicians in the campaign

of 1824 was not, of course, the most important feature of the contest, nor
did it become a major issue, but neither did Calhoun's opponents completely
ignore the possibilities with which "the army candidate" presented them.
It is worth noting that all of Calhoun's soldier-politicians were
younger, well-educated men, anxious for their own success.

Scott, Swift,

and McKenney, for instance, were all younger than the Secretary himself,
who was not yet forty when he announced that he would battle for the
presidential succession.

Calhoun's youth, success, and the audacity of

his public ambition all made of him an appealing figure to men like him
self.

Jabez Hammond, a New York politico who was not enamored of Calhoun,

remarked that at the beginning of the campaign that "there scarcely could

62Ibid., 6:63.
63
Of course there would be other "military candidates" running
for office, but none of these did so possessing the advantages which
Calhoun enjoyed by supervising the War Department while a candidate.
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be found an enterprising young man for whom Calhoun was not the favorite
candidate."

64

III
Calhoun remarked to a youthful supporter that he had rarely "seen
a more propitious moment for young men of talents and energy," and in
65
saying this he was really assessing his own fortunes.
ments of his own political youth had been few.

The disappoint

That he was about to

experience the vicissitudes of political failure, Calhoun had no fear.
And yet the fact of his failure in the campaign of 1824 may have been one
of the more salient features of his entire public life.
Reading Calhoun's campaign letters from this period, one might
easily accept the Secretary of War's professions at face value.

66

He

thought of himself, he said, as the defender of the progressive Repub
licanism which the Monroe administration had manifested during the postwar
years.

67

It was a kind of Republicanism, Calhoun claimed, which was

entirely consistent with that of the fathers of the party.

Neither

Jefferson, nor Madison, nor Monroe had ever argued that the party should
remain static; they all believed, as Calhoun did, that national progress
and political stagnation were incompatible.

Calhoun's reading of his

party's history convinced him that Republicanism was intrinsically a

64

Hammond, New York Politics, 2:126.

^ J o h n C. Calhoun to John P. Kennedy, June 10, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:101.

66

Russo, "Southern Republicans," p. 293.

67

John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 20, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:248.
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dynamic party.

His own progressive nationalism was a demonstration of

his faith in that ideal.

Very late in the campaign, after he had all but

capitulated to the other candidates, Calhoun defended himself to a con
servative Virginian:
I have [never] done an act, which, if condemned in me, Mr. Jefferson,
Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe must not be equally condemned . . . must
I then be judged more rigidly than these old Republican veterans,
and they be excused for what I am condemned?^®
Calhoun did not trouble to reconcile nationalism and Republican
ism, because for him they were identical.

Thus, he saw no inconsistency

in saying in one breath that he was faithful to "the principles of '76,"
and adding in the next that he supported "the system of measures, which
the experience of half a century has shown to be necessary."

69

Those

"measures" that Calhoun defended were precisely the problem for many
Republicans when they considered the Secretary of War's candidacy:

since

his first days in Congress, Calhoun had argued for internal improvements,
national banks, protective tariffs, and an enlarged national defense
establishment.

Robert Garnett feared Calhoun for his "ultra-federa],

politics on the subject of litigated question[s] between the States &
the general Governments,"^ but Calhoun denied that he had any such pro
clivities.

He insisted that he thought the balance of power between

state and nation "the most novel and beautiful feature in our whole system.

68

John C. Calhoun to Robert S. Garnett, July 3, 1824, ibid.,

9:200.
69

John C. Calhoun to Charles Fisher, August 1, 1823, ibid.,

8:204.
70

Robert S. Garnett to Joseph G. Swift, December 28, 1822, Swift

Papers.
71

John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 24, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:243.
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Because Calhoun's orthodoxy was suspect in some quarters, he
attempted constantly to convince others that his policies and those of
"the political fathers of the Republican church" were precisely the same,

72

and in particular he sought to portray himself as Monroe's rightful
successor because of his ideological affinity with his President.

73

This

was Calhoun's public face, but his self-confidence carried him much
farther than he ever publicly admitted.

The Secretary of War considered

himself the standard bearer of his party's evolution.

Although he

claimed to be the direct political descendant of Jefferson, Madison, and
»
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While Calhoun was still in Congress,

he had worked ardently for the so-called "Bonus Bill" in which revenues
derived from the B. U. S. would be applied to works sponsored by the
national government.

After he and other young Republicans had shepherded

the bill past a narrow vote, Calhoun was taken aback when President
Madison vetoed the bill on constitutional grounds.

74

Once again, when

Calhoun was in the War Office, his stand on internal improvements was
altogether too expansive to suit President Monroe's tastes, and Monroe
insisted that Calhoun modify his views on the subject before the Secretary
submitted them to Congress.

75

During this last instance, a friend asked

Calhoun how he and the President got along on constitutional questions,

73

John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 20, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:243.
74
75

Capers, Opportunist, pp. 54-55.
Adams, Diary, 4:218.
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and Calhoun replied that there was no difficulty.

76

Calhoun nevertheless

nursed a desire to go beyond the policies which had been established by
the men he said were his political forebears.

If one views Christopher

Vandeventer's remarkable 1818 "campaign biography" of Calhoun as being
sanctioned by the Secretary himself, one statement contained there stands
out as an expression of how Calhoun really viewed his place in the party:
"The highest eulogium which can be paid to his political career," Vande
venter wrote, "is the circumstance that all parties have adopted his
leading opinions as settled axioms of national policy."

77

Calhoun may

have seen himself, therefore, not merely as the arch-representative of
evolving Republicanism, but as the harbinger of a new Republican faith
which was a synthesis of principle and experience.

Not even James Monroe

was willing to undertake this kind of amalgamation.
Calhoun's eclectic Republicanism enabled him to see himself as
the only bridge between the old and new politics, but there was one element
of the political past which he would not alter.

He had his sights set on

a noble political future; it was a future peopled by benevolent aristocrats
and statesmen, much as he imagined the past had been, when politicians
were supposedly less interested in power than principles.

He had an

affinity for those days when suffrage was so restricted that the well
born and fortunate could afford to be democrats, days in which the credo

76

John C. Calhoun to J. G. Jackson, March 31, 1818, Calhoun
Papers, 2:216.
77

Christopher Vandeventer, "The Secretary of War," dated 1818,
Vandeventer Papers.
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demanded that offices should be awarded rather than fought over with the
vulgar methods of demagoguery.

78

His attachment to the ideals of the gentleman politician was
manifested in two ways.

He first posed as the defender of what he called

"the cause"; that is to say, the triumph of his kind of Republicanism
over radicalism.

By casting himself as the disinterested crusader, Calhoun

acted out the only aspect of the Republican past of which he truly approved.
He argued constantly that his political views were those of the party's
founders, but in fact their images (as he saw them) were the only features
of the past which he did not rejects

Early in the campaign Calhoun wrote

to a supporter in this style:
I know I am, without any self-deception, much more attached to the
cause than to my personal advancement. I would much rather go down
in pursuing, that system of policy, to which I am attached, than
rise by persuing [sic] any other.79
Calhoun thought that only under the stewardship of such men
could the nation progress.

A man who watched over the happiness and

greatness of the country, must inevitably be rewarded by the people.
This, Calhoun said, was "the highest Republican principle, a fixed confidence in the virtue and intelligence of the people."

80

What, then, was the "gentleman politician" of old to do when
set adrift in the turbulent waters of the era of good feelings?

He

78

Calhoun's view of what a politician should be corresponded
most closely with that discussed by Charles Sydnor, in his American
Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in Washington's
Virginia (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1970), pp. 60-62.
79

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, April 5, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:13.
80Ibid.
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first looked about and disapproved of what he saw.

If the people were

as virtuous as he supposed, how could a party rise up which was inimical
to popular interests?

The answer was clear enough to Calhoun:

people in their virtue believed their statesmen were also good.

the
Dangerous

and unscrupulous imposters had risen instead and were on the verge of
gulling the people with their manipulations.

It was in just such a light

that John Calhoun saw Crawford and his radical supporters.

Radicalism

was not only the antithesis of Republicanism in Calhoun's view, but of
democracy as well— "the last and most dangerous enemy," he thought.
order to combat the radical enemy, then, Calhoun sortied forth.

81

In

If the

tricks of deception, maneuver, a.nd "political juggling" were used by the
enemy, the true champion of Republicanism had on his side the certain
knowledge that when the people were warned of the dangers they faced they
would destroy this aberration.

82

So riddled with solecisms were Calhoun's elaborate justifications
for his candidacy that it is doubtful that he ever understood completely
how profound his delusions were.

They were the products of a mind over

taken by itself, trapped somewhere between dreams and reality.

Obviously

Calhoun's candidacy could not hope to flourish if it was guided by such
tortured opinions.

The place where such views as Calhoun's had survived

best had been in the congressional caucuses; but instead of besting radi
calism in Congress, Calhoun took his disembodied views on the hustings,
where they mattered least.

His campaigns in the various states were

handicapped from the beginning.
81

John C. Calhoun to Samuel L. Gouveneur, May 25, 1823, ibid.,

8:74.
82

John C. Calhoun to Henry Wheaton, October 12, 1823, ibid., 8:308.
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Calhoun submitted his candidacy to the states in the first place
because he thought that victory had already been denied him in Congress
by the radical phalanx, not because he had an aversion to this kind of
president-making.

83

None of the candidates opposing Crawford was willing

to remind the voters that the last three Presidents had been chosen in
just this fashion.

Being the man most likely to win in a congressional

caucus, Crawford certainly had no mind to attack this method.

The Secre

tary of War considered the states a fair field, where political manipulation
had not yet taken hold.

He did not understand that as suffrage had

expanded so had the techniques of power politics.

The campaign was thus

a bitter education for Calhoun, for as he came to realize that principles
alone, dispassionately stated, would not win him the election, he found
also that there were other candidates who were much more adroit at this
new sort of politics than he.

84

The techniques and men used by Calhoun in the various states
during the campaign of 1824 at once contradicted his own olympian pro
nouncements about the crusade against radicalism.

At first, however,

the Secretary seems to have thought that radicalism could be beaten
merely by exposing it to the light of public opinion.

A great deal of

Calhoun's early campaign was devoted to the subvention of newspapers in
areas where he thought he had the best chance of success.

In March,

1822, the Franklin Gazette began to print, under the guiding hands of
83

As shall be seen, Calhoun originally thought that his candidacy
would succeed if only he could arrange for his friends to present a dis
passionate and reasoned discourse of his principles to the people.
See
below, p» 332.
84

Calhoun's attempt to use the very kind of manipulative poli
tics as his opponents (and his failure) can be seen below, p, 338.
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Calhoun's partisans in the Family party, a life of the Secretary of War
which immediately drew the fire of Crawford's Washington Gazette.

The

Franklin Gazette's pieces on Calhoun ran over a period of four months,
reaching well into the summer.

With each issue's appearance, Jonathon

Elliot, the editor of the Washington Gazette, reached new peaks of hysterical invective against Calhoun.

85

Calhoun was also careful to see that

articles favorable to his candidacy reached newspapers which were not
committed to one contender or another, and Professor Wiltse believes that
some of these pieces may have been written by Calhoun himself.88

It is

certain that Calhoun made suggestions about the contents of some of this
campaign literature.

87

In one letter to a partisan, Calhoun instructed

him on the finer points of his own career suitable for publication:
My past services, my identity with the late war, & with the
admn [sic] , my uniform Republican course, my habits of industry
and business, the distinctness of my political principles, and the
openness and candour which even my enemies concede to me all furnish
.
QQ
topicks [sic] for arguments to sustain the cause.00
This was pretty dry stuff, but Calhoun was persuaded that it was
the stuff of politics in the states.

Another means of getting his

message of anti-radicalism out to the states was by private correspondence.
He entreated his trusted friends to "write and get your correspondents to
write."

89

85

Early in 1823 former general Joseph Swift visited the candidate

City of Washington Gazette, July 9, 1822.

88Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 258.
87

John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, April 12, 1822, and John C.
Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, April 1, 1823, Calhoun Papers, 7:30; and 8:4.
OQ

John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, March 27, 1823, ibid.,
7:546-547.
89

John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, April 1, 1823, ibid., 8:4.
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in Washington and returned home to New York with an extensive list of
men dedicated to the cause with whom he was supposed to keep in touch.

90

At the same time Calhoun attempted to use what influence he had
to dispense patronage, and in this he counted heavily upon Monroe's
friendship.

The Secretary of War entertained the idea that, since he was

casting himself as the administration's champion, the President should
endorse his candidacy as a matter of course.

In the summer of 1822,

having presented Monroe with a list of appointments he wished the Presi
dent to make, Calhoun wrote to Ninian Edwards that Monroe "begins to
feel the necessity of taking a decided stand."

Calhoun had used the

opportunity of their meeting to urge Monroe to come out against the
radicals as soon as possible, but Monroe equivocated.

91

The President

would not openly declare for one candidate or another, but insofar as he
favored anyone, it was probably Calhoun.
Monroe was quietly on his side:

The Secretary thought that

"That he has taken his stand to support

[the] administration, I cannot doubt;" Calhoun said in October, "it is
high time that he should."

92

However strict Monroe's neutrality has

seemed to scholars of this period, the fact remains that the other two
leading candidates in 1822 and 1823 believed completely in Monroe's
partiality to the young Secretary of War.

By the summer of 1822 John

Quincy Adams thought that the President devoted most of his time to
defending Calhoun against his opponents.
90

93

William Crawford had come

Swift, Memoirs, p. 122.

91

John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 20, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:247-249. Calhoun discusses patronage throughout this entire
letter.
92

John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, October 5, 18]], ibid., 7:294-

295.
93

Adams, Diary, 6:8; Russo, "Southern Republicans," p. 304.
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around to the same opinion earlier.
ments normally outside his gift.

94

Calhoun managed td secure appoint

The most notable of these was the

appointment of Ohioan John McLean, first as Commissioner of the General
Land Office (a post usually controlled by Crawford) and then as Postmaster General.

95

The Secretary of War may also have had a hand in

several appointments in the new Florida territorial government, including
that of Governor William P. Duval.
the gift of the Secretary of State.

This last post was ordinarily within
96

Quite a dispenser of patronage

himself, William Crawford complained about the inroads being made into
those gifts of office he wanted to hand out himself.

"Certain it is,

Crawford said, "that every appointment in Florida was made without my
knowledge, and even the appointments connected with my own Department
have been made without regard to my wishes."

97

It is easy to exaggerate the effect of Calhoun's relatively close
association with Monroe, his modest success at handing out places, and
the literary activities of Calhoun's friends.
have had a limited effect.

These methods could only

Such techniques did have their political

rewards for the candidate who used them well, but they were no substitute
for the ability to manage oneself into a position of power.

For this,

one needed the new masters of political operation.
94

William Crawford to Albert Gallatin, May 13, 1822, Adams,
Gallatin Correspondence, pp. 580-581.
95

...
Francis P. Weisenburger, The Life of John McLean; A Politician
on the United States Supreme Court (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1937; reprint ed., New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), p. 48 (here
after cited as Weisenburger, McLean). Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 260.
96
97

Wiltse, Calhoun, p. 260.
See note 94, above.
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Doubtless many of the men who worked for Calhoun's election were
motivated in one way or another by their own self interest.

One thinks

immediately of Thomas McKenney and Joseph G. Swift, both of whom stood
to benefit personally by Calhoun's elevation to the presidency.

Winfield

Scott's ardor for Calhoun's candidacy obviously went much deeper than his
commitment to the cause of anti-radicalism.

Samuel Ingham and George M.

Dallas of Pennsylvania's Family party had their eyes on local power as
much as did the energetic Henry Wheaton, who helped run Calhoun's New
York Patriot.

No doubt, too, every one of the contenders for the prize

of 1824 had such men working for them, but among several of Calhoun's
key supporters there was an optimism which transcended the Secretary of
War's chances at any time, and indeed matched that of the candidate him
self.

Such confidence could only be possessed by the political dilettante.
For a candidate who had yet to be nominated by any method, Calhoun

was beset by few doubts in 1822 that he would u.ltimately win the election.
Actually, he had ample reason to be pess imi st-.c.
Carolina assembly had pointedly rec-.

A caucus of the South

..uued Lowndes over Calhoun, who was

decidedly the second choice until the seriousness of Lowndes' illness
became known.

Even after Lowndes had left for England in the fall of

1822, Calhoun's friends back home were hesitant to make a move in the
assembly for the Secretary.

98

Before the year was out, however, two

98

See Robert Y. Hayne to William Lowndes, January 21, 1822, in
Theodore D. Jervey, Robert Y. Hayne and his Times (New York: Macmillan,
1909; reprint ed., New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), pp. 126-127 (here
after cited as Jervey, Hayne) . The South Carolina assembly resolution
nominating Lowndes was so obviously lukewarm about Calhoun that the
Washington Gazette, January 8, 1822, reprinted it— not so much to help
Lowndes as to damage Calhoun. On the reluctance of Calhounites to move
for a nomination in the assembly after Lowndes'■death, see Eldred Simkins
to Christopher Vandeventer, December 17, 1822, Vandeventer Papers.
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more candidates did win the support of their state legislatures.

Andrew

Jackson was offered to the voters by the Tennessee legislature in July.
Henry Clay was unanimously acclaimed in Kentucky in November, but a
similar move for Clay in the Ohio legislature ended in a badly bungled
caucus.

99

Far from being distressed by the westerner's appearance in

the li ts, Calhoun was heartened by the prospect that Clay and Jackson
might split the section so that he could win a unity vote.'''00

The

Secretary was sure that he was the only candidate whose popularity
crossed the mountains.

Alone, he said, the West "is too weak and young
jLG x

to carry the Presidential election yet.""L x

He knew that Andrew Jackson

would certainly try to block any move for Crawford in the western states.
The general had already made his position clear on the Georgian:
would support the Devil first."

"I

102

Of all the candidates, Adams' fortunes seemed to Calhoun to be
improving.

The western situation and the fact that the Secretary of

State was the only candidate from a free state gave Adams "great advan
tages," Calhoun thought, "if he know how to improve them."'''00

At the

same time, relations between these two candidates, once fairly close,
were becoming strained.

Adams kept his dislike for the Secretary of War

99

Glyndon Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1937), pp. 168-169 (hereafter cited as Van Deusen, Clay).
■'■°°John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 22, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:249.
■'^"'■John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, January 20, 1823, ibid.,
7:432.

102

Andrew Jackson to James Gadsden, November 20, 1821, Bassett,
Jackson Correspondence, 3:141.
■'■°°John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, August 20, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:249.
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confined to his diary, but only barely.

104

Calhoun kept up a semblance

of civility throughout 1822, but it became more evident that he too was
not as open toward Adams as before."*"^

The South Carolinian was increas

ingly hard pressed in succeeding months to keep the focus of his campaign
upon anti-radicalism, and he hoped that Adams and the other candidates
would do the same; but Calhoun was also trying simultaneously to dispel
the impression that he was merely a stalking horse for the New Englander."*-1
Just how much Calhoun had become a candidate in his own right, rather than
merely the anti-radical crusader as he had originally styled himself, is
indicated by a letter Calhoun wrote to Samuel Ingham late in 1822.
Earlier, Calhoun had explained to William Plumer that he had become a
candidate only because he feared that Adams was not strong enough to stop
Crawford.

Now a year later Calhoun told Ingham that an Adams-Calhoun

coalition in Pennsylvania "would be fatal to the common cause."
Crawford and Adams seemed strong in New York.

108

107

Yet

If Adams could, with

Calhoun's help, win Pennsylvania, the Secretary of State would be in an
excellent position to stop Crawford, the avowed purpose of Calhoun's
candidacy.

Samuel Ingham seems to have suggested just such a coalition

to Calhoun, but Calhoun told his supporter not to take any step "at this

104

Adams, Diary, 5:524-525; 6:43.

"*"°^John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, May 21, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:70.
"*"^John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, April 28, 1823, ibid.,
8:37.
107

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, November 2, 1822, ibid.,

7:327.
"*"^John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, March 23, 1823, ibid.,
7'546.
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time particularly in your State which would have the appearance of
yielding me up for him."

109

Not only was Calhoun unwilling to share

Pennsylvania with Adams for the sake of "the cause," he did not want to
help anyone else against the radicals if he could not directly benefit.
By the end of 1822 it is extremely doubtful that Calhoun's statesmanlike
pose fooled anyone, except perhaps Calhoun himself.
During the following year Calhoun's image of himself was put to
the severest test.

That Crawford and Calhoun had few ideological affin

ities was unquestionable, but Calhoun's prejudice against the Georgian
became almost obsessive.

Calhoun became convinced that Crawford was

aiming to dupe the people into giving him the presidency.

How else

could a man so devoid of principles hope for office? Calhoun wondered.
Crawford's chances for the presidency rested, said Calhoun, "on a single
ground, that of being a thorough partisan.""'''^

Most disturbing to the

Secretary of War was the thought that it was entirely possible that
political management alone might decide the election.

Referring to the

election in New York, Calhoun told a friend:
If a candidate can be elected without services, or qualifications
by sheer management, it must be by the instrumentality of that
active, but unprincipled class of politicians, which a powerful
combination of causes had engendered in your State. Unsustained
by New York the cause [of intrigue] is desperate; but with its
support the struggle must be severe and doubtful.I12
109

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, November 2, 1822, ibid.,

7:327.
'*''*'^See Calhoun's tirade against Crawford's character and political
principles (or lack thereof) in Adams, Diary, 5:497.
^ ^ J o h n C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcyr August 2, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:231.
112

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Gouveneur, April 29, 1823, ibid.,

8:33.
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Although the Calhounites made much of their candidate's attach
ment to certain principles, and despite the fact that Calhoun had
associated radicalism with a contempt for democracy, his own techniques
were scarcely distinguishable from Crawford's.

Calhoun and his men

demonstrated a willingness to use whatever means were available to win
the approval of the key states, and local conditions— not principles—
determined what those methods would be.

Aside from the electioneering

propaganda in the newspapers, there was not a hint of the elegant cam
paign on principle suggested in Calhoun's rhetoric.
Throughout 1822 Calhoun had been sure that Pennsylvania would
stand by him, regardless of what happened elsewhere.

It may have been

that the leading members of the faction known as the Family party had
been too optimistic in their appraisals of their strength within that
state, but Calhoun took every bit of information he received from them
to heart.

Any rumor fed his enthusiasm.

113

A Republican convention to

nominate a governor was due to be held at Harrisburg in March, 1823, and
its importance to Calhoun and the Family party lay in whether the nominee
would support Calhoun.

He was obviously counting upon the Family party

to manage the convention so that he would receive the call of the state
to run for the presidency, and he thought little about whether such a
nomination would be ultra- or anti-democratic.

George M. Dallas went to

Washington to confer with Calhoun in February about making some sort of
move at the upcoming convention.

As always, Calhoun was hopeful.

After

having talked with Dallas, Calhoun wrote to his friend Virgil Maxcy in
Maryland:
113

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, April 5, 1822, ibid.,

7:12-13.
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I have but little doubt but a movement will be made at Harrisburgh
[sic]. You see the importance of the moment. Should it take place
and be properly managed, it must go far to decide the question which
now agitates the c o u n t r y . ^
Perhaps Calhoun did not know that there was then a serious
resistance building in the rural areas of the state to his nomination,
which was spoken of as simply another measure "adopted by the dictatorial
politicians of Philadelphia."'*''*'^

It was known by the Family party surely

that one of the leading gubernatorial contenders, George Bryan, was not
impressed by Calhoun.

Upon his return from Washington, Dallas and the

other members of his faction set about trying to deny Bryan the nomina
tion and substitute a nominee in his place who would owe his success to
116
the Calhounites.
Dallas and the other Calhounites succeeded only partially at
Harrisburg in early March.

The man they backed, John A. Shultz, did

win the nomination for governor, but when Dallas and his friends attempted
to place Calhoun's name before the meeting, they were upstaged by the
delegates from Westmoreland County, who presented the name of Andrew
Jackson to the convention.

What was described as a "bear garden scene"

followed; the uproarious convention closed without a decision.

In the

commotion Dallas and the Family party members on hand thought it best not
to bring up Calhoun's name at all, because of the wild aspect of the meeting.
114John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, February 23, 1823, ibid., 7:491.
^^Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 133.

13.6

Ibid., pp. 134-135; see evidence of the Family party's support
for gubernatorial candidate John A. Shultz in Samuel Ingham to Joseph G.
Swift, October 10, 1823, Swift Papers.
117

Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, pp. 138-139. Klein theorizes that
the Family party had agreed to back George Bryan after the first ballot;
instead Dallas and his men had put their votes behind Shultz from the start.
Dallas may have decided upon this strategy during consultations he held with
Calhoun in Washington the month before the convention.
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Descriptions of the volatile disposition of the convention mem
bers may have unnerved Calhoun, but he did his best not to show anxiety.
Dallas had told him that, notwithstanding the fact that no presidential
candidate had been approved, he still had two-thirds of the conventioneers
pledged to his candidacy.

This being so, Calhoun said, all that was

left to do was to "bring out the next Legislature at the comt.
the session."

119

[sic] of

The Secretary's anxiety did show, however, in a letter

to Congressman Thomas Rogers.

Although Calhoun praised Dallas and his

friends, he nonetheless asked Rogers if something more could be done "in
the counties, when they come to act on the Govr's [sic] nomination?

And

could it not be so managed as to induce the Republicans of the Legislature
to make some expression of their opinion before adjournment?"

120

In his

suggestions to his workers in Pennsylvania, then, Calhoun was not in the
least concerned about the mode of his nomination, only that it be finally
made.

As to the idea of a caucus deciding upon the next president, a

matter which had become one of the true issues of the campaign, Calhoun
was hardly opposed.

The important question, he said, was not the mode

of election, but the character of the man raised up by it.

121

Meanwhile in Pennsylvania it seemed to many that the Calhounites
themselves were a mighty cabal, bent on dictating a presidential choice

118

John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, March 12, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 7:515.
n 9T,.,
Ibid.

120

John C. Calhoun to Thomas J. Rogers, March 12, 1823, ibid.,

7:516.
121

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, June 25, 1823, ibid.,

8:131.
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to the people.

342

The friends of the defeated George Bryan were particularly

chagrined; one Bryanite wrote that "there never was exhibited in any
deliberative body such a scene of political Juggling, manoeuvering and
chicanery as was at Harrisburg on this occasion."

122

It was strange that did Calhoun see any threat in the wholly unex
pected surge of Jackson's popularity at the Harrisburg convention.
consider Jackson's strength as ours," Calhoun wrote.

"We are personally

friends and his intimate friends are my intimate friends.
will be gained by us."

"I

All he gains

The only danger Calhoun saw at this point from the

Hero of New Orleans was "the possibility of Jackson's strength passing to
Adams."

123

By the fall of 1823 the general's strength in the state had

become evident even to Calhoun, who acknowledged in September that he and
124
Jackson divided the state between them. '

Members of the Family party

were guardedly optimistic; John Conard wrote:
I am afraid we shall have more difficulty with the name of Jackson
in this State than was apprehended some time back. It is a name
that has great weight with the mass of uninformed and unreflecting
people, but as for Crawford we consider him altogether out of" the way
in this State and [he] can give us no trouble unless their [sic]
weight should be thrown into the scale of Jackson to destroy the vote
of P e n n ' a . [sic] a l t o g e t h e r . 125
One of the reasons that Calhoun had been so sanguine about his
chances in Pennsylvania to begin with was because Crawford stood no
122

Andrew Boder to George Bryan, March 6, 1823, quoted in Klein,
Pennsylvania Politics, p. 139.
123

John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 24, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:244.
124

John C. Calhoun to Ninian Edwards, September 23, 1823, ibid.,

8:281.
125

John Conard to Joseph G. Swift, September 18, 1823, Swift

Papers.
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chance there, but in the state of New York an entirely different situa
tion obtained.

It was in New York that Calhoun and Crawford would send

their partisans directly against each other, and, counting as he did on
Pennsylvania's support, Calhoun believed that New York would decide the
contest for the presidency.
he said, "is in New York.

"The greatest danger" of radical success,
Her politicks are so much a matter of calcu

lation of personal interest and sudden combinations, that it is
impossible to form a satisfactory opinion."

X 26

Calhoun's description of New York politics was a fair one.
During the past two years there had been a general revolt among the
Republicans of the state against the faction led by DeWitt Clinton.

The

guiding light of the so-called "Bucktails" was Martin Van Buren, already
emerging as one of the wiliest politicians in the state.

By 1822 Van

Buren and his followers had control of the state government in Albany
and had been christened "the Albany Regency."

The Byzantinism of New

York politics worked considerably against the development of any but the
most flexible political principles.

Jabez Hammond, who served in the

legislature at the time, believed that there was "not a shade of differ
ence between the Clintonian and anti-Clintonian democrats in this state.
This was the sort of politics in which a master operator like William
Crawford could shine.
Van Buren did not immediately declare Crawford as the favorite
of the Regency, but keen observers saw nevertheless that the Regency's
organ, the Albany Argus, was slanting its articles in favor of the
X26

John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, May 31, 1822, Calhoun
Papers, 7:138.
127

Hammond, New York Politics, 2:87.
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traditional methods of president-making— that is to say, the congressional
caucus.

Rufus King suspected as early as February, 1823, that Van Buren

meant to sustain the old New York-Virginia axis which had elected presidents since Jefferson.

128

Calhoun's only hope to win New York, therefore, was to campaign,
as an anti-caucus, anti-Regency candidate, and however distasteful it
must be, forge an alliance with any Clintonians willing to support him.
The Secretary of War began his campaign in New York City with the estab
lishment of the New York Patriot, which was to be supported by the
Republican committee of the city.
state only:

But this was to be a foothold in the

"from this, as a center, measures will be taken to extend

the operation over the State," Calhoun told a supporter.

129

Upstate in

Watertown, Calhoun's old friend Micah Sterling flatly told Calhoun that
there the contest was chiefly between Adams and Crawford.

For the present

Calhoun decided to settle for a coalition with the supporters of Adams,
Clay and Jackson against the "radical chief."
that his prospects were "flattering."

Elsewhere, Calhoun thought

130

Doubtless, to some figures in New York politics the intrusion of
the presidential question was an unwelcome complication.

What had been

a contest of wills between the Clintonians and the Albany Regency was
transformed into a battle over how the state would cast its vote for the
next President.
1 28

Committed to Crawford, and therefore bound to support

Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824," pp. 177-178.

129

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Southard, April 9, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:10-11.
1^ J o h n C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, April 28, 1823, ibid.,
8:36-37.
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the congressional caucus, Van Buren and the Regency could only hold their
ground, while the Clintonians and the friends of the other presidential
contenders attacked the Regency— in an interesting turnabout— for being
anti-democratic.
Calhoun, who was less than concerned about the popular will in
Pennsylvania, set his New York friends to propagandizing the cause of
popular voting for presidential electors.

Again in contrast to his

tactics in Pennsylvania, in the case of New York Calhoun and his workers
spoke out against "political management" from the beginning, and styled
themselves as the true friends of the people.
little enough to say on this score:

Elsewhere Calhoun had

it was only in connection with his

New York campaign that Calhoun became the great democrat, albeit an
anxious on e .

There, he said, the people were in danger.

Crawford

looked forward in’New York, Calhoun said, to "advancement on principles,
which cannot be sustained .
the publick happiness."

and "used means that were subversive of

Most alarming to Calhoun was the fact that in

New York, unfortunately, "there abounds, but too much materials [sic]
for his mode of operation."

132

Other leading Calhounites displayed a

similar flexibility on the question of popular democracy.

George

McDuffie, one of Calhoun's closest friends and advisors, saw in the early
Jackson movement in Pennsylvania nothing but "grog shop politicians &
the rabble."

In a fair convention held in that state, McDuffie believed,

nonetheless, that Calhoun was sure to eventually win the nod, but only

'*'^'*'Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824," pp. 178-179.
132

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Southard, June 14, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:117-118.
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apparently if the scum were excluded.

133

Later, referring to the Albany

Regency's opposition to the repeal of New York's election law, McDuffie
told General Swift that "the miserable and ingenuous attempt to evade
the wishes of the people by fraudulent manoeuver, will in all probability
render the partizans of Crawford so odious, as to produce a union for the
people's ticket, that will insure a majority."

134

McDuffie's remark concerning the "people's ticket" had reference
to the latest spate of anti-Regency activity in the state.

Beginning in

the summer of 1823 the Calhounites, with the help of the new New York
Patriot and Republican committeeman Ogden Edwards, staged a coup d 'etat
against the Tammany machine in the city.

135

Planning for the upcoming

fall elections for gubernatorial and legislative seats, the Tammany com
mittee had fashioned a list of candidates which looked as though it had
been written by Van Buren himself.

When the slate was presented to the

Republicans of the city a general revolt broke out, probably because none
of the prospective candidates had pledged himself on the method of
choosing electors.
formed.

Out of the revolt the so-called "People's party" was

At the forefront of the new party were Samuel Gouveneur (James

Monroe's brother-in-law), Henry Wheaton (a major contributor to the New
York Patriot), and Joseph G. Swift, Calhounites all.
All parties claimed victory in the fall elections of 1823.
Calhoun was elated by the news that Wheaton and Gouveneur had been
133QUOte(j -j_n Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 130.
l^^George McDuffie to Joseph G. Swift, January 23, 1824, Swift
Papers.
135John C. Calhoun to Samuel Southard, April 9, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:10-11.
1 36

Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824," pp. 181-184.
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elected to the legislature and counted the whole election as having been
decisively in his favor.

137

Whether indeed these elections told much

about the desires of the people is highly uncertain; one student of this
period guesses that most of the new legislators were favorable to a
change in the old election law, but there were almost as many new formulae
for casting the state's vote as there were politicians.

138

The lack of a clear decision at the polls meant that the presi
dential question would be agitated in the state legislature after all.
That fall the Calhounites estimated their chances in the legislature and
wondered about what position that the new governor, John Yates, would
take.

Henry Wheaton led off the discussions as soon as the legislative

session began, proposing a bill for the popular election of presidential
electors.

The Regency men countered by proposing the creation of a com-

mittee of nine to consider the entire question; significantly, a majority
of the committee was loyal to Crawford.

When the committee of nine

finally reported a bill which effectually postponed the question of
presidential electors until the fall of 1824, it passed by a large
majority.

139

In both votes on the floor of the legislature, the numbers

approving were signs that a Calhoun debacle was in the making.
In the aftermath of the vote to refer the presidential question
to the committee of nine, the address of Governor Yates was anticlimactic.
Yates managed to avoid the question entirely, recommending a constitutional
137

John C. Calhoun to Samuel Gouveneur, November 9, 1823; John C.
Calhoun to C. G. Haines, November 9, 1823; and John C. Calhoun to
Joseph G. Swift, November 9, 1823, Calhoun Papers, 8:354-357.
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Rammelkamp,

"The Campaign of 1824," p. 185.

139Ibid., pp. 186-187.
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amendment, a means hardly satisfying to the Calhounites.

Wheaton was

disgusted by the governor's stand, but still hopeful that something
could be done to forestall a rush toward a state caucus.

"Poor Yates

blubbers, & says he was deceived & made to believe the People did not
want to be set free," Wheaton told Swift.

Before the work of the com

mittee of nine was completed, Wheaton was still doing his best to work
for a state-wide convention.

"If we push this as we pushed the electoral

Law [sic]— vigorously & zealously— we shall obtain a glorious Triumph—
The Country have not the slightest doubt of the practicability of
collecting a very respectable Convention. . . . Have at 'em my boys!"

140

The decision of the New York state legislature to postpone the
question of choosing electors was a defeat for Calhoun.

He contented

himself with believing that the choice would eventually come to the people
of New York in some fashion; the people had been too aroused (and in this
he was right) to let the old methods stand unopposed.

The Secretary of

War's only solace was that Pennsylvania's decision on a favorite candidate
had yet to be made.
decided.

New York did not matter so much after all, he

"We can give them New York and still beat them," Calhoun said,

"Penna [sic] is as firm as a rock.

The 4th of March will develope [sic]

her choice and we feel the fullest assurance, that it will be such, as
we desire."

141

March 4 was the date chosen for the o p g m n g of the

Republican state convention at Harrisburg.

140

Henry Wheaton to Joseph G. Swift,

[January?], 1824, Swift

Papers.
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John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, January 25, 1824, Calhoun
Papers, 8:504.
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During February, 1824, the Pennsylvanians went about the business
of choosing delegates for the convention.
little anxiety.

In the Calhoun camp there was

Samuel Gouveneur, conferring in Washington with Calhoun,

was encouraged by what he knew of the delegates already chosen.

Gouveneur

believed that if Pennsylvania went for Calhoun then his own state of New
York would insist on a popular election of presidential electors and
assure his candidate's success.

He depended as much as did Calhoun upon

Pennsylvania to affect the course of the other states.

"There is the

least reason to expect, that he will [not] be nominated on that occasion
by an overwhelming majority," Gouveneur wrote a fellow Calhounite back
home.

142
But Calhoun's fate in Pennsylvania was decided much earlier than

the Harrisburg convention.

Just a few days after Gouveneur and Calhoun

met, on February 18, a meeting was held in Philadelphia to choose that
city's delegates to the convention.

Calhoun had no inkling that anything

untoward would occur there; Philadelphia was the stronghold of the Family
party and most of his supporters in the state would be in evidence.

It

\

came as a great surprise to onlookers, then, as George M. Dallas addressed
the meeting.

The congressional caucus had been held at Washington only a

few days before, Dallas told the audience, and William Crawford had been
selected by "a miserable and infatuated minority."
had been reached.

A crisis, he said,

It was now the duty of the friends of the people to

unite behind the candidate who stood the fairest chance of defeating
Crawford and the dreaded radicals.

142

Accordingly, he proposed resolutions

Samuel Gouveneur to Joseph G. Swift, February 1, 1824, Swift

Papers.
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withdrawing the name of John C. Calhoun from consideration as a presidential nominee and substituting that of Andrew Jackson m

his place.

143

Dallas' move was utterly unexpected, but the news of it deter
mined the course of the Harrisburg convention the next month.

Of the

125 votes cast at Harrisburg, only one did not go to Jackson.

Eighty-

seven votes were cast recommending Calhoun as Vice-President.

144

Their

business done, the Harrisburg delegates adjourned their convention in a
hubbub, leaving Calhoun's presidential aspirations in a wreck.
Other Calhounites were dumbfounded at Dallas' apostasy.

When

news of the Pennsylvania defection reached Raleigh, North Carolina, B. B.
Smith reported:
Such was the feeling on the occasion, that a general burst of indig
nation was manifested by three fourths of the Citizens of this city,
and, had it been possible to have laid hands on that Judas Iscariot,
George M. Dallas, nothing short of absolute crucifixion, could have
appeased the wrath of the infuriated populace for his villianous [sic]
desertion & political treachery.145
Even staunch old Republican Robert S. Garnett of Virginia was
shocked by the turn of events in Pennsylvania.

"I cannot pardon such

versatility," he said gravely, "such readiness— such eagerness to assist
in consummating the c h a nge.
The candidate himself remained philosophical.

Dallas had told

him about a week before the meeting in Philadelphia that it was feared

143

See George Dallas’ speech to the Philadelphia meeting reported
in Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 161.
144
145
]46

Ibid., p. 165.
B. B. Smith to Joseph G. Swift, April 17, 1824, Swift Papers.
Robert S. Garnett to Joseph G. Swift, March 8, 1824, ibid.
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the cause was lost in that state.

Combined with the news of the caucus

in Washington, Dallas had thought it best to throw his weight behind
Jackson.

Nevertheless, Calhoun had not expected the end to come so

quickly.

As to Dallas himself, Calhoun thought only (or would say only)

that his move was "ill timed."

That being so, Calhoun told Virgil Maxcy,

"taking the U. S. together I never had a fairer prospect than on the day
we lost the State."

147

All that remained for the Calhounites was to assess the damage
done in Pennsylvania, and it appeared to be considerable.

Calhounites

in other states had waited upon a decision in Pennsylvania; so certain
was that state in Calhoun's favor, success there could only influence
other states to take a stiffer stand for the South Carolinian.

Now that

the worst had happened in Pennsylvania, Calhoun's fortunes in Maryland
and Ohio dropped accordingly.

148

In North Carolina the congressional

caucus' appeal to that state's delegation had already caused a good deal
or worry among the Calhounites; by January, 1824, it looked already as
though Calhoun's campaign there might stall.

General Swift's brother

wrote him from that state:
The activities of our Representatives in Congress [are] favorable
to Crawfords [sic] pretensions & unless an immediate & correspon
ding zeal on the part of Mr. Cns [sic] friends is evinced, this
State now unquestionably favorable to Mr. Cn [sic] is lost to a
certainty. Rely upon this.149
147

John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, February 27, 1824, Calhoun
Papers, 8:554-555.
148

John McLean of Ohio, for instance, was convinced even before
the Pennsylvania defeat that Calhoun should content himself with the
vice-presidency. After the Harrisburg convention, McLean became an
Adams partisan. Weisenburger, Life of McLean, pp. 48-49.
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W. R. Swift to Joseph G. Swift, January 26, 1824, Swift

Papers.
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After the decision in Pennsylvania was known, supporters in North
Carolina simply capitulated.

"Since fate has decided against us, it now

becomes us to bow and acquiesce like Christians [sic] & philosophers,
and not to repine at events, over which we have no control, however much
& deeply we may lament their occurrence," wrote one North Carolinian.

150

It^was left to Christopher Vandeventer, however, always so much at the
center of events during the past several years, to sum up the impact of
Calhoun's Pennsylvania defeat:
The late movement in Philadelphia by which the friends of Mr. Calhoun
surrendered him, and fell into the ranks of Genl [sic] Jackson, was
as unexpected here as it could have been to you. That measure was
not founded on any communications from this place, but arose entirely
from the great excitement which prevails in Pennsylvania in favour
of Genl Jackson, and which a gentleman from that State affirms was
as difficult to oppose as the fury of a whirlwind. . . . Pennsylvania
was the foundation on which our hopes principally rested, and it is
to be feared that the late movement in Philadelphia will not only
lose us that state, but will greatly contribute to blast our pros
pects elsewhere. A short time will exhibit the full effect of the
measure.
In the mean time [sic] it appears to us here, that the
Signified [sic] course for the friends of Mr. Calhoun . . . to
pursue will be to stand by and suffer matters to take their own
course. It certainly is not for us to surrender our favorite at
the very first approach of adverse fortune, though at the same time
candor would require at our hands an acknowledgement that his
prospects have been very much impaired, if not destroyed.-*-51

IV
February was the decisive month in the campaign of 1824.

Not

only had Jackson risen on the ashes of the Calhounites in Pennsylvania,
but the long-awaited congressional caucus had gone awry.

In late 1823

William Crawford had become gravely ill and when the caucus was finally

B. Smith to Joseph G. Swift, April 17, 1824, ibid.
151

Christopher Vandeventer to an unknown addressee, February
[n.d.], 1824, Vandeventer Papers.
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held in Washington on February 14, much of his support had eroded.

It

appeared that the toils of the campaigns in the states, together with
Crawford's illness, had been too much for the radicals.

The defeat of

radicalism was John C. Calhoun's only consolation that year.

152

To all outward appearances Calhoun remained a neutral vicepresidential candidate during 1824 and was really the only one who had
a serious claim on that office.

He, Adams, and Jackson had always had

difficulty in defining precisely how they differed, and although Calhoun
made no profession of support for either Adams or Jackson he was not
displeased with the prospect of having either man in the presidency.

153

Some Calhounites took the same view as Calhoun obviously did.
In New York there was still work to be done, and Henry Wheaton outlined
a post-Pennsylvania strategy for General Swift:
Our principle is to oppose the Caucus Candidate [sic], who is also
the Virginia & Radical Candidate, and to rally in every State on the
Strongest anti Crawford man [sic] . In North &_ South Carolina we can
no longer refrain from taking up Jackson, because he is strongest,
because the People [sic] understand that without Pennsylvania it is
wise to push Calhoun a because there is danger that Crawford may
occupy Calhoun's Southern grounds if it [sic] is not immediately
occupied by Jackson.
Furthermore, Wheaton added, "Mr. Calhoun acquiesces in taking any position
his friends may assign him."

155
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Mooney, Crawford, pp. 240-241. See also John C. Calhoun to
Thomas J. Rogers, June 5, 1824, Calhoun Papers, 9:140.
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John C. Calhoun to an unknown addressee, October 8, 1824,
Calhoun Papers, 9:344.
15^Henry Wheaton to Joseph G. Swift, March 11, 1824, Swift
Papers.
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Not wanting to spoil

the chances of success for any candidate

other than Crawford, Calhoun nonetheless dabbled in New York politics in
a way that was inexplicable, even to his friends.

The ex-candidate

believed that Adams would win New York by October, but he evidently
calculated on the possibility that the New Englander's campaign might
fail there.

Calhoun considered, at least for a time, that in the event

Adams could not carry the state, the Calhounites should throw their
support to Crawford rather than Clay.

Christopher Vandeventer was

appalled that such a calculation would even cross the Secretary of War's
mind.

The chief clerk evidently discussed the matter with Calhoun at

some length.

On October 30,

Vandeventer wrote to Micah Sterling that

"our friend . . . fully agrees with me that it would be better to give
i:
it [their support] to Mr Clay [sic] if it can't be given to Mr. Adams."
Why Calhoun thought (even for an instant) to give Crawford any help at
all in New York is beyond understanding.

Perhaps the Secretary of War

had made some calculation that Jackson would be served by such a move—
that the general could somehow win enough popular votes to keep the
final decision on the presidency out of the House of Representatives,
where it had long been assumed the outcome would be settled.
Knowing nothing of Calhoun's intentions, John Quincy Adams was
doubly anxious, lest the Hero of New Orleans steal a march on him in the
last few months of the campaign.

Now that the number of candidates was

considerably narrowed, Adams no longer pretended to have much affection
for Jackson and devoted himself to winning out over the general.

156

"The

Christopher Vandeventer to Micah Sterling, October 29, 30,
1824, Vandeventer Papers.
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army candidate," an epithet which had earlier been applied to Calhoun,
now was attached to General Jackson, and Adams' supporters wondered at
Jackson's unexpected new strength.

Adams' friend Plumer wrote to his

father:
Is it not a bad omen that mere military glory, for he has no
character or reputation as a Statesman [sic], should thus captivate
the popular feeling, & throw the nation headlong into the arms of
a military despot?-*-57
In the siammer of 1824, for the first time, Adams' friends began
thinking about a rapprochement with Clay.

Postmaster General John

McLean, only recently attached to Calhoun, thought that such an alliance
would be fruitful.

"Mr. Adams is opposed to a union with Clay," McLean

wrote, "but I have no doubt of its policy. . . . There is nothing against
it on Principle [sic], for it would give a true representation of the
public sentiment."'*'^
Suspecting that Calhoun really wanted Jackson to succeed, Adams
began a campaign in October to woo the Secretary of War away from
Jackson.

Probably at Adams' request George Sullivan of New Hampshire

began lobbying with other members of the House from New England to vote
for Calhoun as Vice-President.

On November 6 Adams' newspaper in the

capital, the National Journal, made the Secretary of State's support for
Calhoun official.

159

From Calhoun's point of view all of Adams' support

was hardly necessary, but, of course, Adams was not thinking of Calhoun's
welfare.
157

William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., February 29,
1824, Plumer Correspondence, pp. 102-103.
153

John McLean to Joseph G. Swift, October 29, 1824, Swift
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The only way in which Adams could hope to gain the South Caro
linian's help against Jackson was to promise Calhoun something for the
future.

In December, 1824, Adams made another overture to Calhoun through

an intermediary.

On the 11th of December, George Sullivan met with

Christopher Vandeventer at the War Department.
clerk that

"it was in the

support Mr Adams
States

[sic]."

Adams' man told the chief

interest of Mr. Calhoun that his friends should

In turn, Sullivan said, "all the New England

[sic] would support Calhoun for next president."

The whole con

versation seemed to revolve, Vandeventer wrote in his diary, on this
proposition:

"Let Calhoun's friends make Adams P. & [sic] New England

will in turn make Calhoun."
What Vandeventer thought of the proposition is indicated by the
fact that he remained silent for over a month before revealing it to
Calhoun.

When he finally did hear of the meeting, Calhoun was unim

pressed.

He thought Adams' supporters now included too many old radicals

"which would make it difficult for Mr. A. to form an administration which
would have

the support of

would not move

the country."

Although Calhoun said that "he

for either candidate," Vandeventer thought nonetheless

that his superior "decidedly prefers Jackson."161
At almost the same time that Sullivan paid his call upon Vande
venter, Robert Letcher of Kentucky was opening discussions with Adams on
Clay's behalf.

Letcher told Adams that Clay's friends

(Letcher professed

that he did not speak with Clay's sanction) wanted some indication that
an Adams

administration could find a post for Clay.

Adams was

166Entry of December 11, 1824, Vandeventer Diary.
161Entry of January 13, 1825, ibid.
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diplomatic and noncommittal.

Several other discussions between Adams

and Letcher took place in December, and by January 9, 1825, the ground
work had been laid for a meeting between the principals.

At this

meeting Clay pledged himself to support Adams, but there is no evidence
that Adams promised anything to Clay in return.

162

Whether in fact Adams and Clay had reached a modus vivendi, the
Secretary of State was at the very least interested in the votes of the
Kentucky delegation.

Two days before the Adams-Clay meeting, the state

legislature requested their congressional delegation to cast their votes
for Jackson.

Upon hearing the news, the Kentuckians in Congress vowed

to follow their own consciences in the matter; this boded ill for Jackson's
fortunes.

1 63

Even before his candidate had met with Clay, William Plumer

was counting up the states whose support an Adams-Clay alliance might
create; Plumer reckoned on Ohio, Missouri, Maryland, and of course
, 164
Kentucky.
Rumors were certain to be bandied about in the wake of the first
Adams-Clay meeting, and Christopher Vandeventer duly recorded them all
in his diary.

On January 14, Vandeventer heard that "the Adamsites are

certain of Success [sic]— having formed an alliance with the Crawfordites
to share equally the honors of the administration."'*'^

On the next day

George Sullivan told the chief clerk that the rumor was patently absurd.
162
163

Bemis, Adams and the Union, pp. 36-37.
Van Deusen, Clay, p. 187.
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William Plumer, Jr., to William Plumer, Sr., January 2, 1825,
Plumer Correspondence, pp. 126-129.
165Entry of January 14, 1825, Vandeventer Diary.
"'"^Entry of January 15, 1825, ibid.
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But on January 19, Vandeventer learned from Charles Fenton Mercer of
Virginia, a Clay supporter, new information which at least lay within the
realm of possibility.

Vandeventer wrote in his diary:

Colo. Mercer of H. R. [sic] told me that the friends of Mr. Clay had
decided to go for Mr. Adams & that Mr. Clay was to be Secy [sic] of
State— The Speech of Mr Webster [sic] on the bill appropriating
money for continuance of the Cumberland Road to Zanesville was a
confirmation of the understanding on the part of Mr. Adams. Genl [sic]
Jesup who was a week ago as violently opposed to Mr Adams [sic] as
any man in the country npw thinks that Mr Clay's friends of whom ha
is one, will support Mr A [sic] & will carry over to him 6 western
States. La Miss 111. Ohio Keny & Inda [sic] He talked as if this
was on the whole, the best course.167
The clerk told Calhoun of his discussion with Mercer the very
next day.

Calhoun "replied it was an idle scheme."

The Secretary of

War thought that "Clay himself doubtless would give his arm to elect
Adams— but neither he nor his friends dare do it— that Genl [sic]
Jackson would be elected in spite of all their efforts."

After their

conversation Vandeventer wondered if Calhoun really wanted to see
Jackson elected.

"He has often said to me he did," the clerk wrote,

"but I believe he prefers the election of Adams not because he thinks
it [sic] would make the best president— but because a northern president
would become his designs 4. [sic] or 8 years hence."

There were wheels

within wheels in John C. Calhoun's mind, Vandeventer mused, "He pro3.68
fesses to act on higher grounds."
The real truth behind the rumor which Vandeventer heard became
entirely academic during the following days.

On January 24, 1825, the

Ohio and Kentucky congressional delegations,announced that they would
cast their votes for Adams.
167
168

Charges of corrupt dealings began to fly
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immediately thereafter, with the opening shot coming from an anonymous
article in the Columbian Observer of Philadelphia, written by House
member George Kremer.

On January 31, Clay published a reply to Kremer's

article in the National Intelligencer, demanding that the dastardly
writer of the piece in the Observer acknowledge his authorship.

169

Calhoun derived a perverse satisfaction from all these doings,
but by February 5 Vandeventer thought that the Secretary of War had
finally resigned himself to being Adams1 vice-president instead of
Jackson's.

170

Four days later, John Quincy Adams was elected president

by the House of Representatives, and Calhoun became Vice-President by a
large majority vote.

171

On February 12, 1825, Adams offered Henry Clay

the post of Secretary of State and shortly after the Kentuckian accepted
When the presidential choice was finally made known, Calhoun
appeared somewhat overwhelmed by what had happened.

Just after the

House had made its decision for Adams, the new Vice-President elect
wrote to his old friend Maxcy that "things have taken a strange turn" at
the capital and cautioned him not to accept at face value everything he
saw m•

4
-v, newspapers. 173
the
For the rest of the month Calhoun quietly prepared to take his

leave of the Department of War.

169

On March 3, 1825, John C. Calhoun gave

Van Deusen, Clay, pp. 188-189.
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up his post.

As the officers of the department drew up to bid Calhoun

farewell, Christopher Vandeventer stood among them.

The clerk remarked

that Calhoun "appeared much affected in separating himself.

...

My own

feelings were warmly excited by his warm and friendly manner toward
myself."

174

Calhoun took up his duties as Vice-President the next day.

He did not look back.
It was not in Calhoun's nature to ruminate about his past mis
takes, nor indeed to admit that he ever made any.

When he permitted the

writing of his biography eighteen years later, his time in the War
Department would occupy only a small space.

Fewer pages were devoted

to his career as a Secretary of War than the number of years he had
served in that position.

Too many momentous events had intervened in

the meantime.
A few days later the new Secretary of War appointed by Adams,
James Barbour of Virginia, arrived to assume the office.

Barbour called

all the officers together and assured them that he was entirely depen
dent upon their experience and good will.

After his remarks the

conversation grew increasingly stiff and uncomfortable.

Barbour ventured

that it might be well to take a close look at the engineer and Indian
departments, both of which promised "the greatest difficulty."

General

Macomb, chief of engineers, answered that the Quartermaster's department
was important too.

Barbour agreed politely.

Quartermaster General Jesup

volunteered that the engineers needed more men.

When the vast extent of

the country was taken into account, the corps of engineers was dispropor
tionately small.
174

Moreover, Jesup added, there were considerable

Entry of March 3, 1825, Vandeventer Diary.
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differences between the situation in America and that in Europe.
was the beginning of James Barbour's military education.

175

It

Doubtless

the War Department would handily survive his administration as it had
all the others.
175
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EPILOGUE:
CALHOUN AND THE FUTURE

Calhoun had predicted that the election of John Quincy Adams
would "distract" the party and the nation, and that inevitably a new
party would rise up in opposition to an Adams presidency."^"

But why

Calhoun helped bring this renascence of faction about by gradually
moving toward an alliance with Andrew Jackson is a question worth
asking.
Superficially, Adams and Calhoun were much alike.

Adams cer

tainly had a wider experience than the younger Calhoun, but both men
were cultured, well educated, and polished.

Civility was no effort for

them; this was certainly not true in Jackson's case.

2

Both Adams and

Calhoun prided themselves on their mental gifts, and justly so.

Each

man professed to have certain political principles and sought to articu
late them, believing that in politics, principles were still important.
Because their principles were so similar, these two candidates had

"'"John C. Calhoun to Micah Sterling, March 27, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 7:547.
2
John H. Eaton to Mrs. Andrew Jackson, December 18, 1823, Bassett,
Jackson Correspondence, 3:217. Margaret Bayard Smith reported that at the
height of the campaign, she saw Adams, Crawford, and Calhoun joking
together at a party. Later, in a conversation with Mrs. Smith, Calhoun
claimed that he kept his personal associations quite separated from his
political activities.
He would, he claimed, take the result of the elec
tion (of 1828) "with moderation, but above all, as far as possible to
avoid mingling personal, with political feelings. Margaret Bayard Smith
to J. Bayard H. Smith, January [n.d.], 1829, in Smith, First Forty Years,
p. 269.
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difficulty in disentangling themselves from one another during the cam
paign.

By contrast, Jackson's candidacy seemed to represent something

about politics that was dark, inexplicable, and faintly absurd.

Little

of Jackson's political creed could be divined, and what was worse, his
obscure politics seemed not to matter to the electorate.

Calhoun— and

perhaps Adams to a lesser degree— consistently underestimated Andrew
Jackson.

The Secretary of War first did so during the Florida contro

versy, and later when he thought that he could conceal his earlier
opinions from the general.

In 1824 the possibility of Jackson's winning

in Pennsylvania seemed so remote to Calhoun that he and his supporters
could not believe the result when it came.

Yet in the end Calhoun

rejected Adams' proffered alliance and went instead to the general's side.
"War is the general cry and will come speedily too," wrote Calhoun's
friend Samuel Gouveneur, "Jackson and Calhoun will lead the peoples [sic]
3

party, & who would wish to follow more honest & efficient men.[sic]"

Far from having nothing in common, Jackson and Calhoun shared
perhaps the most crucial affinities of all:

a contempt for doctrine and

a certain impatience with the restraints of democracy.

Being a more

elemental sort, Jackson expressed his proclivities in his actions—
Calhoun by his thoughts.

Jackson had less guile than Calhoun, but in the

end their natures showed through just the same.
istics of the leiter:

These were the character

to Jackson or Calhoun doctrine was important only

if they were responsible for its invention.

They believed that democracy

could reach its fullest potential in America if they were appointed its

^Samuel Gouveneur to Joseph G. Swift,
1825], Swift Papers.

[n.d., probably March,
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stewards.

This was not a role which could be played by someone who was

merely an archtypical democrat; a special figure was required, one who
transcended doctrine and form.
Intransigence played an important part in both men's character as
well, and it fed their vindictiveness.

Once again, Jackson was more

forthright than Calhoun, and the episodes in which the general allowed
these characteristics to work upon his actions are so many as to defy
enumeration.

Calhoun's utter belief in himself and his ideals was some

what obscured by his brilliance in the early part of his career, and
during the war the Republicans generally found these qualities useful
against the Federalists, but the campaign of 1824 brought them into full
view.

When the results of the campaign did not satisfy Calhoun's

expectations, his only refuge was to lay the blame elsewhere and to turn
the fury of his disappointment toward John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay.
Less than a week after he had assumed his new office, Calhoun declared:
The mass of moral and political power which carried the late admin
istration through in triumph, has been wholly neglected in the new
organization; and in the final stage of the situation, the voice and
the power of the people has been set at naught, and the result has
been a President elected not by them, but by a few ambitious men with
a view to their own interest, I fear. There is a solemn feeling of
duty, that it must be corrected at another election, or the liberty
of the country will be in danger. It is my opinion, that the country
will never be great till the example is corrected, and the Constitu
tion so amended as to prevent the recurence [sic] of the danger. . . .
Principles cannot be violated in this country with impunity. . . . I
cannot but see what must come; and I shall never separate from prin
ciples, let the consequences be what it may [sic].4
The affinities which Calhoun and Jackson possessed were hardly
of the kind that made for lasting personal or political relationships.
In Andrew Jackson, John Calhoun would eventually encounter a will every
4

John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, March 10, 1825, ibid.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

365

bit as strong and unbending as his own, and the result would be a des
perate constitutional crisis of awful promise.
It was only after Calhoun left the War Department that the
foundations of the nullification crisis were laid by the South Carolinian.
Walking along the Potomac with John Quincy Adams during the Missouri
debates, Calhoun impressed the New Englander with his lack of passion for
the subject.

5

He was so unconcerned with state rights during his presi

dential campaign that he actually suggested that his own expansive views
were entirely orthodox.

In 1824 he had the temerity to explain his

opinions of the Constitution to Robert S. Garnett in terms which could
only have impressed the orthodox Garnett as "variable construction."
Calhoun argued that the Constitution should be interpreted broadly in
some cases and strictly in others.

7

Just four years later, Calhoun would

secretly write his most famous discussion of the state rights doctrine,
The South Carolina Exposition and Protest.

This document and the momen

tous events which succeeded it fixed Calhoun's place in American history
and threw a shadow over his earlier accomplishments as a Secretary of
War, as though the Exposition was lurking all the while within John C.
Calhoun, waiting for its chance to emerge.
Calhoun's War Department years were a period in which he received
an extensive political education, and in the process, a severe test of
his own character.

His reaction to his experiences were a kind not

5Adams, Diary, 4:531.
John C. Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, August 24, 1823, Calhoun
Papers, 8:242-243.
7

John C. Calhoun to Robert S. Garnett, July 3, 1824, ibid.,
9:198-202.
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unknown to human beings:

he retreated within his own thoughts, the only

kind that would satisfy him completely.

There in those thoughts was

born Mrs. Martineau's "cast-iron man."
Calhoun's service as a Secretary of War created a reputation for
the American military establishment that it had never before enjoyed in
times of peace.

It was no less his goal than President Monroe's to make

of the United States a modern and self-sufficient nation militarily.
Under Calhoun's stewardship and Sylvanus Thayer's adroit management,
West Point finally began to function in the way that its earliest pro
moters had imagined.

Elsewhere in the military establishment, officers

of intellect and promise found in the Secretary of War an enthusiastic
ally and supporter.

With the help of such men as General Jacob Brown

and the military explorer, Stephen Long, Calhoun sought ways in which
the army could be put to peaceful uses beneficial to an expanding nation.
That Calhoun's grandest designs failed hardly diminished the Secretary
in the eyes of his soldiers.

To them the blame lay elsewhere.

In truth the War Department and the army formed the perfect con
stituency for John C. Calhoun.

His relationship with the military

establishment was not one which could be called democratic, but it was
one in which Calhoun's magnanimity was allowed as much play as its
master dared.

He was not often the martinet as a Secretary of War.

Having received what was doubtless a favorable description of Calhoun's
way of working in the department from Christopher Vandeventer, former
Secretary of War John Armstrong replied to the clerk:
There is an order of men, upon whom a little brief authority, does
great mischief, perverting morals, manners temp- [sic] er and under
standing.
To be obliged to be near such and subject to their
caprices, is quite as bad as the oar of a galley, but, on the other
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hand, to be near a liberal, intelligent man, who, while he exacts
from others what may be due to himself, never forgets what is due
to them— is nothing— the harness is to [sic] easy and light, that
one forgets it is on; and if we do remember it it is only as a
wholsome [sic] restraint from things, which ought not to be done
which are better omitted.8
It is entirely possible that the changes which occurred during
the Calhoun years would have taken place regardless of who the Secretary
happened to be.

Mahlon Dickerson had been correct in telling his fellow

congressmen that a revolution had taken place in the public mind
regarding the American military establishment.

Not even the most stri

dently anti-military politicians contemplated totally abolishing the
army after the war of 1812; the great question to be resolved was the
role of the army in democracy.
reorganization of 1821:

Congress provided the answer in the

the army could be maintained, but only with the

proviso that it not intrude upon the nation's life.

The role for the

army as the bellwether of national expansion which Calhoun and others
had contemplated was thus rejected.
of civilians.

Expansion would remain the business

It is probable, too, that the professionalism which

leading officers of the army had lately acquired would have found expres
sion without Calhoun's encouragement.

Calhoun merely attempted to

fashion an organization which exploited this new professional mentality,
and so made for himself a certain reputation in American military history.
Certain it is, however, that few men could have brought the
American military establishment into such intimate political associations
as did John C. Calhoun.

If his role as a Secretary of War enabled the

military establishment to evolve beyond its amateur beginnings, Calhoun's

Q
John Armstrong to Christopher Vandeventer, November 11, 1819,
Vandeventer Papers.
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role as a leading politician interfered with that evolution and shaped
it in a way in which Calhoun and his officers had not reckoned upon.
Seldom, perhaps, had so many officers taken a direct interest in
politics.

Regardless of the fact that two candidates for the presidency

ir. 1824 had claims upon the officers' sympathies, they nevertheless
went about their political chores in mufti.

No attempt was made from

any quarter to turn the political contest into a military campaign.

It

is fitting, then, to close this work with Hezekiah Niles' description
of the day in which the House of Representatives decided the presidency:
The house of representatives assembled an hour earlier than usual.
The galleries were already filled, to overflowing, with spectators
from almost every part of the union, and the lobbies and apartments
adjacent, were crowded with well dressed and orderly persons— but
there was not any bustle or confusion— no officer appeared to com
mand the peace, nor did any one in the garb of a soldier pollute
the walls of the capitol with his presence. Such was the respect
voluntarily paid to the majesty of the constitution.9

^Niles' Weekly Register, February 12, 1825.
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